

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By Charles M. Andrews

The Historical Development of Modern Europe from the Congress of Vienna to the Present Time (1815-1897).

Student's Edition, two volumes in one, *net*, $2.75.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO THE PRESENT TIME

1815–1897

BY

CHARLES M. ANDREWS

Professor of History in Bryn Mawr College

STUDENT'S EDITION

TWO VOLUMES IN ONE

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PREFACE TO THE STUDENTS' EDITION.

THE desire of the publishers to issue a one-volume edition of *The Historical Development of Modern Europe* gives me the opportunity to add a brief preface explaining the purpose of the work and its relation to teachers and students.

The volumes were written as an aid to a better understanding of the last eighty years of European history, and as a guide to the intricacies of the political, constitutional, and diplomatic development of the leading European states during that period. As I believed that the duty of the teacher was to interpret and instruct, quite as much as to retail information, and the duty of the student to understand the meaning and importance of historical events as well as to acquire a knowledge of the facts regarding them, I adopted certain methods in presenting my subject, of which I not only approved in theory but which I had tested already in the class-room. The matter here contained represents the concluding portion, considerably enlarged, of a college course in general European history, and has been shaped according to certain simple principles, which I believe to be scientifically sound, and practically helpful to students.

In the first place, I selected for treatment those larger aspects of European history which are of first importance as indicating the continuity of European development, and considered them as fully as time and space would allow. Secondly, I arranged the matter dealt with under separate topics, that the student might see at once the great issues involved, before being called upon to master many details. Thirdly,

I treated each issue or movement with constant regard for the idea of progress, dealing with those events only that serve to make clear the progressive changes in institutions and ideas, and neglecting all others. Fourthly, I endeavoured to preserve the organic unity of the whole, so that the student might see not only the relation of every event examined to the immediate issue, but also the connection of that issue or movement with the larger development of European civilisation. Thus I sought to systematise and simplify the subject, to throw events into a logical and orderly form, to arouse in the student a sense of proportion and a spirit of criticism which might aid him in acquiring a scientific mental habit as important to him as would be a knowledge of facts. Nor do I believe that the interest of the subject is lessened thereby. History understood can never be dull, for there is nothing more fascinating than the gradual unfolding of the tale of human progress.

I sought to be impartial by eliminating from my own mind all prepossessions and by viewing the subject objectively; to be accurate by basing every statement upon the most reliable source, whether original or secondary, that I was able to obtain ; and to be lucid in dealing with epoch-making events even at the risk of repeating myself, knowing full well that perfect clearness in the presentation of many details is difficult to attain by even the best-intentioned writers.

It has always been my wish that for use in the class-room this history should supplement or be supplemented by a good narrative to be used for illustrative purposes. When writing it I had in mind the work, which I then hoped would soon appear but which is still delayed, the last volume (viii.) of the *Periods of European History* series.

C. M. A.

PREFACE.

IN this work, as its title indicates, I have attempted to trace the historical development of Europe from the congress of Vienna to the present time. As the condition of Europe in 1815 and the later movements in the various countries cannot be properly understood without some knowledge of the political, social, and economic changes that have transformed Europe of the eighteenth into Europe of the nineteenth century, I have devoted considerable introductory space to the chief characteristics of the old *régime*, to an outline of the French Revolution, and to the career and influence of Napoleon Bonaparte. The present volume carries the subject to 1848 in France, to 1849 in Italy, and to 1850 in Germany; the next will bring it down to the present time.

There are two methods of writing the history of Europe since 1815, one or the other of which will be employed according to the purpose of the writer. The first of these is to treat events more or less chronologically, by passing from country to country, from national to international affairs, not so much with regard to continuity of treatment and unity of subject as from a desire to keep the history of all the European states at a constant level. This method, which has been in the main employed by the two ablest historians of Modern Europe, Fyffe and Stern, is better adapted for advanced students than for those less familiar with the subject; because by never completing the study of any one movement in any one place, it tends to leave a confused picture in the mind of the reader. Therefore, in this

work, which is not in the first instance written for students, I have employed a different method, that of treating separate movements and subjects—such as the European political system, the Restoration in France, the July Monarchy, the liberal movement in Germany—as logical wholes, carrying each forward to its issue before turning to the others. Although this method involves some repetition, and an occasional reference to events not related in full in this volume, I believe that it will prove the most satisfactory for the purpose in hand.

In another particular does the plan of the work call for an explanation. I have tried to present the subject with a distinct regard for the continuous development of the life and thought of Europe, to study those movements that have made for progress rather than to describe events in detail, or to present all subjects with historical completeness. Therefore I have given but little space to the detail of the Austrian administration and policy, and one entire chapter to the growth of political experience and education in Italy. This movement in Italy deserves prominence, not only because of its importance in the struggle for Italian independence and unity, but also because it stands as a type of the educational development of all the people of central Europe. I have treated the revolutions in Greece and Belgium chiefly in connection with the diplomatic history of Europe, and have said little, except incidentally, of internal events in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden, for, however interesting and important these events are in themselves, they had little part in bringing about the great changes in political thought and organisation that have characterised the last sixty years.

It has seemed best in a work of this kind to omit all foot-notes and elaborate bibliographical references. I have used the best authorities, and have incorporated in a number of instances material from special monographs and recently printed documents, but I cannot pretend to have noted all the literature on

the subject, nor was it necessary for my purpose to do so. I am not aware of having been dependent upon any single work or set of works to such an extent as to make necessary special reference to them here. Students familiar with Sorel's *L'Europe et la Révolution française* and with Fournier's *Napoleon der Erste* will note my indebtedness in my first and second chapters to these writers. In the later chapters on France I have been greatly stimulated by that excellent little work, Dickinson's *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France*, and in all that treats of Germany I have depended, as all must depend, very largely upon Sybel's *Die Begründung des deutschen Reiches*, which I have used in the English translation. Finally, I may express my regret that Stern's admirable *Geschichte Europas*, which has been very serviceable, has not gone beyond the year 1820. The maps accompanying this volume are intended to satisfy no more than the immediate needs of the reader for the period after 1815. The best work in which to trace in detail all geographical changes is Hertslet's *Map of Europe by Treaty*, 1814–1891, in four volumes. There is an excellent map, *Europe après les Traités des 1815*, in Schrader's *Atlas de Géographie historique* (Part 5, sold separately); and in Larned's *History for Ready Reference*, pp. 244, 1540, 1864, are useful maps, of which the second on the Germanic Confederation, the Zollverein, and the Netherlands is admirable. Satisfactory maps can be found in the less accessible atlases of Spruner-Menke, Droysen, and Putzger.

In conclusion, I wish to express my thanks to the many friends who have encouraged me, and to those students in my classes who have given me assistance. But to no one am I under greater obligation than to my wife, whose criticism has guided and strengthened me in every part of the work.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE,
July 8, 1896.

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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMEMT OF MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO THE PRESENT TIME

I

1815–1850

BY

CHARLES M. ANDREWS

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

IN tracing the forces that in their development and expansion have had a direct part in creating the civilisation of our present age, we find ourselves led step by step back to the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. In the outset mainly a religious attack upon the unity and universality of the mediæval church, the revolution soon plunged its followers into a series of religio-political wars in France, Germany, and the Netherlands that, for the time, retarded the normal progress of civilisation. In the midst of this struggle the national states of Europe, freed from the incubus of a mediæval empire, and already outgrowing the limitations of their mediæval life, entered upon their careers as independent political units, and gave to the last period of the great religious struggle an essentially political character. Furthermore, the Thirty Years' War, beginning as a local German movement and, at the start, concerning itself altogether with religious and economic questions, began to assume a cosmopolitan character; and before it was over the questions that were to occupy the attention of Europe for another century and a half had presented themselves

for solution. Differences of opinion as to the relation of states, and not religious dissensions, caused the wars and shaped the diplomacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Although this struggle in its entirety lasted for more than a century, it was no less a revolution than was that of France a century and a half later. Its principles were general and abstract, its influence was cosmopolitan—for it appealed with equal force to people of all Europe,—and it provoked war of the bitterest kind. It broke up the existing order of religious and political society, and established a new system based on the traditions and the tendencies of individual European states. The treaty of Westphalia, which closed the Thirty Years' War, shows that at the time it was made the mediæval system had broken down, that universality in church and state had passed away and the state system been established in religion and politics, and that the public law of the Middle Ages had been destroyed as well in practice as in theory. This treaty gave legal sanction to that system which it was the part of the French Revolution to overthrow. The work of one revolution was as complete as that of the other, but the tasks to be performed and the means employed were essentially unlike.

The new system was based on one fundamental idea, the supremacy of the state, an idea that dominated the public law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But the embodiment of the state was not the nation, it was the prince, the product of Roman, feudal, and Christian forces; the prince, autocrat, suzerain, and chosen of God. To this conception of the state the tendencies of fourteen centuries had been contributing: the Roman law and institutions, the feudal law and customs, the Christian doctrine regarding the divinity of kings had tended to advance the interests of the prince rather than those of the people, to encourage not the liberty of man but the authority of the state. Furthermore, the state confounded itself with the person of the sovereign, and the authority of the

state centred in the person of the prince. He gathered into his own hands all the lines of power; he made alliances and accepted treaties, was chief of the armies and arbiter in peace and war; he fixed the taxes, regulated imposts, extended or curtailed the expenses, had the right of confiscation and escheat, and owned unoccupied lands; he created the nobility, made the laws, dispensed justice, and stood as sovereign head in religious matters;—he was the master of his people, their guardian, judge, legislator, and pontiff. Such were Louis XIV., Frederic II. of Prussia, and Joseph II. of Austria. Under such circumstances it naturally followed that no other human authority was recognised. Legislative bodies as such did not exist, for assemblies of notables, estates, or peoples were but councils of state, committees for consultation not for action. God alone was the judge of the actions of princes, and to him alone was the prince responsible.

Just as at home the state recognised no other will than its own, so abroad it recognised no public law to which it was even morally responsible. Other rights than those of state were not taken into consideration by the kings and diplomats of the old *régime*, who, acting upon the principle that those who gain nothing lose, made it their policy to extend the boundaries of the state and increase its grandeur. Centralisation of authority and enlargement of territory became the two main objects of the states of the old *régime*, and in trying to secure these the diplomats of the eighteenth century developed an international system based on the principle that one nation's gain is another nation's loss, and the interests of one are necessarily opposed to the interests of all. For reasons of state engagements could be broken, contracts of marriage recognised or denied, wills and pragmatic sanctions set aside, wars waged, territory divided, rights of succession disputed, and monarchs dethroned. Of this policy founded on the necessities of state, war was the chief agency; and inasmuch as what was necessary was

just, war was also the arbiter of justice. Thus there existed no general law governing the relation of state with people, or of state with state; the code of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was silent upon the subject of established right, good faith, the durability of engagements, and the obligation of contracts.

The public law defined by the treaty of Westphalia was, therefore, neither a guarantee of right nor a support for public order and public peace. It was dominated by a spirit of selfishness due to the rivalry of states, and by a narrowness of principle that was inevitable when each state was determined to retain for its own use all available resources. While the system of equilibrium was pretending by its principle of the balance of power to ensure its own stability, it was by the abuse of that principle making itself unstable and insecure. Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was well prepared for conquest, because by a logical development of ideas it had come gradually to believe that the dismemberment of states and the dethronement of kings, in satisfying ambition, prevented war. Europe was broken into fragments, and with the exceptions of France and England, no homogeneous national units could be found.

Instead of a solidarity of monarchies supported by a national sentiment there existed a group of states whose territories were constantly liable to curtailment, and whose princes were in constant danger of dethronement or exclusion from succession. This state of affairs resulted from the mis-application of the theory of the balance of power; and, paradoxical as it may seem, the theory when most loudly proclaimed was, in the very act of its maintenance, being most vigorously perverted. Expropriation for the common good of Europe became in time the principle of the state system. Force and the convenience of the sovereigns had become the supreme law to the states of the eighteenth century, and at the time of the French Revolu-

tion, when in theory, at least, sovereignty resided not in the prince but in the people, it became the supreme law to the revolutionists, who had but to turn against the state system its own methods to destroy it.

Although the form of government differed among the states of the European system, from the despotism in Spain, Prussia, and the states of the Habsburgs in Austria to the republicanism of Switzerland, Holland, and Poland; nevertheless, the causes for the general decay were everywhere the same. Unequal distribution of wealth; excessive expenditures in court life; the erection of magnificent buildings, and the maintenance of extravagant mistresses and court-favorites; armaments costly, and constantly increasing in number; and the heavy demands of war;—these were the burdens that weighed upon the states of Europe. States were in debt, and, crushed by an ever recurring deficit, were forced to borrow at ruinous rates, and to draw on their revenue for many years ahead to pay the interest. In these respects the smaller states were more exhausted than the larger, because with inferior and more uncertain resources they were equally prodigal. The nobility and the church freed themselves from financial obligations to the state on the ground of privilege; the *bourgeoisie*, hampered by annoying gild and trade restrictions, paid to the state more than their due; while the peasantry, crushed by a double burden, made payment not only to the government, but also to the feudal seigneurs, who, though they no longer fulfilled their part of the feudal contract by giving their dependents protection, yet retained their feudal rights and held the peasantry in subjection. In France these burdens were least onerous and least vexatious, though here as in Denmark the nobility, partly resident, partly non-resident, gave control of their estates to intendants and agents. Serfage had been re-established in Russia and Prussia in the sixteenth century; in Poland it was still harshly maintained; in Germany was rigidly and painfully enforced; though in some parts of

Italy, in Hungary, and parts of Prussia the kings endeavoured to restrain the heartless nobility, yet in most of the minor states of the Holy Roman Empire the treatment of the peasantry was atrocious, the agricultural labourer being little better than a slave.

But the tendency toward decay was accompanied with a movement toward reform. The prevailing suffering, due to internal disorder and the survival of manorial rights and obligations, did not escape the attention of the governments, nor was it permitted to pass unnoticed by the more humane thinkers and philosophers of the period. In the writings of Voltaire and Diderot and in the practical work of Turgot the desire for reform first found expression, but in France as in other countries men turned their attention not to a reorganisation of the state but to the redress of abuses. But this desire for reform was not confined to France; it existed in the other countries of Europe, where it was brought about not by the influence of French ideas but by conditions antedating the French Revolution, analogous, however, to those whence the French Revolution sprang. Natural law founded on reason, and drawn from the Christian religion and the precepts of the Roman law, after its second revival in the sixteenth century, prevailed over positive and public law founded on fact. That which was as old as Plato, which Locke and Hobbes voiced in England, Wolf in Germany, and Filangieri in Italy, Rousseau made popular in France. The religion of humanity, the sentiment that all laboured for the good of the human race, began to find expression throughout Europe. Sympathy with the revolution in America, and admiration for the incomplete reforms of Louis XVI. and Turgot and for the mistaken efforts of Joseph II., roused the interests of philosophers and politicians who believed that reforms should be undertaken by the state and in the interest of the state. Kings and reformers worked in common, but for different reasons; reformers appealed to princes

instead of to nobles, inasmuch as everywhere, in Sweden, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia the estates were showing themselves, as were the *parlements* of France, enemies of change and jealous guardians of their privileges; while princes, in the interest of their own struggle with the assemblies for absolute power, encouraged the speculation of philosophers. Throughout Europe the progressive revolution went steadily on. An enlightened despotism began to recognise the importance of a better intellectual, social, and judicial system; education was encouraged, schools were opened, universities were increased in number, and in Sweden and Prussia religious toleration began to be appreciated. Serfage began to disappear: it was ameliorated in Prussia under Frederic II., in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, and Hungary under Joseph II., and already overthrown in England two centuries before, it was abolished in Baden in 1783, and in Denmark in 1788. In other countries the *corvées* were diminished, and the pitiable lot of the peasant was made more endurable. The penal laws were amended, torture was either done away with or reduced in severity, and reforms of the civil law were begun. It is a striking fact that the reforms of Joseph II., though undertaken with an unfortunate disregard of tradition and national prejudice, were more drastic in their nature than those proposed by the Constituent Assembly of the French Revolution itself.

Along with this attack on feudalism, which materially benefited the people at large, went an attack on the church for the purpose of reducing it to subjection to the state. The Society of Jesus, which during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries had advocated the autocracy of princes, and, in its zeal for the extension of the faith, had aided in gaining the victory for absolutism, now fell before the very power it had helped to create. The struggle thus begun against the Jesuits was carried on against the Roman Church itself, and while the philosophers attacked the doctrine, the princes at-

tacked the discipline of the church. In each case the authority of the Pope was threatened, and the ecclesiastical estates, already diminished by secularisation, became a ready source of supply for a safe enlargement of princely territory. Catholic princes resisted the temporal claims of the papacy, and in Austria, Parma, Tuscany, and Portugal there was open conflict between church and state. France, the chief defender of the papacy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, followed the practice of the other states of the old *régime* when under the Constituent Assembly and later under Bonaparte it subjected the ecclesiastical orders to the authority of a temporal sovereign.

There was thus throughout Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century a preparation for a social and civil reformation by the state, for the state, but in no way limiting the state. Reforms were undertaken in the interest of power: enlightened despotism was willing to recognise religious toleration and civil liberty, though there was no thought of a reorganisation of the state itself in the interest of popular sovereignty or of political liberty.

But the state, in neutralising the influence of assemblies, in promoting social and civil reform, in destroying feudalism, and in overthrowing the power of the church, stirred the passions of the people, rousing hopes rather than satisfying desires. These very reforms made by the state led the people to believe that the old world needed rejuvenating, created disquietude at a time when the instability of the social order gave promise of success to popular movements, and familiarised the people with the idea of change. There was unrest in Prussia, and in Sweden discontent with monarchy; the Belgians were in armed resistance to the house of Austria; revolution broke out in Bohemia, Hungary, and Galicia, and civil war in Holland, where the patriot party tried to regain its national privileges usurped by a despotic stadtholder; while in Geneva, a municipal revolt

that had been stimulated by the writings of Rousseau foreshadowed, in its hatred of classes and in the cosmopolitan character of the principles that actuated it, the greater revolution to come. The state system that in its pursuit of absolute power had ruined the institutions of the past, was in its turn threatened with ruin when the sudden outbreak in France transformed a progressive revolution into a cataclysm which overwhelmed, in a marvellously brief space of time, the whole European order. Beginning as a national movement, the French Revolution took the form of a great convulsion, and, scattering its ideas and principles throughout Europe by means of military proselytism, drew down upon itself the wrath of the states of Europe. By its declared principles it seemed to threaten the very foundations of European monarchy. Its doctrine of the sovereignty of the people presented as an evident and universal truth, and its appeal to all nations to revolt and free themselves, were so foreign to the principles upheld by the old *régime* that they were interpreted as a menace to all established governments, to whom revolution, considered as a normal overturning of society, was unknown and incomprehensible.

The revolution broke out in France not because the misery was more intolerable or the feudal practices more iniquitous there than elsewhere, nor because the government was less intelligent and more despotic. The reasons were exactly the reverse. The movement began in those parts of France where the old institutions were already disappearing, where the agriculturist, already ceasing to be a serf and becoming a proprietor, was the more alive to the burdens he bore, and resented more deeply the imposition of the feudal dues. The feudal obligations became more hateful as the condition of the peasantry improved; the yoke seemed less easy to bear as it became less weighty. As prosperity increased, the people of France sought to escape from the restrictions that feudalism and mer-

cantilism imposed upon them; they felt the demands of a progressive civilisation, and revolted against a system that, on the eve of the nineteenth century, retained the narrow and burdensome condition of three centuries before. France was a country where ideas of reform had been most widely spread, where intelligence was most highly esteemed, and where education even among the peasantry was well advanced; where was greater homogeneity of national feeling, where government was more centralised, the nobility less politically important, and the power of the king more absolute than was the case elsewhere. The fact that France was a nation free from disintegrating forces, either political or racial, gave to her popular movement a strength that was wanting to similar uprisings in other European states; and she acted before the other states because she had already solved the problem of national unity and national independence.

At this crisis France was in need of a great minister and a great king. Louis XVI., as has been well said, was a good man and a Christian, but not a king. He knew how to love, to pardon, to suffer, and to die, but he did not know how to reign. He would not delegate authority to another, yet he was unable to take energetic and consistent action himself. The work of his minister, Turgot, inaugurated a promising reform that was nothing less than a revolution; but Turgot was too hopeful, too little cognisant of the difficulties of the situation, too anxious for a consummation of his plans, and, thwarted by the opposition of those who were interested in the financial privileges, he fell. A reaction to the advantage of the nobility followed, and the events of the next few years completed the embarrassment of monarchy. The existing condition of things could not last; a crisis was inevitable. France more than any other country was fruitful, the taxation *per capita* was less than it is to-day; yet the state was suffering from an enormous deficit and the people were complaining.

The *parlement* was in full revolt; the army, disorganised and on the verge of insurrection, was ready for defection; while the people, aware of the necessity of reform and of the inability of the government to consummate it, were denouncing existing institutions as a negation of their inalienable rights. With liberty, they thought, all things would become possible; they had become the superstitious supporters of an idea. The government, also recognising a crisis, though ignorant of its true meaning, was powerless to act, and looked in vain for support among the ruins of the old institutions. But from top to bottom of the hierarchy, from centre to extremities, every power was paralysed. The old *régime*, having exhausted its own resources by excessive centralisation, had now no resort save an appeal to the nation. In convoking the States-General France solemnly confessed the impotence of the old institutions.

With this gathering of the representatives of the estates all those ideas and principles that had been agitating France for half a century were called into action. The men of the Third Estate, who constituted a majority of the Constituent Assembly, were dominated by the democratic idea, and sought the destruction of the feudal *régime* and the establishment of equality. Under the spell of the ideal, they sought to destroy the old and build up the new. They paid their tribute to the theories of the Revolution by spending many precious hours in discussing the fundamental rights of man. On the night of the 4th of August, 1789, in an indiscriminate sacrifice of all rights and privileges, they showed their devotion to their principles, and in the proclamation of the 11th of February, 1790, testified to the work already done. Innumerable privileges had been abolished; feudalism as a system had disappeared; bribery had been suppressed; tithes had been done away with; the reorganisation of the finances and the reform of the criminal code had been begun, and the codification of old, complicated, obscure, and contradictory civil law been planned; a

new educational system had been proposed, and in order to substitute for the love of the province the love of the fatherland, the administrative system had been changed; the nation had resumed control of legislation and imposts, and the rights of man had been restored. In the year following this proclamation of February, ecclesiastical corporations, monasteries, and religious houses were suppressed, and trade and gild restrictions abolished.

This was a work fundamental and far reaching, and one that bore witness to the high aim of those who in these two years accomplished the really important part of the Revolution.

But when the work had been finished, what had the destroyers to substitute for the old *régime?* For the moment they offered principles: political as well as civil liberty; sovereignty of the people; responsibility of ministers; freedom of conscience, of the press, and of the person; proportionate representation and taxation; equality in the dispensation of justice; the supremacy of the law—noble principles, such as underlie the modern state. These they embodied in the Declaration of Rights, that part of the constitution of 1791 that shows American influence. But could the Revolution put these doctrines into practice? It could destroy, but could it build up? Government must be based not upon theories, but in large measure upon experience and tradition. The people of France turned instinctively to the traditions and methods of the old *régime*, and could not in one night rid themselves of their mental habits and convictions, even if that night were the 4th of August. They had won liberty, but what was liberty? It was synonymous with sovereignty, said Siéyès. The monarch of the old *régime* had been sovereign and free, and in the transfer of the sovereignty from the king to the people, liberty also had been transferred. But how did the people exercise the liberty thus gained? Democracy recognised no other right than its own, no other authority superior to itself. Monarchy was to be dis-

carded, but the state was to remain as before, only its despot was to be not one but many, a despot abstract and impersonal. Even when liberty had been won, the people of France could not free themselves from the spirit of the old government. The Constituent Assembly declared itself to be a sovereign body, endowed with supreme authority which it intended to use. It recognised none of the checks of the modern parliamentary system; it would divide its power with no one. As the prince of the old *régime* had possessed both executive and legislative powers, so the Assembly combined both executive and legislative functions, and in its exercise of sovereignty showed a complete system of centralisation and absolutism at the very time that it was advocating decentralisation and division of power.

When, therefore, the representatives of the people were confronted with the task of giving concrete expression to these new ideas, they were brought face to face with the most difficult problem of the Revolution. And no wonder they hesitated! A statesman was needed to control the situation; a Cæsar should have been on the throne in place of Louis XVI. Mirabeau, the man best able to apply the new principles, was not understood by the king, nor was he trusted by the Assembly; the king was too narrow-minded and the people were too visionary to appreciate the plans of this great man. He was, as he himself said, the supporter of monarchical power governed by law, the upholder of liberty guaranteed by monarchical power. But the members of the Assembly looked with doubt and suspicion upon any such form of government. They turned away from the large ideas of Mirabeau, and endeavoured to apply as best they could the principles of 1789. And how well did they succeed? In the first place they preserved monarchy, but it was not the monarchy of Mirabeau; it was a monarchy in the last stages of its downfall, shorn of its power, and useless as an executive. Its existence contradicted the absolute sovereignty of the people. Furthermore, the responsi-

bility of ministers was proclaimed, but it was a responsibility without authority, and as no self-respecting person would hold office under such a system, ministerial efficiency was impossible. The right of every citizen to take part in making laws was interpreted to mean the right of every active citizen paying taxes equal to the amount of three days' wages in the locality where he lived. Thus the working man, having lost by disenfranchisement his share of the liberty and equality that had been proclaimed for all, found himself opposed by law to the *bourgeoisie*. And just as the Assembly failed to recognise the full sovereignty of the people, so it failed to recognise full liberty of conscience. By the civil constitution of the clergy it subordinated the church while pretending to protect it, and suppressed liberty of conscience by interdicting any other form of worship than that officially authorised. The Assembly was consistent, however, in denouncing all plans of conquest; but in declaring that the French nation refused to undertake any war with the idea of conquest, and would never employ its forces against the liberty of any people, it was making promises that it could not fulfil. In spite of itself, by the force of events, and at the time when it was most fondly cherishing the hope of a universal peace, it was on the eve of a long and bitter war, and that, too, not for defence but for conquest. Lastly, in the organisation of local government and in the method of constitutional amendment, a system was established so complicated as to be for the most part impracticable.

This is why the fact of the Revolution did not correspond to the theory. The Assembly showed its ignorance and its inexperience in practical matters, and betrayed its doubt and fear of its own constituency, that new and untried power, the people. The deputies may have longed for a new France that would be better than the old, but in fact they compromised the situation by establishing a government that could not be permanent. The Assembly possessed sovereignty but did not

exercise it directly ; while the king, who according to the constitution should have exercised it, was not allowed to possess it. Having rejected the strong system of Mirabeau based upon monarchy, the Assembly substituted its own system made up partly of the old and partly of the new. This half-way measure, by which monarchy was allowed to exist while the legislative was supreme, failed because of its own inherent weakness, and the fact that it contradicted the very principles according to which the Constituent Assembly was supposed to act. Such government was destined to give way to a system from which monarchy had been wholly eliminated, and in which sovereignty was both possessed and exercised by the legislative body,—a radical system associated with the names of Danton and the Convention of 1792.

The principles embodied in the declaration of February were, as we have seen, ineffectually applied in France, yet they had at first roused great joy and enthusiasm among those in Europe at large who were already desirous of reform. The universal ideas of the French people were soon scattered abroad by means already prepared for them, and were modified by the political and social environment into which they came. Each country of Europe interpreted the principles of the Revolution in its own peculiar way, and adapted them to the traditions of its own past. We hear of a democratic uprising in the territory of Liége, of a Roman Catholic movement in Ireland, of a monarchical agitation in Poland, and, what is even more remarkable, we find Belgium and Hungary revolting against the denationalising reforms of Joseph II. But while the grandeur of the ideas quickened the pulses of the European agitators and philosophers, strangely enough they roused neither fear nor apprehension among the princes of Europe ; the Revolution was at first looked upon as but a periodic malady to which all states were liable. Having been reassured by the uncertain and timid acts of the Constituent Assembly

that no serious trouble was to be expected from France, and seeing in the new movement only the effacement and the ruin of a dangerous rival state, the cabinets of Europe remained passive and indifferent while the progressive revolution in their midst went steadily on.

Thus far France had succeeded in preserving peace with the nations. Affairs in eastern Europe had been temporarily harmonised by the treaty of Reichenbach; the submission of Spain in the Nootka Sound dispute with England had released France from the obligations of the "family compact"; the Belgian revolutionists had received no recognition from the king and the Assembly; and Austria and Prussia were looking to the east in the possible event of another partition of Poland. Indeed, so earnestly were they seeking their own aggrandisement that they turned toward the west with regret and reluctance when the course of events demanded their co-operation in defence of the monarchical principle.

But it was impossible for France to remain isolated from the affairs of Europe. In the first place, the logical interpretation of the principles of the Revolution demanded the extension of those principles; and though the Assembly may have desired a peaceful propaganda, yet the revolutionists were obliged to adopt the traditional policy of the old *régime*, the policy of the supremacy and aggrandisement of the state. The logical deduction from the principle of liberty was liberty for all humanity, and it was this desire to free the human race that made legitimate the policy of conquest. But European cabinets recognised no such motives, and, failing to understand the spirit of the Revolution, saw only in the aggressiveness of the French people, the extension of the French power. In the second place, by her attitude toward monarchy France drew down upon herself the vengeance of the advocates of the old institutions. They had not been alarmed by the compromise of 1791, for monarchy was still retained as part of the French

system: but in the constitution of that year the principles of the Revolution had not been consistently expressed, and the more radical revolutionists were determined that that which had been marred should be mended, that liberty and equality should be given their proper place in the building up of the new state, and, furthermore, that the sovereignty of the people should be made a reality. The doctrine of Danton, who saw the necessity of a strong government to suppress anarchy and restore order, and the doctrine of Robespierre, who held that the people were sovereign and could do no wrong, were in harmony upon one point, the rejection of monarchy. Even before the Constituent Assembly broke up, the supporters of monarchy saw their danger, for Robespierre and the Jacobins were becoming the heroes of Paris. This inevitable tendency toward the supremacy of the principles of the Revolution was accelerated by the struggle of monarchy to maintain its position. From October 5, 1789, when the women and mob of Paris forced the king to come to the city, to June 20, 1791, when the king, finding himself practically a prisoner in Paris, sought to escape to Montmédy but was stopped at Varennes, the power of monarchy decreased, and the victory of the revolutionists became more and more complete. After June 25th all attempts on the part of the king to regain his authority were useless.

This dangerous situation of monarchy was destined to make real what had seemed impossible in the spring of 1791, that is, a coalition against France. Since the summer of 1790, the thought of appeal to Europe, a plan familiar to the old monarchies, had been in the mind of the queen, but the king had held back. The decree regarding the civil constitution of the clergy, the greatest error of the Assembly, finally fixed his determination, for in signing it he had been compelled to agree to an act that he thought had no justification. Having at last realised that in the minds of the revolutionists the person of the king and the sovereignty of the state were separate, and that a

fundamental principle of the old *régime* had been discarded, he yielded, and authorised negotiations with foreign courts. In this way Louis XVI. was able to attract the interest and attention of the eastern Powers, and this was something that the *émigrés* had been ineffectually trying to do for two years. These men, fleeing from France at the first indication of danger, never understood the spirit of the Revolution, and knowing nothing of historical development, and ignorant of the real character of absolute monarchy, they thought the institutions of the old *régime* unchangeable and imprescriptible. In bearing to the frontiers the old *régime* with all its errors, follies, and weaknesses they stood as the last defenders of the feudal system in France, a second Fronde, divided and undisciplined, noisy and insolent, with the Count of Artois as their viceroy and the Prince of Condé as their military leader. There it was that they tried to unite Europe for the restoration of the old *régime*. Although the minor German principalities sympathised, and Sardinia and Spain made promises, the leading Powers, especially Austria, refused politely, and for the time being checked all combination. But the flight to Varennes and the danger of the queen changed the attitude of Germany. Said Leopold in a letter to his brother Maximilian: "It is high time to save our sister and to smother this French epidemic." Austria began to draw nearer to Prussia, the preliminary treaty of July 25, 1791, guaranteed each her own territory, and the allies promised to follow a common policy regarding the affairs of France. On August 5th the treaty between the two courts was signed, but Austria, now determined to carry out her project of intervention, found that a concert of European Powers could not be obtained. Therefore the result of the conference held at Pillnitz was, notwithstanding the importunities of the Count of Artois, merely an expedient that failed wholly of its object. Leopold, knowing from the attitude of England that the European Powers could not be

brought to a common agreement, was unable to commit himself to any definite policy, and could only hope that a threat of intervention would bring about a reconciliation between the French king and his subjects.

For a moment Leopold had reason to think that his hopes were to be fulfilled. On September 13th Louis XVI. accepted the constitution of 1791, and on the 18th notified the foreign Powers of his act. At the same time he made known to his brothers his disapproval of their attempt to form a European coalition, complaining especially of their presence at Pillnitz. But the position taken by the king was deceptive in its indication of strength, and instead of having gained support, he had in fact completed his own isolation. His acceptance of the constitution seemed to the Powers of Europe to indicate that he had become reconciled with his people and no longer needed their aid. By reproving his brothers he antagonised the *émigrés*, who, already enraged because the coalition had not frightened France into restoring the old *régime*, disavowed the action of the king, and continued to negotiate and intrigue under their cry of "No concession to the Revolution." The revolutionists, on the other hand, seeing in the treaty of Pillnitz proof of the treason of the court and a plot woven by the king with the foreign Powers, refused to support the king any longer, and gradually committing themselves more and more to republican principles, finally determined to reject monarchy altogether. The declaration of Pillnitz, and the insolent letter by which the Count of Provence and the Count of Artois conveyed the news to France, roused the patriotism of the French people and a hatred of the old *régime* that eventually strengthened the hand of the radical party, ruined the cause of the *émigrés*, and widened the breach between the king and his subjects.

The growing radicalism of France that made impossible any permanent reconciliation between the king and the people,

found expression in the acts of the new Assembly that sat under the constitution. It was soon seen that of the seven hundred and forty-five young, untrained men who composed the Legislative Assembly—in which body the Constituent Assembly had forbidden its members to hold office—the majority were either pronounced revolutionists, or a floating centre that hated the clergy, the aristocracy, and the court, suspected the existence of plots and coalitions, and generally acted with the revolutionary party. The leaders of this Assembly, the Girondins, characterised by youth, eloquence, and generosity, agreed with the Jacobins in desiring to weaken monarchy, but differed from them in being visionary and lacking practical statesmanship. Influenced by republican ideas, and so representing the progress of events, they provoked by their war policy a situation that demanded a strong government, if France were to be saved from invasion. To them war meant power, and their own advancement meant the triumph of the Revolution; and foreseeing only success, they took no thought for the necessities of the future. At the very time that the Assembly, under their leadership, was arousing the antagonism of Europe, it was preparing, by the establishment of the committee government as a permanent part of its system, the means whereby the people of France were to rule more despotically than had even the princes of the absolute state. It was these committees of the Legislative Assembly that gave birth to the Committee of Public Safety.

The policy of the Girondins, which eventually gave rise to a situation that they were unable to control, first took form in the Assembly, in November, 1791, when two laws were passed, one requiring that all *émigrés* who had not returned by January, 1792, should lose their estates; the other, that such of the clergy as did not take oath to the constitution within a week should be deprived of their benefices and expelled from their departments. For the first act the Jacobin hatred of

feudalism, and the threats, plots, and the warlike preparations of the *émigrés* were a sufficient excuse; but the second act was inexcusable, iniquitous, and impolitic. Each showed that the spirit of despotism was beginning to rule the Assembly, and that reasons of state were as powerful in 1791 as they had been in the days of Louis XIV. These measures were far-reaching, both in their immediate and in their ultimate consequences. The immediate effect was to force the issue of a war with the foreign Powers, the ultimate consequence was to be the separation between the two great factions of the revolutionary party. To the Girondins war seemed necessary, because it would insure the success of the Revolution; to the Jacobins it seemed unnecessary, in that it would compromise the Revolution: Danton said internal strength first; Marat complained that war oppressed the poor. But the king himself hastened the catastrophe by daring, on account of conscientious scruples, to veto the law against the clergy, and by commanding the *émigrés* to disperse. By one act he antagonised Paris and the Jacobins, to whom the existence of the king was oppressive and his exercise of the veto power treasonable; by the other, he so threatened the peace of the minor princes of Germany, the protectors of the *émigrés*, that they appealed for help to the larger Powers of Europe.

Thus did forces from all sides combine to bring about an intervention in French affairs by the foreign Powers. Austria and Prussia agreed to act together, and Russia gave her approval, because, as Kaunitz said, "The Empress wished to see Austria and Prussia engaged with France, in order to overthrow the independence of Poland." Had France been willing to meet the demand of the Powers by returning Avignon to the Pope, compensating the minor German princes for losses in Alsace, and restoring monarchy, peace would still have been possible; but the Girondin policy and the war fever made an amicable arrangement impossible. The answer of France was

contained in the declaration of January, which called on the Emperor Leopold to renounce his intentions of opposing the sovereignty and the independence of the French nation. The death of Leopold in March removed the last obstacle to the policy of the Girondins, who had come to the ministry in April after the fall of the Feuillants. As soon, therefore, as they had assured themselves of the neutrality of England and Sweden, they made every effort to compel the king to resign his policy of peace, and to declare war for the nation. In a spirit of exultation the Assembly declared that it was not undertaking the war for the purpose of conquest, or with the intention of employing its forces against the liberty of any people, but only to defend its own liberty and independence against the aggression of kings. Thus the war against Austria, which was ostensibly for the purpose of resisting the Emperor's demand regarding the *émigrés* and the rights of the princes of the Empire, was in reality a war upon Europe and the old *régime*.

The effect of the war upon the progress of the Revolution cannot be overestimated. It sealed the fate of monarchy, led to the fall of the Girondins, and was the immediate cause of the government of the Terror. Each succeeding event intensified the situation. The failure of the first campaign in Belgium increased the excitement in Paris and weakened the position of the king, who had hoped that a victory would strengthen the hand of the Crown. The people, finding in the king's dismissal of the Girondins and in Lafayette's haughty letter to the Assembly evidence of a royal plot, determined at the first opportunity to forestall it by a counter-plot. This the king's veto of the decrees regarding the priests and the camp of the federates furnished, and on June 20th a mass of eight thousand people broke into the Tuileries and insulted the king. This insult, in turn, not only endangered the safety of the royal family and entirely alienated the king from his people, but also strengthened the determination of Prussia and Austria to main-

tain the integrity of the French kingdom against the revolutionists. The first result of this alliance, the impertinent manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, which threatened the city of Paris with destruction if the least violence were committed against the royal family, maddened the people of France, and by precipitating the insurrection of August 10th and the murder of the Swiss guards, completed the downfall of monarchy, and threw the government of Paris into the hands of the insurrectionary Commune. But the revolutionists, at last victorious, began to dispute among themselves for the supremacy, and what had up to this time been a struggle between the Revolution and Royalty came to be a struggle of one revolutionary party against another, and of the Revolution as a whole against Europe.

In reality this victory of the Revolution was a victory for the Jacobins, who, after the 10th of August, had become the masters of the Assembly as well as the masters of France. They were the only organised body, and their instrument and the only effective force was the army of the insurrection made up partly of idlers, vagabonds, soldiers, refugees, and adventurers, and partly of those who wished to destroy France in order to regenerate her. The leaders who used the army for their own ends and remained in Paris quarrelling with one another, felt that the principles of the Revolution had not yet been thoroughly worked out, and that all previous attempts to establish the sovereignty of the people had been but half-way measures. Each attempt had failed and had given way to one more radical, until at length a party had risen to power whose hatred of the moderates and the constitutionalists was immeasurably greater than had been that of the Third Estate for the aristocrats at the beginning of the Revolution. Danton, who in his genius for statesmanship was head and shoulders above his colleagues and rivals, desired a strong government that would bring order and peace, and therefore happiness for

France; while Robespierre, who desired the same strengthening of the executive, wished to use it for the purpose of terrorising his enemies that the doctrines of Rousseau might be established in their entirety. It was his purpose that France should be remodelled, as well as saved from anarchy.

But as long as the Girondins retained any power, the victory for the Jacobins was not complete. The memorable struggle of these two parties for supremacy merely marks one stage in the development of radical principles. From the beginning of the Revolution the tendency had been to decrease the power of royalty. The theory of monarchy based on divine right had given way before Mirabeau's conception of a strong, royal executive, which in its turn had been rejected by the constitutionalists who supported the weakened executive of 1791. But the Girondins, who, having displaced the constitutionalists, had rejected monarchy altogether though wishing to save the person of the king, were now called upon to defend themselves against Danton and the insurrectionary Commune of Paris.

This struggle lends a pathetic interest to the history of the National Convention which met September 21, 1792, to proclaim the first republic and to draw up a new constitution. Scarcely had the Convention assembled when the conflict began. The first victory for the Jacobins was the passing of the decree authorising the king's death, and of the act creating a new tribunal that was to punish with death all who endangered the safety of the republic. The Girondins were caught in toils of their own making, for having brought about the war, they had made evident the need of a stronger government than that they were capable of giving. The defeat of the French army at Neerwinden, in March, 1793, led to the creation of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and combined with the defection of Dumouriez, caused the establishment of the Committee of Public Safety. Furthermore, the Girondins lost their hold upon the people by their ill-timed and unsuccessful attack upon Marat. Jacobin

Paris expressed its hostility toward them in the uprising of June, 1793, and the popular demand for their arrest brought about their downfall; the Commune of Paris had won its first great victory over the representatives from the provinces. Judged by history, the Girondins stand as the heroes of a tragedy. Noble and generous in their ideas, they were in their acts inconsistent, weak, and ineffectual. They raised hopes that they could not satisfy, and the people of Paris, thinking themselves deceived, rose and overthrew them. From the Jacobin standpoint, the Girondins were dreamers rather than men of action,—men of words rather than deeds,—and such men could not be suffered to rule in such a crisis. Executed or exiled they passed from the scene of revolutionary politics, and the Mountain entered into absolute possession. The inadequate rule of the Girondins gave way before the powerful government of the Terror.

Having thus traced the progress of the Revolution, one may well ask where lay its strength. Did it lie in the Jacobins' doctrine, in their leaders—men of mediocre ability to be sure, but determined and audacious—or in their wonderful organisation of Jacobin clubs throughout France? He who seeks for the secret of the Revolution will find it, says M. Sorel, "not in the character of the doctrines nor in the violence of the movements, but rather in the souls who received the doctrines, and in the environment in which the revolutionary ideas were nurtured, in France—in a word, in her people, her social structure, her past." Thus it was the genius of the French people, and not the boldness of the radical party, that supported the Convention and gave efficiency to its action. This was the force that gave life to the decree of November which declared that France wished to help other nations to gain their liberty and to found republican institutions elsewhere. Twenty-five millions of men submitted to the will of a few and sacrificed their possessions and their lives, not for the support of the

Jacobins or their doctrines, but for the aggrandisement of France herself, for the conquest of the old world by the French ideas. The revolutionary leaders were able to guide the destinies of France by appealing to the pride and military spirit of the French people, and by utilising for their own ends the inspirations that the Revolution gave to the French to extend those ideas, those natural principles of social order and government that were intelligible to all, and were, as Tocqueville says, "susceptible of simultaneous application in a hundred different places."

The Jacobins now entered upon their active work, and offered, as the first results of their labour, the republican constitution of 1793, which was based upon equality, liberty, security, and property, on manhood suffrage, and the right of veto by the people, a constitution that never went into practice, but which stands as a statement of the principles of the first republic. If Danton desired peace and Robespierre a government based on the ideas of Rousseau, each was forced to recognise the impossibility of having his wishes granted. A strong government was indeed to be established, but it was to be one that would bring neither peace nor the Utopia of Rousseau. War and national danger were the arbiters of events. The execution of the king had changed the position of the foreign invaders from one of resisting propagandism and revolutionary conquest to one of positive aggression for the purpose of dismembering and exterminating France. Furthermore, the sight of so great a misfortune borne with such unflinching courage had roused the pity of the French people, and had turned the better elements of the country against the Terrorists. The royalists were conspiring in the south-east; the moderates at Lyons were organising to resist the government at Paris; the large cities of Normandy were declaring in favour of the Girondins; and La Vendée was in full revolt. From without, the independence of the nation, the liberty of its citizens, and the

integrity of its territory were threatened; from within, the federalists of the provinces, and the surviving Girondins, who though dispersed were threatening to advance, were exciting fear in Paris.

The war was now for life or death, and no republican constitution was adequate to meet the emergency. Even while the Girondins had been in power steps had been taken that were to lead to the despotism of the Terror, and material had been prepared for the strong government that the situation demanded. The Committee of Public Safety, the Committee of General Defence, and the Revolutionary Tribunal were already in existence, and in April, 1793, were made much more efficient by the increased power of the representatives on mission, and by the creation of the army of the *sans-culottes* and the law of the maximum, that is, the maximum price of necessities. The executive power was now transferred to the centre of the republic, and on September 17th was formed the Great Committee of Public Safety, made up of men who, though neither specially gifted nor noted as trained administrators, were thrust to the front by circumstances. By the powers vested in them by the Convention these men became despots entrusted with the task of ruling France by terrifying it into silent obedience to their will. Under this system Paris was terrorised from September, 1793, to July, 1794, and never was a government so centred and absolute. Power did not lie in the hands of the anarchists or in the hands of the market-women; indeed, at no time during the Revolution had the populace had so little influence in the city. The government was definite and inflexible, and its work was the systematic execution of all suspects, and the removal of all persons who might endanger the republic. Paris at this time was not in an uproar, nor did it flow with blood except at the guillotine. Social and business life went on as usual; people were able to fulfil their obligations or to amuse themselves, as the case might be; and for the majority of the

citizens life was quiet and undisturbed by the occurrences of the *Place de la Revolution.*

There was more disturbance, however, in the ranks of the revolutionists themselves. So despotic was the new government that it could brook no opposition. Just as the old state had removed its political opponents by crushing them, so the Committee of Public Safety, seeing a rival in the Commune of Paris, which had been the real agent in the insurrection of the 10th of August, in the massacres of September, and in the fall of the Girondins, determined on its overthrow. Attacked by both Danton and Robespierre in March, 1794, Chaumette, Hébert, and their followers, the advocates of atheism, socialism, and the worship of reason, were sent to the guillotine. But Danton's own fall had already been foreshadowed by his failure to obtain a place on the Great Committee. This man, the greatest of the revolutionists, sought more sincerely than did any one else to bring to fulfilment the hopes of 1789. He believed in the unity of the French nation, and wished to appeal to the true sentiments of France and not to resort to measures of terror. He planned to inaugurate a reign of law and justice, to revise the constitution, to improve industry and commerce, to encourage sciences and arts. But he needed time to mature his plans, and lacking this in the too rapid movement of the Revolution, he seemed to the people uncertain, heedless, and vacillating, and they lost confidence in him. It was no time after the events of 1793 to propose peace, and a policy of non-intervention, and of renunciation of conquest; it was no time to think of saving Marie Antoinette or the Girondins, or to suggest making an alliance with the moderates after he had committed himself to acts which contradicted each of these proposals. The principles of 1789 could not now be held, for the Revolution was progressing toward a despotism, not toward a republic. Danton, who had been responsible for much of the work of the Convention and so largely responsible

for the genesis of the Great Committee, finally fell before his own creation, because he did not believe in its methods, and not seeing the necessity of wholesale bloodshed, dared to advocate a policy of mercy.

Robespierre, on the other hand, was quick to recognise the tendencies of the Revolution, and convinced of the impracticability of Rousseau's ideas, began a struggle for personal power. The events of the Revolution were working in his favour, for they were leading directly to a dictatorship, but in the sequel it was seen that Robespierre was not dictator. He was not a man of sufficient ability to avail himself of the opportunity that the Convention gave him when it established the Committee of Public Safety, and decreed Terror to be the order of the day. It was not Robespierre who ruled France during the period of the Terror, but this Committee of Public Safety itself, in which was centred all the absolutism of the old state, and which violated by its acts the public law and the principles of the republic based on the rights of man. In the constitution of 1793 the republic had pretended to change the old system and to do away with the excesses of the absolute monarchies by proclaiming the sovereignty of the people ; but now, instead of submitting itself to the law of that constitution and making it the inflexible rule of justice, it used the catchwords of 1793 as a mask to conceal a system of Cæsarian despotism.

The Committee having thus established its political supremacy by the destruction of its enemies, also gained for itself a theocratic supremacy by Robespierre's decree of the 18th Floréal, which accepted in behalf of the French people the belief in the existence of a Supreme Being and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Dogma and inquisition took their place beside political absolutism. This new concentration of power, the greatest since the days of barbarian kings, was justifiable in that it made possible a vigorous war policy, and

enabled France to stand as the strongest state in Europe. Other countries, terrified by the results of the French Revolution, checked the progressive movements in their midst, stopped all projects of reform, and tried to create a reaction by falling back upon the methods of the eighteenth century. Their policy, opposed as it was to the system of public law under which France was acting, roused the anger of every true Frenchman, and made him confound the cause of the Revolution with the cause of his fatherland. The Great Committee could therefore bring to the war a strong national force, whereas continental Europe because of its confusion and discord was powerless. The result of the conflict could not long remain in doubt. Success everywhere attended the republican arms. During 1793 and 1794 eight pitched battles were won by the revolutionists, one hundred and sixteen towns and two hundred and thirty forts were taken, and thirty-eight hundred cannon captured. The danger to the republic was removed.

But the continuance of the system of the Terror demanded the continuance of the conditions that had brought it into existence; whereas, in fact, the success of the French arms, though freeing France from imminent danger, broke up the unity of the Great Committee, and roused against Robespierre, who to his contemporaries appeared as dictator of the Terror, a feeling of opposition in Convention and nation. The Revolution, turning against its own excesses, first struck down the man who seemed to be the personification of the movement, and, attacked by the members of his own party, who were jealous of him, and by the Thermidoreans or moderates, who represented public opinion, Robespierre fell. Humanity had at last entered into the Revolution, and the innovation having once been made, the Terror vanished. The Convention, too, before bringing to a close its long and eventful career, expressed clearly its feeling against the unreasonable acts of the Terror, and did much toward establishing a more rational system of

government. It stopped the work of the guillotine and opened the prisons; it abolished the law of the maximum; it modified the civil constitution of the clergy by suppressing the clerical pensions and restoring liberty of conscience, by authorising freedom of worship, and by giving the clergy control over the churches; it banished the Mountain, recalled the remnant of the Girondins, and abandoned the revolutionary propaganda against Europe. At the same time, however, it frustrated every attempt of the royalists to gain governmental power, defeating the *émigrés* at Quiberon in June, 1795, and on 13th Vendémiaire, with cannon planted in front of the Tuileries under the command of Bonaparte, shooting down the national guard that had risen in aid of the royalists. The success of the Thermidoreans made possible the establishment of the third revolutionary constitution, that of the year III, (1795), upon which was based the government of the Directory, and by means of which a new effort was made to build up an order of things that would take the place of that overthrown in 1793. The first attempt of this sort had ended in the catastrophe of the Terror and the despotism of the Committee of Public Safety; and this, the second attempt, was to end in the *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire and the despotism of a military dictator. The establishment of the government of the Directory was but a futile attempt on the part of the Revolution to carry out the principles of 1789, to do justice to itself by establishing a stable republican government.

As war had made possible the first despotism, so war was to make possible the second; yet in 1795 Europe was ready for peace. The foreign armies were discouraged by the victories of the republicans in Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Spain; the new project for a partition of Poland was increasing the jealousy between Austria and Prussia and turning once more the attention of these Powers to the east: while a general weariness of all the Powers, save England, was furthering the desire

for a cessation of war. For France there was even greater need of peace. Misery and economic anarchy prevailed; confusion in administration and corruption in finance were accompanied with a depreciation of the currency and a fall in the values of houses and lands; money was hoarded, or sunk in the purchase of confiscated property, and proprietors could neither sell nor borrow; famine, cold, and extreme poverty increased beggary and brigandage; the ordinary needs of the provinces had been neglected; education had almost ceased to be considered, houses were in decay, and roads were impassable; trade was at a standstill and commerce destroyed. Were France to be saved from the requisitions being made upon her resources, and her security to be restored, she must have peace. Thus it seemed to the Thermidoreans, who by bringing about the peace of Basle did more for France than by giving her a new constitution, for by the former they removed Prussia from the list of her foreign enemies, and secured for her the momentary rest she so much needed.

But the long duration of the war of the First Coalition had roused in the French people an excessive patriotism that was rapidly becoming militant in character, and had made impossible a permanent peace. They were willing and ready to do battle for their country, for all that which seemed part of the national life and law; they were even eager to defend the acts of the Convention that by means of its greatest committee had grievously oppressed them. And why? Because they saw in the work of the less prominent committees of the Convention a new life and law for France, a reform far-reaching and grand; for not only had the Convention risen against the evils of the Terror, but it had also advanced the cause of civil and religious liberty, furthered national unity and independence, paved the way for the revision of the law, and outlined a great plan for national education. In a word, it had accomplished a work of the utmost importance not only for France but

for humanity. In the minds of the French people these very necessary and beneficial reforms came to be associated with the idea of country, and therefore, when the Convention in October, 1795, declared that the Rhine and the Alps were the natural boundaries of France—and in so doing committed future governments to the annexation to France of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine—the French nation considered itself bound as an act of patriotism to defend this declaration.

This doctrine of the natural limits became a part of the public law of France at a time when the nation was already confusing its own sovereignty with the grandeur of the state, and when—a matter of prime importance in the history of the Directory—the national spirit of France was assuming an unmistakably military character. To the Directory was entrusted the task of carrying out the principles of the Revolution in the interests of a France animated not, as in the outset of the struggle, by spirit of reform, but by a sense of pride and dignity, and by a desire for conquest as great as ever roused a Bourbon monarch to an extension of his power. The influence of events was gradually creating an *esprit militaire* that refused to recognise the old boundaries; that saw in war the life of the state, the glory, the future of France, and in peace,—deception, mediocrity, and humiliation. The Convention, it is true, had set aside revolutionary propagandism; but it had substituted a more dangerous doctrine, the invasion of an enemy's country, as an act of duty and justice, for the affranchisement of lands which, according to its own declaration, were national. The application of such a doctrine as this of natural limits could not but bring on war. If Prussia and the minor states of Germany were willing to accept it, Austria and England were not. Francis II. believed France to be exhausted, and, already committed to the war, made every preparation to continue it. England was an even greater obstacle in the way of the enlargement of the French state; for, already outraged by

the act of the Convention, November 28, 1792, which declared the Scheldt a free river, she was now ready under the second Pitt to continue the struggle begun forty years before for supremacy at sea. Pitt was convinced that a durable peace could not be obtained save by a restoration of the monarchy within the old boundaries of France; and to carry out any such plan meant the territorial and political weakening of the French state. France in her turn recognised the bitterness of the antagonism, and saw eventual success only in England's defeat; and inasmuch as this could be accomplished only by isolation, to separate England from the Continent became a cardinal principle of the republic. The great antagonists could not be reconciled, so opposed were their interests, and France was forced to continue the war in defence of a public law established by herself.

Thus the tendencies from within and the pressure from without were forcing issues other than those to which the republic seemed committed. The Revolution took the form, not, as had been expected, of a peaceful republic, with its accompanying advantages of security, intelligent legislation, and adminstration, but of a warlike republic dependent for eventual peace upon victories won from a Power with whom peace was impossible if the principles of the Convention were to be upheld. The army was dominating the republic; it was becoming the instrument of its policy, its protector, its only organised support; it was, in fact, the nation, and in it lay the patriotism, the enthusiasm, the genius of France. The army, not the Directory, represented the real feeling of France from 1795 to 1799. The logic of events was pushing to the front a system based on military discipline, unity, and obedience, controlled by a single mind, and organised for a single purpose, the glory of France. In the master of such a system lay the real power in France, and such a master was Napoleon Bonaparte.

In contrast with the unity of the army was the disunity and weakness of the government of the Directory. Although for

two years it was powerful enough under the guidance of able men to maintain order in France and preserve its own dignity, yet it was destined to fall into discord and divisions, and in consequence to lose the confidence and respect of the French people, because of the party rivalries and jealousies handed on to it along with the principles of the Revolution, and because of the terms of the constitution itself. The Directors, an executive body of five, who were retired at the rate of one-fifth each year, represented the government of the old Convention, and therefore tended to retain the spirit of the Revolution longer than did the members of the legislative Councils, who, retired at the rate of one-third yearly, began after the election of 1796 and 1797 to be more and more representative of the new spirit of the nation. A conflict in the government was inevitable, a conflict between the old and the new France. On one side was the old France represented by the Jacobins, who by the constitution were legally at the head of the state; on the other, the new France represented by the majority of the nation, which, neither Jacobin nor royalist, but democratic and patriotic, was still loyal to the principles of the Revolution, though wholly opposed to the form that the Revolution was taking. The military successes in Italy and the gains of France in the Preliminaries of Leoben were turning toward Bonaparte the attention of this majority, who were daily becoming more discontented with the government of the Directory, and daily growing more influential in the state. During the conflict between the Directors and the Councils on the 18th Fructidor (September 4, 1797), which resulted in a victory for the Jacobins—their last victory—, the weakness of the constitution became very evident, and once more was France reminded of the hopelessness of a government dominated by Jacobin narrowness, and exposed to party conflicts and personal prejudices. The better elements of the nation, who saw in the victory of the Jacobins only national disorder and bankruptcy,

could not but compare the aimless, chaotic, and seemingly selfish government at Paris with the disciplined and orderly organisation in Italy which had fought with brilliant success for the glory of France. It was only necessary that to this evidence of constitutional weakness there be added indications of military inefficiency and of an unsound judgment concerning external affairs, to bring about a *coup d'état* of great moment; and this evidence the acts of the Directory plentifully supplied. It had already antagonised Switzerland and the German states along the Rhine by injudicious interpretations of the doctrine of natural limits; it had roused against France the Second Coalition, in which Russia was the leading spirit; and it was rapidly losing Italy, which Bonaparte had won with great glory. Bonaparte had only to withdraw to Egypt to show the inability of the Directory to cope with the situation that he had created; and a few forced loans, a law regarding hostages, and an uprising of the *chouans* were sufficient to make evident the inability of the Directory to control affairs at home. France, once more threatened with invasion, wearied with disputes of parties, and aware of the steady increase of insurrection and brigandage, feared a relapse into Jacobinism, and to escape anarchy willingly yielded itself to the only person that seemed able to cope with the situation. The *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire was possible because the people wished it. Bonaparte represented successful conquest, and stood for unity and order, for the integrity and the prosperity of France; and knowing that France was worn out with the Revolution, he was able to overthrow the Directory, the last government founded on the ideas and principles of 1793. In his proclamation of December, 1799, he said to the people of France, "The Revolution has ended." And so it had. He was not the child of the Revolution; he was its Nemesis.

CHAPTER II.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

AS the strength of the Jacobins in the days of the Reign of Terror had lain in the support which the people of France gave to the government of the Committee of Public Safety, so the supremacy of Bonaparte became a reality because France without question approved the *coup d'état*. The nation having lost all taste for revolution and having grown weary of the abuse that the demagogues of the Directory were making of their power, welcomed the downfall of the revolutionary government. The majority of those interested in their own private concerns, without clearly defined political opinions, attached themselves to Bonaparte because he promised order and the return of peace. The royalists of all classes were devoted to him because they hoped for a restoration of the old order, and the re-establishment of the social and political system overthrown by the Revolution; while even the moderate republicans, who had already seen the constitution of 1795 violated and their system practically destroyed, preferred that this should be done by a single man of genius rather than by a body of obscure intriguers who had seized upon an exclusive control of public affairs. In this common consent, in the adherence of the army, the *bourgeoisie*, the royalists, and the more enlightened republicans lay Bonaparte's strength; and his supremacy was legalised and defined by the constitution of the year VIII. (1799), which accommodated itself to the actual situation by creating a strong and powerful executive,

one that was destined to be the only really efficient part of the new government. Such a constitution gave to Bonaparte his opportunity.

Bonaparte's attitude toward France and the Revolution was clear and well defined. He appealed to the vanity of the French people and to their love of glory rather than to their desire for liberty. France, he declared, did not need theories of government, phrases and speeches by idealists; she needed a chief famous for his exploits. For the principles of the Revolution he expressed only contempt; for democratic ideas he had no sympathy. He never understood the "man" of Rousseau or the "citizen" of St. Just. Instead of abstract man possessing equal and fundamental rights, he saw only the real man, whose favour and support he wished to gain, filled with prejudice, dominated by religious and national antipathies due to heredity and historical conditions. He declared Rousseau to have been a madman, he looked on all popular uprisings with mistrust, and considered all speculations and theories wholly idle and absurd. He had watched the Revolution and he had seen its failure; he had seen idealism end either in the brutal realism of the Terror or in the incompetency of the Directory, and he considered it time to return to facts. Feudal and class privilege had been destroyed, the Bourbons had been driven out, equality, liberty, and popular sovereignty had been proclaimed. Upon this foundation Bonaparte prepared to erect a new governmental structure, which, while utilising the results of the Revolution, was destined to check the progress of its ideas and to postpone for fifteen years all farther advance. The Revolution had prepared a nation ready for his hand. He used this material for his own purposes, and neutralised, by his interpretation, the very principles that the Revolution had endeavoured to make real. The principle of equality he made the basis of a political and social structure, because by it a career was opened to every individual in France; and he

needed the services of the French people. He utilised all talents without regard to birth or political antecedents. His generals were frequently of low rank, his councillors might be aristocrats of the old *régime*, ultramontane reactionists, or protestant Jansenists. Incompetence and opposition to his will were the only bars to a share in his government and to leadership in his armies. *Émigrés*, non-juring priests, peasants, and *bourgeoisie* were equally welcome, and for every talent and every shade of opinion he found a use. But he interpreted equality in terms less broad than had the Revolution, because he made it utilitarian and not theoretical. Of social equality he knew nothing, and in consequence he built up a hierarchy which competed with that of the old *régime*, but which differed from it in that promotion was determined by no other test than talent and obedience. Liberty he understood less than equality ; it was lost in the system to which he owed his rise. As his soldiers obeyed, so he expected obedience from the people of France. Sovereignty of the people he recognised by appealing to what appeared to be the dominant passion, by convincing the people that he was ruling them as they wished to be ruled. He said that France did not want popular government, was not ready for it, could not have it. Sovereignty was concentrated in himself; he had saved the people from the anarchy of the Revolution, by him alone must the new structure be reared. Parties, he believed, were factions to be crushed, ministerial independence was a conspiracy to be blotted out, official doubt was treason. In consequence freedom of speech did not exist, and freedom of the press was impossible.

Such was the relation of Bonaparte to the Revolution, and such his attitude toward the ideas that were springing up as a part of the progressive revolution in the other countries of Europe. But although he set himself squarely in the path of progress, established a tyrannical and despotic government, and checked the progress of the Revolution, yet he could not destroy

the principles that underlay the Revolution. Up to this time France had by means of her own example instructed the people of Europe in revolutionary ideas, and by founding the republic in 1792, had shown them that to be independent and free they must have sovereignty based upon unity; but now, abandoning her peaceful propagandism, she was to thrust her ideas upon them by means of conquest. Bonaparte himself, like a second Alexander, was destined to carry the seeds of a new Hellenism and to scatter them by force over Europe. But neither conqueror nor conquered understood the importance of the work. The people of other countries who had received with joy and enthusiasm the appeal of the Constituent Assembly, now confounded France with the man who ruled her, and failing to recognise the Revolution under the new form of conquest, resisted it with horror. Though to the monarchs of Europe Bonaparte seemed the Revolution incarnate, to the people he seemed only the destroyer of their fondest hopes and liberties.

With marvellous skill Bonaparte as first consul entered upon the task of raising France out of the chaos and the humiliating military condition into which she had fallen under the Directory. After spending a year in healing the discords of parties, he began to redeem the pledge that he had made to restore order and correct abuses. He reorganised local government, re-established the credit of the state, alleviated the distress of the poor, and, drawing his authority from the constitution of the year VIII., he reduced the functions of the local governments, and began to concentrate all power in himself. By 1801 he had put an end to the religious schism by a policy of religious toleration, and had signed a concordat with the Pope; and about the same time restored the *émigrés* in order to destroy them, and began the creation of his new aristocracy. He continued the work of the Convention by undertaking the revision of the law code, and by erecting a vast system of education whereby he might attach the youth of France to himself and

to his government. He founded schools in the provinces as well for military and technical training as for academic, and outlined the scheme for university instruction which he perfected a few years later. Finally, he entered upon the task of internal improvements, constructed roads, canals, harbours, and breakwaters, and began the rebuilding of the great cities of France. In these ways he won the support of the peasantry, the *bourgeoisie*, the aristocracy, and the church.

But before this work of re-establishing France was even approximately completed, Bonaparte had restored the military prestige which the Directory had placed in peril. Hardly was he seated in his place when he found it necessary to turn his attention to the war of the Second Coalition. Having sent Moreau into upper Germany, he himself with great military skill carried an army over the Alps into Italy, and in the battle of Marengo won back all that the Directory had lost. Austria, not only having lost Italy, but threatened with a greater danger when Moreau after winning the battle of Hohenlinden advanced within twenty leagues of Vienna, was compelled to sue for peace, and to submit herself at Lunéville to the harsh terms of her conqueror. In nine months Bonaparte, by removing Austria from the path of French conquest, and by persuading Russia to withdraw from the alliance with the other Powers, had destroyed the coalition, and more than restored to France the position she had held in 1797. The channel of the Rhine became the new boundary line on the east, the territories on the left bank fell into the hands of the republic, and the republican governments of Italy were reorganised and re-established. The shock of war was already beginning to reshape the map of Europe, to simplify its political arrangements, and to prepare the way for national unity in those countries where particularism and disunity had so long prevailed. The Italian states were reduced from twelve to six. At the Diet of Ratisbon the whole imperial structure of Germany was recast; the ec-

clesiastical estates were secularised and added to the existing kingdoms; a kind of Germanic Empire took the place of the Holy Roman Empire; and a congeries of larger states supplanted the multitude of petty principalities. This work of reorganisation, which occupied the attention of the German princes for two years, was not completed, however, in 1803. A second conquest was needed three years later to show the weakness of the old imperial structure, and to destroy entirely the old *régime*.

The retirement of Pitt in 1801 made possible at last a general European peace, for England, the last member of the coalition at open war with France, agreed to the treaty of Amiens in the following year. But the peace could only be temporary, for the real question at issue had not been settled. The struggle for the supremacy at sea, and for the mastery of the new worlds in the east and the west had been a long one. Begun in India with Clive, continued in the Seven Years' war, the first part of the struggle had been fought out at Plassey in 1757, at Minden in 1759, and at Quebec in the same year. The second part of the struggle had seen the victory of Yorktown and the revenge of France in 1781; while the third part, begun by England as paymaster of the First Coalition, had merged into an open war when Pitt, uniting Russia and Austria in the Second Coalition, had fought with the Directory in Holland and on the sea, and failing on land, had maintained the English naval supremacy in the battles of Cape St. Vincent and Camperdown in 1797. Bonaparte took up the gage of battle fully aware of the mightiness of the conflict, for from the time of the campaign in Italy in 1797 he had seen in England the great and abiding enemy whose overthrow was essential to his own supremacy in Europe. But her national unity, commercial prosperity, industrial strength, and geographical isolation were such that instead of conquering England as a preliminary step to continental supremacy, he was led on to the subjugation of

the Continent in order to form a counter-coalition by means of which to destroy his greatest enemy.

The idea of the conquest of England through the destruction of her commerce had originated with the Jacobins, and Bonaparte in accepting it not only made use of the commercial fear and jealousy that underlay the hostility of France toward England, but also showed himself in sympathy with the prevalent but mistaken notion that English wealth depended on commerce alone. Already in 1796 and 1797 the Directory had begun to exclude British goods from France, but the serious results of this policy did not appear until the turn of the century, when the application of steam to machinery increased enormously the English manufacturing output, and led to a consequent enlargement of the export trade. The danger of the closure of the world market to English goods became evident immediately, and it was Bonaparte's determination to effect this closure that led to the renewal of the war. He had formulated a scheme for the invasion of England as early as 1797, but had changed his plan of attack and entered upon the "mad expedition" to Egypt to drive England from her possessions in the east, to destroy her depots in the Red Sea, and to seize the Mediterranean route to India. To accomplish this he had retained the Ionian islands in the treaty of Campo Formio, an act that antagonised Russia and made possible the formation of the Second Coalition. England, in her turn, determined to preserve the Mediterranean route to India, maintained her control in Malta, and in so doing technically violated the treaty of Amiens. In this retention of Malta Bonaparte saw not only a breach of the treaty, but also a bar to his control over the routes to the east, one of which he already possessed through the Dutch in the Cape. Unwilling to make the slightest concession favouring the importation of English goods, and continuing during the negotiations over the treaty to increase the number of French, Italian, and Dutch ports from

which English merchants were excluded, he made the renewal of the war an industrial necessity to England.

Preliminary skirmishing followed the declaration of war in 1803. English privateers chased French merchant-vessels from the seas, and Bonaparte advancing into Hanover defeated the electoral troops, and closed northern Germany to English commerce. At the same time he assembled on the borders of the Channel at Boulogne a formidable array for the ostensible purpose of driving English vessels from the strait, and possibly of invading England herself. Whether this movement were anything more than a grandiose display for the purpose of terrifying John Bull is doubtful, but at any rate in Bonaparte's eyes Boulogne formed an admirable training ground in case the war should take on a more threatening character. That it would do so he had no doubt, but he took advantage of the delay of 1803 and 1804 to establish himself more firmly in France. Having suppressed (by the execution of Cadoudal and the banishment of Moreau) a dangerous conspiracy that had for its object the restoration of the Bourbons, he began the exercise of autocratic power by the murder of the innocent Bourbon, Duke of Enghien, a pitiable blunder, which sent a thrill of horror through Europe, and undoubtedly deprived him of much of the confidence, enthusiasm, and devotion upon which his power rested. But Bonaparte knew the value of a successful *coup d'état* in the eyes of the French people, and he did not allow the crime of Vincennes to hinder his march toward absolutism. The constitution of the year XII. (1804), by imposing no limit upon the monarchical power, testified to the actual position that Bonaparte occupied, and legalised the assumption of the imperial crown. By a vote of 3,000,000 to 2500 France confided to him the government of the French Republic with the title of Emperor, and declared the imperial dignity to be hereditary in his family. The fiction of the Republic was still retained, but superimposed upon it was a

new institution, the Empire. It is remarkable, as Fournier points out, the distinction that is everywhere made in the constitution between "Empire" and "State." "We know," he says, "what was the French state. The Revolution had given to it its limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. But just how far did the Napoleonic Empire extend? The vagueness of the expression of the constitution guaranteed war and war only; it did not guarantee the peace that all desired so ardently. As long as the Empire lasts it will fight and when it ceases to be victorious it will disappear." The Empire was, therefore, what Napoleon *victor* would make it. It was not a state, it was a personal supremacy; born in the midst of war it depended on war for its very existence.

And war it was to be, almost unbroken war, for ten long, eventful years. England was already committed to the struggle, and had no other recourse than to continue it. But a coalition of the Powers was necessary. Russia, now in the hands of Alexander, who had been deeply offended by Napoleon's arbitrary conduct in Piedmont, Holland, and Switzerland, and by the execution of the Duke of Enghien, made overtures to England, and agreed upon a treaty in 1805 to force Napoleon back within the natural boundaries of France. To enlarge the league of the Powers, Russia brought pressure to bear on Austria, who, though aware that Napoleon had broken his promises by his actions in Italy, and by his seizure of the iron crown of Lombardy, would probably have preferred to remain neutral. Prussia, wavering in policy, with an inefficient foreign office, was tempted by the bait of Hanover, which Napoleon was constantly holding out to her, to declare herself neutral, and at the time when the Third Coalition needed her aid, played a double game, and in the end lost. In the war of the Third Coalition the forces that took part were not equally matched. On one side was a league of states, which, jealous of one another and determined to maintain their individual interests,

were bound together by necessity and an agreement that was only half-hearted; while on the other was Napoleon, who, determined to provoke by every means in his power the wrath of the old states, had at his command a people, experienced in war, filled with pride of past victories, and strong in the new life and energy that his administration had given to the institutions and social life of their country. The recent reorganisation of Germany had weakened the Germanic Empire, because it had destroyed what little unity remained to it, and had prepared central Europe for conquest by enabling individual states, such as Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg to turn from the support of Austria to an alliance with Napoleon. The war of the Third Coalition, which transferred the scene of the land-struggle from Italy and the territory of the Rhine to the centre of Europe, was characterised by two mighty victories plainly indicative of the peculiar genius of the two greatest combatants. The battle of Trafalgar overthrew all hope of a French naval supremacy, and completed the long list of victories, beginning with La Hogue in 1692, which made England the greatest sea-power in the world. On the other hand the battle of Austerlitz, fought five weeks later in December, 1805, no less determined the military genius of Napoleon on the land. It destroyed the coalition, forced Austria to a peace that excluded her from the affairs of both Germany and Italy, and prepared the way for that grand but impossible scheme, the revival of an empire which, like that of Charles the Great, was limited by no boundaries, and was confined to no single nationality.

Austerlitz prepared the way for a great work of imperial reorganisation by destroying at a single blow the reconstructed German Empire of 1803. The princes of Germany, convinced that the ties that bound the different members of the Empire together were no longer a guarantee for their protection, convinced that the idea of country and of common interest had of necessity disappeared, declared themselves on August 1, 1806,

freed from the imperial union, while those of western and central Germany erected a new confederation adapted to the circumstances of the time, that is, adapted to the supremacy of Napoleon. On the 6th of August the Emperor Francis renounced the imperial crown, declared the imperial ties dissolved, and absolved princes, electors, and states from their allegiance to himself as legal chief of the Empire according to the constitution. The instability and weakness of the central European system was thus officially declared, the Confederation of the Rhine was established, and the opportunity was given to Napoleon of still further manipulating the arrangement of states to his own advantage.

The first stage in the expansion of Napoleon's imperialism had now been reached. The Emperor had refused to confine himself to the natural limits of France, and having extended his interest to the centre of Europe had, in overthrowing the Holy Roman Empire, destroyed one of the oldest and grandest of the state systems of Europe. This system, it is true, was the more easily overthrown, in that it was a mere relic of the past, reduced to impotence by a dominant state sovereignty, based on no national foundation, and supported by no spirit of individualism. By the conquest of Italy and the Empire Napoleon had not seriously endangered the erection of a stable French Empire, an Empire less permanent perhaps than would have been one enclosed within the natural French boundaries, the Rhine and the Alps. But to Napoleon there was no consciousness of a dividing of the ways in 1806. Determined to impose his will upon Europe, partly to satisfy his Cæsarian ambition, partly to effect the commercial isolation of England, he did not see that he was beginning to exhaust the national forces at home at the time when he was about to rouse against him the national forces of the other states of Europe. His own military genius, which stood by him to the very last of his battles, and his inability to understand any other state policy than

that of the old *régime*, blinded him to the fact that in his attack on Prussia and Spain he was confronting not only kings but peoples also. When in 1806 he took up the challenge that Prussia had at last thrown down, and effected the downfall of that country in the battles of Jena and Auerstädt, he made inevitable an eventual harmonious union of the Powers against him, made resistance to him the foundation of a new public law for Europe, and provoked, by his want of moderation in his hour of triumph, the desperate resistance of a humiliated people, and disappointed the better elements in France who were hoping for a lasting peace with each recurring victory. And yet, as Napoleon passed on after his contemptuous treatment of Prussia to the bloody victories of Eylau and Friedland and to the peace of Tilsit, which seemed to mark him as the master of Europe, not even the loss of his veteran troops and the employment of the raw recruits that France was sending to take their place could throw doubt upon the apparent stability of his success. It required six years more of war for the Powers of Europe to forget their personal ambitions, and to make the downfall of Napoleon the necessity of the hour. Alexander, who was annoyed at Austria's neutrality, and provoked because England who had promised much had accomplished so little, doubted the expediency of continuing a war that brought him nothing; and at Tilsit gave way to the grandeur of Napoleon's imperial designs and the fascination of the Emperor's personality. After rescuing Prussia from the complete oblivion to which Napoleon would have consigned her, he consented to the erection of the Napoleonic Empire of the West, and accepted the imperial policy for the downfall of England.

Napoleon's early dreams of empire were rapidly becoming realities. Emperor of a state wonderfully reorganised, its administrative machinery simply and efficiently constructed, its law codified, its educational system remodelled, its peace with

the church made, he had now extended its boundaries to nearly their widest limits. Around France he had begun the erection of subordinate kingdoms looking to him for protection, appanages of the house of Napoleon. The republics of the Directory and the Consulate had been transformed into kingdoms under his generals or members of his family. He had extended the work begun in the organisation of the Confederation of the Rhine by decreasing the number of German states formed in 1803, and, by the mediatisation of the little courts and knightly territories, had strengthened the lesser states. To all members of the Confederation he had given full autonomy, thus increasing the number of independent and sovereign states in central Europe, a condition favorable to his own designs. Furthermore, he had conquered the two most important states of Germany, Prussia, and Austria; and having overthrown Europe to the border of Russia, he had made peace with the only remaining continental Power whose opposition was at all dangerous. From the banks of the Niemen, as he turned back to survey western Europe, he could see no dangerous enemy confronting him on the continent. Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal could be easily reduced to subjection, and Spain he had already determined to make a dependent state, having received at Tilsit, it is supposed, Alexander's permission to do this. With Sweden despoiled, Denmark submissive, and Portugal conquered, with a Bonaparte on the throne of Spain, there seemed to be no obstacle in the way of a revival of the very Empire that he had just shattered in pieces, for Napoleon desired to restore the imperial grandeur of Charles the Great, and to give it a new lease of life.

But the establishment of an Empire of the West would be little better than a dream so long as England had the supremacy of the seas. To meet her on her own element had been rendered impossible by the victories of the Nile and Trafalgar; to conquer her in a single battle was equally impossible

because of her location. Therefore Napoleon never lost sight of that plan borrowed from the Revolution, of overthrowing England by reducing her to industrial and financial ruin. In every extension of the territory of France he had increased the coast-line under his control; in every treaty that had been made he had imposed his will upon the conquered territory in order to close every harbour of Europe to English trade. The effect of this definite policy was to lead to acts of retaliation by England, and as retaliation was followed by counter-retaliation, the coast-system was changed into the continental blockade. In 1806 England, in order to stop the neutral trade, declared all ports between Brest and the mouth of the Elbe closed to neutrals; and a little later laid an embargo on Prussian ships in British waters. On October 21, 1806, Napoleon replied from Berlin declaring the British islands to be in a state of blockade, and all English goods or merchandise belonging to England to be prizes of war, and prohibiting any vessel coming directly from England or her colonies from entering any continental harbour. This decree applied to the coast-line from the Baltic to the Adriatic, not including Denmark, Portugal, and the Austrian port of Trieste. To this decree England replied in the first Orders in Council of January, 1807, which ordered that no vessel should trade from ports from which British ships were excluded. This was moderate in comparison with what followed. It was the rapid extension of the continental system between January and November that increased the bitterness of the conflict. The decrees of England, thus far fairly temperate, gave way in November to a declaration of commercial war in the second Order in Council, which placed in a state of blockade all ports from which the British flag was excluded, forbade all trade in the merchandise of the countries to which these ports belonged, and made lawful prize of all such merchandise wherever found. To this Napoleon replied from Milan, in December, denationalising all

ships that should submit to the British rules, and declared that such ships, and all others that sailed to or from England or any of her colonies, should be liable to seizure.

The struggle thus begun between the land power and the sea power seemed for the moment to turn in favour of the Emperor. England had, in reality, overstepped the bounds of legitimate retaliation, and had subjected neutrals to conditions that made neutral trading impossible. The United States at once passed the Embargo Act of 1807, which was a protest against what was considered to be on the part of England an attempt to establish a complete maritime monopoly. Other states, Sweden, and for a time Turkey, fearing British supremacy, closed their markets, and even in England herself petitions were presented to the House of Commons praying for relief. This led to a modification of the Orders, and the total blockade was changed into a rigid blockade of the northern European states. Napoleon's attempt to seal up, hermetically, all foreign markets against England was truly imperial in its grandeur. To effect the commercial exclusion of England his greatest rival, and by so doing to ruin her, was the main object of his efforts ; but in the end it was the sea power and not the land power that won the victory. In his endeavour to break the strength of his enemy, Napoleon was led to attempt feats of conquest that could be only momentarily successful. The hostility of the continental states was intensified by the evils and hardships of the system of blockade, and even France, proud as she might be of Napoleon's military successes, could not long endure the grinding of the continental system that was doing more than a dozen defeats to undermine the foundations of Napoleon's supremacy and to effect his final downfall.

Until the year 1807 the career of Napoleon had been almost entirely successful. But at that time was reached the turning point, for then it was that there began the victory of nationalities not only over Napoleon but over the old *régime* as well.

Hitherto the principles of the old state system had prevailed in the internal and external relations of the states of the continent outside of France, and in consequence the kings of Europe, dependent on their own resources and their old system of government, had been easily conquered by Napoleon supported by the united French nation. After 1807 the rôles began to be reversed, the law of nations began to supplant the law of kings, and the states of Europe, such as Sweden, Russia, Prussia, and Spain, began to recognise either by word or deed the principles of national integrity and national honour. On the other hand the Revolution, which had declared war on kings and proclaimed peace to the nations, was changing its attitude, and, arrested and fixed in France in the form of a military despotism, was threatening the peace that it had proclaimed, and was antagonising the nations whose independence it had desired. It is a striking and all-important fact that at the time when the kings of Europe were calling to their aid the national element of their respective states, thus turning against the Revolution its own arms, Napoleon was taking on more and more the character of a prince of the old *régime*, and was gradually disclosing to France as well as to the rest of Europe the fact that it was his personal supremacy for which France was fighting and not the principles of 1789. Before 1807 Napoleon had posed as the champion of democracy; after 1807 he stood forth as a despotic ruler, whose principles were those of the princes of the eighteenth century state.

He was beginning to show in his relations abroad a disregard for the rights of princes and the integrity of states that exceeded the worst offences of Louis XIV. At the meeting with Alexander at Tilsit, and later at Erfurt, he entered upon a scheme of dismemberment and despoilation involving a bargaining of principalities and a neglect of binding engagements, acts which proved him to be a master of eighteenth century diplomacy. In the accomplishment of these ends he was be-

ginning to depend on dynastic alliances and the support of kings, and for the sake of increasing his personal strength, to plan coalitions, in which schemes there existed no thought of the union of powers for the common good of Europe. His annexations of territory, which were made necessary by the obligations of the continental system, were arbitrary and irritating actions, defensible on no other ground than that of force. His attitude toward the papacy was impolitic in that in his endeavour to obtain the submission of the Pope and to create a Gallican church that would represent his will, he drove France into ultramontanism. At home he abused his power in his frequent proscriptions, in his insult to the church at the council of Savona, in his insult to the legislature in the dissolution of the *Corps législatif*, and in his utter disregard for the obligation of contracts and in his subordination of justice to his own personal feelings of resentment.

If this conduct aroused indignation among the people of Europe and made common action easier in the final day of reckoning, no less did it disturb the people of France, who had thus far supported Napoleon because they saw in him the glory of the French nation and a protection from the anarchy that had preceded the imperial *régime*. After 1806 there was a general longing for a peace that never came. The *bourgeois* classes, losing confidence in the face of increasing destitution owing to the prolongation of the war, began to waver in their loyalty. Many of those high in authority were becoming uneasy because of the very grandeur of the imperial plans, and were beginning to doubt the solidity of an institution based as it was on the life of a single man or the fate of a single battle. Some of the generals upon whom Napoleon had depended were dead or were soon to fall on the field of battle as in the case of Desaix, Lannes, and Duroc; some were estranged from him as in the case of Bernadotte, Moreau, and later Murat; while others of inferior ability were placed in positions for

which they were not fitted. The army of the Revolution, created in the *levée en masse* of 1793, had given place to an army of young troops that lacked the tenacious endurance of the old veterans, and of foreign contingents that had nothing of the national spirit of the army of the Directory. Lastly, the constant levies of men, steadily increasing until the years 1812 and 1813, were gradually extended to every part of the population, and were not only exhausting the vitality of France, but were leading to a general and deep dissatisfaction.

This was the situation at the time when Napoleon was about to begin a commercial war with England. His determination to force the Continent to obey his will, that there might be no loophole of entrance for British trade, led the Emperor to his first important step after Tilsit, the attack upon England's ally, Portugal, in part to affront England, in part to force upon Portugal the continental system. But to conquer Portugal it was necessary to gain the consent of Spain to a safe passage of French troops across the Spanish peninsula. This was accomplished in the treaty of Fontainebleau in October, 1807, and before the end of the year the prince-regent of Portugal had fled to Brazil and abandoned his country to the invading army. These events had momentous consequences, for Napoleon having gained a foothold in Spain, went farther, and adopted that policy of aggression that roused the Spanish nationality against him; and England, already determined to strike at her enemy on land as well as at sea, was roused to the defence of her ally, and, rejecting all proposals for peace, accepted the Portuguese coast as the seat of operations, and began the prosecution of the peninsular war. Thus the commercial antagonism of England was brought into combination with the national antagonism of Portugal and Spain. The twofold project of Napoleon, the enforcement of the continental blockade, and the subjection of the rising nationalities, became the drag upon his imperial career. It divided and exhausted his resources;

it exasperated the people of the coast country of the North Sea, increased the hostility of Austria, and weakened the friendly attitude of Prussia, because of the economic hardships that it entailed; it compelled the Emperor to enter upon wars that involved him in certain defeat; it roused the national spirit in Prussia, and the hope of independence in the Austrian states; and finally it precipitated a conflict with the Roman Catholic Church, because of the refusal of the Pope to accept the continental system,—a conflict that led to the annexation of the Papal States, the excommunication of the Emperor, and gave to the movement in Spain and later in Austria the character of a holy crusade.

Thus we see that when in 1808 the two Emperors, Alexander and Napoleon, met at Erfurt to complete the work of Tilsit, the situation in Europe had materially changed. The centre of the movement was transferred from the east to the west. Whereas at Tilsit Napoleon had his eyes fixed, as in 1797, upon the greater Britain in India and at the Cape, at Erfurt he was compelled to recognise the futility of his imperial dream for the conquest of England through her colonies, and to turn his attention to the uprising of the Spaniards, whose strength and endurance he estimated as much too low as he rated his own prestige in France too high.

Spain was a united state with pride, spirit, and a glorious past, and even in the later days, when her greatness had departed, the inefficiency of her kings tended to make the people more self-dependent and reliant. To a certain extent local autonomy still existed, because Spain had never suffered from the bureaucracy and excessive centralisation that was hampering national development in Prussia. In common with other European states she had entered upon a period of reform in the era preceding the French Revolution, but with 1792 a reaction set in under Aranda and afterwards under the infamous Godoy; and the Spanish government, instead of promot-

ing measures of amelioration, instead of adopting a healthy foreign policy and building up a strong monarchy, spent itself in impotent acts of spite at home and contradictory intrigues abroad, which resulted in financial bankruptcy and administrative corruption. This it was that had made possible the disgraceful treaty of Fontainebleau. On account of the weakness of her monarchy, Spain, the most monarchical of countries, was obliged to seek safety in the strength of her people; and the very ecclesiasticism that had in the past weighed upon the country intensified the national struggle by giving a religious aspect to the war, and by adding religious hatred to outraged national pride.

In 1808, by the intrigue of Bayonne Napoleon swept from the throne of Spain both the old king Charles IV. and the young prince Ferdinand, and placed his brother Joseph in their stead. Almost immediately Spain rose in protest; appeals were made to England; local committees were formed; and so intense was the excitement and so prompt the action that in the encounter at Baylen Napoleon met his first reverse in the capitulation of Dupont's army on the 20th of July, 1808. This event, coupled with Sir Arthur Wellesley's victory over Junot at Vimeiro in Portugal on August 21st, not only stirred to its depths the patriotism of the Spaniards and made possible the freeing of Portugal, but it also proved for Napoleon an ominous beginning of that struggle of the nations that was to lead to his overthrow. The Emperor, however, saw in it only a temporary reverse, and turning back from Erfurt he put in motion his disciplined troops, and advanced against the disunited and untrained Spaniards. On December 13th Madrid was captured, and before the end of the year the Emperor was hastening westward to the reconquest of Portugal, and the destruction of the English, whom he hoped to meet at last face to face on land.

But the issue proved to be otherwise, for Napoleon was no longer the entire master of his own actions, and he was not

destined to confront his greatest adversary until the eventful day of Waterloo. Even while he was engaged in following the retreating English under Sir John Moore through northwestern Spain, he was summoned back to eastern Europe by the rising of Austria. This government, already three times defeated and three times dismembered in territory, was finding the burden of Napoleon's will too great to be borne. Shut out from foreign commerce by the now hated continental blockade, deprived of her Italian and Adriatic territory by the treaty of Pressburg, which had followed the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, driven from leadership in the affairs of Germany by the control that Napoleon exercised over the Confederation of the Rhine, Austria found herself isolated and reduced to inactivity in Europe. She seemed to herself to have fallen from the headship of a mighty empire to be a mere middle kingdom between Russia and France. The irritability engendered by the situation found a relief in the hopes aroused by the national successes in Spain, and under the new minister Stadion was begun a pseudo-national movement for the resurrection of Austria as the head of a united Germany. It marks the importance of the growth of the national idea that this state, with no national interest of its own properly so called, should have adopted as the policy of its archducal administration a patriotic and national propaganda, in the furtherance of which patriotic literature was circulated and appeals were made to the enthusiasm of the German portions of the Austrian provinces. A *landwehr* was enrolled, assistance was promised by both Bohemia and Hungary, patriotic songs were written by Arndt and others, and the proclamation of the Archduke Charles, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, spoke of the war as a movement for the deliverance and unity of the German people.

This was the movement that compelled Napoleon to hand over the pursuit of Sir John Moore to Marshal Soult, and to hasten to Paris to enter upon the new campaign. The outlook

was in more ways than one threatening for Napoleon. The insurrection in Spain was every day taking on a more alarming form; the Austrian army was commanded by a general second only to Napoleon in European reputation; Prussia for two years under Stein and Scharnhorst had been preparing for the struggle; England was ready to help on the coast of the North Sea as well as in Portugal; part of Napoleon's army was occupying Prussia, part was scattered in Spain, where every captured town had to be garrisoned, and part was massed to meet the new danger. But the great states were still seeking their individual interest rather than the common interest of Europe, and were seemingly unaware of the importance of a European concert. When Austria rose, after the Spanish movement was well under way, the Czar, holding to the treaty of Tilsit, looked on complacently. Prussia, resisting the patriotic impulses of her people, put off for four years the national uprising that might have made the Austrian movement in 1809 successful, and not only rejected the patriotic plans of Stein and drove him from her borders to Russia, but also adopted a policy of complete inaction at a time when doing so was almost criminal. England, too, the only ally of Austria in 1809, seemed unable to realise the importance of the peninsular war, and dissipated her energies in a tardy and useless expedition, which resulted in the capture of Flushing, and the destruction of the troops by the fevers of the island of Walcheren. Austria, thrown back on her own resources, was defeated in that mighty shock of battle at Aspern and Wagram in May and July, 1809. For the fourth time the house of Habsburg succumbed to the might of the French Emperor and suffered serious curtailment in the territory over which it ruled. The Emperor of Austria bound himself more firmly than ever to maintain the continental system and to give up all relations with Great Britain. The European Powers had yet to learn that lesson in unity of action, without which resistance to

Napoleon was ineffectual. Napoleon carried the day not merely because he was the first military genius in Europe, but also because he was able to meet a divided enemy.

At this juncture Napoleon seems to have recognised the instability of the imperial structure that he was erecting, and to have become convinced of the need of a firmer support than his own personal supremacy. European political alliances had been too easily ruptured in the past for him to feel confident that a permanent ally could be obtained without the aid of a tie of blood. Aware of the importance of a dynastic alliance that would strengthen his political position in Europe he turned instinctively to Russia, with whom he wished to preserve the *entente cordial.* This was important in that the agreement of Tilsit had been strained already by old dissensions, by the inactivity of the Czar during the Austrian campaign, and by the enlargement of the Duchy of Warsaw, an act offensive to Alexander. To a man with Napoleon's ambition, a family relationship with the Czar was attractive, because it would be a bond of union between the Empires of the East and the West, and the Emperors would become brothers instead of merely friends or allies. Napoleon, however, knew of the hostility of the empress-mother, to whom Paul I. had given the right of disposing of her daughters, and even before the formal request was made to Russia, he had begun to sound Austria on the same subject. Metternich, the new Austrian minister, encouraged the imperial plan, for knowing that a Franco-Russian alliance meant ultimate ruin for Austria, he determined to substitute a policy of diplomacy for a policy of war, and to bind Napoleon to the Austrian house by the offer of an Austrian archduchess in marriage.

The willingness of Austria to enter into a dynastic alliance with Napoleon pleased the French Emperor, whose main desire was to obtain an entrance into the European family of kings. As, therefore, the Czar delayed the answer, which, according to

Napoleon's idea of promptness, should have been sent in forty-eight hours, first for twenty days and then for forty, the Emperor began to talk about Byzantine duplicity and was ready to sacrifice the stronger alliance for a connection with the more ancient imperial line. His pride was wounded by the delay rather than by the refusal which eventually came from the empress-mother, and he determined to satisfy his *amour propre* by an appeal to Italian cunning. On April 2, 1810, the man that Metternich considered to be "the Revolution incarnate," married the granddaughter of the Empress Maria Theresa, and this was, perhaps, the most important event in the latter days of Napoleon's career. The placing of an archduchess upon the throne of France, only sixteen years after Marie Antoinette had perished on the scaffold, was, says M. Sorel, "for old Europe the most extraordinary event in the whole history of the Revolution." For new Europe it was no less extraordinary, in that it involved an entire recasting of Napoleon's continental relations. It marked a momentous advance in Napoleon's imperial ambition, and showed how fully he had committed himself to the ideas and methods of the old *régime*; it antagonised Russia, and introduced the policy that resulted in the expedition to Moscow, for as Cambacérès said in conversation with Pasquier, "ere two years have fully gone by we shall be engaged in a war with the Power whose daughter the Emperor will not have married"; it bound Napoleon irrevocably to Austrian rather than to Russian interests and lulled him into a confidence in his father-in-law that was unwarranted, inasmuch as Metternich was even at this time the arch-conspirator against him, and was employing this marriage as one means whereby to destroy the man whom he considered the greatest enemy of Europe.

Thus by 1810 the position of Napoleon was less strong than in 1809, and he was becoming more and more dependent on his own personal genius as an administrator and a strategist,—a

genius that seemed to become greater as the hostile forces increased in number. Having already roused against himself the national spirit of Spain, Portugal, and Russia, he had by the marriage with Marie Louise undermined the dynastic support upon which he now depended. He had discarded the Russian alliance, and in consequence Alexander was already considering the arrangements of Tilsit as broken, and was anticipating, even in 1810, a war with France. He had bound himself to Austria, thus playing into the hands of Metternich, who was ready, when the suitable moment arrived, to break the trust imposed in his Emperor, Francis II. In Spain the brigand warfare, with its intermittent success and failure, was dividing Napoleon's forces, and was wearing out the troops to whom was entrusted the conquest of the peninsula. In Prussia the patriotic endeavours of Stein, Scharnhorst, and Hardenberg were only for the moment neutralised by the conservatism of the Prussian government and the presence of the French troops occupying Prussian fortresses. Sweden was preparing to range herself on the side of the opposition, when, after the insurrection of March, 1809, and the death of the heir-elect to the throne, Marshal Bernadotte, who had been on the worst possible terms with the Emperor, was chosen as prince-royal. And England, with the war party once more in power in 1810, was encouraged to persevere in the war, and was pursuing under Wellesley that terrible peninsular struggle in which the victory of Busaco, September 27, 1810, and the retreat of Masséna from before the lines of Torres Vedras in the same month roused the enthusiasm of Spain and the courage of the German patriots. In some respects more influential than all else was the quiet yet merciless grinding of the continental system, which began to be most injurious to the continent after 1809. To the genius of one man and the fear inspired by previous success, there was therefore opposed the antagonism of Russia, the diplomacy of Metternich, the untried strength of Spain

and Prussia, the bitter hostility of England, and the inflexible laws of trade and commercial intercourse that Napoleon had so imperiously violated.

The continental system, which had already affected the political relations of the Emperor with Portugal, Spain, Austria, the Papal States, and the territories bordering on the North Sea, was now destined to alter seriously his relations with Russia and Sweden. With Russia the situation was already strained. Alexander was in no wise pleased with the form that Napoleonic imperialism was taking. The Emperor of the French, he thought, was showing little consideration for the interests of Russia. In his desire to control the North German-coast line Napoleon had annexed Oldenburg, to whose duke the elder sister of the Czar had been betrothed. Then too his consenting to the election of Bernadotte angered the Czar, because it seemed to indicate French control of Sweden; his adding of Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw pointed to a possible resurrection of Poland, or at least to an increase in the territory of a state under French control on the borderland of Russia; and his insisting on Russia's adherence to a ruinous trade policy was increasing the economic distress of the Russian people, who were far more injured by trade isolation than was France. In Russia paper money began to depreciate alarmingly, and the rouble from 1808 to 1810 fell in value one-fourth. Gold left the country, and colonial wares rose to practically prohibitive prices. The economic situation in 1810–1811 convinced the Czar that the continental policy could not be maintained. A contraband trade was impossible, because of the bulky character of Russia's staple articles, for timber, grain, hemp, etc., were not well adapted for secret export. In 1812 Russia broke the terms of the treaty of Tilsit and the agreement of 1810 by assuming a position of neutrality, thus practically destroying Napoleon's work by opening a breach for English goods.

Although, as we have seen, Napoleon's personal hostility to Alexander, due to the failure of the Russian marriage project and the Czar's inactivity in the Austrian campaign, must be taken into account in considering the Russian campaign, yet the secession of Alexander from the continental system was the vital cause leading to the advance upon Moscow. Napoleon knew that Alexander was under the influence of councillors hostile to himself—the empress-mother, Pozzo di Borgo, and Count Nesselrode—and he was aware that the opposition of the Czar was increasing. Furthermore, in joining with Austria he had revived the policy of the restoration of the Western Empire, and was beginning to look on Russia as a legitimate object of attack. The Tilsit project of dividing the world began to give way to the older project of conquering the world, and Napoleon's ambition extended even to the overthrow of that Power whose alliance he had been glad enough to gain in 1807. This act more than any other that had gone before betrayed the entire want of sympathy that Napoleon felt for France. Had he so desired he might even now have retired from his career of conquest, and have retained the main territories that he had conquered. But it was no part of Napoleon's plan to settle down as Emperor of the French and turn his attention solely to the building up of a great and stable Empire. He saw only war, not peace. For France as such he cared nothing ; he admitted that the war with Russia was injurious to the French interests, yet he was urged on to the fatal issue by the very terms of his own imperialism. For him there was no abiding place, he belonged to no nationality, he had no sense of national pride ; no country could claim him as its own ; he was, as Metternich said, cosmopolitan.

With Russia there was no hesitation. The breach between the Emperors became the wider as the position of the Czar became more favourable for resisting attack. So long as he was on hostile terms with Sweden, on account of Finland, and

at war with Turkey, on account of the Danubian principalities, a war with France meant a serious dividing of Russia's forces. But Bernadotte, finding that the continental system was ruining Sweden, entered into secret arrangements with Alexander in 1812, in the hope of eventually obtaining the throne of France for himself; and in the same year Turkey, acting under English advice, signed the treaty of Bucharest, and threw off the spell of the French influence. Alexander was enabled, therefore, to concentrate all his forces upon the one point of attack from the west, and announced his determination of allowing the French, if they so desired, to cross his frontier. Reluctant as he was to provoke war, nevertheless he felt that with 300,000 of Napoleon's troops in Spain the time was favourable.

There was no declaration of war. Napoleon advanced to Dresden, assembled there the sovereigns of the vassal states, stated the number of auxiliary troops that he needed, and then concentrating his forces on the Vistula prepared for entrance into Russia. In May, 1812, the Niemen was crossed by an army of 325,000 men, of which 155,000 were French. Nothing can better indicate the diplomatic and military genius of Napoleon than the fact that out of the 600,000 men who made up the Grand Army, the rear guard, and available contingents, only 200,000 were Frenchmen. The remainder came from Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, Holland, and the minor states. Under Napoleon's leadership, western Europe with a mighty army was prepared to overthrow the only state remaining unconquered on the continent. On August 18th Napoleon took Smolensk. The Russian policy of delay, which was continued under Barclay de Tolly until September, gave way to the more active policy of Kutusoff, and the battle of Borodino was fought. Such a battle, so far from the base of supplies, was rather a loss than a gain for Napoleon, and it would seem that he was led on to Moscow less from design

than from a desire to destroy the Russian army, and to gain sustenance for his troops. Moscow was reached by September 14th, and there the silent city showed that the Russians understood that the surest way to accomplish Napoleon's ruin was to cut him off from supplies. The burning of the city only intensified the situation; it did not create it. For a month the Grand Army lingered, but Alexander gave no sign, and offered no terms. Isolated at St. Petersburg, away from Napoleon's influence, the Czar made no agreement for an armistice and, acting under the advice of those who were opposed to Napoleon, rejected all overtures. The man whom Napoleon had considered pliable at Tilsit, still devoted to him at Erfurt, had become his implacable foe at Moscow. Napoleon had firmly believed in his ability to break down the opposition of the Czar, and to effect a treaty with him at Moscow, as he had done with Francis II. at Vienna, and Frederic William III. at Berlin. Upon this one calculation he had based his hopes. This error of judgment in one of the greatest of the world's undertakings carried with it momentous consequences,—consequences inevitable, not because of Alexander's refusal to yield, but because Europe was waiting to take advantage of Napoleon's failure. The fall of Moscow had accomplished nothing; there was but one course to follow, and that was to retreat, and with every step in that famous march the hopes of Europe rose. Before the 6th of November, Napoleon's army had dwindled away by losses in battle, want of food, and the distresses of the march to 55,000 men, and this number was reduced by the cold and storm to about 20,000 men, of whom but 3000 were Frenchmen.

Napoleon's retreat was coeval with other reverses and was the signal for still more. While the "great criminal," as Stein called him, was wrecking one army in Russia, Wellesley, now become the Duke of Wellington, was defeating another in Spain. At Salamanca, July 22, 1812, Marmont was overcome in a spirited contest, Madrid was temporarily evacuated, and

Joseph fled from the city. Although Wellington was unable to maintain his position because of the stupidity and inefficiency of the Spanish radicals, nevertheless his success both encouraged England, and threw for the moment the control of the Spanish government into the hands of the revolutionary party. Though England, involved in a war with the United States, as one outcome of her attempt at a maritime monopoly, had been inclined to favour a discontinuance of the struggle, the battle of Salamanca brought her once more loyally to Wellington's support, and led the radical party in an excess of democratic zeal to draw up a constitution, showing, it is true, the influence of the French revolutionary ideas, but one-sided, unbalanced, impracticable, and constitutionally unsound. The situation is a striking one. Although the Spanish patriots were foisting upon a monarchical country an ultra-democratic constitution, and were hampering Wellington by ill-advised and jealous actions, nevertheless, by means of their tenacity, their persistent warfare, and national enthusiasm, they were able to keep the large French army that Napoleon was obliged to maintain in Spain constantly engaged in profitless campaigns.

To attribute Napoleon's final overthrow to the consequences of his expedition to Moscow is to take a superficial view of the forces that were working against him in Europe. This truth becomes evident when we realise that unparalleled though that disaster was, nevertheless Napoleon lost little in the control that he exercised over France and the other states. France, instead of deserting her Emperor, once more prepared to sacrifice herself, and stood firm in her support of him. Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Confederation of the Rhine gave no sign of defection, and Austria declared that she would respect the alliance of 1810. The results of the expedition were, however, momentous in that they encouraged Alexander to continue in his opposition to Napoleon, and roused a

determination in the Prussian people to strike once more for the liberty of their state. The union which was effected between Russia and Prussia was due not to any natural drawing together of the two states, but to the conviction on the part of Stein and the people and army of Prussia that the issue must be fought out with Napoleon, and that Prussia, though bound by treaty to fight on the side of France, must aid Russia to overthrow the Emperor. Aware that he would be supported by the people of Prussia, General Yorck dared to receive in a friendly manner the Russian advance that was pursuing Napoleon and to treat with it in the Convention of Tauroggen, December 30, 1812; and Stein dared to accept the governorship of East and West Prussia under a commission signed not by the King of Prussia, who was still outwardly the faithful ally of Napoleon, but by the Czar.

Thus the first step in the union of the Powers against Napoleon, the first step leading to the treaty which began the reconstruction of Europe, was the resultant of two treasonable acts against the King of Prussia, for which under ordinary circumstances the authors ought to have been severely punished. But the circumstances were not ordinary; as Yorck said, "The army wants war with France, the people want it, and so does the king; but the king has no free will. The army must make his will free." That the king was held in restraint, and was in reality favourable to the policy inaugurated by Yorck and Stein is evident from the rapidity of his change of face. Having ordered Yorck to be court-martialed on January 19th, on the 22d he withdrew from Berlin to Breslau, away from the French influence, and made from there his first appeal to the Prussian people, which authorised the arming of the population. On February 12th Yorck was given the chief command over the forces of Prussia and Pomerania, and on the 27th was signed the treaty of Kalisch, which marked the final separation of Prussia from the alliance with France, laid the foundation

for the fourth great coalition, and by its secret terms began the rearranging of the map of Europe, completed at Vienna two years later. According to these terms Prussia, having renounced all claim to Hanover, thus making easier the alliance with England, was to be restored as regards population, territory, and indebtedness, to the position she had occupied before 1806. With the declaration of war on March 16th and the famous appeal to the people of Prussia on the 17th, the first war of liberation was begun. The popular forces of Prussia, Spain, and Russia were now ranged against Napoleon, and the first step was taken leading to the union of the Powers, a union based upon the common desire of all the states to be freed from the yoke of France. The victory of Napoleon at Lützen May 2, 1813, was very different from those of Jena and Friedland. The all-important test of the situation was not whether the allies could defeat Napoleon in a single battle, but whether the new union could be maintained. Were the Powers willing to sink all party differences and political jealousies in the one great task of forcing Napoleon back into France? Were they ready to complete the work begun at Kalisch and to make that treaty the first of a series of agreements by which common resistance to Napoleon would be made an interest higher than those of state and a union would be formed that would outlast the circumstance to which its formation was due, a union that would determine not only the fate of Napoleon but also the relation of the European states in all diplomatic intercourse in the future? Herein lies the importance of the Fourth Coalition; those which had preceded belong, properly speaking, to the diplomatic history of the eighteenth century; the Fourth Coalition begins the diplomatic history of the present day.

The test of the situation was soon made. Already, as early as March 3d, Great Britain had promised to furnish Sweden a subsidy of a million pounds sterling in case she entered the

war, and agreed to support her claim to Norway in the final reconstruction. Therefore ten days after the defeat at Lützen Sweden joined the allies and sent 25,000 men to their aid in Germany. Again were the allies defeated, this time at Bautzen, May 20th, and again was the victory barren of advantages to Napoleon. The nations were now thoroughly roused. England on the 14th and 15th of June signed the treaty of Reichenbach with Prussia and Russia, and the three Powers strengthened the accord of Kalisch by mutual agreements in regard to the purposes of the war and the furnishing of money and men. Moreover Austria was wavering, and Wellington, a month after the defeat at Bautzen, won the battle of Vittoria in Spain over Jourdan, Soult's successor, drove King Joseph into France, and on June 20th defeated Soult himself, who was returning to the relief of Pampeluna. The events of the summer of 1813 leave us with the conviction that forces beyond Napoleon's control were slowly driving him step by step back from his conquest in the east, and that the very people whose importance he was inclined to belittle, were destined to crush him in the end.

But as yet the union of all the Powers had not been effected, for Austria still remained outside the coalition. The experiences of eight years were, however, gradually changing the attitude of the states of Europe toward one another. Common danger was creating a common interest, and private advantages were beginning to be set aside in the interest of the one absorbing need of the moment. Austria had taken no part in the first war of liberation, not because she did not hate Napoleon, but because Metternich was playing a cool, calculating, and essentially selfish diplomatic game. He was determined to adhere to the alliance that bound Austria to Napoleon until the opportunity should arise that would enable her to join the coalition, not merely with reasonable hope of success, but also with the certainty of holding the leadership in all

future actions of the Powers. He had no desire to be the liberator of Europe, but, working solely for the interest of Austria, wished to be then, as later, the arbiter of Europe. When, therefore, on June 4th, Napoleon granted to the allies an armistice—the "fatal" armistice of Pleiswitz—partly that he might recruit his shattered forces with new French levies, partly to gain time to bring up the army of Italy to intimidate Austria, he played directly into Metternich's hand. The latter, assuming the rôle of mediator between the opposing forces, let it be known to the allies that if Napoleon rejected the conditions upon which Austria's plan for a general peace was based, then that government would join the coalition. On the 26th of June, in a famous interview with Napoleon, Metternich became convinced that the French Emperor was doomed to failure if he continued the war; and on June 27th he signed a secret treaty with Prussia and Russia at Reichenbach, in which Austria promised, in case of Napoleon's refusal of her terms, to declare war against France, and to aid the allies with a force of 150,000 men. Napoleon having accepted Austria's mediation on the 30th, arrangements were made for a congress to meet at Prague to discuss the terms of the peace. There is little reason to believe that either Metternich or Napoleon was sincere in the matter; each knew that war was inevitable, and each was working to gain time to strengthen his military forces. When, therefore, the last hour of the 10th of August arrived, the date fixed for the close of the negotiation, and Napoleon still withheld the credentials of his representative, Metternich, putting the finishing touches to the war-manifesto of the Austrian Emperor, caused the beacons to be lighted which proclaimed to the army on the Silesian frontier that the negotiations had failed, and that the mighty struggle of the states of Europe against Napoleon was about to begin.

The favourable conditions under which Austria entered the

alliance in consequence of the defeat of Bautzen, the skilful diplomacy of Metternich, and the character of Alexander and Frederic William III., made it possible for Austria to define in her own terms the rules of conduct that were to govern the actions of the allies. These rules were based not on any recognition of the national movement that was making a successful resistance to Napoleon possible, but rather on the old state system that subordinated the people to the state, and the state to the person of the prince. The policy of Austria was the policy of Metternich, whose leadership in the affairs of Europe dates from the beginning of the second war of liberation. His doctrine differed from that of the old *régime* only in the elimination from it of the element of rivalry that had hitherto prevented a union of the Powers. Metternich looked with suspicion upon the Prussian national movement as revolutionary, and neither Alexander nor Frederic William was favourable to Stein's doctrine of the rights of a nation. Therefore they made no allusion to recent popular uprisings; they demanded the rejection of all revolutionary schemes, and insisted on the supremacy of princes and the preservation of the integrity of states. Thus while the people, to whose efforts were due the only effective blows thus far aimed at Napoleon's supremacy, were actuated by the new ideas, the rules that were to govern the future conduct of the war and the relation between the Powers were those of the past, not of the future. The struggle at Leipzig may have been the battle of nations, but the diplomacy that controlled the issues of the battle was the diplomacy of princes.

The second war of liberation began in August, 1813, and lasted until the allies stood upon the frontier of France in November of the same year. On one side or the other were ranged forces from every country in Europe except Turkey. Though in plan, strategic movement, and energy Napoleon showed no decline of military genius, he both underestimated the strength

and the unity of the allies, and he placed too much confidence in his own forces, who were no longer the veterans of Wagram and Moscow, but the untried troops of the conscriptions of 1812 and 1813. He had too little regard for the changed circumstances under which he was fighting, and he does not appear to have informed himself fully of the numerical strength and position of the enemy. His contempt for the military tactics of his opponents leading him to formulate a plan of campaign that took no recognition of possible defeat, he failed to prepare substitute movements—as he had been accustomed to do in all his earlier campaigns—to be used in case of any disarrangement of his original scheme. He reckoned without a true estimate of the difficulties of the situation; for he did not know, what is clear to us to-day, that the allies had resolved not to enter into any engagement with troops of which he was personally in command, but had agreed to concentrate all their energies upon his lieutenants. In consequence of this arrangement, Napoleon was obliged to see his plan thwarted early in the campaign by successive defeats, and losses so heavy as to render impossible the execution of the contemplated movement.

The campaign that followed is divided naturally into two parts by the stipulations of Töplitz. In the first period the allies acting, in a sense, separately, engaged with Napoleon's generals, and defeated Oudinot, Macdonald, Vandamme, and Ney in a series of well fought battles in August and September, 1813. But a defeat which the Austrian general Schwarzenberg suffered at the hands of Napoleon himself made it clearer than before that however successful the allies might be in defeating Napoleon's subordinates, a change of plan was necessary before the issue could be fought out with Napoleon himself. With the Emperor at bay, and acting on the defensive, with his troops massed together at the centre of operations in Saxony, more united efforts than before were needed if suc-

cess were to be attained. Furthermore, as the Powers came to believe that with concerted action the downfall of Napoleon was inevitable, they found themselves face to face with the problem of European reconstruction, and began to desire a more definite understanding upon this question. Therefore, on September 9th, the allies met at Töplitz, and enlarged the agreements made at Kalisch and Reichenbach, and defined the present and future policy of the alliance. England now came into the common accord, and the four chief Powers agreed upon concerted action, promising not to conclude peace, armistice, or convention without the common consent. This agreement, founded though it was on military necessity, is the first common act marking the transition from the public system of the eighteenth century to that of the nineteenth. Jealousy and rivalry there still were, but the need of union was stronger than either of these. To this need everything else was subordinated; each of the three continental Powers guaranteed to each of the others the integrity of its own state; Austria and Prussia retained the extent of territory possessed in the year 1805, and eastern Europe was restored to the condition it was in before the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. At the same time, in order to rescue central Europe from the influence of Napoleon, the allies guaranteed to each seceding member of the Confederation of the Rhine absolute freedom. Independent sovereignty, which had not been legally possessed by these states in the days of the Holy Roman Empire, Napoleon himself had offered as a reward to the states of Germany, when after the dissolution of the Empire he effected the erection of the Rhenic Confederacy. Metternich in accepting this *status quo* and confirming the full sovereignty of the individual states, acted with a double purpose. He wished to offer terms most likely to attract the separate states to the side of the allies; and at the same time he was determined to resist the national policy of Stein, who was endeavouring to remove barriers to

German unity, not to create them. In this act Metternich fixed the course of German history and postponed the consolidation of German nationality for fifty-three years.

Having regulated these important matters, the allies prepared to unite their forces in a combined attack upon Napoleon's position at Leipzig. For three days, October 16th, 17th, and 18th, the battle raged, and finally ended in the overwhelming defeat of the Emperor and the downfall of his personal supremacy and of the Empire outside of France. His mastery beyond the Rhine vanished; the members of the Rhenic Confederacy withdrew from him their allegiance and the Confederation ceased to exist; the kingdom of Westphalia fell with the flight of its ruler; Holland rose against the French quartered on her soil; the Italian states began to bestir themselves either for the return of their old rulers, or for unity and a republic. Gradually the allies cleared the western German provinces of French troops, and in the early days of November pushed forward to the frontier of France. The people that Napoleon had so grievously affronted were now ready to enter France itself, upon whose soil no hostile foreigner had trod for twenty years. France was encompassed on the south as well as the east. Along the Rhine were the armies of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and the minor states; while on the southern frontier was Wellington, who during the autumn months had captured the French garrisons of San Sebastian and Pampeluna, and with the way thus opened into France had terminated the peninsular war by defeating Soult at St. Pierre on French soil, and compelling him to retire to Bayonne.

An important question now presented itself for solution. Should the allies enter France, or should they treat with Napoleon and allow him to retain his Empire and his dynasty? The object of the war of 1813 had been attained. The pressure of foreign rule was removed, the Confederation of the Rhine was dissolved, Napoleon was driven back into his own terri-

tory, and defensive measures were no longer needed. In fact, events had moved so rapidly for the allies that they could hardly realise that the grand imperial structure had fallen; and so very rapidly had it crumbled to pieces that they were brought to take the offensive before even their plans for defence were fully matured. To be suddenly transformed from conquered to conquerors, to have seen Napoleon, stripped of allies, in flight, and depending upon the resources of France alone, was to attain to a sudden and unexpected prosperity before they were ready for it, and to stand face to face with new problems and new situations before arrangements had been made to cope with them. It is little to be wondered at that the allies disagreed as to the best course to be pursued; for the perplexity natural under the circumstances was increased by the attitude of the Powers toward each other. Austria was unquestionably jealous of Prussia and Russia, and Metternich, inasmuch as he considered these countries to be too much influenced by liberal ideas, looked with suspicion upon all plans they advanced. Therefore Metternich, who, as we know, practically controlled the diplomatic situation, was for peace and the preservation of the Napoleonic Empire within reasonable limits. In this view the smaller German states concurred, and England also, having no economic interest at stake and actuated by no spirit of revenge, was opposed to rousing France to a greater fury, and was content if the imperial territory were restricted. On the other hand, the war party, consisting of Russia and Prussia, felt that as long as Napoleon remained in power, no matter how small the territory left to France, he would always be a menace to the peace of Europe. No boundaries had satisfied him in the past, and no boundaries would satisfy him in the future; furthermore, so great was the power of his personal magnetism that in all probability France would follow his leadership in any emergency, even against her own will. Thus argued the war party, influenced, it may be said, by a desire to

retaliate; and to them, therefore, nothing save the dethronement of Napoleon seemed adequate to meet the emergency. Prussia, still burning with indignation at the remembrance of the insults heaped upon her, was not satisfied to let her conqueror go unpunished, and Alexander wished to invade France because Napoleon had invaded Russia. As for the moment, however, the war party yielded to the opinion of Metternich and consented to treat for peace, proposals were agreed upon at Frankfort and issued on the 9th of November. The terms now offered were not so favourable to Napoleon as those made to him before the second war of liberation. In the summer of 1813 the allies would have left the Emperor many of the gains of Pressburg and Tilsit; but at Frankfort, with the battle of Leipzig no longer uncertain, and with Napoleon back once more within the boundaries of France, they felt that to talk of his controlling any territory outside of France was absurd, and agreed to go back to the treaty of Lunéville in 1801 and to offer France her natural boundaries, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, as limits satisfactory for a great and stable empire. In addition, it was decided to offer freedom to Germany, Italy, and Holland, and to restore the old dynasty in Spain, thus beginning the restoration of the European states.

There is, however, every reason to believe that Napoleon had no intention of accepting the very favourable terms offered to him. Why this was true we can only conjecture. Doubtless he hoped that the differences of opinion soon leading to dissension among the allies would bring about a dissolution of the coalition. Having possibly become aware that his tenure as Emperor depended on his showing a bold front, he may have felt that to abandon his war policy would be an indication of weakness. Perhaps his confidence in his own astonishing good fortune prevented a clear insight into the threatening character of the situation confronting him. Whatever the cause may have been, it is evident that to him negotiations

were only useful as an expedient to gain time. Now, as ever, he consulted his own interests, and thought nothing of the welfare of France or the happiness of her people. Even though many indications of discontent might have made a wiser man pause, Napoleon did not understand the new mood of the French people. Though he accepted the proposal of a congress to meet at Mannheim, he carefully avoided committing himself to the terms of the allies.

The delay of Napoleon and the growing conviction among the allies that no real peace was possible, led to the victory of the war party, and the determination to withdraw the proposals already made. On December 1st the Emperor was informed that the armistice was closed, and on the 13th the combined forces crossed the Rhine. From the east and south four large armies, three of the continental Powers and one under Wellington, entered the French territory to maintain the cause of outraged nations against a Power that in its foreign relations for more than a decade had violated nearly every principle of justice and law. That to Napoleon the invasion was a surprise in the promptness with which it was executed and in the unanimity with which the allies acted, appears from the fact that he made no attempt to guard the frontier, and left nearly 150,000 men in fortresses in Germany. Of all the allies Austria alone seems to have been anxious to postpone the final issue, and it is true that the Austrian army neither moved nor acted with the vigour and enthusiasm of the armies of Russia and Prussia.

The campaign that followed was the first that was conducted on French soil. Two aspects of it are worthy of notice: the superb defence made by Napoleon, and the increasing severity of the demands of the allies, due to their determination, which increased as the weakness of Napoleon became more apparent, to restore the political boundaries of Europe as nearly as possible to the form they had taken before the Revolution.

The position of the Emperor was most discouraging. The exhaustion of France was becoming every day more alarming, and he was able to gather together no more than 60,000 men, of whom few had vigor and experience. Expressions of discontent were common enough in Paris, and even in the *Corps législatif* the report of the committee contained strong words against imperial absolutism, and asked for some limitations upon the imperial power. The propositions made by Napoleon to Spain and the Pope, for the purpose of weakening the allies and of checking, if possible, the advance of Wellington from the south, were rejected; Holland had already driven all the French troops and imperial officials from her territory, and had recalled the Prince of Orange; and, most important of all, Murat, King of Naples, Napoleon's brother-in-law, who might have turned the issue of the campaign by threatening Austria from the side of Italy, concluded a treaty with Austria and England, and in the hope of becoming dynastic king of Italy joined the allies. The situation seemed wholly favourable to the enemies of the Emperor, and Blücher's victory at La Rothière on February 1st, in strengthening the conviction that Napoleon's downfall was at hand, led Schwarzenberg, as head of the Austrian forces and representative of Metternich's policy, to propose a renewal of the peace negotiations. The basis of such negotiations had been discussed at some length at Langres about a week before, and so positively had Alexander and Metternich disagreed as to the conduct and purpose of the war that at one time Austria threatened to withdraw her army. But the Czar, yielding to the persuasions of the peace party, consented to the opening of a peace congress at Châtillon, February 8th. To this congress Napoleon sent his envoy, Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, with full powers to negotiate for a peace. Unfortunately the Emperor seems to have been labouring under the conviction that the congress of Châtillon was simply the congress of Mannheim postponed, and that the Frankfort proposals

were to be made the basis of every treaty of peace. On the other hand, Alexander still persisted in his determination to dethrone Napoleon, and to place on the throne of France either Bernadotte or the Bourbons. In the presence of such differences of opinion, agreement was practically impossible; and as Austria, England, and Prussia, although resolved not to return to terms as favourable as those of Frankfort, were at this time opposed to the extreme measures of the Czar, the work of the congress dragged, and Alexander, by the withdrawal of his representative, forced a postponement before any agreement had been reached.

Then began Napoleon's series of victories. The Prussians under Blücher and Yorck were defeated in the valley of the Marne in four battles, February 10th to 14th, with a loss of 20,000 men. On the 17th two Russian corps under Wittgenstein and Wrede were almost cut to pieces in a bloody combat at Nangis, and on the 18th, the main army under Schwarzenberg was attacked near the junction of the Seine and the Yonne, defeated, and driven back to Troyes in a battle famous, not only as one of the most stubbornly contested of the campaign, but also as the last of Napoleon's victories. Metternich somewhat disdainfully calls this a skirmish, but it was enough of a victory to impress Napoleon with the belief that the allies, disorganised and demoralised, were in full retreat across the Rhine. The victory, coming as it did between the first and second periods of the congress of Châtillon, essentially altered the situation; for on February 17th, when the congress reopened and the allies presented to Caulaincourt the terms according to which a treaty would be drawn up, Napoleon was in a position, so far as his own view of the situation was concerned, very different from that occupied two weeks previously. Then, defeated at La Rothière, he had sought for peace to save Paris, although it is probable that even then he would have repudiated any agreement that his envoy might have made

based on terms less favourable than those of Frankfort. Now, however, as conqueror he took a more definite stand. He was willing to make peace, and to allow the allies to depart for home unmolested, but only on the condition that France be allowed to retain in full her natural limits. Any other proposition he rejected with scorn. But the allies, not discouraged by defeat, had equally made up their minds that the Frankfort terms should not be offered to Napoleon; that the only possible basis of agreement was not the territorial conditions of 1801, but those of 1791, that is, France without Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhenish provinces. A deadlock was, therefore, inevitable. Caulaincourt, hoping that Napoleon would see the necessity of a compromise, for ten days used every device to gain time. On February 29th a definite answer not having been returned, the allies determined to bring the conference to a close, and for the second time Alexander recalled his representative. Hope of an agreement with Napoleon was now practically abandoned, and a new necessity presented itself arising from the fear lest Austria, who had consistently opposed a vigorous war policy, should withdraw from the coalition. A closer agreement between the Powers was necessary, a more definite treaty to bind the allies more firmly together. The treaty of Chaumont, signed March 1, 1814, was for a purpose similar to that aimed at in the treaty of Töplitz, but its terms are of greater importance to the student of the period, in that they were intended to govern not only the aggressive action of the allies in the emergency that confronted them, but also in all relations offensive and defensive for the future. The treaty is the most important thus far made, for upon it rests the common accord existing among the European states of the present time. After promising to act harmoniously for the restoration of peace to Europe, to sign no treaty save by common consent, to furnish 150,000 men each for the prosecution of the campaign, England adding a subsidy of £5,000,000, the Powers agree

"that the present treaty, having for its object the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe, the peace and independence of the Powers, the prevention of the encroachments which have hitherto desolated the world, is intended to last for twenty years dating from the day of signing, and then, if circumstances demand, a convention will be called three years before its expiration to discuss the question of further prolongation." This article marked, in the history of the European state system, a constitutional advance of the most important kind; for it looked forward to the period beyond the fall of Napoleon, beyond the general congress agreed upon at Töplitz, to the Europe of the future. It interpreted in a manner unknown to the old *régime* the doctrine of the balance of power, in that it proclaimed for Europe a public law that recognised, not only the sovereignty of the individual states, but also a common interest of Europe that each state was obliged to respect. The treaties of Kalisch, Reichenbach, Töplitz, and Chaumont mark stages in the gradual building up of a new European system, and indicate a steady progress toward a higher conception of the obligations under which the Powers stood to each other. Although these new principles, founded as they were on military necessity, and imperfectly developed amidst selfish rivalries, have been employed as well for the arrestment as for the advancement of society, they have, nevertheless, made it possible to create a European equilibrium truer and more stable than that of the eighteenth century.

The negotiations ended with the signing of the treaty of Chaumont, and the close of the congress of Châtillon two weeks later. The allies had made their last real attempt to bring about a peace, and Napoleon had lost his last opportunity of retaining the throne of France. War was renewed; but again a difference of opinion arose among the allies as to the plan to be followed in the new campaign. Prussia insisted on a combined advance of the three armies in the direction of

Paris, but Austria, timid as usual, and unwilling to risk the fate of the campaign on the chance of a single battle, preferred gradually to wear out Napoleon's strength by separate movements. Either plan would undoubtedly have succeeded in the exhausted state of Napoleon's troops. Events were, however, now moving too rapidly to be affected by the rivalries of the allied sovereigns, for the hostile armies were fast surrounding the Emperor. Wellington, pushing up from the south, was compelling Soult to retire beyond the Garonne, and was aiding the royalists in Bordeaux in their attempt to proclaim as Louis XVIII., the Bourbon Count of Provence; while Blücher by a fine side movement hurried to join the army of the north, and in conjunction with Bülow defeated Napoleon at Laon, March 9th and 10th. The Emperor in desperation turned southward, and with only 40,000 men gave battle to Schwarzenberg's division of 100,000 men at Arcis-sur-Aube, but in the encounter that followed he saw the uselessness of prolonging the battle, and for the moment revived the plan that had occurred to him after the defeat at Leipzig of cutting off the connection of the allies with the rear, rescuing the garrisons imprisoned in the German fortresses, and rousing the old Confederation of the Rhine to come to his aid. In that desperate scheme he reckoned too much on the irresolution of the allies when he concluded that they would not dare to move forward with an enemy in their rear. This was, however, exactly what they did dare to do. Disregarding the Emperor's movement eastward toward the Vosges, they put into practice the lesson that he himself had taught them, and pushed on to seize the capital. Having defeated Mortier and Marmont at La Fère-Champenoise in the most successful battle fought since the beginning of the campaign, the combined armies passed down the Bondy and La Bourget roads leading to Paris, which they reached on March 30th. Napoleon hurried back from Doulevent to save his capital, but when he was within fifteen miles of the city, he

learned that, after ten hours' fighting in the outskirts of the city on the part of the French troops, his brother Joseph, lieutenant-governor of Paris, had given authority to the marshals to capitulate, and had left the city. On the same day the terms of capitulation were signed, and on the next, March 31st, the allied armies entered Paris.

Now at last Napoleon was ready to make such terms with the allies as would save his throne and dynasty. But their demands had grown with their success. If at Châtillon they would have left Napoleon his dynasty and his Empire within the French boundaries of 1791, at Paris they demanded an unconditional abdication. For some time the question had been before them, and the difficulty lay in the fact that in this, as in so many other matters, they disagreed as to the best course to be followed after final defeat was assured. There can be little doubt that the Austrian Emperor would have preferred to leave his son-in-law in possession of his throne. Metternich had said to Caulaincourt, "You must be aware of our views, principles, and wishes. . . . these are for a dynasty so closely bound up with our own;" and Talleyrand reports a similar speech in which Metternich said that it was not possible to think of the Bourbons as the new sovereigns, because of the personal character of the princes of that family. Castlereagh, the English minister, and Hardenberg the minister of Prussia, were inclined to favour the same view. In support of the dethronement of Napoleon stood Alexander, although he was by no means committed to the cause of the Bourbons; indeed, from a personal repugnance to that family he was inclined to support the cause of Bernadotte, in whom, however, the other Powers had no confidence. Stein, interestingly enough, was in favour of restoring the Bourbons, for, as he says, "I supported their cause on all occasions, regarding their restoration as the effect of their hereditary right to the French throne, which not having been extinguished in any valid manner was to be main-

tained in all circumstances ; and considering all other solutions, such as a completely new dynasty—there being no eminent man towering above all others who might be the founder of it—absolutely inadmissible.'' Pozzo di Borgo thought the same, and both agreed with Talleyrand that nothing remained but Bonaparte or the Bourbons, and that any attempt to create a regency or to appoint Bernadotte was a mere intrigue. The opinion of Stein, who since the retreat from Moscow had become a favoured adviser of the Czar, had considerable weight with Alexander, who, beginning to recognise that Talleyrand's judgment was the better, not only entered into communication with him, but also took up his abode at his house. In point of fact, however, all the allies were agreed that Talleyrand was best able to frame and carry out the plan suited to the emergency ; and he, finding that the decision lay in his hands, supported the Bourbons because he knew that only their restoration could reconcile Europe to France. As president of the Senate, he convened that body, the old Senate of the constitution of the year VIII., which alone of all the legislative divisions had remained intact during the autocratic rule of Napoleon. On April 2d, rejecting Napoleon's offer to abdicate in favour of his son, this body voted in favour of his deposition, and retirement from the exercise of all powers, and erected a provisional government with Talleyrand as its presiding officer. When Napoleon heard of this action of the Senate he abdicated unconditionally on the 6th of April, and accepted the conditions of the allies that were embodied in a treaty signed five days afterwards.

By the terms of the treaty Napoleon was allowed to retain the now meaningless title of Emperor, and was given in full sovereignty the island of Elba as his place of sojourn, with a yearly revenue of two millions of francs to be paid by whatever government France established. The duchies of Parma, Plaisance, and Guastalla were given in full sovereignty to the

Empress Marie Louise, and to the various members of the family, including the ex-Empress Josephine, large annuities were granted. A safe conduct was allowed to all who wished to go with Napoleon to Elba, an escort of the imperial guard was provided to accompany him to the place of embarkation, a corvette was furnished for his exclusive use at the island, and a body guard of one hundred faithful men was permitted to remain with him. On the 12th Napoleon ratified the treaty, and, remaining at Fontainebleau until the 20th, lingered long enough to realise what appears to have come to him as a painful surprise, that he had long ago lost the support of the better elements of France. Deserted by his generals, who gave their adherence to the new government, by his councillors, many of whom were prominent in the government itself, and by his wife, who returned to her father, he suffered a last insult in the attack by the mob of royalists at Orgon on his way to Elba. And yet, even before he left the soil of France, the sound of party conflict, the murmurs of the people and the army, who hated the *émigrés* and were unfavourable to the restoration of the Bourbons, may have reached his ears, and have assured him that if his own personal supremacy in Europe was at last ended, France had not gained the peace and satisfaction for which she had been so long waiting.

CHAPTER III.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM.

WITH the departure of Napoleon to Elba and the return of the Bourbons, France to all outward appearance was approaching the position she had occupied before the Revolution. The *émigrés*, led by the Count of Artois, who had been one of the first to leave France in the early days of the Revolution, were crowding back, and were taking their places once more in the state and the army; the white cockade was already supplanting the tri-colour; the territory of France was to be but little greater than it had been in the reign of Louis XVI., and a Bourbon king was once more to sit upon the throne of his ancestors. The work of the Revolution and of Napoleon would seem to have been undone; each step in the outward expansion of the power of France from 1792 to 1812 had been retraced in the rapid retreat after the Moscow campaign. The political boundaries of the majority of the European states were to be restored as nearly as possible to what they had been before the Revolution; and in consequence, the face of Europe, politically distorted by Napoleonic conquest, was to take on a more familiar form. In France, save in the administrative, judicial, and financial organisation, apparently little trace of Napoleon's work remained. The Bourbons and the *émigrés*, with no appreciation of the real work of the Revolution and the Empire, cast from them the memory of all recent events, and prepared to enjoy once more a *régime* of legitimism and prerogative.

But it needs only a brief examination to show that such an appearance was only on the surface, and that Europe had passed through a period in which an organic change had taken place both in the social structure and in the ideas and expectations of the people at large. War had diverted, deflected, and, in some instances, retarded the progressive tendencies of the period before 1789, but it had in no sense destroyed them. Napoleon fell because he could not withstand the strong national feeling that his aggressions had quickened in the peoples of Europe outside of France. But it is only in the history of the next fifty years that we can find the demonstration of the propositions laid down by the Constituent Assembly. National unity and individual liberty constitutionally defined are the terms that indicate the forces that the Revolution set loose. In watching the working of these forces we shall be studying the history of Europe.

The work of restoration was not, however, based upon the ideas that were stirring in the minds and hearts of the people of Europe. Such ideas were not capable of immediate application, partly because they were not recognised by the diplomats, who had before them the task of reorganisation, partly, because they were as yet ill defined and too closely identified with the recent violence of the French not to be dreaded by those who desired peace. This fear of popular movement was well expressed by Metternich when it was proposed to leave the selection of a ruler to the choice of the people of France. "The plan of calling the nation," he said, "to deliberate on questions concerning the foundations of the social edifice of France, would unchain the Revolution again, and can never be the object of the alliance [of the Powers] or the meaning of their deliberations." Here we see expressed the fear that the conservative statesmen entertained for the popular movement. The example of the Revolution had not inspired them with confidence in the rule of the masses, while the aggres-

sions of the French nation under Napoleon had only strengthened the governments in their belief that to recognise the claims of the people was to endanger the peace and order of Europe. It is not strange that a majority of the statesmen should have been unable to appreciate the importance of the new principles, and, considering them dangerous, should have turned from them to a policy that involved nothing new, and that had for its object restoration, not revolution. For this doctrine, a new term, legitimism, was invented, which meant the legitimacy not merely of kings but of governments. "A lawful government," says Talleyrand, "be it monarchical or republican, hereditary or elective, aristocratic or democratic, is always one whose existence, form, and mode of action have been consolidated and consecrated by a long succession of years. . . . The legitimacy of the sovereign power results from the ancient status of possession." Such a doctrine seemed wholly admirable to the supporters of the old state system, and they accepted with satisfaction the first application of it in the return of the Bourbons to France. In this Talleyrand professed to act in defence of the new principle of prescriptive right inherent in some particular family; but in reality he used "legitimacy" as a convenient political catchword, whereby to advance the best interests of France. He believed that the return of the Count of Provence as Louis XVIII. was the wish of the French people, and that in no other way could France be restored to her place in the European brotherhood of kings. The return of Louis XVIII. was due in the first place to Talleyrand, then to the importunities of royalists and *émigrés*, and lastly, and in the smallest degree, to the allies. With the actual summons of the Bourbons the allies had nothing to do; their share was the official recognition of the new government, which they believed to represent the will of the nation.

After the entrance of the king, Louis XVIII. into Paris, and

the issue of the declaration of Saint-Ouen, in which he promised to adopt a liberal constitution, the first important duty was to determine the conditions of reconciliation that the allies would accept, and so draw up a treaty of peace. This treaty also was the work of Talleyrand, who had been appointed by the new king minister of foreign affairs, and he defends its conditions bravely in his *Mémoires*, maintaining that the treaty was far from unfavourable to France; that it was not to be expected that the state, "drained as she was of men, money, and resources, invaded on all her frontiers at the same time by innumerable armies composed of people animated with a spirit of hate and vengeance," should expect tender treatment at the hands of the allies. He takes pride in the fact that by this, the first treaty of Paris, ratified April 30, 1814, France not only received back the greater part of her colonies, but in retaining Avignon, the county of Venaissin, the county of Montbéliard, and all the districts formerly belonging to Germany that had been annexed to France before January 1, 1792, she was also gaining much more in the way of a frontier than had been offered to Napoleon at Châtillon. In the latter case the conditions of 1791 had been the basis of agreement; in the former, the conditions of 1792.

In addition to questions affecting French interests directly, the allies debated and embodied in the text of the treaty certain important matters looking to the reconstruction of Europe and the common interest of the nations. Switzerland was declared independent; Holland was restored to the house of Orange, with the promise of an increase of territory; Italy, outside the limits that were to remain Austrian, was to be composed of sovereign states; while the decision of Töplitz, guaranteeing the independence of the separate German states was confirmed, and the important additional statement was made that the future government of Germany should be of a federal and not of an imperial character. Of the matters of common interest the

most important related to the navigation of rivers that separated or crossed different states. In order to facilitate intercourse among nations, the Rhine was declared to be free to all nations, and the Scheldt, in a secret treaty signed the same day, was also thrown open to all. Furthermore, the allies made important additions to the private international law of Europe when they declared that no inhabitant of countries restored or ceded should be held liable either in person or property on account of his conduct, political opinion, or attachment previous to the signing of the treaty ; and that all foreign or native residents of such countries should be allowed six years in which to dispose of their goods, and to remove to whatever country they pleased.

Important as was the treaty of Paris it could not settle all European questions, and therefore it expressly arranged for a general congress that should complete the work of reorganisation. "Within the space of two months," says the text of the treaty, "all the Powers that have been engaged on either side in the present war, shall send plenipotentiaries to Vienna to regulate in a general congress, the arrangements that are necessary to complete the dispositions of the present treaty." Here were to be discussed and drafted in one general treaty the rearrangements of territory that had been agreed to either in the treaties of Kalisch, Töplitz, Chaumont, and Paris, or in special treaties that had been made, mainly in 1813 and 1814, between individual states.

In September, 1814, in consequence of this agreement, there assembled at Vienna diplomats from nearly every state in Europe. There were present not only the accredited representatives of the European Powers, but also an extraordinarily large number of the sovereigns of Europe. In size, in brilliancy, in the extravagance of the entertainments, and the activity of the social life during the period of the sitting, the congress of Vienna was the most elaborately organised con-

gress that had been held up to this time in Europe. In the work that it accomplished it stands second only to the congress that framed the treaty of Westphalia ; in the adroitness of the diplomats, of whom none was more clever or more successful than Talleyrand himself, it is without equal. Arriving a few days after the others, Talleyrand found that the representatives of the four Powers, apparently assuming that the congress was but a continuation of the alliance of Chaumont, had already agreed that neither France nor Spain nor any Power of the second order should take part in the deliberations, but that all decisions should be made by the allies. Talleyrand, soon showing that this arrangement was contrary to the article of the treaty of Paris providing for the congress, gained his first success in securing for the representative of France a share in the deliberations on a footing equal to that of the representatives of the allied Powers. Having thus raised France, who had been conquered only five months previously, to what he considered was her proper place in Europe, he next applied his genius as a diplomat to the enforcement of his doctrine of legitimacy, and his skill as an intriguer to creating dissension among the allies. In both particulars he was eminently successful. Although throughout the congress he was apparently proclaiming and supporting his favourite principle of legitimacy, in reality he was using it to conceal the efforts that he was making to advance the interests of France. He used the question regarding the disposal of Saxony to break up the quadruple alliance ; and he insisted upon the restoration of the King of Naples to gain for France an ally in Italy ; he supported the neutrality of Switzerland, thereby to strengthen the French frontier at its weakest point ; and even in agreeing to such decisions as the union of Holland and Belgium, or the annexation of Genoa to Sardinia, which seemed directly aimed at France, he believed he was doing his country more good than harm. On the whole we may agree with him when he says that, " notwithstanding

the disadvantages of the position in which France found herself at the opening of the congress, she succeeded in taking in the deliberations such a leading part that the most important questions were decided according to her views, and after the principles that she had established and sustained."

We can better appreciate Tallyrand's remark as we examine in greater detail the work of the congress, the chief features of which were the restoration of rulers and governments based on the principle of legitimacy; the redistribution of conquered territory, and the granting of indemnities; the reorganisation of Germany, and the settlement of certain matters of an economic and commercial nature foreshadowed in the agreement of Paris. In the discussion of the questions embraced in the first group no serious difficulties presented themselves, for the allies had in the main already determined upon the policy to be followed, and had made their first application of it in returning Louis XVIII. to France. They also confirmed the restoration of Pius VII. to the Papal States, and Ferdinand VII. to Spain, that Napoleon had effected before his downfall. Victor Emmanuel was restored to the kingdom of Sardinia, and in view of the fact that there were no heirs and the direct line was in danger of dying out, the right of inheritance was transferred to the collateral line of Carignan. This, in the mind of Talleyrand, was a safeguard against any claim to the Sardinian throne, to which Austria might have been entitled by marriage. Furthermore, Bernadotte's title to the Swedish throne was assured; the exiled princes of Germany were put in full possession of their principalities, according to the arrangement of Töplitz and Chaumont; the house of Brunswick was re-established in Hanover, the house of Habsburg-Lorraine in Tuscany, the house of Orange in Holland, and the house of Braganza in Portugal; Switzerland was declared independent and neutral forever, and finally Ferdinand IV. of Naples was made Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies. In the latter case the allies, espe-

cially Austria, were in duty bound to defend the claims of Murat, who had been promised the Neapolitan throne as the price of his defection; but Metternich, convinced that an independent state under the old Napoleonist would be a hindrance to absolute Austrian control over the peninsula, effected Murat's overthrow in May, 1815. Thus, so far as the dynasties were concerned, no important change that had been brought about by Napoleon was allowed to remain; all usurping dynasties were swept from the face of Europe.

When, however, it came to the question of the distribution of territory, the solution was neither simple nor easy. It was, in fact the most difficult of all the problems presented to the congress, for it gave every opportunity for jealousy, rivalry, and friction. The simplest matter to be settled was the distribution of territories that had been taken by the chief Powers during the war, the right to which had been confirmed by treaty. Russia retained Finland, Bessarabia, and the Persian border provinces; Austria retained Lombardo-Venetia, as had been agreed upon at Paris, and the Tyrol, Salzburg, and Liechtenstein in accordance with a secret treaty with Bavaria; Bavaria retained Ansbach and Baireuth, which Prussia in 1813 had agreed to concede to her; Prussia returned to the position occupied before 1806, except that she had gained the island of Rügen and Swedish Pomerania, by surrendering Lauenburg and paying 2,000,000 crowns to Denmark, who, in the first instance, had received them from Sweden as indemnity for the loss of Norway.

The second group of distributed territories included such as were added to restored states in order to preserve the balance of power and to build up a strong defence against France. According to the agreement made at Paris that Holland should be enlarged, the Belgic provinces were placed under the control of the house of Orange, thus uniting under one dynasty two peoples, who differed in race, religion, and economic interests;

the promise made to Bernadotte by Alexander, and confirmed by England, that Norway should be added to Sweden was fulfilled; and Genoa was annexed to the reconstituted kingdom of Sardinia, in order to make more powerful, as it seemed to the allies, the state that controlled the entrance from France to the plains of Italy. Even Talleyrand agreed to this, because he thought that the erection of a strong state in the northwestern part of Italy would act as a counterpoise to any attempt of Austria to extend her power southward. Lastly, three new cantons, Geneva, Neufchâtel, and Valais, were added to the nineteen existing cantons of Switzerland, thus completing the number of the cantons as they are to-day. In nearly every case these cessions were the result of previous agreement.

The settlement of the questions that came up in connection with the third group of distributed territories involved the allies in a long and bitter controversy. The territories concerned, Poland and Saxony, one of which had been erected by Napoleon into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, while the other had held consistently to the cause of Napoleon to the end of the Leipzig campaign, were at the disposal of the allies. The difficulty that arose was a most natural one. Russia wanted the Duchy of Warsaw in order to re-establish the kingdom of Poland as a free state under a Russian protectorate; Prussia wanted all Saxony as a suitable indemnity for her sufferings and her losses. But the other Powers, believing that the equilibrium of Europe would be endangered if Prussia were allowed to have an enormous extension of territory in central Germany, and Russia to extend her western frontier nearly to the Oder, were quite unwilling to grant the claims of these two states. Alexander, yielding to the opinion that a Poland almost entirely in the possession of Russia, would be a cause of continual anxiety to Europe, and Talleyrand, with characteristic sophistry arguing that where the interest of one state was evidently involved the principle of legitimacy did not hold good, the Polish

question was settled without serious result, and a division was agreed upon. Russia obtained by far the larger share, thereby pushing her territory westward to its present frontier; Prussia, although she lost a part of what she had received in the third partition of 1795, gained enough to give her a well-rounded eastern boundary; Austria acquired Galicia and the salt mines of Wieliczka; and the territory of Cracow was declared to be free, independent, and neutral, the congress expressly decreeing that the Poles were to have a representation and national institutions guaranteed them by Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

But the Saxon question was far more difficult to settle. If the harmony of the congress had been disturbed by the discussion over Poland, it was broken by the discussion over Saxony. Now was the time for Talleyrand to show his power of intrigue. Knowing that Russia and Prussia would stand together, he applied himself to the task of winning England and Austria to the French point of view, which was to preserve Saxony and to restore her king. England was at first inclined to favour annexation, desiring a strong state in northern Europe as protection against Russian aggression. Austria did not oppose this, although Metternich had little sympathy with many German patriots in their desire to effect the annexation with the hope of furthering the cause of German unity. The matter might have turned out differently had not Prussia refused to join England and Austria against the Russian project in Poland. The western Powers, fearing an increase of Russian strength, were anxious to draw Prussia away from the alliance with that Power. When, therefore, Prussia and Russia began to assume an attitude of defiance, and it was learned that they had entered into new treaty arrangements November, 1814, Talleyrand seized his opportunity, and by the formation of a secret alliance between France, Austria, and England, according to which each agreed to furnish if necessary 150,000 men

to check Russo-Prussian ambition, won his greatest diplomatic victory. This treaty satisfied the ambition of Talleyrand in that it completed the victory of France. That state recently so humbled was now acting in close concert with two of the greatest states of Europe, England and Austria, and with three second class Powers, Bavaria, Sardinia, and Hanover. There was also a prospect that other states would enter the alliance. In less than one year from the treaty of Chaumont (March 1, 1814 to January 3, 1815) France had become the chief and soul of a coalition of her own against the signers of the treaty of Kalisch. But Talleyrand carried his diplomatic zeal too far. We may well believe with Pasquier that the advantages of this alliance for France were more apparent than real, and that the loss of the friendship with Russia, who had been the most instrumental of all the allies in effecting the return of the Bourbons, was hardly compensated by the union with England and Austria, who during the war had been the bitterest enemies of France, and had to the last resisted the dethronement of Napoleon. In another and still more important particular was Talleyrand lacking in political foresight. In consequence of his insistence, in which he was supported by Austria, a compromise on the Saxon question was agreed to. The king was restored, but his kingdom was dismembered, and Prussia received about one-half of the whole, with compensations for the remainder in the neighbourhood of the Rhine. Inasmuch as these new provinces lay along the French frontier, Prussia was made by this action of the congress the natural guardian of the Rhine, and became in consequence a central rather than an eastern German state; Austria by giving up her Netherlandish provinces, taking in place of them Dalmatian and Italian territory, was moving in a south-eastern direction away from Germany; and Prussia was pushing westward into the heart of Germany. This movement, which had begun with the settlement of the Jülich-Cleve question in the seventeenth century, had been checked by Na-

poleon, who sought to push Prussia eastward in order to make impossible German unity under Prussian leadership. The restoration of the western provinces began the undoing of Napoleon's work, for Prussia now returned to her former position with increased territory.

The third group of problems related to the reconstitution of Germany, than which no state in Europe had suffered greater changes. In 1803 the imperial constitution had undergone an entire alteration, and the old Holy Roman Empire had become in a sense Germanic. The ecclesiastical estates were secularised and distributed; the small principalities began to disappear, and the large states began to grow larger. Having overthrown the Empire in 1806 and enlarged the lesser states by mediatising the lands of the knights, the lowest class of the feudal order, Napoleon transformed some of these states into kingdoms and gave them independence and sovereignty, knowing full well that in strengthening their spirit of particularism he was placing a serious obstacle in the path of German unity. After the treaty of Tilsit he gathered thirty of these states into his enlarged Confederation of the Rhine, begun in 1805, a preliminary work that greatly simplified the task of the congress. The Powers, accepting the situation as Napoleon left it, and recognising the sovereignty of the members of the Rhenic Confederacy, declared in the treaty of Paris that the Empire should be replaced by a federal body. The discussion of the form that the German constitution should take had begun in November, 1814, but interrupted, first by the Saxon question, and again by the return of Napoleon in March, 1815, it was finally taken up and carried to completion in May and June of the same year. There were three possibilities for Germany: an hereditary empire, a strong centralised federal government, or a loose, weakly compacted federal league. Prussia and Bavaria opposed the revival of the imperial dignity, because, as Hardenberg frankly said, an empire as strong as was necessary

would be disadvantageous to the independence of Prussia; while a weak empire would be useless. But a strong federal government was possible, and many of the lesser princes looked to Prussia as the suitable leader. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar and his minister Gersdorf advocated a union of a portion of Germany, somewhat after the plan of Frederic the Great's league of the princes, to become the germ of a larger confederation made up of those states whose position and character were not opposed to the spirit of the original confederated states. But such a scheme would have required more sacrifices than most of the South German states were willing to make. A treaty of confederation had been drawn up by Hardenberg and Humboldt, the Prussian representatives, based upon an elaborate and well-defined scheme for a strong government. But Metternich, who sat with the representatives of Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hanover on the committee appointed on German affairs, having opposed the plan, because it promised too much and was too liberal in its character, on May 7th himself presented a counter-draft based on the idea of a loose confederation of states with full sovereignty under the presidency of Austria. This draft was modified because of the negotiations with Prussia, and another was presented by Metternich on the 13th, which, in its constitutional features, closely resembled the treaty as finally adopted. Though severely criticised by Humboldt, it was made the basis of discussion, because Metternich refused to make any concessions; and on May 14th, a fatal day for German unity, it was practically accepted, in the absence of the other members of the committee, by Prussia and Hanover. On the 26th the plan was officially laid before the princes of Germany, to whom Metternich said, in explaining the vagueness of the scheme, that the more detailed development of the constitution must be left for the Diet of the Confederation to complete. The discussion that ensued in the larger gathering of the German states, which

lasted from May 29th to June 3d, betrayed at once the difficulties attending any attempt at German unity. There was no talk of sacrifice, and the deputies concerned themselves with questions of sovereignty, rank, and precedence. Bavaria in particular was constantly threatening to remain outside of the Confederation. On June 4th, Prussia, influenced by the approaching end of the congress, agreed to sign the draft, reluctantly, however, for though both Hardenberg and Humboldt believed that inasmuch as it contained the main point sought for—the federation of Germany—it was better to accept it than to allow it to be farther weakened by discussion, or to be put off until after the congress had adjourned, yet both felt keenly how inadequately it represented the opinion of the people of Germany. The document was then voted upon, and on June 8, 1815, was finally signed by all except Darmstadt and Saxony. Thus there was established the Germanic Confederation, a body made up of forty sovereign states, six kingdoms, seven grand-duchies, nine duchies, eleven principalities, four free cities, and three states belonging to Denmark and Holland. These states were to be represented in a Diet sitting at Frankfort. Of this organisation as a whole it can only be said that it was hastily put together, and entered upon its career of evil for Germany with unmistakable signs of weakness and incompetency.

The policy that Metternich was thus applying in the case of Germany was adopted by the congress in its treatment of the Swiss question. Each of the nineteen cantons of Switzerland that had been organised into a fairly centralised state by Napoleon in the Act of Mediation of 1803, had with the fall of the Emperor resumed its claims to full independence and sovereignty. The situation was wholly to Metternich's liking, for, fearing that a compact and democratic state would be a menace to Austria and a refuge for radicals, he was determined to prevent the formation of such a state in Switzerland. The

Powers having in consequence declared that the full sovereignty of the individual cantons was to be made the basis of the Helvetic system, the cantons, now twenty-two in number, in August, 1815, drew up a constitution, in many ways strikingly like that of Germany, and erected a government in which the only federal bond was an inefficient and practically powerless Diet, and the only limitation upon the cantonal sovereignty was the denial of the right to make alliances hostile to the interests either of the Confederation or of the individual cantons. This decentralised government, by relegating all political and economic reforms to the initiative of each canton, arrested the development of Switzerland for more than thirty years; and by its want of control over religious matters made possible the Sonderbund war of 1847.

The last group of subjects discussed in the great congress indicates clearly the growth of new ideas regarding the relation of man to man, and of state to state. In a declaration dated from Vienna, February 8th, the eight Powers, England, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Portugal and the Brazils, Prussia, France, and Austria, declared it to be their wish to put an end to the slave trade, "that scourge which," they say, "has so long desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity." While this declaration was only morally binding in that it left to each state the selection of its own time for abolishing the slave trade, nevertheless the Powers asserted that they would concur "in the most prompt and effectual execution of this measure, by all the means at their disposal," and would act "in the employment of these means with all the zeal and perseverance which is due to so great and noble a cause." Furthermore, the regulation of the treaty of Paris regarding the navigation of the rivers was made to apply to all the western rivers within the disposition of the Powers assembled. It was determined that such rivers should be free along their whole course from the point where each of them became navigable to

its mouth ; that they should not, with respect to commerce, be prohibited to any one ; and that all rules that should be established at any time should be framed alike for all, and be as favourable as possible to the commerce of all nations. Such acts were undoubtedly the outcome of economic necessity ; and though it may be said that the Powers were wholly selfish in seeking to check the traffic in slaves and to promote commercial intercommunication, yet the fact remains that at the congress there was introduced a new principle of a higher order controlling the diplomatic intercourse among the nations. Eighteenth century ideas regarding the relation and interests of states were breaking down. The mercantilist doctrine that what one state gained another state lost, was giving way to the truer economic doctrine, that everybody's gain is nobody's loss. Mercantilism did not admit the possibility of a steady growth in the wealth and resources of all the states simultaneously, and scarcely recognised any international principles in industry and commerce. In respect of these matters the policy of the Vienna congress was broader than that of the eighteenth century diplomats, who, concerning themselves with public rather than private international law, were blind to other interests than those of state. Such questions as those dealing with the slave trade, the navigation of rivers, and the right of aliens were to be left no longer to the decision of individual states, but, affecting as they did the common interest, they were to be settled by the common agreement of the Powers.

The fact that the plan of entrusting questions of international importance to the Powers sitting in council was inaugurated at the congress of Vienna, warrants the statement that its work marks an important stage in the development of a more equitable public law for Europe. It is true that mistakes were made by them. Talleyrand's principle of legitimacy was of no historical value ; territories were moved about with no regard to national or religious sentiments ; the union of Belgium to

Holland and of Norway to Sweden, the division of Poland and the reconstruction of Germany were in the interest of dynasties and not of the people ; no attention was paid to Italy's desire for unity ; and the one liberal action, the establishment of the independence of Cracow, was undone within thirty-two years. But with these particulars aside, we must recognise that the attempt to give Europe even the beginnings of a political organisation was a step in the direction of progress, for the congress of Vienna determined the political status of the states of Europe under the collective guarantee of the great Powers. The fact that by this act the peace of Europe was secured for thirty years is sufficient evidence to prove that the existence of such a council of the Powers, the object of which was to anticipate and control any differences arising between state and state, was itself a benefit to civilisation. We may regret that the diplomats at Vienna had so little political wisdom as not to see that the desire for national independence and constitutional liberty sprang from something deeper than a mere love of revolution and anarchy ; but it must be remembered that the majority of the diplomats knew no diplomacy save that which Napoleon had used,—the diplomacy of the old *régime*, and that it is not easy for us to appreciate the tenacity with which they clung to the old ideas in the presence of the fearful disturbances that the rising of the French people had brought upon Europe.

And the fears of the Powers were not allayed by events that were taking place during the sittings of the congress. On the morning of March 7th the news was brought to Metternich that Napoleon had left the island of Elba, and was approaching the continent. Talleyrand thought that he intended to land in Italy and operate among the disaffected Italians in Parma and Lombardy, but Metternich, with truer knowledge of Napoleon, said that he would go straight to Paris, for France alone could furnish him with the aid that he needed.

The motives for this famous movement of Napoleon are not far to seek. Before the diplomats had begun their work at Vienna, Napoleon had settled down as sovereign of the island of Elba. His untiring energy found an outlet in the almost feverish activity that characterised his ten months' residence in the island. He commanded, organised, constructed, inspected, walked, and rode, as if to forget the past in incessant movement, which gave him the illusion of action. He had his army, his navy, his ministry, his court life, even his troop of actors. Yet at the same time he did not lose sight of continental affairs. He knew of the unpopularity of the Bourbons, and was aware that the entrance of the *émigrés* into France had given rise to an intense dissatisfaction, particularly in the army, where old soldiers had been dismissed, and old names had been struck off the officer lists. He knew that the old nobility had been rewarded, that the Count of Artois had assumed the place of lieutenant-general, that old court ceremonies had been revived, and that every attempt had been made by *émigré* and *chouan* to blot out the memory of twenty-two years. At the same time he was watching another body than the French army. He knew of the disputes in the congress of Vienna, and of the bitter feeling among the plenipotentiaries. Believing that the alliance, to which the allies had adhered when Europe was in a state of war, might now be broken in a time of peace in the controversy over the spoils, he thought that the chances were in favour of a dissolution of the congress. He had also his personal grievances that made him uneasy at Elba. It was an open secret that Pozzo, Wellington, and Talleyrand were planning to remove him from his island to St. Lucia or some other place more distant and more secure. Louis XVIII. was not at all disposed to pay the annuity of two million francs allowed in the treaty of Fontainebleau. The Emperor of Austria had removed from him his son, and Metternich had succeeded through the attractions of

Count Neipperg in dissuading Marie Louise from joining him. He feared that Talleyrand was plotting to put him in close confinement, or even to assassinate him. These grievances furnished him with a pretext, and probably made his return more sudden and precipitous than it otherwise would have been. The actual cause was the hope of success to which the condition of France had given rise; while over and above all else was the fact that he was Napoleon Bonaparte, still in the prime of life.

The startling character of the report acted as a tremendous force binding the allies once more together, and giving harmony to their actions. The alliance of January, that diplomatic triumph of Talleyrand, which nearly dissolved the congress, —a dissolution which Napoleon seems to have thought had already taken place—was undone in an instant, and all Talleyrand's efforts to build up a French coalition came to nothing. In this emergency Talleyrand's first thought seems to have been to prevent Austria from going over to the support of Napoleon, by forcing from the eight Powers who had signed the treaty of Paris a declaration of common hostility to the exiled Emperor. The allies of the Fourth Coalition verbally renewed the conditions of the treaty of Chaumont, and on March 13th issued their declaration that "Napoleon Bonaparte, in breaking the agreement by which he was established in the island of Elba [had] destroyed the only safeguard attached to his existence. In reappearing in France with designs of disorder and revolution he [had] by his own act deprived himself of the protection of the laws and [had] manifested to the world that neither peace nor truce [could] be made with him." The Powers consequently declared that Napoleon had "placed himself beyond the pale of civil and social relations, and that as the enemy and disturber of the world's peace" he had "delivered himself up to public justice." On March 25th, after it was known that Napoleon had arrived at Paris, the verbal agreement of March 7th was

replaced by a formal treaty of alliance, in which the Powers, after engaging to maintain the conditions of the treaty of Paris and the stipulations thus far signed at Vienna, placed their armies on a war footing. In a short time all the other states of Europe had joined the alliance, and the last coalition against Napoleon was formed.

In the meantime what was the attitude of France, upon whom alone Napoleon could depend? It was evident that he would not be supported by all France, for opposition to him had been gaining strength for some time before the battle of Leipzig. It was also evident that his main strength would lie in the army, and the poorer and more revolutionary classes. On his march northward from the bay of Jouan he met with astonishing success; the peasantry of Dauphiné received him with open arms; the troops despatched by the governor of Grenoble refused to resist him; Labédoyère and Ney deserted to his side; regiment after regiment abandoned their allegiance to the Bourbons; the old guard in a body deserted the Duke of Reggio; and finally the troops of Paris began to waver until not a regiment remained to protect the king. Louis XVIII., after declaring to the Chamber of Deputies that he was ready to die in defence of France, fled to Lille; but the spirit of defection had spread into the north also, and as the generals in command at Laon, Lille, and Noyon were already planning a military uprising, the king, in fear of imprisonment, hastened to foreign soil, settling at Ypres and afterward at Ghent. But while the army and the poorer classes supported the Emperor, the *bourgeoisie*, desiring peace, and fearing that Napoleon's return meant a continuance of the war, looked on with coldness and suspicion. Among them were those who not only sought for peace as necessary for the security of capital and the increase of wealth, but also wished to retain and advance the political liberties granted by the charter that Louis XVIII. had already issued. This the constitu-

tional, party worked hard to impress upon the people the real gains of the Bourbon government, to show that their liberties were better secured by the new *régime* than by the old; but its efforts were in vain. The Bourbons and their *clientèle* had succeeded in one short year in destroying in the minds of the people at large all gratitude for the reforms inaugurated; the nation preferred glory with Napoleon to liberty with the Bourbons. Then, too, Napoleon came to France with peace and liberty upon his lips. To each class he uttered well chosen words. To the peasants he promised protection from the nobility, relief from conscription, and security in the possession of their lands; to the capitalists he said that he was weary of war, that the Empire now meant peace, liberty, and repose; to the constitutional party he promised the maintenance of a constitutional government, and he declared that he would meet the desire of the French nation for greater political liberty by a modification of the constitution of the Empire. In the hope, therefore, of drawing the constitutional party to his side, he caused such an amendment, the *Acte additionnel aux constitutions de l'Empire*, to be drawn up by Benjamin Constant and Regnaud de St. Angely, which in the main followed the Charta of Louis XVIII. and guaranteed freedom of religion, of the press, and of the individual, responsibility of ministers, and the security of the person and property. How this attempt at a limitation of absolutism would have ended can only be conjectured. It was never put to the test. Liberal professions were incongruous in the mouth of Napoleon, and representative government was in no sense in harmony with Napoleonic ideas.

While Napoleon was thus declaring to France his peaceful and liberal intentions, he was also endeavouring to enter into negotiations with the allies; but here he met with absolute failure. No attention was paid to his declarations; his couriers were turned back, and Caulaincourt was informed that the allies would hold no communication whatever with his master.

Each side, therefore, continued its preparations for war. Napoleon never showed greater activity, greater genius for administration, than when he attempted, in the months of April, May, and June, to get ready an army to defeat the allies, restore the Empire, and establish the Napoleonic dynasty once more upon the throne of France. Not only had he to organise a government and equip an army, but he had to do this in the face of apathy, disloyalty, and even treachery on the part of many of those upon whom he was obliged to depend. Yet in spite of this he succeeded in getting together a force of 200,000 men, consisting largely of veterans strong in the experience gained from earlier campaigns, and making up one of the best armies that he had had for many years. To this force the allies were able to oppose in all about 900,000 men, who, however, were scattered from Belgium to Savoy. Two possible plans were open to Napoleon: one was to allow the allies to enter France and advance toward Paris, thus giving the Emperor more time wherein to raise, equip, and drill an army; the other to act on the offensive, and in a series of brilliant strokes to defeat the separated allies, somewhat after the manner of the earlier campaigns. The condition of France made imperative the adoption of the second plan, for the tenure of Napoleon was too uncertain, the discontent too great, the opposition from within too imminent, to permit the admission of a foreign army to the soil of France. Therefore, Napoleon determined in one quick, aggressive movement to attack first the Prussians under Blücher near Ligny and Charleroi, then the English, Dutch, and Belgian troops under Wellington, lying between the Scheldt and Brussels; and finally, having defeated each in turn, to move southward with the utmost rapidity against the Russians and Austrians on the upper Rhine. Even Fouché, already treacherously plotting against him, believed that he would win the first two battles, but prophesied defeat in the third.

To carry out this plan of campaign, therefore, he left Paris on the 11th of June, and started for the northern frontier. In the first encounter with the Prussians at Charleroi on the 15th, the Emperor won the day, and compelled the Prussian advance to fall back to Ligny. On the 16th, Ney began his attack at Quatre Bras, which lay between Charleroi and Waterloo, and was held by the Dutch and Belgians under the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. The gradual arrival of the British troops saved the day, and Ney was driven back toward Charleroi, with a loss of 4000 men. But in the meantime the Prussians, attacked by Napoleon himself, had been forced to retreat from Ligny northward toward Brussels. At this point, with Wellington's forces exhausted and exposed and Blücher's in retreat, Napoleon neglected to follow up the attack. He probably thought that the Prussians had retreated south-eastward toward Namur instead of northward, an error which made it possible for Wellington to move northward from Quatre Bras to Waterloo, and for Blücher to make good his escape to Wavre. The matter of supreme moment in the minds of the allies was to keep together for mutual aid, a fact that explains Blücher's movement northward on a line nearly parallel to the Brussels road. Wellington, trusting in Blücher's promise to support him, had taken his stand along the high ground near Waterloo, and was prepared to accept battle if offered. It had now become plainly evident that Napoleon planned to force his army between the allies to prevent their union. He had sent Grouchy on the 17th to follow the Prussian retreat; but that general, instead of bending toward the west to intercept the Prussian flank movement toward Waterloo, made the attack at Wavre; and in so doing failed to check the Prussians, because he engaged with their rear-guard only, and was too far away to be of use to Napoleon at the critical moment. When, therefore, on the 18th the Prussians at Wavre heard the cannonading which announced that Wellington had accepted Napoleon's attack,

they began their movement from Wavre westward, a bold and dangerous movement, because in case of Wellington's defeat it left them exposed and far removed from their communication on the Rhine. The attack on Waterloo began about noon on Sunday, the 18th, and the battle was waged with alternating success and failure around the farmstead of Hougomont and along the crest of la Haye Sainte for more than four hours. Soon after four o'clock began the famous cavalry charges in which the flower of Napoleon's horsemen beat in vain against the squares of Wellington. The arrival of the Prussians gave new life to the English resistance, and made more and more hopeless the advance of the French horse. Finally, at seven o'clock, Napoleon made the last and most famous attempt to dislodge the allied troops, but it was met with the same stubborn determination that had characterised the fighting of the preceding seven hours. Then, as the imperial guard fell back before the fire of the English, Wellington ordered a general advance. The Prussians hurled themselves on the French right, and the British cavalry supporting the advancing infantry wrought havoc and defeat as they swept down the valley. With the fall of Planchenoit, the last point defended by the French, the rout became general, and the battle of Waterloo was over.

Neither England nor Prussia can take to herself the credit of the victory of Waterloo ; Wellington could not have won without Blücher, nor could Blücher have won without Wellington. The battle is famous not because it was a defeat for Napoleon—for eventual failure was inevitable—but because as a defeat it was sudden and overwhelming. Napoleon had come into contact with only one of a series of mighty armies drawn in an arc about France, under the leadership of men who had learned the importance of united action. Europe was determined on the overthrow of the man who had once more threatened its peace, and neither armistice nor compromise was possible. The reappearance of Napoleon in no way altered the course of

events, except as it bound the allies more closely together, quickened the diplomatic lethargy at Vienna and involved France in a heavier punishment. The question of the future of Europe and the destiny of Napoleon was settled not at Waterloo but at Leipzig, and the more famous battle only made impossible the continuation of his personal supremacy over France. After the flight from the field of battle, only one course lay open to the defeated Emperor, and that was to abdicate absolutely. As France would have nothing more to do with him, he fled to the coast with the intention of embarking for America; but finding that he was watched by British cruisers, he placed himself under the protection of the English. By a formal agreement, the Powers handed him over to England for safe-keeping, and under her escort he was taken to St. Helena, where he died in 1821. The comparatively trifling hardships of Napoleon on the British island, the French hostility to the commonplace government of the house of Orléans, the French love of great deeds, and the bitterness of party conflict kept alive the Napoleonic legend until there arose, forty years later, a new Napoleon, a ghostly resemblance of the old, to testify to the wonderful personality of the man who for twenty years had been the centre of the interest of Europe.

With the final withdrawal of Napoleon from European politics, there came once more before the allies the necessity of solving the problem regarding the position of France. Matters had now taken on a different aspect, for the Powers of Europe held France responsible for the short but bloody campaign of the Hundred Days. The renewal of the coalition on March 25th made the Powers once more the armed arbiters of Europe, and as the object of this quadruple alliance had been the overthrow of Napoleon, who had been supported by Louis XVIII.'s "misguided subjects" as Louis himself called them, so the first task was the settlement of the terms of reconciliation. Preliminary to such treaty-arrangements was the restoration of the

Bourbons as the only guarantee of peace, the establishment of a stable government with Talleyrand as the minister of foreign affairs, and the regicide Fouché, whose nomination was a disgrace to the royalist party, as minister of police. The Duke of Richelieu, in whom the Powers had the greatest confidence, was appointed the French representative to negotiate the terms of peace, the most difficult of which was that relating to the boundary of France. In regard to the question as to whether France should be reduced to helplessness by an extensive curtailment of territory, the Powers again differed. Wellington opposed the demand for a great cession of territory, and advocated a military occupation of French fortresses, for a sufficiently long time to give strength and security to the government of the king. In this view Russia concurred, arguing that a war undertaken to maintain one treaty of peace ought not to result in the substitution of another less favourable. Though Austria agreed with the others that the campaign had not been for conquest, yet, believing that a military occupation was insufficient, insisted that some cession of territory should be made. Prussia alone, already defeated on the Saxon question at Vienna, and burning with a spirit of revenge for old and new wrongs, declared herself in favour of a territorial weakening of France. Hardenberg wrote that a sure and durable peace could only be obtained by taking from France all territory east of the Vosges along the Meuse to the sea, a policy that meant of course the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. In the Prussian declaration of August 4th he added these prophetic words: "Let us not lose the moment so favourable to the weal both of Europe and France which now offers of establishing a peace. At this moment we can do it. The hand of Providence has visibly offered us this opportunity. If we let it slip, streams of blood will flow to attain this object, and the cry of the unhappy victims will call us to give an account of our conduct." This is a striking foreshadowing of the struggle

that did take place fifty-five years later. But again Hardenberg had to abandon his position as he had done on the Saxon question and in the controversy regarding the form of the Germanic constitution. A compromise was effected and France was left very much as she had been in 1790, although in some directions her territory was reduced to an extent less than it had been a century before. The fortresses of Philipeville, Marienburg, Saarlouis, Saarbruck, Landau, and the territory of French Savoy were to be surrendered, but Alsace and Lorraine in their entirety were left to France. By far the heaviest burden was the war indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, to be paid in five years without interest, and the requirement to furnish 50,000,000 francs per annum for the equipment, clothing, and incidental expenses of the allied troops, which to the extent of 150,000 men were to occupy the soil of France for a period not to exceed five years.

Thus, generally speaking, the war of the Hundred Days cost France dear in territory, money, and prestige; but this was not all she suffered. The Prussians, Bavarians, and Würtembergers behaved outrageously in Paris; bivouacs were planted in the garden of the Tuileries; warehouses were plundered; and the recently constructed bridge of Jena was threatened with destruction. The works of art which, with the exception of the Victory of the Brandenburger gate in Berlin, had been left to France in 1814, were now taken away from the Louvre; the bronze horses of St. Mark's were returned to Venice; the "Transfiguration" and the "Last Communion of St. Jerome" to the Vatican; the "Apollo Belvedere" and the "Laocoon" to St. Peter's; the "Venus de' Medici" to Florence; the "Descent from the Cross" to Antwerp, and Memlinc's "Last Judgment" to Dantzig. Perhaps no one of the acts of the allies so touched the pride of the French people as this wholly justifiable restitution of property. It might well have been expected that the Powers of Europe would wreak a just ven-

geance upon France for the new miseries she had brought once more upon the nations; nevertheless, they showed a striking spirit of moderation, and treated France with the magnanimity befitting a mighty conquering state. Even while they demanded sacrifices they left the country strong and without serious humiliation, to take its place once more as a European Power. If they erred it was on the side of too great liberality; for it might have been better in the end for Europe had France been made to suffer a greater curtailment of territory.

With the signing of the Final Act of the Vienna congress, June 9th, with the sending of Napoleon to St. Helena, August 15th, and with the signing of the second treaty of Paris, November 20th, was completed one great period of European history. The period had been one of intense excitement and action, because of the marvellous energy and genius of one man, whose movements had disturbed the normal order of society, had diverted the gradual economic and social development of European civilisation, had waked in states a sense of common interest and common duty, and in nations a consciousness of their influence and their powers. The era upon which Europe was about to enter was an era of peace. The nations were exhausted. The spring of action, strained to the utmost, now broke, and with the passing away of the vehemence and violence of the revolutionary age, there arose in the hearts of all a desire for a cessation of the horrors of war, a longing for tranquillity and repose. The peace that followed, which was the more intense as the warfare had been the more widespread and active, was created neither by the congress of Vienna nor by the policy of reaction; it was possible because of the languor that follows excessive excitement and of the weariness and distress of the nations composing the European family. It was the general fear of a disturbance of this peace, and of an outbreak of the old revolutionary forces that made it possible for the policy of princes to dominate the new national aspira-

tions, and to keep in check all attempts on the part of reformers and *doctrinaires* to change the existing constitutional order. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that the conservative spirit would have been less unyielding, and the resistance to all popular movements less positive and inflexible, had it not been for the almost fanatical persistence of one man, Metternich.

So intense had been the feeling roused by the despotism of Napoleon, and so great was the need of popular support on the part of the princes of Europe, that the period from 1813 to 1815 was an era of appeals, and of promises that seemed to favour national unity and constitutional liberty. Political reforms, national greatness, and constitutional government continued to be the subject of a good deal of discussion during the years from the first war of liberation to the Carlsbad decrees in 1819. In 1813 Frederic William, needing the support of his people, had held out hopes of a national assembly, and had spoken with fervour of the new national life of Germany; and Alexander, at this time the most liberal-minded of all the sovereigns, had made the appeal of Frederic William much more efficient by proclaiming to the Germans in the same year that he would support them in their struggle for liberty. Austria also, through General Nugent, the leader of the imperial troops, had in plain, straightforward, and apparently honest language, held out to Italy the promise of independence and unity. Talleyrand, in a memoir drawn up and presented to Louis XVIII., had defined constitutional government in liberal terms, alleging that his opinions were those of the ministers and diplomats generally. Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies, also, had entered upon his reign with promises of peace, concord, and oblivion of the past, had declared himself in favour of reform, had proposed changes in the fundamental law, and had given his people to believe that he was in favour of a constitution. In one form or another, Russia, Prussia, and Austria were either sincerely or hypocritically expressing sympathy with the

constitutional and national ideas that were dominating Europe. Each Power had promised either directly or indirectly to those states that lacked national unity somewhat of that which they desired. The result was that in Germany and Italy particularly, there existed great animation and expectation, and that liberals everywhere were greatly encouraged by the grant of a liberal constitution to France by Louis XVIII., and by the attempt of Prussia and Russia to fulfil their promises. On May 22, 1815, while the congress of Vienna was still sitting, Frederic William issued an ordinance in which he repeated the pledge already given to the Prussian people, and definitely promised a constitution by means of which should be established a representative government of the people. On June 21st of the same year, the cannon at Warsaw announced that Alexander had restored the kingdom of Poland. To it he gave a constitution, which promised a strictly Polish administration and a national representation; which guaranteed the liberty of the press and religion; which assured equality before the law to all citizens without regard to class or condition; and which made ministers responsible to the national court for all breaches of its conditions.

There is no doubt that even at best the reorganisation of the old governments along constitutional lines would have been difficult and slow; but the obstacles were increased by the opposition of Metternich, who not only controlled the policy of his own state, but who influenced also the actions of those European sovereigns who had thus far shown themselves more or less in sympathy with a moderate liberalism. Against all liberal movements Metternich deliberately set his face. He was a man of little elasticity of mind, to whom stability and the existing order were the only conditions of peace. He was a statesman who lacked far-sighted statesmanship, a diplomat who saw only one class of political interests, and those the interests of the governments. He accepted the doctrine of the

progress of the human mind, but believed that this progress had not been accompanied with a corresponding growth of wisdom; that there had on the contrary developed a spirit of presumption, "the natural result of the rapid progression of the human mind toward the perfecting of so many things"; and that to "the presumptuous man, to whom knowledge seemed to come by inspiration, for whom experience had no value, to whom faith was nothing," was to be ascribed "the erection of false systems supported by passion and error." To Metternich, therefore, all uprisings of the people, all expressions of the principles of the French Revolution in the form of popular demands, seemed dangers and menaces to the public order. He drew his horror of the Revolution from his long struggle with Napoleon, and, unable to discriminate between the Emperor and the Revolution itself, he concluded that in every country with which Napoleon had come in contact seeds of the Revolution had been sown from which had sprung a revolutionary spirit that was concealing itself under the mask of patriotism. In his mind there was no distinction between liberalism and anarchy; each stood for independence of authority and the destruction of governments. Having held such doctrine from his youth up—for he tells us in his *Mémoires* that when but nineteen at Maintz he felt that the Revolution was the adversary he should have to fight,—he continued in times of peace, as the enemy of the doctrines of popular sovereignty and democratic government, to oppose all that the Revolution had done for Europe. Although he was a thorough egoist, superficial in judgment, unprogressive in political ideas, and immovable in his own convictions, he was undoubtedly possessed of great persuasive power and considerable personal magnetism, and must be ranked among the great diplomats of Europe.

Thus Metternich, representing a counter-revolution of peace and conservatism, and confident of the stability of Austria, sought first to control his Emperor, and then, by protecting

his country from the agitations going on without, to prevent it from becoming in any way influenced by revolutionary ideas. Hoping thus to render Austria the type of law and order, he next endeavoured to maintain the position that Austria had gained in the second war of liberation, and to secure for his Emperor, and for himself as his representative, the position of arbiter of Europe. This he was able to do, after the war had closed, by the new political system that the congress of Vienna had established for Europe. Instead of a group of states loosely connected and constantly struggling for the maintenance of a European equilibrium, as had been the case in the eighteenth century, there was now a federation under the control of the four chief Powers (or five with France), which guaranteed the peace of Europe. Thus Europe could be looked upon as a great family, governed by a self-created congress of the Powers, which had as its principle of action the preservation of rest and quiet to each member of the family. Metternich interpreted the task of such a congress to include interference not only in the relations between states but also in the internal life of states, and thus demanded that the congress intervene to protect each individual state in which stability was endangered by uprisings of any kind whatever. In accepting this interpretation the congress claimed the right to interfere actively in the affairs of any state in order to secure public order, and to preserve the integrity of treaties and the principles of legitimism laid down at Vienna. Neither the system of congresses nor the dogma of interference was the product of any single man's mind ; both resulted from the many enforced experiments that had been made to obtain harmonious action, and their continuance was deemed necessary to prevent any further outbursts of the revolutionary spirit.

The name, the Holy Alliance, that has been given to this union of Powers, comes from a curious incident that took place during the negotiations regarding the terms of the second treaty

of Paris. This alliance has become famous far beyond its deserts. It was the work of Alexander, who, as Emperor of all the Russias, occupied a leading place among the sovereigns because of his share in the recent overthrow of Napoleon. This man had during his earlier years been brought under the influence of such liberal and progressive men as La Harpe, Czartorysky, and Stein, and from the date of his accession in 1801 had shown a strong tendency toward liberalism. Before Tilsit, and again in the first war of liberation, he sought to pose as the liberator of Europe. Now that which in the earlier period had expressed itself in sympathy with the popular cause, tended, in consequence of the tremendous pressure of events in the following years, to become sentimental and religious. In 1814 he had come under the spell not only of a mystical romanticism but also of the strong religious reaction that swept over Europe; and for some time had been on intimate terms with Baroness de Krüdener, the wife of a Russian diplomat, who made a deep impression upon him. With her he entered into long discussions upon dogma, confession, penance, and the like. The effect of such conversations was the greater because Alexander never forgot the circumstances of his accession to the throne, which had come about through the assassination of his father. In consequence of these influences he began to exemplify Metternich's judgment that he was possessed of a character which showed "a peculiar mixture of masculine virtues and feminine weaknesses," and was always influenced "by fanciful ideas," seizing "upon them as if by sudden inspiration and with the greatest eagerness." Looking upon himself as the angel whose sword had struck down the Corsican Satan, and with a sincerity that has led some to ascribe to him symptoms of insanity, he seemed inclined to pose as the religiously appointed guardian of the affairs of Europe. As the result of these new sentiments, he drew up a kind of formal expression of his religious enthusiasm applied to politics, and presented it to Aus-

tria and Prussia. Frederic William signed it willingly enough, but Metternich, according to his own statement, modified it considerably, because it was, as he said, nothing but "a philanthropic aspiration clothed in religious garb," "a loud-sounding nothing." Nevertheless he advised the Emperor to sign it, partly because he was unwilling to affront Alexander at a time when he wished to make use of him, and partly because he could really make the Holy Alliance further his own ends.

The document thus sent out in the name of the three monarchs was signed in turn by every European Power except England, Turkey, and the Pope. The last named did not sign it, in the first place, because he was not asked; in the second place, because he was too dogmatically religious to believe that a union between a Roman Catholic (Francis), a Greek Catholic (Alexander), and a Protestant (Frederic William) could come to any good end. England did not sign it because, as Castlereagh said, it was "a simple declaration of Biblical principles, which would have carried England back to the epoch of the saints, of Cromwell, and the roundheads." The prince regent, however, compromised by writing to the Czar that he approved of the principles contained in the document. Probably no one of the European sovereigns except Alexander and Frederic William took the document seriously, and it was, therefore, of no political consequence, except as it gave a certain amount of strength to the union of the Powers already established for the preservation of peace.

As this European system looked backward to the earlier war alliances for its inception, so it looked forward to a series of peace congresses in the records of which its rules of action were to be expressed with elaborate minuteness. A definite agreement was, however, necessary, and this was made at Paris, November 20, 1815, when the four chief Powers entered into a treaty of alliance and friendship of a very different character from that contained in the text of the Holy Alliance. In

this treaty, which was the legal warrant for the summoning of all future congresses, the Powers, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, resolved to give to the principles laid down at Chaumont and Vienna the application most suitable to a time of peace, and agreed to renew their meetings after fixed intervals. The object of these meetings was, the document says, "to consult upon their common interests and to consider the measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." But there is no indication in the text of the agreement of the policy to be followed. Upon this question the Powers were by no means agreed, and there was every reason to suppose that the first congress, whenever it should be called, would not present a picture of unruffled harmony. Russia was likely to prove obstinate, for in all previous experiments Alexander had stood opposed to the Austro-English attitude, and it was largely for the purpose of overcoming this obstinacy that Metternich had humoured Alexander by joining the Holy Alliance. It was a politic move and proved successful in the end; and perhaps no phase of the diplomacy from 1814 to 1821 is more interesting than the manner in which the Austrian chancellor won the Russian Czar to the cause of reaction. Metternich's success, disastrous as it was in many particulars for liberalism in Europe, did confer one unquestionable blessing upon the nations. The repose of Europe was threatened not only by what Metternich called "the power of rebellion and outrage," but also by the danger of a disagreement in this council of sovereigns, which, had it come about, might have divided Europe into two hostile camps. Such a division Metternich prevented; for by his diplomatic skill, his power of persuasion, his sophistry, and confidence in his ability to influence others, he was able to make his policy supreme in Europe for a decade, in Germany for nearly twenty years, in Austria

until his downfall in 1848. He it was who called the congresses and was the soul of their action. He strengthened the new European system by bringing the sovereigns and their ministers to a recognition of the necessity of harmony for the maintenance of peace.

After 1815, the first opportunity that arose for the testing of the new system and of Metternich's ability to control its decisions was in 1818, when a congress was called to determine the question of the evacuation of French territory, which, through the wise administration of the Duke of Richelieu, was agreed to by the Powers two years before the final date named in the second treaty of Paris. At this congress not only was the evacuation satisfactorily arranged by the withdrawal of the foreign troops from France, but the union of the great Powers was completed by the invitation extended to France to take part in their deliberations, present and future. The treaty was signed on October 9, 1818; on November 4th the invitation to France was sent; and on the 15th the final declaration, which marked the last step in the establishment of the new European state system, was agreed to by the five Powers. By this declaration the sovereigns announced their object to be "the maintenance of peace and guarantee of all transactions hitherto established." They bound themselves "to observe the principles of the law of nations, which alone could efficiently guarantee the independence of each government and the stability of the general association." They solemnly acknowledged "that their duty toward God and toward the people that they governed required that they give to the world, so far as they were able, an example of justice, harmony, and moderation"; and they considered themselves "happy to be able to devote their efforts in the future to the protection of the arts of peace, to the increase of the internal prosperity of their states, and to the reawakening of those sentiments of religion and morality, the supremacy of which had been weakened by the evil of the time."

Any one reading this public declaration might well have believed that the allies were acting in perfect harmony for the welfare of Europe; but he would not have been so optimistic had he known that in the same day the four Powers renewed the war alliance against France, "in order to resist the unholy influence of the new revolutionary uprising which might threaten her." This was called out by the rapid growth from 1816 to 1818 of the liberal movement in France, and though it was meant to be entirely secret, it was known to Richelieu and through him to Louis XVIII.

In spite of appearances to the contrary, Canning, home secretary of England, and other clear-sighted liberals believed that the union of the Powers was a menace to liberty. It is true that the public acts of the congress of 1818 did not justify them in this opinion, but their worst fears were fully realised in the acts of the congresses of Troppau and Laibach, which were convened in 1820 and 1821 to suppress the popular risings in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. Metternich, who was the ruling spirit at these congresses, was able to impose his policy upon the assembled sovereigns, though matters at first did not go entirely to his liking. He found Alexander, and particularly his minister Capodistrias, opposed to his policy of intervention; and England, who was unwilling to recognise the right of the Powers to cross the boundaries of another state, inclined to a policy of neutrality. But by dint of urging, by references to the spectre of revolution, he managed to separate the sovereign of Russia from his minister. Capodistrias refused to submit to Metternich's influence, and consequently became in the mind of the Austrian statesman "not a bad man, but, honestly speaking, a complete and thorough fool, a perfect miracle of wrong-headedness." Alexander, who finally submitted to Metternich's persuasions and accepted the policy of suppression, "behaved excellently well," although it required a transference of the congress to Laibach to complete the imperial change of

mind. When this had been accomplished the three Powers agreed on their statement of principles. They claimed in their circular issued from Troppau the incontestable right to take common measures of safety against states in which the government had been overthrown by rebellion. Such an uprising they considered as an infraction of the peace of Europe, an attack upon the European system to be met by pacific or coercive measures as the case might be. They resolved to recognise no governments founded on revolution, and in inviting England and France to co-operate, expressly declared that their only desire was "to preserve and maintain peace, to deliver Europe from the scourge of revolutions, and to obviate or lessen the ills which arise from the violation of the precepts of order and morality." Putting their principles into immediate practice, the congress authorised Metternich to send eighty thousand men into the Neapolitan kingdom, and thus, although England and France refused to co-operate, advanced a step beyond the position taken at Aix-la-Chapelle. They followed Metternich's creed that all that was legally established must be preserved by joint-action, without regard to right, justice, or the character of sovereigns and courts. Perjury, cruelty, and disregard for the duties of kingship went for nothing in the face of the fact that popular movement was revolution, and popular demands, presumptuous interference. These principles the Powers declared on May 21, 1821, to be the permanent guides of their action.

However permanent the Powers may have intended this policy to be, nevertheless it was in fact to have but one more trial. The intervention in Naples prepared the way for intervention in Spain, where a military revolution had broken out in 1820 against the restored Ferdinand VII., who in 1815 had overthrown the constitution and had since been conducting himself in a brutally arbitrary manner. In close connection with this movement there began in the Spanish colonies in

America outbreaks that eventually resulted in South American independence. In 1822 the Spanish constitution of 1812 was proclaimed by the successful revolutionists, and Ferdinand in Spain, like Ferdinand in Naples, nephew and uncle skilled in the arts of duplicity alike, took the oath to the constitution. Once more the arbiters of European peace knit their brows over a successful revolution, and a congress was summoned at Verona in 1822 at which were present the two Emperors, the kings of Prussia, Sardinia, and Naples, the lesser princes of Italy, and the representatives of France and England. The conditions were favourable for an application of the new principles. Alexander had now completely gone over to the side of Metternich. The man who in 1815 had granted Poland a constitution, and had compelled Louis XVIII. to grant a charter to the French people, now wished to dispatch a Russian army into Spain to overthrow a revolution whereby Spain had obtained a constitution. France, also, through a political change which had brought the Ultras into power, wished to enter upon a campaign for the protection of the Spanish Bourbons, and asked the Powers whether in case the French ambassador were withdrawn from Madrid and a war were begun, their assistance could be counted upon. But while Russia and France were thus committing themselves to the doctrine of intervention, England was taking a stand against it even more definite than before. Although at Troppau Sir Charles Stewart had not positively declared England's separation from the policy of the continental Powers, yet, notwithstanding the support he would have received from the reactionary tendencies of the home government, he found himself unable to accept their decisions. At Verona, however, the breach was made. Wellington rejected the proposal to intervene in Spanish affairs, and Canning, now foreign minister, soon made it clear that England intended to recognise Spain's revolting colonies across the seas, and to employ every effort, save that

of actually resisting Spain, to prevent an unjust war. From this time a fundamental difference appeared between the attitude of England and that of the governments of the Continent. Castlereagh, who had been foreign minister from 1810 to 1822, in sympathy as he had been with so many reactionary phases of continental politics, had begun in his later years to see the injustice of the doctrines governing the acts of the congresses, and had already proposed the policy that Canning, his successor, defiantly followed. The congress of Verona sanctioned the restoration of Ferdinand VII. by the French, but England no longer followed the common accord. The system of a union of the Powers to regulate the affairs of Europe remained intact, but the principle of interfering in the internal affairs of states was applied for the last time at Verona. Events were moving rapidly, and the attack on the doctrine in which England stood opposed to Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France, was soon to result in a breach in the alliance of a character so serious as to make impossible its retention as a political law of Europe.

That which effected the overthrow of Metternich's supremacy and the doctrine that he supported was the Greek revolution, the first of those revolutions in the decade following the congress of Vienna that represented a true national movement. Stimulated by an intellectual revival that gave new life to the desire for independence, and by the ideas of the French Revolution, which had penetrated even to the Hellenic peninsula, the Greeks, maddened by the barbarous cruelty of the Turks, rose with determination against their oppressors, and entered in 1821 upon their famous struggle which tested the tenacity of the Greek people and won the sympathy of liberals everywhere. Starting with an uprising in the Morea, the insurrection spread rapidly to continental Greece; but suffering from jealousy, ill-faith, and even treachery, from want of united action and efficient leadership, it was not evenly or continuously sustained. At first Alexander, under the influence of

Metternich, was wholly antagonistic to the efforts of the Greeks, as, to be consistent, must have been the man who had aided Austria at Laibach to put down the uprising in Naples, and who had been anxious at Verona to march 150,000 men into Spain. Metternich's hand was upon him, and toward the Greek revolution Metternich felt only hatred. Its origin was to him "in the plots of disorganised factions that menace all thrones and all institutions." Fearing that any attempt to repress the revolt according to the method employed in Naples and Spain might result in a breach of the alliance, he recommended to Alexander the advisability of leaving Turkey to terminate the struggle alone. This advice Alexander at first followed, as did, in fact, all the other states of Europe. But as the Greeks persisted in their efforts, and it became evident that a whole nation was heroically resisting the tyranny of the Ottoman Empire, the people of the west were roused to an enthusiastic support of the revolution ; all nationalities began to be represented in the Grecian army, money began to pour into Greece from all lands, and even the governments began to change their attitude. Canning did not conceal his own sympathy with the Greek cause, and England took into consideration the advisability of abandoning her position of neutrality. In 1824, Alexander, fearing the growth of English influence, proposed the division of Greece into three parts, Morea, East and West Hellas, tributary to the Sultan, but otherwise self-governing. This of course meant a Russian protectorate, and Metternich, as well as Canning, saw through the scheme. The former was now driven to take a definite stand, and refusing to consider any compromise measure, insisted upon entire submission or entire independence for the Greeks. Both he and Canning began to speak of war for the purpose of resisting Russian aggression. Russia began to draw apart from Austria, and after the death of Alexander in December, 1825, his brother Nicolas,—bound by no tie to the

past, free from all connections, sentimental or political, with the policy of the Austrian statesman, and interested in one subject only, the strengthening of Russia at home and abroad, —began to listen to the English overtures. Under the influence of Wellington, whom Canning sent to St. Petersburg, an alliance between the two Powers was formed; and on April 4, 1826, was issued a protocol of conference between the British and Russian plenipotentiaries, in which the mediation of England was accepted between the Ottoman Porte and the Greeks. This act, as Metternich confessed, drew "a definite line between the past and the future." The Holy Alliance was almost hopelessly shattered; the doctrine of intervention might still be applied by individual states, but it could no longer be the governing principle of the European state system; England and Russia stood opposed to Austria, Prussia, and France, and "everything," as it seemed to Metternich, "was going wrong." Nor had the end of the "wrong-going" yet been reached; for in 1826, when it was decided to hold a congress in London to settle the question of Greek independence, Metternich found his supremacy gone. His instructions to the Austrian ambassador, based on the principles of 1822 and 1823, from which the ambassador was under no conditions to depart, were repudiated by Russia, because they were at variance with the principles of the protocol of April 4th. Metternich had lost his cunning; and the congresses of Europe were no longer to be bound by the principles of legitimacy, stability, and intervention that had characterised the earlier congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona. Even France, who was in the hands of the reactionists and ecclesiastics, saw in the support of the Christian Greeks a crusade against the Mohammedan Turks, and deserted Metternich for the opposition. The treaty of London, July 6, 1827, was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, Prussia alone remaining faithful to Austria. The mediation of the Powers was now offered to the Greeks and the

Turks, and on the refusal of the latter to accept the situation the battle of Navarino, October 20, 1827, in which France, England, and Russia intervened to protect the Greeks, made sure the independence of the Hellenic nation. The "terrible catastrophe," according to Metternich, the "untoward event," according to Wellington, introduced a new era in the history not only of the Greeks but also of the public law of Europe.

So effectual was the check given to the reactionary policy in the matter of the Greek revolution, that almost no attempt was made to apply or even defend the principle of intervention as a European policy when the next occasion for its maintenance arrived. In 1830, immediately after the revolution which overthrew the Bourbons in France, Belgium rose in revolt against the rule of the house of Orange, and determined to undo the work of the congress of Vienna by gaining independence as had Greece. It was at once a national and religious movement, for the Roman Catholic clergy of Belgium, resenting the Protestant rule of Holland, aided the people in their uprising. It was a strange combination of forces, this union of the ultra-conservative ecclesiastics with the ultra-liberal opposition to effect the separation of Belgium from Holland; but it was a successful combination, for Holland was unable to make head against it, and the appeal of King William to Prussia for aid called forth from Louis Philippe of France a firm declaration of non-intervention, which deterred Prussia from coming to the aid of the old policy of Metternich. Through the diplomacy of Talleyrand, who was sent as minister to England, this doctrine of non-intervention became the basis of an alliance between the two Powers, and was sufficiently strong to overcome England's desire to support the union of Belgium and Holland, the plan which Castlereagh had advocated in 1814. When it became evident that Louis Philippe would not support any proposition to unite Belgium to France, either by actual annexation, as many Belgians desired, or by a dynastic connection,

such as the election of his son to be king of Belgium, a new relation of the Powers was entered into. At the congress or conference of London, December, 1830, to which all the five Powers sent representatives, the policy of Troppau and Verona was reversed; Belgium was declared independent, and a new law governing the European state system was proclaimed. In this congress the more liberal and progressive notion of non-intervention supported by France and England won its first great victory over the reactionary ideas of Austria and Prussia, to which Russia, on account of her hostility to France, was inclined to adhere when her own interests were not at stake. It was Talleyrand's last great stroke of diplomacy.

The doctrine of intervention which was thus practically given up as a law governing the diplomats at a general congress, continued to be maintained by the three eastern Powers for twenty years longer. Russia had supported the opposite principle in the case of the Greeks for purely selfish purposes; for Nicolas had no particular love for Greek independence as such, and he returned willingly to the older doctrine when it was to his interest to do so. Prussia, though rapidly advancing through internal social and economic reforms to a position of greater self-reliance, was still under the power of Metternich, and continued to recognise officially the principle of intervention. In 1833, after the revolutions in France, Belgium, Italy, and Poland, and after the abortive conspiracy at Frankfort, the three Powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia met at Töplitz and Münchengrätz and renewed their fidelity to the principles of Troppau and Verona. A treaty was drawn up, October 15, 1833, in which it was declared that the courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia recognised the right of every independent sovereign to summon any other independent sovereign to assist him in putting down revolution; that no other Power had the right to interfere to prevent this; that in case such interference were undertaken, the three Powers would interpret it as an act of

hostility against themselves, and would take prompt measures to repel such aggression. This triple alliance was kept strictly secret.

No opportunity of applying the doctrine as laid down in 1833 was given until the revolution of 1848 and the uprising of Hungary. But that the principle of intervention to suppress liberalism of any kind whatever was still maintained by the eastern Powers is evident from other events of an important character. In 1835, Austria sent financial aid to Spain to assist the Carlists in their struggle against the constitutionalists under General Quesada, and she would probably have gone further had she not been deterred by the attitude of France and England. In 1836, in consequence of the continued agitation in Poland, and the use made of the independent city of Cracow as a refuge for revolutionists, the three Powers determined to occupy the city, and Austria was commissioned to reduce it to order. This was but the preliminary step to the final overthrow of its independence, which took place in 1846 after the Poles in Galicia, stimulated by the desire for national separation and by a spirit of revenge, began to organise, and encouraged the inhabitants of Cracow to drive out the Austrian regiment of occupation. In consequence of these actions, with the consent of Prussia and Russia, the city and environs were annexed to Austria.

Finally, in 1847, Switzerland, whose neutrality had been guaranteed in 1815, seemed to call for the attention of the Powers. After a political and religious agitation of thirty-two years the Helvetic republic was confronted with the danger of disunion because of the separate organisation of the Sonderbund, a league of the seven Roman Catholic cantons against the progressive and reform tendencies of the other states of the Union. Metternich, aided by Guizot, who having broken with England was favouring reactionary methods, rose to the defence of the principle of full cantonal sovereignty and threw his

support on the side of the Sonderbund. In so doing he undoubtedly increased the difficulty of a peaceful settlement between the Sonderbund and the Union, because he led the Roman Catholic cantons to believe that in case of war Austria and France would certainly interfere. No action of the Powers was, however, actually taken until after the Sonderbund war of 1847 and the victory of the radical party, although Guizot was accused in France of sending arms and ammunition from Besançon to the aid of the conservatives. In consequence of the overthrow of the Sonderbund, which Metternich characterised as "a triumph of radicalism over principles incontestably legal" forming "the only practicable basis of the life of states," the Powers (without England) offered their mediation. This was refused by the Swiss Diet on December 7, 1847, and it was therefore decided to hold a conference at Neufchâtel to settle the Swiss question, although it was well known that England would not co-operate in any policy of intervention and might refuse to send a representative. It is perfectly clear from Metternich's statements that the other Powers were in accord on the question of interference, and of applying coercive measures if necessary. "The foreign governments," says Metternich, "do not intend to *intervene* in the affairs of the Confederation, but they do intend to *intervene* to preserve against the dangers, with which the radicalism of the Swiss threatens their territories, the repose which they feel it their duty to assure to the peoples entrusted to their care. If this be intervention, and if for this we lay ourselves open to blame, then we put ourselves on record as decided to commit this crime." This is the last statement of the old doctrine of Troppau and Verona, but it was destined never to be carried out. Switzerland, though she dreaded the new situation more than the crisis through which she had just passed, was saved from foreign interference by events of a more momentous nature. In the general revolution of the next year Guizot and Metternich were both driven from office, and the

doctrine of interference in the affairs of other states was lost sight of in the necessity under which each state felt of looking after its own affairs.

Only once more was the principle of intervention applied, and then it was intervention as defined in 1833 and not the intervention of Troppau or Neufchâtel. When in 1848 the Hungarians attempted to win independence from Austria, that Power applied to Russia for aid according to the conditions of Münchengrätz. With this request Russia complied, and the overthrow of Hungary at the hands of Paskiévitch proved to be the last attempt to apply the doctrine of intervention in the interest of absolutism. This temporary revival of the Holy Alliance, of which Russia, the only eastern Power untouched by the revolution of 1848, became the inspirer and guardian, proved to be of short duration. In 1852, on the assumption of the imperial title by Louis Napoleon, Frederic William IV. of Prussia, in his letters to Baron Bunsen, his ambassador at London, made every effort to effect a union of the four chief Powers for the guaranteeing of their respective territories against the new Napoleon, offering to put 100,000 men into the field if a military convention were agreed to. But the other Powers refused to respond, and Russia, whose decision was of first importance, determined, although with unconcealed ill-humour, to recognise the new government, thus preventing the last attempt to put into operation the principles of the Holy Alliance. To this alliance the Crimean war gave the death-blow; for in that war all the Powers of Europe were either neutral or aggressively antagonistic to Russia. In the diplomatic rearrangements that followed the year 1856 England, perceiving the growing intimacy of France and Piedmont, and fearing French aggrandisement, drew away toward Austria, while Prussia, under the guidance of Bismarck, began to assume a friendly attitude toward Russia. In this reshaping

of the relations of the Powers a new period was begun in the diplomatic history of Europe.

After this brief sketch of the European system and the diplomatic relations of the Powers for half a century let us turn to the history of the individual countries, in order to trace the political, social, and economic changes that preceded and made possible the revolutionary movement of 1848.

CHAPTER IV.

FRANCE DURING THE RESTORATION.

FRANCE more than any other European country had been altered by the events of the period from 1789 to 1814. There had the old state been destroyed and the old society shattered in pieces; there the forces set loose by the Revolution, checked though they had been by Napoleon's absolutism, were still active, resolute, and persistent. France was at bottom in the year 1814 a state inclined toward democracy. Its feelings, thoughts, customs, and forms of expression savoured little of the narrowness and inequality of the eighteenth century. The Revolution had done its work thoroughly, and although its principles had as yet found no adequate expression in government, yet the seed had been well sown, and the French people at large were under the spell of a new and liberal influence.

To this end Napoleon had in no small part contributed. Although his government had been the opposite of democratic; although it had insulted every principle of the Revolution; although it had throttled the press, stifled all independence in commerce and trade, allowed corporations to exist only on the fulfilment of heavy conditions, subordinated every official to itself, and ordained that the end of education, of religion, of life itself should be Napoleon and the state—although it had done all these things, nevertheless it had strengthened in many parts the work of the Revolution. It had made merit the test of value; it had raised to high positions of rank men of the

burgher and peasant classes ; it had made it easier than ever before for men of talent without regard to birth, wealth, or belief to become prominent in the state and in the army ; it had relieved trade of the old gild restrictions, and had overthrown the narrow municipal policy that was hampering free competition ; it had freed the peasant from the compulsory services of the century before ; it had broken up the great estates, and, although it is not probable that the numbers of actual proprietors had thereby increased, yet the acquirement of estates of a moderate size had undoubtedly been made easier ; and lastly, in the *code Napoléon*, it had erected a body of law that was favourable in matters of inheritance to the development of a democratic rather than an aristocratic community. Into this state, whose people were dominated by the democratic spirit of the Revolution and whose government was the completely centralised system of Napoleon, came the Bourbons with their ideas of royal prerogative drawn from the eighteenth century. Unable to enter into full harmony with their political environment they made legitimism and the right of kingship too often the bases of action and substituted the "divinity of kings" for the "power" of Napoleon and the "law" of the Revolution.

It was soon made known to the Bourbons on their accession to power that the new dynasty must recognise the wishes of the people of France, and must make an effort to reconcile parties and to bring liberty of the individual into harmony with centralised government. In consequence of this there was issued on the 4th of June, 1814, a constitutional charter, in which Louis XVIII. frankly acknowledged, what many of the *émigrés* would not, the fact that there had been a Revolution, and that the France of the Restoration was a different country from the France of the old *régime*. In this he had been instructed by Alexander and Talleyrand, the latter of whom had definite ideas as to the manner in which the new

government should be carried on. "We have to consider," says the Charta, "the effects of an ever increasing progress of knowledge, the new relations which this progress has introduced into society, the direction given to the public mind during half a century, and the serious troubles resulting therefrom. We have perceived that the wish of our subjects for a constitutional Charta was the expression of a real need, but in yielding to this wish we have taken every precaution that this Charta should be worthy of us and of the people whom we are proud to rule." Yet while thus limiting monarchy, this same Charta took good pains to preserve the rights and prerogatives of the Crown. The king alone was invested with executive power; as head of the state he commanded the army and navy, declared war, and concluded treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce; he appointed all the officials of the public administration, and issued regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state. He was the fountain of justice, in his name it was administered by the judges whom he appointed, and by him the rights of pardon and commutation of punishment was retained. But, although the executive powers were exercised by the king alone, and justice emanated from him, the legislative functions were shared with two chambers, the Chamber of Peers and the Chamber of Deputies. The former body, composed of members appointed by the king and holding their office for life, formed a high court of justice for trial of treason, and held its sessions, both legislative and judicial, in secret. On the other hand, the Chamber of Deputies, composed of members so elected that one-fifth of the number retired each year, who themselves paid a direct tax of 1000 francs and were chosen from the various departments by electors paying 300 francs direct taxes, held their sessions openly, and passed all measures by majority vote. Plans of taxation were submitted to them first, but all other measures could be submitted

to either body as seemed best. Although the king had the exclusive right of initiating legislation—a right that soon fell into disuse—and of sanctioning and promulgating the laws, nevertheless either Chamber could petition him to submit a law on any subject desired. In matters relating to the rights of the French citizens there is to be found in this Charta nothing new to those who were familiar with the constitutions of the Revolution. All citizens were equal before the law, liberty of worship and of the press was guaranteed, and trial by jury was preserved.

Though it can be said of this Charta that it was inferior in many respects to the constitution that Alexander had granted to Poland, and contained many defects, yet it must be allowed that it promised more liberty than France had possessed at any time under Napoleon. It is true that it imposed an excessive restriction upon the right of suffrage; admitted a possible abuse of the royal power when it gave to the king the right to issue ordinances necessary for the safety of the state; strengthened the position of the ultra-conservative party when it declared in Article 71 that the ancient *noblesse* might resume their titles; and lost something of its value in the eyes of the people when it was seen to be a gift from the king and not a constitution accepted by vote of the nation. Nevertheless it erected a government that was in itself strong and on the whole liberal, for if it made reservations, it also guaranteed rights, and it was retained, with some revision, as the constitution of France for thirty-four years. No organic weakness of its own, but the attacks that were made upon it and the strained interpretations to which it was subjected, made a revolution inevitable,—a fact that the circumstances leading to that revolution will indicate clearly.

Louis XVIII., the giver of the Charta, a man of the best and most peaceful intentions, desiring above all else to avoid further disturbance, inclined toward that policy which in a sense

Napoleon had followed of creating a strong and a peaceful France by uniting all parties. Dominated by no blind political passion, Louis thought to accomplish his purpose by standing above parties and making concessions to liberalism. But unfortunately skeptical, cold-blooded, lazy, indifferent to the business of state, and wanting in personal magnetism, he also lacked the force that was necessary to control so serious a political situation, and became, as time went on, increasingly dependent on the opinion of others. Furthermore, he was hampered by conditions and circumstances beyond his control. He can hardly be held responsible for the intolerance of the *émigrés*, who, under the leadership of his brother, the Count of Artois, were rousing against the king and his government the opposition of France. Nor could it be expected that he would be entirely free from the traditions of the past that he represented. It was not easy for a Bourbon to become a constitutional king, to throw over the divine right of government in order to accept the principles of a movement in which he had taken no part. France had accepted him, particularly in the second restoration, at the hands of the allies, and he was supported in his position by the fact that France was willing to recognise his title based on legitimate right. He was, therefore, the real head of the state, possessing full and extensive powers, and in law no figure-head ; yet he could never be the real governor of France as had been Napoleon. France was governed by parties that the king was unable to control, and, in general, the party in power was more liberal or more conservative than the king himself. However positive might be his wishes he was unable to obtain the support in the Chambers that he wished, and he found it impossible to establish a government strong enough to oppose the extreme liberals on one side and the ultra-conservatives on the other.

If the king had not succeeded under the favourable conditions of the first restoration, much less likely was he to succeed

under the unfavourable conditions of the second. The Hundred Days and the events preceding them had been exceedingly disastrous to the Bourbon government. In 1814, Louis XVIII. had been received with the joy that accompanies the promise of peace and the hope of a freer government. Party differences were hushed; the wearied nation had but one desire, to be relieved of the pressure of Napoleon's despotism and the anxieties that had attended the long-continued warfare. But in the short space of one year a marked change had come over the spirit of France. The attempt of the royalists to thrust themselves into positions of prominence in the state that they might control the government, their scorn of the Revolution, their insulting hostility to all things Napoleonic, created party schism and started party issues that menaced the peace of the country. The return of Napoleon and the defeat at Waterloo, aided by the impulsive character of the French themselves, increased party bitterness and intensified the conflict of classes. After November, 1815, harmony was no longer possible, and the feeling of a large portion of the French people for the Bourbons had materially altered. The allies had summarily placed Louis XVIII. back upon his throne, and in adding the burden of a money indemnity and a military occupation had made it inevitable that the people should associate the restoration of the Bourbons with the idea of punishment. The party hostility thus aroused was increased by the fact that the old nobility and the conservatives generally identified themselves with the monarchy by demanding rewards for their faithfulness, while those who had supported Napoleon, aware that they had been defeated, were by virtue of this feeling hostile to the monarchy. When, therefore, Louis XVIII. began for the second time to govern France, there were already existent well-defined parties, whose struggles for control of the government make up the history of the fifteen years under consideration. On one side were the conservatives, the party of reaction; on the other the

radicals, the revolutionary Left; while between lay the two Centres, made up of moderates.

The party of reaction, the Ultras, represented not merely the social traditions of the old *régime*, but also its political and religious doctrines, which were once more reaffirmed as imprescriptible truths. These doctrines were maintained and defended by a group of writers who stood for a counter-reaction against the doctrines of the Revolution. On one hand these writers opposed the opinions of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Condorcet, and endeavoured to prove that a natural religion, a social compact, sovereignty of the people, and a progressive perfectibility were false in theory and disastrous in practice. On the other they taught that sovereignty and authority emanate from God alone; that as He rules the world, so the Pope has authority over the Church, the king over his people, the father over his family; that institutions may mature but they cannot change their character; that inasmuch as stability is the divine desire the existing order must be permanent, or if by the evil in man it be overthrown, it is the duty of man to restore it to its former condition. With this political creed went also a theological creed, which contained all the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church, and the union of the two creeds made up a body of doctrine that rendered the Ultras the bitter enemies of the new democratic spirit in France. The triumph of the papacy, the restoration of the Jesuit order, the brilliant writings of de Bonald, de Maistre, and Lamennais threatened the position of Protestantism, opposed the romantic tendencies already becoming prominent, and strengthened the growing opposition to the Charta and the liberal party. The Ultras rose to the defence of the throne and the altar, and they considered the Charta as the chief obstacle in their path. They advocated an unlimited monarchy, but the very existence of a constitution made such a monarchy impossible; they believed in the restoration to the nobility of all their old privileges, but the Charta only restored

the titles of the *noblesse* and denied them their special functions in making all Frenchmen equally eligible to civil and military positions; they wished to extend the belief in the absolute truths of the Roman Catholic faith, but the Charta allowed freedom of religion; they desired the supremacy of the ecclesiastical ministry, but the Charta and successive laws took away from the church the control of education and marriage. To men of this class compromise was treason, moderation a lapse from faith; to them there was but one order, one divinely appointed system, that of the old *régime;* for them the only course was to return to the institutions which the Revolution had overthrown. Truly these *enragés* conservatives had forgotten none of their past privileges, and had learned none of the lessons which recent experience should have taught them.

Over against this party of reaction stood the party of the other extreme, the revolutionary Left, composed of republicans, who were without fixed ideas or plans, dissatisfied imperialists, anarchists and opponents of law and order, all of whom found themselves somewhat loosely bound together in a common opposition to monarchy in general and to the restoration of the Bourbons in particular. Many of these men had been soldiers and adherents of the Empire, some were of the lower classes in the cities and a considerable number of the higher classes. Lafayette, Manuel, Constant, Grégoire were more or less closely connected with this party, which in process of time was destined to sub-divide into definite parties with more pronounced and positive opinions.

It is, however, in the parties of the Centre that we are to find the real interest of the period to 1822, for in them lay the support of the government, and upon them the Charta depended for protection. The members of the Centre were, taken as a whole, those who wished to enjoy the real benefits of free and representative institutions, who desired a more practicable application of the principles of 1789 than had been made during

the Revolution, who wished to maintain the Charta because they believed that it embodied these principles. They were divided into two groups, of which one, the Left Centre, may be defined as the constitutional party of progress, the moderate liberals. To these men, sometimes called even at this period the *doctrinaires*, whose theory was to hold fast to that which is good but never cease to struggle for something better, the Charta, though insufficient in itself, was a step in the direction of a better government. They were determined to use it as a guarantee, and to build up by slow stages a system more perfect from the standpoint of constitutional theory. In so doing they supported the monarchy of the Bourbons although they were not satisfied with it. Having opposed the Left because that body represented rather the methods than the philosophy of the Revolution, and the extreme Right because it accepted nothing of the Revolution, they found in the Right Centre their natural allies, so long as that party gave to them its confidence. With the Left Centre were identified Royer-Collard, Guizot, Camille Jourdan among the deputies, Broglie among the peers. The other party, the Right Centre, accepted the Charta unconditionally, following unreservedly its guidance, and desired to change it only so far as it was necessary in order to preserve it. The members of this party agreed with the king in his policy of compromise and reconciliation and thus became the main support of the monarchy. They did not sympathise with the reactionary excesses of the Ultras, because such excesses disturbed the harmony of the nation; they had no sympathy with the party of the Left, because it was hostile to the monarchy and the Charta. Members from the Right Centre formed the government from 1815 to 1822 and its best representatives were Richelieu, de Serre, Pasquier, and Decazes.

These were the party lines that were being sharply drawn during those first unfortunate years of Bourbon government, 1814 and 1815. But the return of Napoleon created some-

thing more than the political opposition of parties; it roused the religious and social hostility of classes. Scarcely had Waterloo been fought than the ultra-royalists in certain parts of France rose to take their revenge upon the revolutionists and the followers of Napoleon. Marseilles, Avignon, the territory of the Gard with its capital Nîmes, were the scene of a reactionary rising known as the White Terror, which was not confined to an attack upon the revolutionists, but extended to a fanatical onslaught upon the Calvinists as well. Few persons, about 130 in all, counting those on both sides, were killed, but reactionary spite vented itself in ferocious attacks upon the vanquished party, and sated its spirit of revenge by the murder of two notable men, Marshal Brune, who was murdered at Avignon on the 2d of August, and General Ramel, who was struck down by a crowd of bandits at Toulouse two weeks later. The massacres were serious enough, but of greater moment and more embarrassment to the government was the long duration of the movement in the department of the Gard, where still lingered traces of the old religious antagonism of the sixteenth century when Huguenot and Catholic looked upon each other as legitimate prey. Here the trouble lasted for four months, until it was finally put down by a detachment of Austrian troops. In these excesses France as a whole had no part. Even the royalists did not dare to applaud in public acts committed in their name.

The White Terror can hardly be said to represent the victory of reaction in France, for it was the result of local quite as much as of general causes. Much more serious was the result of the elections of 1815, when the people were called upon to send deputies to the first Chamber called under the Charta. In consequence of the defeat of Napoleon, which caused large numbers of the men of the Revolution and the Empire, who were frightened and persecuted, to stay away from the polls, and of the high suffrage established by the Charta, which dis-

franchised thousands of the old soldiers and members of the poorer classes, the elections almost everywhere turned in favour of the reactionary party. The majority of the new Chamber consisted of *émigrés* from the country, gentlemen of the provinces, soldiers of La Vendée or their sons, quondam officials and merchants with strong legitimist tendencies, representatives all of the intolerant ignorance of the ultra-royalists, of the resentments against the Revolution and the Empire, of the regrets for the old *régime*. Immediately the fate of the Talleyrand ministry which Louis XVIII. had accepted the June previous was sealed, for made up as it was entirely of men who had served during the Revolution or under the Empire, and including not a single member of the party of the *émigrés*, it had, needless to say, incurred the strong hostility of the royalists. Talleyrand, hoping to save himself, dismissed Fouché, but in vain ; and finally he, too, retired, not without the hope that he would be recalled. In his place entered the Duke of Richelieu, whose residence in Russia had made him a favourite of the Czar, and whose known moderation gave him the confidence of France.

The Chamber—called "undiscoverable" because the king could scarcely believe that such a Chamber had been discovered—began at once on organisation to pursue the policy of the White Terror under a constitutional form, and first of all demanded the punishment of traitors. Proscription lists had already been drawn up as early as July, but of those there named some had fled from France, Labédoyère had already been shot, and Lavalette had escaped from prison. But the Chamber vented its wrath upon Mouton-Duvernet, Chartran, General Bonnaire, the brothers Faucher, and others, while Marshal Ney fell a victim to the reaction of terror that seized upon the better elements of the Chamber of Peers, by which he was tried. On the other hand, of the assassins of the White Terror, criminals against justice and humanity, some never

were punished at all, while others went free for many years; the Terror seemed to have frozen the law.

In addition to these constitutional murders—for they can be called nothing else—the Chamber endeavoured to undo by constitutional means the work of the Revolution, and to restore France once more to the church and the throne. The Chamber sought to suspend individual liberty, to restore confiscated property, to make the right of suffrage depend on property only, to put on trial not only those who had voted for the death of Louis XVI. but also a number of those who had served as military or administrative officials of Napoleon, and they would have liked to make the day of the execution of Louis XVI. a day of national mourning. Before the passage of the amnesty bill, which Richelieu brought forward early in December, the prisons were filling with suspects, and the prévôt-courts, made up almost exclusively of generals and captains of the old *régime*, were conducting arbitrary trials without jury and without appeal. The amnesty bill itself was only saved by nine votes from being ruined in the passage by exceptions that would have given legislative support to every expression of royal hate. Furthermore, the army was reorganised, and the *émigrés* and their followers took the place of the old soldiers of the Empire. Friends of legitimism filled important administrative posts, and a system of espionage and denunciation threatened the tenure of any one known to be in sympathy with the doctrines of the Revolution.

But revenge for the past was in the opinion of the "undiscoverable" Chamber only a part of its appointed work; there was the further duty of securing the future by making possible the supremacy of the Crown, and through it the supremacy of the Church—throne and altar inseparably bound together. To this end worked a body standing for systematised reactionism, the Congregation, originally a small order of faithful men and women, organised for the purpose of keeping alive Catholicism

during the supremacy of Napoleon and the captivity of Pius VII. Meeting together in secret, its members endeavoured during the conflict between Napoleon and the Pope, to keep up the courage of the followers of the church and to furnish to the Pope assurance of faithful attachment. In consequence of the return of the Bourbons and the rapid increase of the converts to Roman Catholicism, this body entered upon a career of propaganda. It became, under the leadership of the Count of Artois, in a sense a political body, to which laymen and ecclesiastics alike belonged. While most admirable and legitimate was the work of many of the other associations that were formed side by side with it for the purpose of extending Catholicism in France, nevertheless all alike suffered from the suspicions which the Congregation proper incurred. The people came to believe that all these organisations taken together formed behind the throne a secret system, whose head was the Pope and whose arms were the Jesuits; whereas, in fact, the Congregation alone, although it had nothing to do with the Jesuits and its interference in political affairs was mainly the work of the *émigrés*, was deserving of suspicion. Its one object was to restore the Roman Catholic Church, to maintain her old rights, and to extend the influence of her principles; and to this end it imposed espionage upon its members as a duty of conscience, and it employed not only people of the higher classes, but artisans and petty merchants as well. Montlosier said that he had seen in Paris chamber-women and footmen who declared themselves to be in the service of this society. In the "undiscoverable" Chamber it made its first attempt to remodel France in the interest of ecclesiasticism, by planning to make the clergy a landed estate, as before the Revolution, through the restoration of their lands, and by proposing to put the University under the control of the bishops and to give the lesser clergy the control over local instruction and the care of the registry lists of births and deaths. Of all the propositions

that were made two only were carried out; the law of divorce was repealed, and all married priests were deprived of their pensions. Had the reactionary measures of this Chamber become laws, France would have been thrown into the hands of the church and the Ultras; free thought and free education would have been sacrificed to ecclesiastical intolerance; and the gains of the Revolution, as expressed in the Charta, would have been cast aside in the interest of a revived mediævalism.

But the Chamber in its excess of zeal so far overreached itself as to bring about its own destruction. More ultra than the king, these ultra-royalists had passed the bounds of the royal forbearance. Louis XVIII., seeing that representative monarchy was in peril, and realising that the reactionist policy would, if maintained, lead to revolution, if not to civil war, influenced, too, by the advice of his ministers, notably Decazes, determined, in accordance with the authority granted him by the Charta, to dissolve the Chamber. This he did on the 5th of September, 1816, and by so doing gave to the Bourbon monarchy fifteen more years of life. This act fell like a thunderbolt upon the Ultras, who received it with indignation and wrath, and condemned it as a political stratagem; but among the mass of the people joy was everywhere evident, for, except in the west and the south where the Ultras had some following, the hostility to the reactionist policy was very general. More broadly speaking, the royal ordinance brought to an end the counter-revolution, for it announced to the people that the king was dissatisfied with the deputies they had sent up, that he had broken with the Ultras, and would follow the policy of the moderate party. In 1816 a moderate minister and a sensible king saved the country from a revolution that a fanatical Chamber seemed determined to provoke, a state of affairs quite unlike that of 1830, when a fanatical minister and a narrow-minded king facing a liberal Chamber brought on the revolution that dethroned the Bourbons.

Besides bringing joy to the people at large, the royal ordinance had the good effect of sobering the body of electors, and the new Assembly fully justified the hopes of Richelieu that a second reactionary Chamber was impossible. The result of the new elections showed that the power lay in the hands of the middle classes, and with them as his support, Richelieu entered definitely upon his own policy, which had been so seriously endangered by the late intractable Chamber. His chief aim was to reconcile the nation and the monarchy, or, as it has been otherwise expressed, to "royalise the nation and to nationalise royalty"; his secondary purpose, to reconcile France with Europe and to begin the undoing, in the relations with the other Powers, of the evil work of the Hundred Days. For the purpose of creating harmony in France many important measures in the years 1816 and 1817 were passed: the law suspending individual liberty was modified, a new electoral law establishing a direct suffrage was established, the army of France was put upon a respectable footing, and the Count of Artois was deprived of his authority over the national guard of the kingdom. Many of these measures, which indicated the growing strength of the liberal party, were the work of Decazes, who had become the favourite minister of the king. But the most important act of the ministry was the work of Richelieu alone. By the confidence that he had inspired in Alexander, and by the statesmanlike manner in which he conducted the negotiations at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, he succeeded that year in relieving France of the burden of foreign occupation imposed upon the country by the second treaty of Paris. At this congress, where the new European state system was successfully launched, the Powers consented to the evacuation of the French territory at the end of the third year of occupation. France was then invited to take her place as one of the great Powers of Europe, and to join in all future deliberations. Inasmuch as in 1817 the state had already es-

tablished its financial credit, and was enabled to negotiate a loan wherewith to pay off the indemnities due to the foreign Powers, it is evident that under the rule of the moderates not only had the internal condition improved, but also the external relations were becoming once more harmonious and peaceful.

But this victory of the moderates brought evils in its train. The new elections held in the year 1818, the very year of the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, proved exceedingly disquieting to the upholders of the moderate policy, and especially to Richelieu. Already, in 1817, "independents" of the Left had appeared in considerable numbers in the Chamber, but now in 1818 prominent leaders of the most advanced liberalism, such as Lafayette and Manuel, were returned. If Richelieu had seen with dismay the ultra-royalist majority in the "undiscoverable" Chamber, he was no less disturbed by the prospect of an Assembly, that might at any succeeding election contain a majority opposed not only to the ministry but to the monarchy itself. But Richelieu was too good a royalist to have any intention of playing into the hands of the revolutionary Left, whose avowed policy was hostility to the Bourbons, and he determined, even if the plan involved a reconciliation with the Right, to urge a union of royalists of all degrees of opinions for the purpose of resisting the invasion of revolutionary doctrines. His fears were not, however, shared by other members of the ministry, notably Decazes, so that when he began to approach the Right for support and agreed to a modification of the electoral law, a division in the ministry was inevitable. It was clear that either Richelieu or Decazes must give way. The latter consented to accept the ambassadorship to St. Petersburg, and Richelieu endeavoured to form a new ministry. But having failed in this he resigned in December, 1818. In the reorganisation that followed, Decazes, serving as minister of the interior under General Desolles, practically con-

trolled the government, and true to his disregard of Richelieu's fears, continued without hesitation a moderate policy.

The tendency in French politics was now markedly toward liberalism. The country at large was reaping the benefits of stability and repose. Commerce, industry, and agriculture were feeling the good effects of a re-established credit and the advantages of a country freed from the occupation of foreign armies. The government of Decazes was proving most successful in attempting to develop a moderate policy under a constitutional monarchy, and a law on the liberty of the press gave joy to the journalists, who were already becoming more outspoken and fearless, and proved the exemplar for later legislation. But under this appearance of repose there existed the most intense party feeling. The Ultras, who were roused by the failure to reap the reward they had expected from Richelieu's attitude, attacked the moderate measures. The popular anger at the work of the prévôt-courts strengthened the opponents of the government. The Left was maddened by the "never" of Count de Serre and Decazes, when the ministry was petitioned to bring forward a measure pardoning the regicides; and at the same time in the Centre itself the division took place that was to result in the opposition of the *doctrinaires* to the party to which they had hitherto given their support. Party feeling was running high when the elections of the year 1819 showed that the tendencies toward a radical liberalism were too rapid for the well-being of the country. Of the thirty-five new liberal members one was the son of a regicide, another one of the proscribed of 1815, while twenty had held administrative or military offices during the Hundred Days. But the election that nearly provoked a civil war in France was that of the Abbé Grégoire, constitutional bishop of 1791, one of the most violent of the old revolutionists, a member of the National Convention, and a regicide morally though not technically. On the election of this man the royalists uttered a cry of horror,

and even the king, who had not objected to a Fouché four years before, expressed his displeasure. The Powers of Europe, already in the mood that brought them together at Troppau a year later to suppress the Neapolitan revolution, looked on doubtfully at such an evidence of radicalism in France; and Metternich began to wonder whether France did not need the attention of the quadruple alliance. But France was quite able to take care of herself, and the Chamber with little opposition declared against the admission of Grégoire, largely on the ground that his election was an insult to the king. Decazes took into consideration the reforming of the electoral law, and the king, though evidently unwilling to be led by the passions and prejudices of the ultra-royalists, was ready to make concessions to the Right.

It was now hoped that in consequence of these acts the crisis had been safely passed, when an event took place that turned the tide of liberalism, brought about the fall of the Decazes ministry, and eventually gave the victory into the hands of the party of reaction. On the evening of the 13th of February a fanatical liberal, named Louvel, murdered the Duke of Berry, the younger and more intelligent and courageous of the two sons of the Count of Artois, the last hope of the Bourbon dynasty, and the only Bourbon competent to rule France wisely. But Louvel's dagger did more than strike down a man, it murdered a policy as well; for the act seemed to the Ultras and the conservatives to be but the natural outcome of the recent liberal successes. "You ask me," said Nodier, "whether the knife which murdered the Duke of Berry was a dagger or a saddler's knife. I saw it and I call it none of these; it was a liberal idea." In consequence of the clamour that rose among the Ultras, unappeased by the various concessions that Decazes was ready to make, the king allowed himself to be influenced against his favourite, and suffering sentiment in a moment of weakness to blot out other considerations decided that any new

combination of ministers with Decazes as leader was morally impossible. When, therefore, the Ultras pleaded for the removal of Decazes, and the *doctrinaires* looked on coldly, making no sign of approval or disapproval, Louis yielded, and removed Decazes, though he left the ministry otherwise intact and made no change in his policy. Richelieu, whose attitude in 1818 seems to have satisfied the Ultras that he was still strongly opposed to any increase of liberalism, was summoned for the second time to take his place at the head of affairs; and he resumed once more the policy of moderation, which he believed to be under the circumstances the only one possible for France.

But the situation had become altogether different. The political tide had turned, and however much the minister might wish to pursue a middle course he was forced by circumstances to lean toward the Right, just as in the period from 1816 to 1818 he had been obliged to lean toward the Left. In the reorganisation of the ministry that followed the fall of Decazes, a union was tried between the Right Centre and the Right. In this new combination it will be noticed that the *doctrinaires*, that is, the Left Centre, were not included, a fact which shows that the breach between the two wings of the moderate party had become complete. In abandoning the Right Centre at this critical period the *doctrinaires* must bear in large part the blame for creating a situation from which the Duke of Richelieu was unable to extricate himself. By drawing away toward the Left, on the ground that the Right Centre was committing itself too much to a stubborn acceptance of the Charta, they left the ministry of Richelieu to the mercy of the ultra-royalists, and forced it to adopt a policy of concession in the vain hope of forming a constitutional party of the Right. To this end the ministry brought forward measures to limit the suffrage and fetter the press. Prefects and sub-prefects of a liberal type were removed, and their place was filled by men of more pronounced royalist opinions. The army was reorganised by

the purging of the disaffected officers in the hope of making it a loyal ally to the monarchy. Richelieu even proposed abolishing the annual elections, by means of which the recent liberal gains had been made possible, and invited Villèle, a moderate royalist, to be a minister without a portfolio, and Corbière, an ultra-royalist and a man of no great honour, to be minister of public instruction, an act that raised a storm of protest from the liberals.

But this desire to maintain peace and harmony carried in train concessions that were impossible. Richelieu, though anxious to unite all supporters of the monarchy against the revolutionary spirit, was convinced that such a union could be beneficial only in case all would agree to work for the strengthening of France and the monarchy, and not for the triumph of party. But the Ultras were determined to take advantage of the situation in order to gain the control of government. When, therefore, Richelieu as a last concession tried to form a fusion ministry by summoning Villèle into the cabinet, he found that neither that royalist nor Corbière would accept positions unless such further concessions were made as would give to the Right the control of the departments of the interior, war, and public instruction; and his refusal to grant these demands practically lost him the support of the Right, and left his ministry in a difficult and critical position, politically isolated. He could not turn to the Left Centre, for that party would certainly reject him after his attempted reconciliation with the Right. The only course that remained was to pursue such a policy as to attach to him all those of the royalist party who had not determined beforehand to oppose him, and at the same time to conduct affairs with such wisdom as to give the country confidence in the ministerial policy. In this way he hoped to gain a ministerial support in the coming elections of 1821. But in this he failed. The new elections resulted, it is true, in a general defeat of the liberals, and a

consequent increase of royalist deputies; but these seem to have been men of little enlightenment, most of them strangers to politics, and, as Richelieu said, "accustomed to conduct themselves more by impulses of the heart than by reflections of the mind." The new members, therefore, instead of coming to the rescue of the struggling ministry, fell under the intriguing influence of the ultra-royalists of Paris, and allowed themselves to be led by the Count of Artois and his advisers. The Right and the extreme Right now came into complete accord, and Richelieu found himself confronting a Chamber whose first act was to frame an address full of charges against the ministry. The policy of the ministry that aimed at the tranquillity of France was sacrificed to the intrigues of a party which saw in the concessions and overtures which Richelieu had made only weaknesses to be utilised, and which, forgetting the welfare of France, acted for the selfish interests of nobility and church. To make the isolation of the ministry complete the king himself, now beginning to come under the influence of the Countess du Cayla, herself an agent of the ultra-royalists, deserted his minister. In this crisis Richelieu, thinking a reorganisation of his ministry dishonourable, and seeing no hope in an appeal to the country, gave up the struggle, December 14, 1821, and let the control of the government pass into the hands of the Right.

Of this momentous change, which defined the political history of France for nearly a decade and retarded her constitutional development, Pasquier, one of the sacrificed ministry wrote as follows: "In 1822, the house of Bourbon committed a most unreasonable act; it broke at a moment when it could have been most useful to it the instrument which had already rendered such great services. The destruction of the second ministry of the Duke of Richelieu was more than a political fault, it was a veritable crime." That which had been destroyed was not merely the ministry of Richelieu, it was also

the last trace of the moderate spirit of 1816; that which took its place was not merely the ministry of Villèle, it was also the revived spirit of 1815, the spirit of the "undiscoverable" Chamber, of the party that was commissioned to withstand and overthrow the liberal movement in France.

With the entrance of the Ultras into power the tranquillity that the country had enjoyed under the rule of the moderates came to an end. Commotion, agitation, conspiracy began to disturb the country, and it was not long before the liberal and revolutionary elements were in arms against the royalist aggressions. The Ultras in the name of the church declared war upon society, and society returned to the church war for war. "Deplorable chaos followed, in which good and evil, the true and the false, the just and the unjust were," says Guizot, "confounded and indiscriminately attacked." France was now destined to suffer the evil effects of the narrow policy of reaction that had already attempted to silence liberalism in the other countries of Europe.

The policy of the new government, in no wise different from that of the "undiscoverable" Chamber, was now more accurately defined. The Jesuits began a thorough and far-reaching propagation of their principles; the Congregation, with renewed confidence in its strength, extended its system, enlarged its field of activity, and in the person of the Count of Montmorency entered the Villèle cabinet. An attack was at once planned whereby the altar and the throne, too long outraged by the Charta, might be reconstituted in true mediæval form. At the University, where the liberal opposition to the Ultras had been most defiant, the lectures of Royer-Collard, Guizot, Cousin, and Villemain were suspended by order of the Abbé Frayssinous, whom the ultra-royalists had made grand-master of the University, and, after Chateaubriand, minister of ecclesiastical affairs and public instruction. Contrary to law, colleges were established by the Jesuits in order to counteract the influ-

ence of secular teaching. The laws of 1820 against individual liberty and freedom of the press were rigidly enforced, and it became evident as early as 1822 that the new government was determined, by one means or another, to limit and annul the most important guarantees that the Charta had made to the public liberties of France.

But while the mission of the Ultras was to strengthen the altar by active propagandism and to weaken all opposition to their purposes by laws of censure and arbitrary arrest, it was also their work to strengthen the throne. To this end events worked in their favour. Death removed from their path dangerous political opponents, Camille Jourdan, Richelieu, de Serre. The dynasty of the Bourbons was strengthened, and the loss of the Duke of Berry neutralised, by the birth of a posthumous son, Henry, Duke of Bordeaux, later Count of Chambord. Thus the dynasty was sure of an heir. The imperialist party, against whom the wrath of the Ultras had been vented in 1815, had suffered a vital loss in the death of Napoleon in 1821, an event that gave to the royalists special cause for rejoicing. So firmly fixed had become the reactionary government, of whose policy the most extreme version of the doctrine of legitimism was an integral part, that when in 1822 the Powers of Europe met at Verona to consider the question of the Spanish revolution, France took an attitude essentially different from that she had assumed at Troppau and Laibach. With Louis XVIII. still possessing a will of his own, guided in 1820 by Decazes and in 1821 by Richelieu, France had expressed herself in favour of non-intervention. In 1822 and 1823, with Louis XVIII. wholly under the spell of du Cayla and Artois, and with the Ultras controlling the government, a vigorous policy of intervention for the purpose of upholding the throne of Ferdinand, a Bourbon and a bigoted Roman Catholic, was determined on, and France, practically for the first time, entered seriously into the deliberations of a European congress.

At the head of her representatives was Montmorency himself, and by his side Chateaubriand, both men who were ambitious to imitate Austria's action in Italy. Here was an opportunity for a military crusade to save the descendant of Louis XIV., to defend the altar and the throne, and to expel the Revolution from its last stronghold in Europe. Montmorency's arbitrary conduct, aided by Chateaubriand's duplicity and Metternich's encouragement, carried the day at the congress, and committed France to a policy which Louis XVIII. opposed and even Villèle considered unnecessary. Ultra-royalist successes in the elections of 1822 led to the adoption of this policy by the Chambers. A striking feature of the debate was the reply of Manuel to the argument that Ferdinand VII. was in danger of suffering the fate of Charles I. and Louis XVI. in words that were interpreted as an apology for the regicides. For this he was forcibly ejected from the Chamber, an arbitrary action, itself a practical violation of the parliamentary liberties of a deputy, and a worthy counterpart of the decision to send 100,000 men into Spain to overthrow the Spanish constitution. Acts like these indicated the temper of the Ultras, and roused a bitter hostility among the liberals throughout Europe. But the Ultras became really supreme in France when on September 24, 1824, Louis XVIII., who had ceased to be the real ruler of France in 1822, died, and the Count of Artois, the old *émigré* and arch-ultra, became king as Charles X. The man who had been the first to leave France on the outbreak of the Revolution, he whose whole life had been opposed to the Revolution, at the head of a powerful organisation whose avowed object was the overthrow of the Charta, was now, by right of succession, the king of France; and what is more striking, he ascended the throne without any opposition on the part of the nation, so well had the movement that had begun with the fall of the second ministry of Richelieu accustomed the people to the supremacy of the ultra-conservative party.

The serenity of France was, however, more apparent than real, for while externally the people appeared to be satisfied, nevertheless under the surface there was disquietude and disappointment. The movement, common to all Europe of this period, toward the formation of secret societies for the purpose of spreading revolutionary ideas, had been accelerated in France when political power began to centre in the parties of the Right Centre and the Right. Of the two most important political associations, that with its centre at Saumur had been known by the title *Chevaliers de la liberté* and had had influence chiefly in the region of the Loire, where it numbered about 40,000; the other, the Carbonari, founded upon the model of the Italian society of that name, was established for the more definite purpose of opposing the Congregation. The latter of these, large but loosely connected, and affiliated with the other sections of the same order in Italy and Switzerland, had been made up chiefly of members of the army, the bar, and the schools; and though it had had no fixed principles, its avowed object had been the overturning of the house of Bourbon, in order to erect upon its ruins, as some of the members believed, an empire under Napoleon II. (Duke of Reichstadt), to re-establish the republic as others claimed, or, as a third group seems to have desired, to establish a liberal monarchy under the house of Orléans. Among its members had been many persons of worth and influence, of whom the most notable had been Lafayette, who was the head of the principal wing. In 1820, the two societies had amalgamated, and several conspiracies had been undertaken, which had received their encouragement from the revolutionary uprisings in Naples, Piedmont, Portugal, Spain and Greece, and from the fall of the moderate government of Richelieu. At Saumur General Berton had led a hopeless rising in favour of the Bonapartists, and in the same year, 1822, an extensive conspiracy, in which Lafayette was implicated, had been put down at Belfort. The Villèle minis-

try had been exceedingly vigorous in its opposition to these movements, and had so far succeeded in suppressing conspiracies that at the death of Louis XVIII. there were no revolutionary societies of consequence in existence in France. This, however, does not alter the fact that the serenity which accompanied the accession of Charles X. was due rather to the activity of the government than to the satisfaction of France. The revolutionary and liberal elements had been silenced, not convinced.

In still another particular did the government of Charles X. seem more secure than the actual condition of France warranted. In 1823, the year before the accession of the Count of Artois, the liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies had dropped from 110 to 19. It might well seem that such a royalist Chamber indicated a general contentment throughout the country with the Bourbon government. But a brief examination shows that what seemed to be an expression of the will of the people was but the result of an outrageous abuse of administrative power on the part of the government. Local functionaries were threatened, frauds of the most barefaced type were practised, election lists were tampered with, false tickets used, while the electoral law of the "double vote" of 1820 gave undue influence to the proprietary class. No wonder that the elections, directed, dominated, and falsified by the ministry, resulted in the return of a large majority of royalist members, who considered the Charta the fatal legacy of a detestable epoch. Thus the government and the ministry were living in an atmosphere false and dangerously deceptive as to the true condition of France. They were seeking only to strengthen their power, and to employ it so as to render public opinion powerless, and to increase by counter-revolutionary measures the authority of the landed aristocracy and the clergy. To enable them to attain these ends, there had been passed in the year 1824 a new law, which abolished the old custom, established by the Charta, of returning annually one-fifth of the Chamber, and which de-

creed that the Chamber then sitting and the ministry then in power should remain for seven years, at the end of which time a renewal of the entire Chamber should be effected. This act, which was passed before the death of Louis XVIII., assured the supremacy of the Right, and completed the breach between that party and the nation.

Inasmuch as Charles X. had been the practical ruler of France since 1822, and was supported by a minister and a chamber that seemed to be willing to promote the ultra-royalist policy, there was no reason to suppose that a policy different from that of the preceding three years would be adopted. And yet for the moment matters looked otherwise. Charles X. seemed to heed the last words of his brother, "Preserve the crown for this child" (the Duke of Bordeaux) and issued a program of his intentions, in which he declared his devotion to the Charta. This statement, followed by the pardon of a number of prisoners and the re-establishment at Grenoble of the faculty of law that had been dissolved because of its opposition to the law of censure, made it seem for the moment as if the king had decided upon a policy of reconciliation, and had felt the need of sinking the partisan in the king. From the 24th to the 29th of September, 1824, the Count of Artois for the first time in his career roused a feeling of satisfaction among the people of France, and the new reign became in a sense popular. But a reconciliation between the Charta and the Ultras, who had declared war upon all that was liberal and progressive, was impossible. The party of the Right could no more become a constitutional party in 1824 than it could in 1822; and whether its leader were the Count of Artois or Charles X., the presumptive heir or the King of France, he was equally unable to realise that a king could not be king of a party, and that all France belonged to him as he belonged to all France. He carried to the kingship all the predilections of party, and openly declared that the Chambers were simply an advisory board, and

that in case of a difference of opinion the king's will was absolute. It is undoubtedly true that he considered it dangerous and humiliating for the Crown to make concessions to popular opinion, and he is to be credited with a sincerity in his belief, false though it was, that the reconstruction upon its old foundations of the authority of the throne, the aristocracy, and the clergy, was essential to the safety of the monarchy and of France.

The good impression made by the auspicious opening of the new reign was soon neutralised by the introduction of superannuated forms of etiquette and titles of the old *régime*, and by the solemn coronation that took place at Rheims, where mediæval ceremonial was accompanied with an ostentatious exhibition of relics, and the oil of Clovis was employed to anoint the forehead of a nineteenth-century king. The entrance of the king into Paris was a theatrical display, which, while harmless in itself, left an unpleasant impression upon the minds of the people, who feared that this fondness for mediævalism in external things might be but a prelude to a fondness for mediævalism in policy and government. Confidence was not strengthened when the people saw the king surrounded by his old advisers, and submitting to the influence of men of the most positive ultra-opinion ; when they saw him, from motives of economy, dismiss one hundred and sixty-seven generals who had begun their career under the Republic and the Empire ; when they saw him discontinuing the pension granted by Napoleon to the mathematician Légendre because the latter had refused his vote in an academic election to the candidate recommended by the government, and when they saw the last rites of the church refused to an actor, whom the people had honoured and praised.

The hostility aroused by these impolitic actions was greatly increased by the deliberate declaration of the policy of the government in the acts passed by the Chambers in the years

1825 and 1826. Villèle, who found himself wholly unable to resist the pressure of the mediæval forces acting in politics, demanded of the Chambers the passage of four measures of the most remarkable character, measures, which though never as a whole actually put into operation, were nevertheless clear indices of the character of the party in power. Villèle first asked on behalf of the *émigrés* for an indemnity for the estates that had been confiscated during the Revolution. On one side it was claimed that such indemnity was the only means of establishing union in the French nation ; on the other, it was argued that if the principle of indemnity were admitted, then the descendants of all dispossessed persons from the earliest times of French history would have a claim upon the government. The measure was, however, carried, and 988,000,000 francs were appropriated for the purpose. Secondly, Villèle demanded the re-establishment of religious communities for women, to be effected simply by royal ordinance. This demand for nunneries was planned as a precedent for the re-establishment, in the near future, of monasteries, and the legalising of the order of Jesuits, whose reappearance in France had never been legally recognised. Although this law was passed, the opposition of Pasquier led to such an amendment of it as to render it harmless. Thirdly, and most remarkable of all, was the demand for a law of sacrilege, whereby it was proposed to punish the theft of sacred vessels from a church by death, the profanation of the host by amputation of the hand, followed by death. This measure, supported by de Bonald, was opposed by Pasquier in the Peers and Royer-Collard in the Deputies. It was branded as a return to the barbarism of the Middle Ages, as introducing theology into legislation, inasmuch as it involved the legal recognition of the doctrine of transubstantiation ; and it was shown to be contrary to the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Charta. Behind all these measures appeared the Congregation and the Jesuits, whose insistence in this particular

was checkmated by the fact that the sacrilege law, though passed in a modified form, was never put into force. Lastly, in 1826, the ministry demanded the restoration of the rights of primogeniture, involving the entail of property in the eldest son. This measure was stigmatised as attacking the idea of equality before the law, and to the liberals it appeared as a monstrous encroachment upon the law of nature and reason, and a violation of public morality. Fortunately the law was rejected by the Chamber of Peers, and Paris in consequence gave itself up to joy and festivity.

These measures roused everywhere the feeling in France that the government was endeavouring to do by parliamentary means what the Congregation had been attempting to do by more unofficial methods. The people, however, believed that the Jesuits were promoting all these evils, and were doing all in their power to place France under the yoke of a narrow-minded clergy ; and that which the people at large felt came to be in a less exaggerated form the opinion of many of the moderate royalists, for the unity of the Ultras was breaking under the heavy strain to which it was subjected, and a rupture between the *parti-prêtre* and the *parti-royaliste* was fast approaching. It seemed as if the former were endeavouring by every means in its power not only to increase the hostility that the revolutionary and liberal elements felt towards it, but also to alienate the party of the moderate royalists, upon whose support in the Chamber it depended for a parliamentary majority. Should such majority be lost, and should the Ultras persist in their mediæval policy, there would be no other resource for them than an appeal to measures either positively illegal or based upon a strained interpretation of the constitution. The history of the four years from 1826 to 1830 furnishes the solution of the intricate problem which the situation offered, and presents the striking picture of a nation and its authorised government gradually drawing farther and farther apart from

each other, until a revolutionary movement was needed in order to restore the country to itself.

That which precipitated this conflict between the two wings of the royalist party was the presence of the Jesuits in France contrary to law; for their boldness, rapid growth, wealth, and power, which, due in large part to the favour that had been accorded to them by the Restoration, was exciting the jealousy of the old *noblesse*. In the session of 1826 Count Montlosier, himself an *émigré* and partisan of the old ideas, began an attack upon the Congregation and the Jesuits, whom he denounced as a menace to the state, a danger to public order, and an enemy to religion in France. Montlosier, coming from a province where the leading families had been Jansenists, did not believe in the dominance of ecclesiasticism in politics. His memoir upon the Congregation, in which was set forth the methods whereby that body gained information and converts, produced a tremendous effect in France, and gave to the opponents of the ecclesiastical party a new weapon of attack. Although the matter was not brought to a parliamentary decision, the outcome of the debate in the Chamber was a moral defeat for the ministry and the *parti-prêtre*. The government confessed that the Jesuits had no legal right to exist, and when the matter was brought before the *Cour royale* of Paris, a judgment was obtained which declared the presence of the Jesuits illegal but referred the matter to the police. In consequence of this attack by the moderate royalists, the rupture between them and the *parti-prêtre* became complete, and the latter hurled its anathemas at justice, the press, the moderates, and at all that smacked of liberalism, which one pious prelate characterised as "the diabolical fury of the men who found their happiness and glory only in war against God and kings, in the bloody disturbances of the people, in the disorder of hell, where sat enthroned the prince of insurrection, the angel of evil." This was Bishop Tharin, of Strassburg, the man chosen by the

Bourbons to be the teacher of the Duke of Bordeaux, the heir to the throne of France.

Notwithstanding the indignation roused by such statements among the people of France, Villèle, now hopelessly committed to the policy of the extreme reactionists, continued in his efforts to guard the royal power and to maintain the supremacy of the ultra-party. By a process of elimination he succeeded in freeing the ministry of all members of a moderate character, but in so doing he largely increased the number of his political opponents. In 1827 was proposed a new law against the press, in accordance with which the journals and irregular publications were to be subjected to close scrutiny, and a breach of the law was to be followed by excessive fines. Had the law been passed not only would the press of France have been practically destroyed, but printing and publishing and all the dependent interests would have been ruined, and literature, learning, and the professions would have been seriously injured. Fearing the effects that such a law would have, the French Academy entered a protest, but Charles X. refused to receive it and some of the members of the Academy were punished for their boldness. The general opinion was well expressed in the speech of Royer-Collard. "The law which I oppose," he said, "bears witness to the existence of a faction within the government as surely as if that faction had drawn the curtain and had allowed itself to be seen. I do not ask what it is or whence it comes or whither it is going, I judge it only by its works. In this instance it proposes the destruction of the press; last year it untombed the mediæval right of primogeniture; the year before the law of sacrilege. In religion, in political and civil organisation it is returning to past times. Whether one calls it a counter-revolution or not matters little, it is a return to the past. It is hastening by fanaticism, privilege, and ignorance back to barbarism and to a dependence upon the forces to which barbarism gave birth." In consequence of this intense opposition

and of the fear that the law would be rejected or thoroughly amended by the Chamber of Peers, Villèle withdrew the measure. But he could not efface the impression that the mere proposal of such a measure had made upon the people of France. Opposing royalists, liberals, and the people at large felt that the withdrawal of the law was cause for public thanksgiving. Fireworks, torchlight processions, music, balls, and patriotic songs showed how deeply the popular feelings had been stirred, and even the national guard in returning from the Champs de Mars, after a general review held by the king, dared to express its sentiments by shouting "Down with the ministers!" "Down with the Jesuits!" before the windows of many members of the cabinet and the carriages of ladies of the royal family. This act carried with it consequences of a serious character; for immediately the ministers brought forward a measure, which, of all the errors of the Restoration, became most serious in its consequences, a measure for the disbanding of the national guard. This measure became a law, and 20,000 men, the flower of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, wounded in honour, hostile to the royalists by temperament and industrial interests, were changed from defenders of the city and the throne to enemies of the king and opponents of the house of Bourbon.

But the time was rapidly approaching when the ministry was to have its reckoning with the people whose wishes it had so long defied. Within the Chamber of Deputies there had now arisen from a constantly increasing and hostile minority a demand for the dissolution of the Chamber, on the ground that the septennial law, passed in 1824, did not apply to the existing Chamber that had been elected in 1822 for a term of five years. That term, it was claimed, had now expired, and a dissolution should take place. Villèle, confident that a new election would return a Chamber more in accord with the royal policy, acceded to this demand, and transferred some sixty of the most reactionary members of the Chamber of Deputies to

the Chamber of Peers in order to prepare the way for the expected royalist majority in the Deputies, and to overcome the opposition that the Peers had shown to the policy to which he had committed himself. In the mind of the government all preparation had been made to continue the ultra-royalists in power for an indefinite period.

Never was a minister more mistaken in his estimate. The elections of 1827 offered the opportunity for the expression of the popular opinion, which had hitherto acted more or less sporadically. For a long time the liberals had been awaiting the occasion, and had been making extensive preparations for the electoral struggle. The general direction of the contest was taken by a society called *Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera.* This society, founded by certain old Carbonari that had been converted to constitutional ideas, and numbering among its members men of all classes and opinions under the leadership of Guizot, Broglie, and others, had for its one object the creation of a liberal majority in the Chamber, and the overthrow of the Villèle ministry. In order to effect this result, it made every effort to prevent electoral frauds, to scrutinise the composition of the electoral lists, and to stimulate the zeal of the electors ; and it was aided in its work by a general coalition of liberals and disaffected ultra-royalists under the name of the constitutional opposition. Indeed the nation at large stood ranged against the *parti-prêtre*, for radicals and revolutionists acted together with constitutionalists and Ultras. In consequence of this active campaign, an imposing constitutional majority was rolled up against the ministry. Villèle, brought face to face with a hostile Chamber hoped, by sacrificing many of his colleagues and replacing them with men less unpopular, to save himself ; but this attempt to form a ministry in harmony with the new Chamber failed. Finally, on January 5, 1828, it was announced that the Villèle ministry had resigned, and a new ministry had been formed under the leadership of Martignac,

a man of sagacity and moderation, who had opposed the policy of the government in the last few years of the Villèle ministry.

The Martignac ministry, although not a politically homogeneous body, in the main represented the party of the Right Centre acting in conjunction with the moderates of the Right. As a concession made by the king to the liberal majority in the Chamber it was a failure, because the country was practically committed to an opposition to the king, and to any ministry that he might appoint. Nor did Martignac ever possess the confidence of the Crown. In not a single measure was he supported by the king, and at court he was obliged to war against a crowd of enemies and rivals. Like Richelieu in 1821, he received no support from the Left Centre. Yet in spite of this isolation the ministry showed itself wise and skilful, and made a great and honourable effort to surmount the difficulties of the situation. Censorship of the press was abolished, an improved electoral system was introduced, and the Jesuits were deprived of their control over education ; but all these measures were unable to gain for Martignac the confidence of the Chamber. By refusing to consider a measure for the reorganisation of the communes he increased the liberal opposition. But in this act he was justified, for he knew that the king would refuse to sanction another liberal measure, inasmuch as his signature to the acts against the Jesuits had already overstrained his royal conscience and had brought down upon his royal head the bitter reproaches of the ecclesiastics. Thus Martignac stood helpless between the two extremes ; the liberals accusing him of a breach of faith began to withdraw their support, while the king who had already many times regretted the existence of a ministry that was obliged by virtue of the composition of the Chamber to make concessions to liberalism, finally determined to change his cabinet at the first opportunity. When, therefore, in August, 1829, the majority in the Chamber was found to be against the government, the ministry was informed that it had

ceased to exist, and on the next day the *Moniteur* contained the royal ordinance announcing the new ministry.

Having failed to satisfy the representatives of the country, though he had done more to appease popular discontent than he deemed consonant with the dignity of the throne and the royal prerogative, the king determined in the new appointments to satisfy himself by adopting a policy of rigid and strict conservatism. The head of the new ministry, Polignac, a man greatly disliked by the people of France, a positive and bigoted reactionist in matters of church and state, represented the *émigrés*, the ultra-clericals, and all others who had taken their oath to the Charta with a reservation saving their religious obligations; Labourdonnaie, minister of the interior, quarrelsome and passionate, was a defender of the ideas of the old monarchy and a deputy always advocating proscriptions against the liberals and the Bonapartists; while Bourmont, minister of war, old chief of the *chouans*, who had deserted to the enemy on the day of Waterloo, and had borne witness against Marshal Ney at the time of his trial, seemed to the people a man without principle and without courage. In creating a ministry composed of men of this character, the king deliberately declared war upon liberalism, war upon the Charta, and war upon all that the Revolution had accomplished; for inasmuch as Polignac could not hope for a majority in the Chamber, it could only follow that parliamentary government was to be given up, and a government by royal ordinances substituted; that the rule of law was to be supplanted by the rule of arbitrary royal commands. A struggle between the Crown and the Country was inevitable; and the liberals, particularly those of the middle class, braced themselves to meet the coming events, the issue of which the neutral elements of France awaited with terrified expectation. Many state officials, who had held places under Martignac, resigned their posts; Lafayette made an extended tour of the provinces for the purpose of forming associations in

the various cities to resist unconstitutional projects; the society *Aide-toi* prepared, in case of a dissolution of the Chamber, to watch the elections and to prevent fraud, and in this it was aided by the laws passed by the Martignac government; the newspapers entered into the struggle with fearlessness, and their activity was increased by the failure of the government in a suit brought against the *Journal des Dêbats* for an article upon the existing situation.

The first passage at arms between the king and the Chamber took place at the opening of the new session, March 2, 1830. The king closed his speech from the throne with these words: "The Charta has placed the liberties of France under the guardianship of the rights of my crown. These rights are sacred, and I am under the obligation of handing them over intact to my successor. Peers of France, deputies of the country, I do not doubt that you will aid me to realise my good intentions; that you will repel the shameful insinuations which malevolence has sought to spread abroad. If any conspiracies attempt to put obstacles in the way of my government, such as I do not wish to foresee, I will find the means to remove them in my own determination to maintain the public peace, in a just confidence in the people of France, and in their declared love for their king." This speech, made more menacing by significant accentuations upon certain of its phrases, was thought by many, both within and without the Chamber, to contain covert threats at the system of parliamentary government. Outside the Chamber the newspapers, notably the *Constitutionnel*, answered the speech, and Thiers, for the express purpose of combating "enthroned reactionism," started, in conjunction with Mignet and Carrel, the *National*, and formed, with Dubois and Rémusat, controllers of the *Globe*, the nucleus of that band of journalists, "young philosophers of liberalism," as Mazade calls them, to whom was so largely due the checkmating of the counter-revolution.

The opposition to the speech within the Chamber found expression in an address, which after a spirited debate in secret session was carried by a vote of 221 to 181. In this address, the formal answer to the speech from the throne, the signers declared their lack of faith in the new government. They stated their belief that the Polignac cabinet was dangerous and menacing to public liberty, and assured the king that the only way to establish constitutional harmony between the various parts of the government was to dismiss the ministers. The address of the Chamber of Peers was but little less positive. The committee sent to carry the address of the deputies to the king was received in such a manner as to leave no doubt of the king's intentions. "I have listened to your address" he said to Royer-Collard, who was the spokesman of the deputation, "and my heart is troubled that the Chamber refuses to aid me in my good intentions. Gentlemen, I have expressed my resolutions in the discourse pronounced at the opening of the session. These resolutions cannot be changed." On the next day the Chamber was prorogued for six months, and it was generally understood that it would not be summoned again. The royalist and ecclesiastical party was overjoyed; but the ministry, though outwardly confident, betrayed its misgivings in making overtures to such moderates as Decazes, Pasquier, and Martignac to enter the service of the state. But these men wisely refused to join a ministry that seemed to be on the eve of its downfall, and besides were too conscientious to support a policy with which they were not in sympathy. Polignac determined therefore to go straight forward in the course that he had mapped out, and in doing so showed a blindness, a fanaticism, a misunderstanding of the situation that is incredible. That he depended on superhuman aid to bring him safely through the crisis is evident, but at the same time he undoubtedly underestimated the seriousness of the situation. He told the king that though there was a certain amount of political

unrest, he believed it to be confined to a small group of men whose interests led them to meddle in politics; assured him that the mass of the people was not engaged in agitation but attended to its business, applied itself to industry, and was safe from the seductions of the political parties; and persuaded both himself and the king that the country would not support the demand of the Chamber for the dismissal of the ministry. While he discouraged a *coup d'état*, he confirmed the king in that state of mind, which Molé so well characterised as "rather rash than resolute." It is evident that in the early days of 1830, though the ministers were blind to the real character of the situation, they still had sufficient sense not to resort to extreme measures.

The result of the elections held in June and July effectually destroyed the illusion that the people at large would support the king. For these elections both parties had made extraordinary preparations. The government, having successfully carried through a war with Algiers, hoped that such a victory and the adding of new territory to France would win many adherents. But while the king, ministry, and *parti-prêtre* rejoiced, the mass of the people remained untouched by the new glory. The matter turned out as the liberals had anticipated; their opponents destroyed the good results of their success by the extremes to which their enthusiasm led them. Not only did the ecclesiastics greet the victory as showing the hand of God raised for the defence of the king, but the government also gained audacity with success, and felt that the time was fitting for a purging of the cabinet. Courvoisier and Chabrol, the only members with any political wisdom, were dismissed, that the ministry might be "strengthened" by men of the Polignac type,—an action interpreted by all as a preliminary step to resolute measures. The struggle at the polls became more intense; prefects, ecclesiastics by their pastoral letters, members of the royal family by actual solicitation, and even the king

himself entered the lists on the side of the government. But all their efforts were in vain. Not only were the 221 signers of the address returned to the new Chamber, but the ministerial minority was so far reduced that the ministerial support became insignificant. But this was not all. Eminent men in science and education were passing over to the ranks of the opposition, and even those who had been most active in placing the dynasty on its throne now turned against it. Talleyrand, considering that legitimacy had "betrayed her own principles," turned from the support of the Bourbons, and even the personal friends of the dynasty entered the hostile ranks.

In the presence of such a situation the ministry deliberated as to the best course to pursue. The king rejected Polignac's proposition to reorganise his cabinet, and proposed that the fourteenth article of the Charta should be examined to see if it would not offer a means of escape. After long discussion it was decided to meet the situation by a series of ordinances, based on this provision of the Charta, which authorised the king to issue the regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state. In reply to the query whether such an act would not provoke a violent resistance, the ministry still persisted in affirming that on account of the high suffrage the people at large took so little part in the elections that an ordinance touching the electoral system would not rouse them, and that the interests of a free press concerned so small a number of individuals that no danger was to be feared from an ordinance of censure. Still believing that the people were generally content, and that the opposition was the work of a small group of ambitious malcontents, chiefly journalists, it concluded that even if a disturbance should occur, the military forces would be able to meet the emergency. In consequence of these discussions, there was issued from St. Cloud on July 25, 1830 and published in the *Moniteur* the next day, a series of royal ordinances that have

become famous in the history of France, because by means of them the counter-revolution was brought to an end, and the principles of the old *régime* ceased to be a factor in French politics. Accompanying the ordinances was a report which gave the reason why they were issued. "A turbulent democracy," it said, "is endeavouring to put itself into the place of the regular power. It dominates the elections by means of newspapers and associations; it endeavours to fetter the rights of the Crown and to dissolve the Chamber. A government that has not the right to take measures for the safety of the state cannot exist. That right is older than the laws, because it exists in the nature of things. An imperious necessity demands its application, and the moment has come to take measures which are without doubt in accord with the Charta, but which pass above the ordinary order of legislation." Then followed the five ordinances in succession. The first declared that the liberty of the press was suspended, that no journal of any kind whatever was to appear in the future without the authorisation of the government, and that this authorisation was to be renewed every three months; the second declared that the Chamber already elected but not yet in session was dissolved; the third modified the electoral law, reduced the legislative term from seven to five years, and introduced again the yearly renewal of one-fifth; the fourth convoked the Chambers for the month of September; and the fifth summoned to the council of state a certain number of ultra royalists and men belonging to the *parti-prêtre*.

In issuing these ordinances the king was guilty of an unwarranted extension of the royal prerogative, and brought to a crisis the movement that had been gradually gathering strength ever since the appointment of Polignac had been made known to the Parisian world. To have allowed the ordinances to stand would have been to destroy the parliamentary system of France; for it would have made possible, by means of a system of arbitrary commands, the reestablishment

of the autocracy of the old *régime*. It is, therefore, the more remarkable that at first the ordinances caused little disturbance, a fact due in part to the small circulation of the *Moniteur*, in part to the timidity of the deputies of Paris, who met at the house of Casimir Périer, but separated without reaching a decision. Until the evening of the 26th Paris as a whole remained so calm as to discourage the more violent deputies from taking aggressive action. But the journalists, upon whom the blow fell most heavily, acted with promptness and decision. Forty one men, representing eleven papers, drew up and signed a protest which charged the ministry with a violation of the law, and called upon the citizens to take the first steps in resisting illegal violence. Two journals only, the *National* and the *Temps*, dared to print the protest, and copies of these papers were scattered in all quarters of the town, and read everywhere by printers and compositors. These men, roused to fury, took the lead in the agitation, and were soon joined by a number of men, exmembers of the Carbonari, who were disgusted with the persistent inaction of the liberal deputies. Although only indirectly affected by the ordinances, these men met at the house of Cadet Gassicourt and there formulated plans whereby the uprising should be conducted with unity and dispatch. Insurrectionary committees were appointed in each of the twelve arrondissements to rouse the people to build barricades and to procure arms. In consequence of the activity of this revolutionary element and the passions aroused by the protest of the editors, the city on the 27th began to show signs of popular agitation, and the excitement was increased by the appointment to the command of the royal troops of General Marmont, whose desertion of Napoleon in 1814 made him a traitor in the eyes of the people. The national guard took its place on the side of the populace, and even the regiments of the line were unwilling to turn their arms against the people. On many occasions they even refused to obey their commanders, partly, no

doubt, because of the demoralising influence of the hot July days and the persistence with which they were kept under arms, but in greater part, because of their sympathy with the popular cause. Even on the 28th, the king still trusting in the justice of his cause, and in the expectations of divine aid quite as much as in the force of his arms, refused all concessions; and it was not until the 29th, when the Tuileries had fallen into the hands of the insurgents, that he consented to withdraw his ordinances and to change his ministry.

Events had, however, passed beyond the king's control. The future of the dynasty lay in the hands of the deputies, who after seven consecutive meetings had gained sufficient courage to discuss the situation soberly, and to put the national guard under Lafayette's leadership for the defence of the city. A little later a provisional government named by them with Lafitte as chairman, established itself in the Hôtel de Ville and assumed the command of the city. Paris at last having a provisional government and an organisation for defence, was ready to take up the question of a permanent government. This was, however, a difficult matter. That the idea of a conflict between the ministry and the Chamber had entered the minds of all no one would for a moment dispute; but it is equally clear that no one expected a revolution, or at first even thought of driving the dynasty from the throne by force. Before the defeat of the troops on the 29th the deputies and the journalists would have been content with a parliamentary victory, but after the evacuation of Paris by the soldiery, the victorious revolutionists made up their minds that the result of their uprising could be made permanent only by a change of rulers. Thiers and Mignet, who had left the city to avoid arrest, took on their return a stand emphatically against accommodation, and with them Lafitte agreed; but it required the efforts of another day to convince the majority of the deputies, who were still willing to treat with the king, that no such compromise was possible.

On the night of the 29th, Thiers and Mignet, as the representatives of a group of journalists that was gradually forming itself into an influential party, began to put into operation the ideas with which for some months past they had been endeavouring to familiarise the people through the medium of the *National*. They had constantly hinted that to save the Charta it might be necessary to change the dynasty; and, sure of the constitutionality of their position, they had already made up their minds as to the course to be pursued in case a conflict were precipitated. In the unsigned placards that were posted throughout the city on the night of the 29th, they briefly but emphatically expressed their determination that Charles X. should not enter the city, because he had shed the blood of the people; and having taken the position that a republic would embarrass France by exposing her to frightful discord and division at home, they showed that the only possibility for France was the Duke of Orléans, of the younger branch of the Bourbons, who was devoted to the cause of the Revolution, had never fought against France, had borne the arms of the first republic at Jemmappes, had fought under the tri-colour, was willing to accept the Charta, to interpret it as France wished, and to hold his crown from the French people.

The influence of this positive action and the failure of the king's representative, Duke of Mortemart, to appear at the meeting of the deputies on the 30th, wrought the required change in the opinion of the deputies; and it was unanimously resolved to summon the Duke of Orléans to accept the position of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. In the address drawn up by Benjamin Constant were the words, "It is necessary to labour without relaxation that France may obtain the guarantees necessary to make the Charta an entire and complete reality." To this the duke replied that, "Henceforth the Charta would be a reality," and accepted the office of lieutenant-general. The provisional government had accomplished a very important part of its work, but it had yet to reckon with

a populace that desired a republic, and a king that had not yet abdicated. Lafayette's acceptance of the Duke of Orléans either won over or entirely set aside the republicans, although for a time it looked as if the new arrangement would provoke a second revolution. On the other hand, the king, despairing of the situation, abdicated the throne in favour of his grandson, the Duke of Bordeaux, and the Duke of Angoulême gave up his claims to the throne. The royal office was therefore thrown open, and when the news of the abdication came to the Chamber of Deputies that the Duke of Orléans as lieutenant-general had convoked, it was decided to call the Duke of Orléans to the throne under the title of Louis Philippe.

The revolution of 1830 was a political revolution, essentially different from that of 1789. It did not spring from any deep-seated wrongs of France, for the country was rich, at peace, and industrially prosperous. It wrought no great change in the condition of France, because it concerned only the political liberties of the French, and not their economic or social welfare. It was a conflict between ideas rather than classes, between conceptions of government rather than theories of social and economic relations, between political parties rather than between industrial groups. It was made necessary because the traditions of the old *régime*, represented by the party in power, were opposed to the principles of the Revolution embodied in the Charta. Inasmuch as the whole Restoration was a reaction, a conscious and deliberate act of revolution was needed to place again the principles of 1789 in the ascendant. Under the Restoration, monarchy and the church were tending towards supremacy. The dominance of monarchy meant the suppression of representative government, that is, of political liberty; and the dominance of the church meant the suppression of religious toleration, that is, liberty of thought. Though this reactionary program was not carried out in detail, yet it was evident that it would be in case the dynasty were preserved.

There was, therefore, but one course to pursue—to overthrow the dynasty in order to save the Charta. In passing judgment upon the course of events, one must blame those who restored the Bourbons quite as much as the Bourbons themselves; and must remember that the ultimate cause of the uprising of 1830 was not the incompetence of the ministers of Charles X., or the series of errors of which he himself was guilty, but the attempt to bring into harmony the political ideas of two periods of time separated by the revolution of 1789.

CHAPTER V.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ABSOLUTISM IN ITALY.

THE problem that confronted the people of Italy was of an essentially different character from that which the people of France were endeavouring to solve. In the latter case, as has been seen, a struggle of parties followed the restoration to power of representatives of the old *régime* and the application of a doctrine of government that was antiquated and reactionary; in Italy, on the other hand, we are to see a proud and liberty-loving people, influenced by the doctrines to which the French Revolution had given birth, endeavouring to gain constitutional recognition and national unity.

Italy had dreamed of unity in the past but had never possessed it. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, and Savonarola had longed for it, and the Popes had at times striven for an ecclesiastico-political unity under their leadership; but although geographically formed to be the home of a single people gathered together under a common government of her own, Italy had remained for fifteen centuries broken and disunited. As a state she had been little more than an appanage of the Holy Roman Empire; her kingship had been absorbed into the headship of the Empire, the representative of which rarely concerned himself with matters Italian and in no way stood for the national feeling. The great cities, free to a large extent from the burden of feudalism that hampered municipal growth in other countries, became the centre of an active and progressive local life, but at the same time, in so doing, produced excessive decentralisa-

tion. The papacy, head and centre of a universal church, could aid but little in a movement toward national unity, for, of no nationality itself, it could identify itself with none.

At the time of the Revolution but two of the Italian states, the kingdom of Sardinia and the States of the Church, were under princes whom we may even approximately call native; in all the other states were foreign dynasties, Habsburg or Bourbon, each exhibiting in a more or less complete degree all the characteristics of a state of the eighteenth century. In each, notably Naples and Tuscany, there had been taking place a progressive revolution in social and political life, and in each reform movements had been inaugurated; but the reaction of the last decade of the eighteenth century had in Italy, as in Spain and Germany, established the doctrine of absolutism more firmly than ever. However, affairs took a new turn when Italy became the scene of Bonaparte's campaign against Austria, and when the general of the Directory began those experiments that encouraged the Italian people to hope for liberty and national independence. Bonaparte swept away the existing political system. One after another the absolute states fell before the tide of his military success, and in their places appeared that succession of republics, the founding of which indicated the desire of the Directory to reproduce along the border of France the only type of government that it considered worthy of perpetuation. Absolutism and municipal independence gave way for the moment to republicanism and the influence of the French ideas. The cities of Lombardy and the Roman Legations were joined together in the Cisalpine republic; Genoa was converted into the Ligurian republic; the people of Rome, renouncing the authority of the Pope, accepted with enthusiasm the erection of the first republic of Rome; and finally the Neapolitans, roused to a condition of excitement unknown under the Bourbons, welcomed the Parthenopean republic as a release from the despotism of the old king. This arrangement of Italy

into four states after the French model was destined, however, to last only as long as Bonaparte acted as representative of the republic; for with his elevation to the imperial throne, a group of republican states under the guardianship of France was no longer consistent with the situation. Portions of Italy were, therefore, successively added to the Empire, and the remainder was divided into two parts, the kingdom of Italy, extending from the Alps to the centre of the peninsula along the Adriatic, under Eugène de Beauharnais; and the kingdom of Naples, including the remainder of southern Italy, first under Joseph Bonaparte, and, after his summons to Spain in 1808, under General Murat. Sicily alone, where King Ferdinand had taken refuge, escaped the influence of Napoleon.

Politically speaking Italy had never been nearer a condition of unity than when, divided into two kingdoms, she began to feel the benefits of compactness and uniformity in government. Into these states Napoleon introduced orderly administration, uniform laws, and a wise system of internal improvement, a work in which he had the hearty support and material aid of the Italians themselves, who took up the task of Italy's betterment with zeal and enthusiasm. They joined themselves to the fortunes of their conqueror, and relying on the promise that he had made, they looked to him for the continuation of the task that promised in its accomplishment the fulfilment of their aspirations. But Napoleon ruled Italy more despotically even than he ruled France. He gave to the Italian people, as he had given to the people of France, social equality, but he denied them political liberty. He gave to them a better organised country and better cities to live in, but he demanded in return the obedience and submission to his will that he exacted from all those that he ruled. He made them partakers in his military glory, but he imposed upon them that heaviest of burdens, military proscription. He gave them protection, but at the same time he made them feel the completeness of his police

system and the reality of his despotism by suppressing the freedom of speech and of the press, and by placing in their path a thousand vexatious obstacles to freedom of movement and trade. That he might have a more efficient force to aid him in his wars he roused hopes and encouraged enthusiasm by unfulfilled promises ; above all, by the promise of unity did he play with subtlety and design upon the chords of the Italian nature. He held out before the eyes of the impressionable Italians the picture of a state freed from foreign princes, applying its energies to its own upbuilding, a *patria*, a fatherland, a national home. Under the spell of this hope Italy waited, trusting to see with each new treaty, each alteration of her governments, each reshaping of the political boundaries of her states, some indication of the favour of her conqueror and master. But Campo Formio gave way to Lunéville, Lunéville to Pressburg, Pressburg to Vienna, and with each successive treaty the conviction began to dawn upon the Italian mind that Napoleon was in reality unfavourable to those very doctrines upon which she based all her hopes. At the time of the retreat from Moscow Italy had awakened to the reality of the situation ; she had discovered that force, subterfuge, and a shameless political intrigue had been the return from Napoleon for her service and devotion, and that she had fallen prey to a reaction that brought once more into supremacy the doctrine of absolutism and aggrandisement. Therefore, after 1812, a spirit of opposition to Napoleon became increasingly prominent. Clergy and nobility desired the success of Austria and the return of the old *régime*, while the people, the reformers, the romanticists, all who had felt the invigorating touch of the newer, larger life of Europe, began to see that the salvation of Italy lay in her own power and resources.

At this crisis, when Napoleon was being forced step by step back to the boundaries of France, a leader was needed. Would it be Eugène or would it be Murat? The former, nobly refus-

ing to abandon the brother to whom he owed his advancement, put aside the crown of Italy which the allies offered to him as the price of defection. "I will never be king at that price," he wrote to the commander of the Austrian forces, Marshal Bellegarde. But Murat was shaped in a less loyal mould. Ambitious to hold the throne of Naples, and unable to discover a middle course between devotion and defection, he abandoned his Emperor in the hope that the success of the allies would result in making him the king of the entire peninsula. Led on by the persuasions of his wife and the diplomacy of Metternich, who knew the ambitions and the weaknesses of the man, he dared to negotiate with Napoleon in order to give to his treachery a certain legal character. But Napoleon left him to his fate, and in January, 1814, he signed the treaty with Austria and thus bound himself to serve the man who had already resolved that no outward trace of the Napoleonic *régime* should survive, and that Murat should be involved in the downfall of his Emperor. Metternich was determined that Italy should have no other master than himself, no other unity than that which came from dependence upon Austrian rule; and hardly had Murat declared his independence of Napoleon and to all appearances secured his position as king of southern Italy, when the allies, acting through Lord Bentinck, the English representative in Sicily, declared for the return of Ferdinand to the Neapolitan throne. Murat was caught between two fires; his treason to Napoleon, which Pasquier declared had contributed more than anything else to encompass the total ruin of the Emperor, had thrown him into the hands of the allies, and now they were about to repudiate him for the legitimate prince. Murat had sacrificed his honour only to be caught in the intrigues of the Power whose cause he had supported. With the final downfall of Napoleon and the return of the Bourbons, it became plainly evident that among the diplomats meeting at the congress of Vienna none would be found to sup-

port the cause of the ex-Napoleonist. Austria would not allow an independent king in Naples; Bourbon would support Bourbon. Therefore Murat began to take measures to maintain the kingdom of which he was king; and having gathered forces—some sixty thousand men—upon the frontier of his state, he watched with anxiety and determination the issue of the conference.

That each of the Powers wishing to win the support of the Italian people appealed to their desire for liberty, is a striking proof of the longing that Italy of the years 1813 to 1815 had for peace, independence, and national consolidation. Napoleon had discovered that the catch-word of liberty was an open sesame to the hearts of the Italians. Bentinck had appealed to them as Italians loving liberty and not tyranny when he sought to further the cause of Ferdinand IV. "Holland, Portugal, and Spain," he said, "can testify to the disinterestedness of our efforts. Shall Italy alone remain in chains? Shall Italians war against other Italians to aid a tyrant to destroy their liberty? Italians, do not hesitate, be Italians!" And now Austria, in order to consummate the most unpardonable of all her acts, took up the same cry. General Nugent in 1813, and again the next year, and Marshal Bellegarde in 1814, touched the same chord when they promised liberty and independence to the Italians as the reward for their support of the allied cause. "We come to you as liberators," said Nugent, "long enough have you groaned beneath the weight of oppression. You shall be an independent nation, happy if only you prove true to those who love you and will protect you." "Do not fear," he repeated, "that under new masters you will be forced back into the old condition of weakness and dependence. No, Italians! this is not the purpose of the allied Powers. Your independence, the maintenance of your civil and political existence are among the causes of the present war, to the end that you may be among the peoples around you

a single body, a single nation worthy of the respect of others, and free from the dominance of foreigners."

To a people who were already feeling the evil effects of Napoleon's rule, who were impoverished by his heavy taxations, whose industry and agriculture were almost at a standstill because of his military exactions, whose foreign trade and commerce were hampered by the restrictions imposed by the continental blockade—to a people suffering from these burdens such words came to satisfy the greatest longing of their hearts. Such appeals quickened the natural wish for peace, for free institutions, for country, and roused in the children the hope that Napoleon had excited in the fathers, a hope now the stronger because of the military and administrative unity that had already been created by the shedding of their blood in a common cause on every battlefield of Europe. Piedmontese, Lombards, Romagnols, Tuscans, Romans, and Neapolitans were beginning to feel the need of a union of forces and interests, of a state worthy of the respect of Europe, in which all local hostilities should be given up for the common good, all differences reconciled in the one fraternal desire to work for the welfare of a fatherland. Italy perhaps more than the other states of Europe was expectant and hopeful in that period that preceded the gathering of the Powers to decide upon the rearrangement of the European states in the interest of peace and a political equilibrium.

It is wholly problematical what would have been the result of a free gift to the Italians of those privileges that would have enabled them to construct a free state. Italy was certainly not ready for the full exercise of those rights that the French Revolution had proclaimed as fundamental for man, and it is more than likely that she would have failed to make a proper use of liberty had it been granted to her. The Italians needed the hard experience of resisting oppression and absolutism before they could reach the point of realis-

ing the necessity of subordinating local interests and personal ambitions to the one great work of creating a united state. The spirit of particularism that had created marked differences of habit and speech, and had developed forms of government as unlike as were those of the republics of Genoa and Venice and the kingdom of Naples, would also, in all probability, have produced such differences of opinion as to prevent the adoption of any common plan of action. In the light of such a probability it cannot be said that it was the failure of the congress of Vienna to carry out all the promises made by those who, speaking in the name of the Powers, promised Italy unity, that is deserving of condemnation. It is rather the completeness of the reaction upon which, as far as Italy was concerned, it saw fit to enter; it is the fact that in the consideration of Italy's future not a thought was taken whereby the object of Italy's earnest prayers was to be ultimately attained; it is the fact that in the application of the doctrine of legitimacy it did not impose a single condition or limitation upon those who were restored to their thrones, or endeavour to lighten the oppression by a recognition in its final statement of the needs, if not the rights, of a high-strung, enthusiastic people. Italy would have been satisfied with less than autonomy. She would doubtless have accepted joyfully even the old rulers, had guarantees been given to save her from the evils of despotism, had the new European council taken as its guiding principle a doctrine, no matter what its imperfection, more in accord with the spirit of the nineteenth than with that of the eighteenth century. But speculation is idle. In whatever way we may believe that Italy would have used her liberty; whatever the congress of Vienna might have done for the amelioration of the condition of a long-suffering people; the fact remains that the diplomats of the congress did the very worst thing possible, and did it so effectually that the treatment was not only worse than the disease, but it brought the

patient into a condition more serious than before. The absolutism of 1815 and of the years following was more complete than it had been in the era preceding the conquest of Bonaparte. Even the good results of the progressive revolution of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, were swept away in the determination to destroy as effectually as possible all traces of Napoleon's influence.

Upon this principle the congress acted; it determined to restore the legitimate sovereigns to their rightful thrones and to bind them by no limitation or qualification. In the spring and early summer of 1814 Victor Emmanuel returned to Turin from Sardinia, where he had been holding a petty court at Cagliari. The joy of his people at receiving their own king was turned to doubt as they saw old institutions and customs restored, and even officials of twenty years before given full powers; as they saw monasteries and nunneries revived and the Jesuits in full control of the royal conscience. Francis IV. returned to Modena, and before the expiration of a year, had begun the rehabiliment of autocracy and the restoration of the Roman Catholic Church. The Habsburg Marie Louise was established in Parma and the Bourbon Marie Louise in Lucca, and though both followed a temperate policy they were wholly under the control of Austria. Pius VII. returned to Rome and once more all administration was put into the hands of ecclesiastics; the Jesuits were recalled, feudal privileges were restored, and a general air of theocracy began to pervade the city of Rome, the Legations, and the nineteen provinces into which the Papal States were divided. Ferdinand III. came back to Tuscany, and here alone was any attempt made to preserve the reforms of the earlier period and to give a milder character to the autocracy of the prince. Good government prevailed, the church was kept in subjection, and the people were unmolested in the pursuit of their ordinary vocations. In consequence of this moderate policy, which at least brought

prosperity if not a guarantee of liberty, Tuscany became the envy and even refuge of those who were suffering from oppression in other parts of the peninsula.

But of all the states of Italy, Lombardo-Venetia and Naples were the special objects of Austria's care and attention. In one case she possessed the right to administer affairs directly, in the other she was determined to prevent the continuance of a Napoleonic dynasty, and by the overthrow of Murat to effect the restoration of the legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand, to the throne. The return of Lombardy to the house of Habsburg was a restoration agreed to by the Powers at Paris in 1814, and confirmed by the diplomats at Vienna when the final arrangements were completed. The transfer of Venice had been demanded by Metternich at Töplitz, and it is little to the credit of the allies that they agreed to the extinction of a republic, first overthrown by Bonaparte, that could look back upon an unbroken existence of over a thousand years. The acquisition of these provinces was Austria's compensation for the territories along the Rhine, which she now resigned permanently. In order to make possible a harmonious agreement between the Powers, these two historic states were denationalised and were brought directly under the control of the country that had thus far suppressed every attempt of its own people to effect changes in the interest of free institutions. Austria extended her political boundaries to the Po and established in northern Italy a typical Austrian administration. Her methods, though not always bad, aimed at the suppression of all local privilege, and sought to create out of disaffected Italians loyal and obedient Austrians. To this end a military system was employed, punishments became frequent and severe, and judicial tribunals were often managed in the interest of absolutism. The Austrians introduced their own dispensatory system, their own coinage, their own code of law; and driving native Italians from professorial chairs, notably at Milan, they introduced foreigners who could

scarcely speak the Italian language. Although the Lombards and Venetians enjoyed many advantages in the way of equality before the law, equality of taxation, universal toleration, and absence of arbitrary government, nevertheless, as Count Strassoldo wrote to Metternich, "they abhorred and detested the uniform system of administration by which they were put on a level with Germans, Bohemians, and Galicians." The industries of the country hampered by petty restrictions tended toward decay; trade was directed by motives of policy rather than by rational economic laws; and commerce, the historic interest of Venice, was neglected altogether. That the economic deterioration of the two provinces, which were given over in the main to agriculture and small trading industries, was not greater than it was during the ensuing thirty years, was due to the natural richness of the countries themselves.

In regard to Naples the case was otherwise. Here lingered the kingdom of Murat, the last of the old Napoleonic dynasties, and here was centred the last military opposition to Austrian supremacy that Italy was to show for many a year. But Murat's dethronement had already been agreed upon by the Powers, for although England had in 1814 disavowed Bentinck's interference, she had become convinced that Murat was not to be trusted and had thrown her influence on the side of his enemies. Murat, knowing the decision of the allies, took advantage of the return of Napoleon from Elba to offer his services to the Emperor, although at the same time he was bound by his treaty with Austria. In order to forestall any advance attack from the latter Power he pushed his army across the papal frontier without waiting for instructions from Napoleon, and at the same time appealed to the Italian people to rally to the defence of their liberties. But save for the co-operation of a few towns this appeal was wholly without result, and having been badly defeated by the Austrian troops at Tolentino, May 3 and 4, 1815, he fled first to France and then to Austria.

Finally, in October of the same year he made one more attempt to win back his kingdom; but captured in Calabria by Ferdinand, who was now restored to his throne, he was condemned to death, and fell under the fire of a platoon of Neapolitan soldiery. After the defeat of Murat the Powers had restored Ferdinand, had overthrown the constitution of Sicily that Ferdinand had granted through the influence of England, and had united the two states, Sicily and Naples, under a common administration as the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Furthermore, the establishment of Ferdinand as the first king of the new kingdom made him wholly dependent on Austria, and he bound himself still further by making a treaty with Austria, in which he promised to introduce no constitution into his realm, and to hold himself aloof from all union with other Italian states. Austria's influence in Italy was now as complete in the south as in the north.

The death of Murat removed the last hindrance to the complete supremacy in the peninsula of the principles of the restoration. So far as possible the old dynasties were in their old places and the old methods of government were in full operation. Scarcely a thought had been given to the Italian desire for independence. Instead of a free government the Italians were brought face to face with one the more despotic, because it depended for its maintenance upon a stronger Power, to whom rulers looked for encouragement in the application of a narrow-minded oppression. In consequence of this attitude of the Powers the Italian situation took on a new form. The people in general began to recognise the true character of the doctrines that guided the actions of the diplomats of Europe and that formed the fundamental principles of the chief of the diplomats, who saw in Germany and Italy the countries most needing a judicious but firm application of his doctrine of repression. They began to see that to Metternich the restored rulers were but convenient instruments, whereby all traces of French influence could

be rooted out and ecclesiasticism and legitimism introduced, all such indications of disorders and popular madness as freedom of the press and representative government be set aside and discouraged, and order and tranquillity be maintained. As this conviction began to seize upon the minds of the people, Italy became transformed from a country ready for the national rest that follows satisfied hopes into a country ready for rebellion and revolt. If there was calm upon the surface, if to the travelling observer the administration seemed regular and systematic; if Lombardy appeared prosperous and the Roman states contented, all was due to the thoroughness with which absolutism had done its work, and not to any universal popular peace and satisfaction. What Count Strassoldo told Metternich of the northern province may well apply to all the states. "Our Italian possessions," he wrote, "are guaranteed to us by physical force only; a moral force is entirely wanting to us here." In fact, everywhere underneath the surface were currents of unrest. From 1816 to 1820 the increase in popular agitation in different parts of the country was steady and persistent. Northern Italy with its nationality held in check by a rigid Austrian system was ready for revolt against the house of Austria; central Italy, once more under the rule of the papacy, was secretly organising against ecclesiasticism; while southern Italy, which had fallen into the hands of the Bourbons, was more active than were any of the other states in preparing rebellion for the purpose of winning constitutional rights. Metternich's opinion that a proper application of Austrian methods would turn public opinion in favour of Austria, cause discontent to disappear, and persuade the Italians generally to regard Austria as the only government that could afford a sure support to public tranquillity, was hardly warranted in the face of his own declaration that there was a great ferment in the minds of the population and universal discontent.

This discontent, of which Metternich speaks, was fostered by

secret societies. Italy was the motherland of scores of these fraternities, many of them baneful in their influence, divided in their plans, and often lacking organisation, purpose, leaders, and, in fact, all the means necessary for carrying through a successful revolution. They flourished under grotesque names in the universities, the army, among the higher classes and among the lower, and formed chapters in other countries also for the promotion of the cause of revolution. Of all these societies the most famous and widespread was the Carbonari or society of the charcoal-burners, which would appear to have taken on an organised form during the reign of Murat, about the year 1811. This association, which may be taken as the most typical and influential of all the Italian societies, represents both the undercurrents of popular agitation, and, in its higher and most worthy aspect, the influence of the revolutionary ideas and principles that had been evolved out of the events of the preceding twenty years. Italy had been shaken to her very foundation, and it was impossible that the national elements should rearrange themselves as they had been before. Therefore Carbonarism is for the student of Italian history not a great political movement, not even a great organised revolt, but a widespread political symptom indicating the spirit of the newer life that was everywhere dominating the mind of the people of western Europe. Carbonarism was not limited to Italy; it included the popular elements in neighbouring countries, in France, as we have seen, in Switzerland, and Spain, and established its branches wherever it could find a following. In this way there was formed a network of secret organisations, working for the attainment of different ends in the different countries, but everywhere dominated by the one definite policy of opposing legitimism, despotism, and reaction. In France it protested against the Restoration, in Spain against the wretched government of Ferdinand VII., while in Italy it opposed Austria and everything for which that state stood. It took as its

cardinal principles individual liberty, constitutional government, and national independence; and for its instruments of action, agitation and revolution. Its chief defects were the character of its organisation, the method that it employed, and the aim that it placed before itself; for each was vague, insufficient, and unsatisfactory.

In organisation it was secret, cosmopolitan, and ceremonious, three characteristics that were fatal to the ultimate success of the cause for which each Carbonaro laboured so courageously. In form the system was a republic, but the facts did not always bear out the theory. The territory of activity was divided into provinces, in each of which was one or more lodges whose numbers were increased as rapidly as possible. The members were also divided into "tribes," and there was a senate and a house of representatives that were supposed to make the laws for each "tribe." In point of fact, however, the constitution of the Carbonari was never very rigorously followed, and in practical working the system became rather oligarchic than republican. Instead of unity and free intercourse there was little or no communication between the lodges. Initiated members did not know their leaders, often did not know their fellow-members. Instead of common co-operation in the making of laws, obedience was demanded to rules the origin of which was kept a secret, and power was concentrated in the hands of a few men, to whose councils few were admitted and whose identity was in the majority of cases a secret. Thus Carbonarism not only preserved its principles and actions from the knowledge of the world outside, but it also showed its lack of faith in its own members by denying to them the full confidence of the order. Then, too, it was cosmopolitan, and not Italian. It believed in the propagation of its doctrines throughout Europe, and did not concentrate its efforts upon the redemption of Italy alone. It was, therefore, a part of the general European liberal movement with its centre in Italy, a connection that weakened

its strength, and prevented its holding a secure place in the hearts of many of those who desired Italy's salvation, and who were willing to sacrifice themselves for her cause but not for the cause of Europe. To many of these Carbonarism appeared dangerous, and they were inclined to support the view of the conservative and reactionary element, that Carbonarism was the promoter of disorder, lawlessness, and revolution. It consequently became associated in their minds with all movements that employed assassination and sought to overthrow the existing social order. And, finally, the impressive and elaborate ceremonial with which Carbonarism surrounded itself may have had the effect of inspiring awe, but it did not help to rouse the loyal devotion and co-operation of all those who entered the order. The candidates were terrified by the ordeal of initiation and by the oaths which they were obliged to take. Every step symbolised the duties of the new members, and by various formalities, many grotesque, many trivial, the principles of the order were impressed upon their minds.

In the main the weaknesses of the order can be easily determined. The leaders having little confidence in the members acted secretly according to the exigencies of the moment; and this method, involving secrecy within secrecy, prevented ready and enthusiastic action, and created a situation dangerous to any society, in that it made difficult the development of an *esprit de corps*. As there were no general gatherings, and few opportunities for interchange of opinions, and as there was almost no way of determining the loyalty of members, suspicion and distrust not infrequently entered the ranks. With such a diverse and heterogeneous following treachery was inevitable, and the spy system became of necessity a regular part of the administration. Cases are on record where members were put to death for breach of faith or for causes known only to the leaders, who played the part of autocrats, a rôle contradictory to the essential principles of the government of the order. In scope the

movement was too general, in action too limited; its members believed in the universal success of the liberal doctrines but made the application too local. Perhaps they could not do otherwise. They were also eager for Italian independence, but they were inclined to look for aid outside of Italy as well as within her borders, and so grew to depend too much upon the co-operation and support of the liberal element in France. Furthermore, they were far from agreed as to the form that the government should take after independence had been won. The majority looked forward to a single republic as their ideal government, and saw in the government of the order a type of their ideal; others believed in a federal state made up of the different states of Italy; while a third class was inclined to believe in the superiority of a constitutional monarchy. This uncertainty as to the party program gave a certain aimlessness to the struggles of the Carbonari. But notwithstanding these objectionable features, the order gathered to itself supporters from every class and rank, seemingly seeking strength from numbers rather than from character. Soldiers, students, priests, officials, and men of letters were enrolled in its lodges, and threw in their lot with its cause. They hated Austria, autocracy, and ecclesiasticism, and they saw in the order the only means, inadequate though many considered it, whereby agitation for the cause of liberalism could be maintained.

The first notable outbreak of the Carbonari was in Naples and Piedmont in the year 1820, an important year in Italian history, for in it occurred the first attempt of the people to gain constitutional liberties. Although the movement failed in the end, it taught the Italians many lessons in the craft of princes, and also showed them the futility of the methods that they were employing. It made evident their strength and their weakness, and disclosed—had they but known it—the obstacles that the liberal movement had to overcome before ultimate

success could be gained. To understand the uprising in Naples we must look back for the moment to the year 1812, when the Spanish Cortes, encouraged by the successes of Wellington and acting under the spell of the French revolutionary ideas, issued a constitution which though noteworthy as expressing the democratic sympathies of the Spanish liberals was a failure in so far as it tried to outline a form of government adapted to the character and needs of the Spanish people. Government of one chamber, national sovereignty, universal suffrage, supremacy of the Roman Catholic Church, and retention of the Salic law were among the contradictory provisions of this constitution, which in fact was modelled after that of 1791 in France. It was abolished in 1814 on the return of Ferdinand VII. to Spain, but in 1820 in a revolution—the first properly so called after the congress of Vienna—the liberals were so far successful that they were able to force the king to accept the old constitution. Immediately the Neapolitans, quick to respond to any stimulus from Spain, began to clamour for the introduction of this constitution into the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and, in so doing, ignored the much better form of constitutional government that Ferdinand I. (then Ferdinand IV. of Naples) had conceded to the Sicilians in 1813. But to this constitution, which, as we have seen, had been set aside when Naples and Sicily were joined in 1815, the Sicilians were loyal, and they resented the Neapolitan choice of the Spanish constitution. For the moment, however, everything seemed hopeful. At the first appearance of an organised popular revolt, Bourbonism in Naples yielded to the clamour, and conceded all that the Carbonari demanded. Ferdinand I., advised by his minister, promised the constitution, and on July 13th took a solemn oath, which he concluded with these words: "Omnipotent God, who with thine infinite gaze readest the soul and the future—if I lie or intend to break the oath, do Thou at this instant hurl on my head the lightning of thy vengeance."

These promises and solemn oaths gave to the act of the king every appearance of sincerity, and roused the people to a frenzy of joy and enthusiasm. It was the heyday of Carbonarism, because to that order redounded the victory. The Carbonari stepped to the front as the leaders of liberalism, and their lodges and membership increased rapidly.

But the victory so easily gained had to be maintained in the face of a double opposition, that of the king, who had most disgracefully perjured himself, and that of Metternich, who saw in the Neapolitan movement, not only a local uprising in Naples but a disorder fostered by all the worst elements of Europe. He saw in it the reign of anarchy, not of law, and was convinced that if a proper example were not immediately made of it, the German courts, feeling its influence, would soon be aflame with a desire for constitutional government. Above all he feared for its influence upon the Czar, whose sympathy the liberal element was reckoning on at this time. To Metternich it was therefore a critical moment, and the congress of Troppau was called to sound the opinion of the other European Powers, particularly that of Alexander, regarding Austrian interference. It was his uncertainty as to whether the Czar would or would not oppose his doctrine that led him to say in his communication to Count Rechberg that the Austrian "fire-engines were not full in July, else we should have set to work immediately." The result of the congress convinced him that Alexander was more amenable than he had dared to hope he would be, and was gradually opening his eyes to the soundness of the Austrian doctrine. A postponement of the congress having been decided upon, in order that a second meeting might be held nearer to Italy at which the King of Naples might be present, a short statement of principles was drawn up, and an agreement was made to meet at Laibach in the January following. Metternich arrived at Laibach on January 4, 1821, and during the months that followed brought every form of pressure to

bear upon the Czar. "My words," he says, "sounded like a voice from the other world." "If ever any one from black became white it is he." In consequence of this change of mind, there was sent out on March 15th a "laconic order" authorising 80,000 Austrian soldiers to march to Naples to put down the revolt. The fact that Alexander placed 90,000 Russians at Austria's disposal was worth to Metternich all the promises of the Czar, for he felt that this action would "prevent disturbers from counting so readily on the Emperor Alexander in the future." On March 23d Naples fell, and Ferdinand, agreeing to all that the congress had done, returned to his kingdom to take up once more the old routine of despotism and proscription. The constitutional government to which he had sworn allegiance and which he had promised to defend was swept away; the leaders of the recent movement were condemned; the army was reduced, and the execution, imprisonment, and exile of all co-operators in the revolution turned to miseries the joys of the year before. Naples was given over to bad government, corrupt administration, financial bankruptcy, conspiracies, and brigandage, and this condition of things was supported by the military power of Austria.

While the movement in Naples was thus being extinguished, an uprising in Piedmont brought added distress to the Austrian chancellor because it seemed to be of a more alarming character. However reactionary Victor Emmanuel had been after 1815 in reviving old methods of government, he was, nevertheless, obstinate in his determination to resist an Austrian protectorate. This Metternich knew, and hence his disquietude. The king really loved his people, he had shown himself loyal and patriotic, and notwithstanding the fact that he had married an Austrian wife, he had rejected every Austrian proposal for a treaty. When, therefore, the liberals, who represented a more scholarly and intelligent class than did the revolutionists of Naples, made their demands for a constitution, and the Car-

bonari of Turin added the influence of an agitation which threatened to become a revolution, the king found himself in a dangerous predicament. Anxious to conciliate his people and to prevent bloodshed on the one side, he was nevertheless convinced by the report of his minister, San Marzano, who had been at Laibach, that the allies would prevent a constitutional government in Piedmont as they were about to do in Naples, and that any concessions to the agitators would be followed by direct Austrian intervention. Unable himself to solve the difficult problem he avoided the responsibility of a decision by abdicating the throne, after having appointed as regent Charles Albert, prince of Carignan, during the absence in Modena of his brother Charles Felix, the heir to the throne. Between the newly appointed regent and the new king there were important differences. Charles Albert, belonging neither to the age of despotism nor to the age of constitutional government, wavered between the two extremes, his sympathies in the main being on the side of the liberals, while tradition, environment, and education drew him to the ranks of the supporters of the old *régime*. Charles Felix, on the other hand, was uncompromisingly on the side of reaction, and in this he was supported by the Duke of Modena, with whom he was connected by blood and marriage. The attitude taken by these men in this emergency was characteristic of the opinions that each held. Charles Albert, aware that he had been made a sacrifice to the monarchy and the revolution, took the decided step of sanctioning the promulgation of the Spanish constitution and accepting the program of the liberal party; but at the same time he sent a report of the situation to Charles Felix, asking for instructions. The answer of the king was not unexpected to the regent. Immediate word was returned that all that had thus far been done was null and void, and that if necessary Austrian troops would be employed to force the liberals into submission. Furthermore, the hint was thrown out that if

Charles Albert refused to obey, he might lose his chance of the succession to the throne, inasmuch as the wife of the Duke of Modena, niece of Victor Emmanuel, was the next heir, if the Salic law were not applied. To these commands the regent submitted. He, too, abdicated ; and leaving Turin for Novara on the evening of March 22d, the day before the Austrian troops entered Naples, passed into exile, distrusted by the liberals and mocked at by the reactionists. Little wonder is it that the next step in his career should carry him into Spain to serve in the army of those who were overthrowing constitutionalism there. On April 8th the punishment meted out to rebels fell on the Piedmontese liberals. Their forces concentrating at Novara were defeated by an army made up of Austrians and royalists, and the second effort of Metternich to suppress the demand for constitutional liberty ended in success.

Thus the two movements that had begun with great promise of success were brought to an end, and to all appearances reactionism was as firmly established as ever. As far as the constitutionalists could see there remained no advantages to bear witness to the efforts that they had put forth, no liberal gains to encourage further uprisings. The policy of Ferdinand I. after 1821 was more despotic than before, while that of Charles Felix had none of the kindly love and affection with which Victor Emmanuel had tempered the excesses of his autocratic rule. Well might the liberals and the revolutionists, reduced to inaction, begin to consider wherein lay the causes of their failure, and to inquire why, when at first they had been so eminently successful, they had lost in the end all that had been gained. The attempt to obtain a more liberal government had failed not because of the armed interference of Austria, the perjury of Ferdinand, or the bigotry of Charles Felix,—these obstacles to victory were to be taken as matters of course,—but because of the defects inherent in the character of the Italian people, and in the organisation through which they sought to accomplish

their objects. As a people the Italians were earnest, yet excitable, and of a low grade of civilisation, though their leaders were often men of ability and intelligence. They were lamentably ignorant, particularly of political and constitutional matters; their standard of life, notably in southern Italy, was low, their economic condition deplorable, their environment unhealthful and degrading; sickness and poverty were common among them, and agriculture was unprofitable. Their excitability and ignorance made them most susceptible to revolutionary influences, but at the same time decreased their chances of success in case they actually revolted, and prevented them from profiting by success in case they were victorious. Furthermore, in the cities were collected large numbers of those who were ready at a moment's notice to enter upon any undertaking that promised possible betterment. Revolutionary by nature, this class was encouraged by the rapid increase in the number of those who were forced by the oppressive attitude of Austria and the local rulers to employ revolutionary means. The methods employed to suppress revolution drove the people to madness, and also caused many who wished for peace and tranquillity to ally themselves with a cause, the plans of which they did not always approve. Imprisonment only served to extend the membership of the Carbonari, and persecutions drove men of prominence over to the side of the people. Thus there was gathered a mass of easily roused insurrectionists, who were working together, not so much from conviction as from a desperate feeling that no other course save one of revolution was possible. Where unity and harmony of action were wanting, success could hardly be attained.

But failure was due not merely to the instability and heterogeneity of the rank and file, but more directly to the lamentable want of proper leadership, to the absence of any common and definite policy, and to the inefficiency of the revolutionary organisation. There was plenty of enthusiasm but no unity of

direction. Those who should have been united were divided into parties, and wasted their strength in mutual recrimination and jealousy. Muratists and loyalists opposed each other in Naples; the Sicilians, themselves divided into Palermitans and Messenians, and angry because of the rejection of their own constitution, entered upon a civil war for independence that lasted from July to October, 1820. In Piedmont republicans disliked the policy of the moderates, who in turn objected to that of the republicans. Every elevation in rank roused the jealousy of those passed over, every effort at conciliation with monarchy started the cry of treachery, every compromise was branded as a concession. What one accomplished another sought to undo, success in one direction led to hasty exultation, that was followed by failure in some unexpected quarter,—and there was in general a great waste of energy and action. As the various parties failed to support each other, so the petty states of the peninsula, in their jealousy and selfishness, acted in isolation, refusing to give that aid which, had it been opportune, might have brought success out of failure. Thus it was possible for party to be set against party and state against state; and there was much truth in Metternich's aphorism that Italian hatred never expressed itself against a cause, but only against a person.

In general, then, the Italian movement failed because the inexperienced and untrained forces of liberalism were trying to gain a victory over the old and tried forces of reaction. The supporters of the old *régime*, convinced that their doctrines were still too firmly fixed to be easily uprooted by the revolutionists, rejoiced in the fact, and hastily concluded that the tide of liberalism had turned. The "era of salvation," which Metternich dated from the first intervention at Carlsbad in 1819, had as yet shown no signs of approaching an end. The constitutional movement in Prussia had lapsed into hopeless inactivity; the Spanish revolution was not very prosperous; the Ultras in

France were gradually making Richelieu a reactionist in spite of himself and his moderate sympathies; while the Greek revolution had hardly passed out of the first stage and was as yet considered harmless by the Powers. The Italian failure was simply in keeping with the ill-success of liberalism everywhere, and time alone could remedy some of the defects of the liberal movement. The attempt in Italy shows that Carbonarism and secret associations generally were incompetent to prepare a people for independence and constitutional government, and that Italy had to pass beyond the stage of mere agitation if she were to lay the proper foundation for a strong government. In consequence of their failures, the Italians themselves became aware that Austria was the great enemy to be resisted, and realised that as long as particularism was encouraged by the Austrian influence, and as long as the national forces were rendered ineffectual by party division and scattered uprisings, a successful accomplishment of the purpose that Italy had so close at heart could hardly be expected.

But the greater internal strength that the Italians needed was impossible so long as the Carbonari were the chief upholders of the Italian cause, and Austrian interference was inevitable so long as Europe maintained the doctrine of intervention as the principle governing the councils of its diplomats. But during the period from 1821 to 1831 important changes took place. At the end of the decade Carbonarism, though never ceasing to be an active factor in the agitation for independence, had practically lost its supremacy and was gradually being supplanted by Young Italy, a new association of higher aims and nobler principles; and the doctrine of intervention was strictly maintained only among the eastern Powers. England had declared against it at Troppau and still more positively at Verona; Canning was already declaring in favour of the independence of the South America republics in 1824–25; the quadruple alliance had been overthrown in 1827; and France, in

1830, driving reaction from its position at the head of the state, had made non-intervention a cardinal principle of the July Monarchy. Europe of 1830 was gradually reorganising its public law; and Austria, although declaring that she would never recognise and never yield to "the so-called principle of non-intervention," was already weakened by the withdrawal of the moral support that up to this time she had received from the practical unanimity of the Powers.

But after all, hope for Italy lay not in the changed attitude of the Powers, not in aid from France or from any other liberally inclined country; it lay in a steady internal improvement, in a gradual elevation of the standard of education and experience, in greater unity of purpose, and in the creation of a national *esprit de corps* that should be sufficiently strong to impress upon the minds of Italians and foreigners alike the fact that Italy was a nation and not a group of divided states. But the time had hardly come when the results of such a regeneration of Italy were to be seen. In 1830, owing to the stimulus of the success of the revolution in Greece and France, and, a year later, in Belgium, an effort was made in Piedmont, Modena, Bologna, and the Papal States to throw off the burden of reaction and absolutism. Once more recurred the phenomena of the decade before; once more the movement took a revolutionary form; once more the party divisions, the ill-judged confidence in princes, the want of common action, led to hopeless failure followed by bitter reprisals, imprisonment, exile, and death. Tyranny and inquisition gained rather than lost, and absolutism settled down upon the agitated states more heavily than ever.

Among those that were suspected of complicity with the movement was a young man, Joseph Mazzini, who was arrested by the government of Genoa, because, as he himself says, he "was a young man of talent, fond of solitary walks at night, and habitually silent as to the subject of [his] meditations";

and because, he continues, "the government was not fond of young men of talent, the subject of whose meditations was unknown to it." Mazzini fell a victim to that doctrine, accredited to the Emperor Francis, that obedient subjects, not talented men, were wanted by the state. He was imprisoned at Savona, and there it was that he began to lay his plans for the establishment of a new association, Young Italy, which was to accomplish through the education of the younger generation, what the Carbonari had failed to accomplish—the regeneration of Italy. Acquitted of the charges against him, Mazzini hastened to Marseilles; and there, surrounded by exiles from Modena, Parma, and the Romagna, he prepared to carry out his design. He was determined to avoid the faults of the Carbonari, whom he believed to be actuated by principles dangerous as they were erroneous. He opposed their "complex symbolism, their hierarchical mysteries, their political faith"; he hated their "tyranny of invisible chiefs, their ignoble blind obedience, their spirit of revenge." Having been persuaded to become a member of the order he was saddened by the emptiness of the oath, "a mere formula of obedience, containing nothing as to the aim to be reached, not a single word about federalism or unity, republic or monarchy." He declared that the only weapon of the association was a mere negation, a war upon government, nothing more; that it was destructive not constructive, calling on men to overthrow the old, but wholly unable to build up a new edifice upon its ruins; that the order possessing no real doctrine or principle substituted for it "a variety of strange and incomprehensible symbols." He opposed the order as "a body, huge and powerful, but without a head, an association in which not generous intentions but ideas were wanting; deficient in the science and logic which should have reduced the sentiment of nationality pervading its ranks to fruitful action;" and above all he opposed it because it was cosmopolitan and not Italian. "Cosmopolitanism," says Mazzini,

"is a beautiful word, if it be understood to mean liberty for all men; but every lever requires a fulcrum, and while I had been accustomed to seek for that fulcrum in Italy itself, I found the Carbonari looked for it in Paris."

This antagonism which Mazzini felt for the Carbonari he felt in even greater degree for all those who could be classed under the head of "moderates," that "absurd and hypocritical name adopted by our Italian copyists of every evil thing in France, as if there could exist *moderation* in the choice between good and evil, the truth and falsehood, advance and retrogression." This bitterness of feeling arose from his intense dislike for the July Monarchy in France and for the policy that it advocated. He hated the selfishness of the *bourgeoisie*, who were to him the moderates *par excellence*. Drawing his illustrations from French history, he inveighed against moderation as leading to inconsistency, compromise, and concession, all of which he considered immoral and dangerous; and believing that no good could come from the actions of ministers and congresses, he attacked with equal ardour diplomacy as a bargaining of principles. "We shall not seek," he said, "the alliance of kings, nor delude ourselves with any idea of maintaining our liberty by diplomatic arts or treaties: we shall not ask our salvation as an alms from the protocols of conferences, or promises of cabinets. We are of the people and will treat with the people. They will understand us."

Thus, by the elimination of all these objectionable features, the way was prepared in Mazzini's own mind for founding a new association, whereby Italy's redemption might be hastened, if not attained. In his writings he gives a careful and detailed statement of the characteristics of the new order. It was to be simple in organisation, entirely free from symbolism and graduated degrees; it was to consist of central and provincial bodies, and to have in each city an organiser, aided by propagandists. Thus there were to be but two grades, the affiliators

and the affiliated. The order was to be based on a definite principle—one that became an article of faith to the members—the establishment of a free and united Italy, an independent nationality composed of twenty millions of men "strong in a good cause and an inflexible will." The new state was to be independent, that is, from its soil was to be driven every hostile foreigner; and it was to be republican, that is, privileges were to be abolished, clerical aristocracy was to be suppressed, the class that bought and sold labour was to be diminished gradually, individual faculties were to be developed, and a system of legislation was to be inaugurated that should be "adapted to the wants of the people and calculated to promote the unceasing progress of national education." Mazzini believed that monarchy was no longer possible as a permanent state; that it was but one of a series of progressive transformations taking place in Europe and not the final one; and that if it were established as the political order in Italy, the inevitable result would be another revolution or a number of successive revolutions, by means of which the republican principle, destined by the law of God and humanity to be supreme, should be enthroned as the law of the state. Monarchy, he maintained, was imperfect: if elective, it tended to generate anarchy, if hereditary, to generate despotism; only republicanism insured the future and guaranteed the sovereignty of the nation, and such must be expressed in a single state, not a federation of states. That Italy should be a unit was foreordained by the physical characteristics of the country, that she should be the home of a great and free people was predestined by her natural limits; and to gain this was the mission of Italy. Without unity no real national life was possible, without it Italy would be impotent, a prey to particularism; for as federalism involved multiplicity of aims and consequently the supremacy of privilege and caste, unity alone could guarantee equality, could develop the life of the nation. But such unity must not be political

only. "Without unity of religious belief and unity of social pact; without unity of civil, political and penal legislation, there can be no nation. . . . Young Italy would have the administrative organisation designed upon a broad basis of religious respect for the liberty of each commune, but the political organisation destined to represent the nation in Europe should be one and central."

Secondly, the association was to depend for its strength not on mere numbers but rather on "the perfect concordance of its members as to the path to be followed, and the certainty that the moment of action [would] find them ranged in a compact phalanx, strong in reciprocal trust, and bound together by unity of will beneath a common banner." Those who made up the body were to be the people, for revolution must be made by the people and for the people, as upon the people only can a nation be built. By "the people" Mazzini understood the youth of the nation, individuals under forty years of age, men carefully selected, of good character and thoroughly in sympathy with the aims of the order. Such an association must expect nothing from foreign governments. "They will never be really willing to aid you," he said to his followers, "until you have shown that you are strong enough to conquer without them." Italy could work out her own salvation, if only her people could learn to be constant and united in their efforts. Her regeneration could only be achieved by a truly Italian revolution and no real or lasting liberty could be given by a foreigner. In this vein Mazzini inveighed against all support from outside, on the ground that liberty so gained must always be dependent upon the state of things abroad and could never be lasting.

The method whereby these results were to be obtained was through education and insurrection, and one was to supplement the other. Education was to teach the need of insurrection, insurrection was to become a means of national education.

That Italy should learn and act at the same time, the new organisation was to spread its doctrines freely, to make them known to the people. Secret though it might be, its principles were to be wholly public and proclaimed through Italy and indeed through the world by a system of propaganda. In fact the organisation was to become a publishing association, for the disseminating of articles upon "the political, moral, and literary position of Italy, with a view to her regeneration," that the nation might be prepared for insurrection.

These are the main features of this famous organisation, which was endowed in its own eyes with a double mission, public and secret, educational and insurrectional. Its success was immediate and astonishing. "From student to student, youth to youth, the confraternity extended itself with unexpected rapidity." Its publications, sent forth from Marseilles by every opportunity that offered itself and spread through Italy in the face of governmental opposition, took the place of personal influence, creating a new enthusiasm and rousing new aspirations. From Genoa, along the two Riviere to the Neapolitan kingdom on the south and the Austrian provinces on the north, the writings of this handful of unknown men spread, until the Italian governments were forced to appeal to the government of France to break up the headquarters at Marseilles. But before this was done the work had been accomplished. In less than one year Young Italy had become the dominant association throughout the peninsula. "It was the triumph of principles," says Mazzini, in an oft-quoted passage, "the bare fact that in so short a space of time a handful of young men, themselves sprung from the people, unknown, without means, and openly opposed to the doctrines of all those men of standing and influence who had hitherto possessed the confidence of the people and directed the popular movement, should find themselves thus rapidly at the head of an association sufficiently powerful to concentrate against itself the

armed persecution of seven governments, is, I think, in itself enough to show that the banner they had raised was the banner of truth."

Noble as were these ideas, and influential as they became in rousing the Italians to a greater consciousness of their shortcomings, and to a knowledge of the causes to which were to be traced the failures of previous revolutions, nevertheless their influence, moral rather than political, was limited to the more intelligent element among the people. Young Italy was neither a secret nor a revolutionary organisation, properly so called. It was an educational not a military society, and Mazzini was never a successful man of action or a ready and energetic organiser. He was too obstinate in adhering to the doctrines that he set forth, too uncompromising in dealing with the more practical sides of life, too inexperienced in the affairs of the world to succeed in any of his attempts to make a practical application of his ideas. He was able to inspire the youth of Italy with a greater confidence in the task that lay before them, with an almost religious faith in the cause of Italy's liberation. His writings, spread through the peninsula, gave moral unity in the midst of political disunity and created a common feeling of loyalty to a common country. They gave harmony to the thoughts of thousands, who, scattered through the different states of Italy, had hitherto failed to grasp the real meaning of a united Italy, and had wasted their time in abortive attempts because they did not see clearly the work that had to be accomplished. Mazzini pointed out what this work was, and did it in no half-hearted way. But when it came to the actual working out of this plan by the organisation that he had founded, then the defects of the whole scheme became clear. Young Italy never succeeded as a revolutionary body, nor was the insurrectionary part of the program ever successfully carried out. In 1834, because of the persecution in Piedmont of members of the order by Charles Albert, who had come to the

throne in 1831 after the death of Charles Felix, an invasion of Savoy was attempted from Switzerland, but proved a lamentable failure. From 1841 to 1844 a series of attempts was made to rouse the Neapolitans and the inhabitants of the Papal States; but the watchfulness of the governments and wholesale arrests and condemnations prevented the movements from coming to any definite result. In 1844 the Bandiera brothers, sons of a noble family, who, roused to a patriotic frenzy by Mazzini's appeals, attempted, despite the protests of those with more information and better judgment, to excite a revolt in Calabria, were captured and executed by the Neapolitan government. This unfortunate episode checked the revolutionary propaganda, and seriously injured the cause that Mazzini still continued to promote. The party of action, as Mazzini called his followers, practically ceased after 1844 to be a political factor, and its work became more underhand and indirect. While Mazzini in London was weaving unpractical plots, the organisation in Italy pursued its work quietly, often effectually, generally maintaining a position of hostility to all efforts that aimed at Italy's redemption through the co-operation of princes. Although the members of Young Italy took part in the revolutionary movement of 1848 and supported Piedmont in the war against Austria, nevertheless, they greeted with satisfaction the final overthrow of Charles Albert at Novara in 1849. When, also, in 1855, they saw Cavour, as they thought, hastening the destruction of monarchy by entangling Piedmont in the Crimean war, they rejoiced; and when after 1856, Cavour endeavoured to draw the less fanatical of the members to the side of the King of Sardinia, Mazzini and the other leaders entered upon a series of intrigues to weaken the Piedmontese government. By its moral efforts Young Italy undoubtedly hastened the cause of independence and unity, but by its political narrowness and encouragement of unsuccessful revolutions it retarded the work of others possessing better

judgment and greater insight, and brought down upon itself a condemnation so great that in the decade from 1850 to 1860 it was denominated by leaders among the moderates "one of Italy's scourges."

The period from 1835 to 1845 is, taken as a whole, one of the saddest of that earlier struggle which preceded the general uprising of 1848. Patriots were endeavouring to gain some successes by movements that had little result other than the sacrifice of lives. Governments increasingly watchful were suppressing every popular manœuvre; despots like Ferdinand II. of the Two Sicilies, who had succeeded his father in 1830, were growing each year more tyrannical: while others, like the Grand Duke of Tuscany, with liberal tendencies were leaning toward a stricter application of the principles of paternalism. Austria was advancing her troops to Ferrara in order to protect the Papal States against forced concessions, while France was occupying Ancona, in order to protect the authority of the Roman See and to encourage the reform of the Roman States. This was in many ways an unfortunate venture, as the officer in command favoured the liberals and protected refugees. The presence of the French in Ancona was a source of constant irritation to the Pope, Austria, and Europe alike, and had the effect of bringing down upon the liberal cause, which the French really wished to aid, the increased wrath of the absolutist princes, and of making the work of the moderates more difficult. In the Lombardo-Venetian provinces the police system was extended, and a military administration kept the popular elements from making any effort of importance. Espionage was common, censorship of the press, of education, of all independent thought or action was strictly imposed; and the provinces were rapidly becoming as stationary as were the other Austrian states. Having with so much difficulty established this order and stability, Metternich was on the alert to see that nothing disturbed it. Of Naples he had no fear, for

popular movements there threatened nothing. Brigandage was fast overrunning the country, but as it did not aim at constitutions, the government, that was becoming increasingly severe in checking the slightest indication of liberal feeling, was hopelessly lax in matters of crime. Only in Tuscany and Piedmont did Austria find cause for anxiety and the liberals cause for hope. Leopold of Tuscany listened to Austria's rebukes, but refused except in a few comparatively unimportant matters to accede to Austria's wishes. He encouraged education, looked after the welfare of his people by improving the lands of the kingdom and encouraging charitable organisations, kept out the Jesuits, and prevented the church from interfering in affairs of state. Piedmont also showed signs of an interest in liberal reforms. It is true that there the church was all-powerful, the mode of administration antiquated, and the king himself vacillating and inconsistent; but at the same time the law had been improved, trade and commerce put on a better footing, a system of railroads begun, reforms of a social character promoted, and art and literature encouraged. Charles Albert, bound by a compact made with Austria in 1824, was unable to enter upon any great constitutional reform without deliberately breaking with that country; but by taking a firm stand in 1845 upon the subject of commercial intercourse between Lombardy and Piedmont, he showed that he had no intention of being a slave to Austria's wishes. When it was represented to him that he was incurring Austria's ill-will, he replied, "If Piedmont should lose Austria, Italy would gain thereby and then—Italy would act for herself"; and again later he said to d'Azeglio, "if the occasion presents itself my life, the lives of my sons, my arms, my treasure, my army, all shall be devoted to the cause of Italy." In the midst of the universal reaction the states of Tuscany and Piedmont became the centres of expectation, for there alone appeared to be any sympathy for the national welfare, any willingness to resist the encroachments of Austria.

While thus in the greater portion of Italy the old struggle between revolution and reaction was continued, while Mazzini was endeavouring without success to carry out his program of insurrection, and the absolutist princes were guarding their power by new methods of repression, there were taking place other movements that were literary rather than revolutionary in character. The plan that is always made use of in any era of public excitement when freedom of speech is forbidden or restricted, namely, that of stirring the loyalty and patriotism of a people by means of literary works, was resorted to in this crisis of Italian affairs. Writers of novels, poems, memoirs and histories, animated by a liberal and sympathetic spirit can preach against autocracy, define political doctrines, and stimulate political aspirations with as great success under a literary guise as in open and direct speech. In Italy the literary struggle began, as it had elsewhere, in a war between the classicists, whom Mazzini called "the supporters of a literary despotism, dating its origin and authority two thousand years back," and the romanticists, "who sought to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of classicism in the name of their own individual aspirations." In the issue the classical writers, defenders of conservatism in letters as well as in politics, were driven from the field by the romanticists, who grew stronger and more influential as their aim became more definite. Foscolo in the earlier period, Niccolini, Pellico, and Manzoni a little later, Guerazzi and Giusti toward the middle of the century, were all representatives of the newer school, and struggled with Monti and the older generation of writers, who still clung to the stiff, unelastic models of the theological and scholastic past. Skilfully woven into the very texture of the literature, mingled with beautiful descriptions of nature and tales of the romantic past, were lessons in patriotism and in loyality to Italy. By striking situations, carefully chosen incidents, and subtle suggestions the literature of the period, notwithstanding the strictness of

the censorship, became text-books of liberty instructing Italians in their duty towards their country, and roused a consciousness of the imperfectness of the present by increasing their interest and pride in the history of the past. Stimulated by the patriotic ideas that were expressed in many of these writings, notably in *The Betrothed* of Manzoni, the Italians eagerly read works which have now in a measure lost their interest because of the changed social and political conditions. In spite of Leopardi's pessimism they read with enthusiasm his patriotic odes, and found his doctrine of despair an incentive to improve the condition of Italy.

These writers, however, had only an indirect political influence; their aim was in the first place literary, and their part was to give life to Italian letters, that had for two centuries, from Tasso to Alfieri, fallen into decadence. But during the period from 1840 to 1850 a group of writers arose whose first object was to influence the public opinion of their countrymen, and who used letters only as a means of effecting political reform. This school, which came to be called the Piedmontese school, was composed of conservative, high-minded Italians, men of intelligence, who were fully aware of the greatness of the task that lay before them and at the same time possessed an insight into the causes of the evil and an ability to discover more practical remedies than had hitherto been advanced. Although these men differed regarding the form that Italy, when united, should take, nevertheless they agreed in general that Italy was not ready for a republic. Believing the Mazzini schemes to be impracticable, they set about planning an order that should not only be in touch with the longings of the Italian people, should not only represent national unity and independence of all foreign control, but at the same time should be reasonable, practicable, and adapted to the character and conditions of Italian life. Two parties arose, led by Piedmontese publicists, of which the first, under its leader Vincent

Gioberti, who had been banished from Piedmont in 1833, received the name of the Neo-Guelphs because of its desire to revive the political headship of the papacy. This party advocated a federation of states under the leadership of the Pope, and the Gospel of the party was Gioberti's book *On the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*. Supplementing this work of Gioberti's, but of a more practical and suggestive character and appealing rather to the reason of the Italians than to their emotions, was Balbo's *Hopes of Italy*, which can hardly be classed in the strictest sense of the word as a Neo-Guelph publication. Nevertheless it agreed in many of its essential features with the ideas of Gioberti, in that it advocated a federation of states and not a single united state. These men, discarding the republic on one side and a single constitutional monarchy on the other, supported the establishment of a federation of conservative monarchies that should be bound together by deliberative assemblies, composed of the most intelligent and upright men of the different states. These states were to recognise the importance of a free press controlled by a sympathetic and honourable censorship. The princes, who were to be men of good faith, were to be guided in their government by the acts of the deliberative assemblies. According to Gioberti, who laid chief stress upon the restoration of the Pope to his old position of pre-eminence, these assemblies were to be under the general presidency of the Pope; but to Balbo this question of papal primacy was of far less importance than the more immediate question of what should be done with Austria. Gioberti proposed admitting the Austrian Emperor into the federation of princes, giving to him a position similar to that which he occupied in the Germanic Confederation; but Balbo, believing that the hope of Italy lay in the entire withdrawal of the Emperor from Italian affairs, refused any such concession. He was unable to see clearly how this withdrawal was to be effected. It could be forced or voluntary. Expul-

sion by force might be accomplished by a combination of Italian princes, by the people rising *en masse*, or by the intervention of a foreign Power; but to Balbo none of these schemes seemed practicable in the existing condition of Italy. He hoped, therefore, for a voluntary withdrawal through some rearrangement of the European situation. Balbo, who was an intelligent observer of European politics, appreciated as early as 1844, when the struggle of the Ottoman Empire with Mehemet Ali was still fresh in the minds of the statesmen of Europe, the possibility of a redistribution of territory in the east. He noticed the gradual transference of Austria's political supremacy from the north-west to the south-east, and with true historical insight he judged that in all probability her control over northern Italy would be eventually given up for a more permanent authority in the region of the Danube. He hoped, therefore, that in the fall of the Turkish Empire, and in the partition of territory that this would involve, Austria would be induced by the Powers assembled in a new European congress to give up her hold upon Italy, in case adequate compensation should be given from the lands wrested from the grasp of the Turk.

The second of the two parties was led by a statesman more directly connected than either Balbo or Gioberti with the actual accomplishment of Italian unity. Massimo d'Azeglio, artist, romanticist, and man of affairs, is one of the triumvirate with Cavour and Victor Emmanuel II., to whom Italy owes the actual fulfilment of her hopes. This party, basing its plans neither on religious regeneration nor on papal supremacy, was convinced that Italian independence could be obtained in no other way than by the promotion of conservative reforms that would bring about a steady constitutional growth in the more liberal states, notably in Piedmont. D' Azeglio hoped to rouse Italy to a realisation of her defects by statements of fact and by sound argument. He repudiated secret societies, none of which he had ever joined, but he apologised for them as

"the fruit of the blind, stupid, and retrograde absolutism of the restoration." He believed in so influencing public opinion that it might see that to proclaim the Spanish constitution in Piedmont—"as if Spain and Piedmont were twins and could wear each others clothes"—were madness. "Revolutions conducted by violence," he says in his *Ricordi*, "have not my sympathies. I have, however, always admired those revolutions that operate through the agency of a passive resistance. Conquests of this nature, the only ones that can be called true revolutions, have always seemed to me the most meritorious, the most noble, the best assured." To accomplish such a work d' Azeglio laboured; and in 1845 published a pamphlet on *Recent Events in the Romagna*, with the hope of so far rousing public opinion, as to drive the various rulers to a policy of moderate reform. By its brief, logical, and direct presentation of facts the pamphlet soon came to be known very widely throughout the peninsula. It brought the people to a realising sense of the evils of insurrection, by portraying the serious danger attendant upon such an uprising as that of Renzi in 1845, which only increased party hostility and the jealousy of states. At the same time the author gave the other side of the picture; he dissected the papal government and showed its injustice, weakness, and dishonourable character. The work marks the starting point in the development of a more healthy public opinion; it opened the way to further investigation into the condition of Italy, to careful studies, especially in the period from 1850 to 1860, into the economic, administrative, and educational condition of the country; it set the Italians to thinking less about ideas and more about facts; and by increasing a knowledge of the actual condition of Italy was able to make clear the remedies to be applied.

Other members of one party or the other, Canuti, Capponi, Durando, advanced various schemes for the reorganisation of the state. Nor was it an unhealthy sign that there was

still great diversity in the schemes proposed. Construction had taken the place of destruction, and the problem of Italian unity had advanced a long way in the direction of a solution. Whether a united republic or a federal republic were advocated, a single kingdom, a dual kingdom, or a triple kingdom, it made but little difference; all plans were of value in that they served to familiarise the people of Italy with the idea of a change of government, helped to make clear the fact that Austria was the greatest enemy of Italian unity, and showed the need of progressive and conservative reform. The advance in political intelligence is steady as we pass from the Carbonari to Young Italy and from Young Italy to the party of reform. By studying the condition of other countries, the reformers saw the backwardness of Italy, and began to investigate the reasons therefor. In consequence of the new spirit actuating the leaders of public opinion, the period from 1845 to 1848 presented many important movements of a character most encouraging to the patriot who desired Italy's regeneration, and to the statesman who believed that a passive resistance and a gradual reform would give to the new state a more enduring foundation than insurrection or military agitation. In the face of the progressive revolution that was to sweep over Italy during these years, the comments of Metternich, chancellor of a state forty years behind the other states of western Europe in economic, administrative, and financial methods, show the shallow statesmanship of the man. "Two parties reign to-day [1847] in Italy, the liberal party, which reckons on the weakness of governments and seeks to display its reforms before their eyes; the other, the radical party, which addresses itself to popular passion and dins the word deliverance into their ears. Between these parties there exists no other difference than that between the preface of a book and the book itself. That truth applies perfectly to the chiefs of both parties. Between a Balbo, a Gioberti, an Azeglio, a Petiti, and a Mazzini and his acolytes

there is no other difference than that which exists between poisoners and assassins, and if the intentions of the men differ, that difference disappears upon the field of their activity."

As the party of the Neo-Guelphs, who looked to the Pope as the future head of a federation of Italian states, had been the first to formulate its doctrines, so it was at Rome that the first indications of a new era began to appear. As long as Gregory XVI. lived there was little expectation of making real the doctrines of Gioberti. "I would subscribe entirely to your *Primacy*," wrote Borsieri, one of the Milanese plotters of 1824, to Gioberti, "if it were possible for you to become Pope and for me to be, unworthily, your secretary of state." But in 1846 Gregory XVI. died, and a ferment of interest arose as to his successor. In the College of Cardinals a bitter struggle took place between the supporters, Sanfedesti or Gregoriani, of Cardinal Lambruschini, a loyal believer in the policy of Gregory XVI., and the more moderate cardinals, who, feeling the necessity of making some concessions to the popular desire for reform, endeavoured to bring about the election of Cardinal Gizzi, who was the favourite with the people of Rome. It was found impossible, however, to elect either candidate, and a compromise was effected whereby Giovanni Mastai Ferretti, bishop of Imola, was chosen to the pontifical throne. Mastai was almost unknown even to many of his own colleagues, and this obscurity was one cause of his success. Although connected with the liberal party of Gizzi, he was able to command the support of the reactionists, who saw in him a candidate easily influenced; while his sincere piety, his loyalty to the church, his large-hearted liberality won for him the votes of those of the college, who, with less defined political opinions, desired to bring about the purification of the Roman See. To those, too, among the reformers, who had watched the career of the bishop of Imola, the election of Mastai was a source of gratification, for he had shown himself in his earlier years to be of a

liberal and sympathetic spirit, and had won for himself the good-will of the people of Imola by his independence and desire to improve the condition of the people. It was, therefore, a natural inference that the new Pope, who, as Pius IX., was about to enter upon one of the longest and most eventful pontificates in the history of the papacy, would show himself favourable to reform. The followers of Gioberti began to believe that their leader had spoken the truth and that a federation of liberal states under the presidency of the Pope was about to become a reality. Even the followers of Mazzini were not displeased with the turn of affairs, for the situation seemed to be a kind of exemplification of the maxim of their leader, "God and the People."

Except to the critical observer the first acts of the Pope in that year 1846–47 appeared to express a loyal and consistent desire to further the cause of better government in the Papal States, and consequently the cause of better government in Italy generally. On July 18th Pius IX. made his first claim to public confidence by publishing an amnesty for all political offenders, exiles whom the policy of Gregory XVI. had driven from their country. Though this amnesty roused the enthusiasm of the people of Rome, it was but an incomplete measure in that by demanding from every one pardoned a promise in writing never again to offend against the papal government it prevented many eminent exiles from returning. Nevertheless, the amnesty showed that the new Pope had broken from the policy of his predecessor, and that he was willing to consider sympathetically the needs and wishes of his people and would certainly not content himself with this single act. Already had he begun the purification of the curia by suspending special privileges awarded by Gregory and by deciding that priests should not be exempt from regular taxation. Later in the year the good work was continued. In September the tax upon salt and flour was removed, a committee on reforms was instituted, and

lay tribunals took the place of ecclesiastical tribunals; laymen were introduced into the council of the Pope, a committee of four laymen and one ecclesiastic was established to supervise the press, and greater liberty of publication was permitted. The measures created very great joy, but the people were almost frenzied with delight when in July, 1847, the Pope entered a vigorous protest against a renewal of the Austrian occupation of Ferrara, which had been terminated nine years before, and despite Austria's explanation continued for some months to oppose the occupation and to deny Austria's right therein. The popularity of Pius IX., who had to all appearances broken with Austria as well as the Gregorians, was now firmly founded, and the world looked on with interest to see the character of his political reforms. In October, 1847, a decree was issued, which instituted the municipality of Rome, under a senator (mayor), eight assistants, and a hundred members; on the 15th a council of state was created composed of twenty-four members named by the Pope from lists voted upon by each of the provinces; and, finally, on December 29th, a decree was issued defining the powers of the council of ministers. Though these new measures provided that the greater proportion of councillors should be laymen, it may be noticed that in no respect did the Pope admit that sovereignty lay anywhere else than in his own hands. However willing he might be to gratify the wishes of his subjects, he did not abate one jot of his absolute authority.

While thus the Pope was winning the good-will of his people by a policy that was liberal in appearance, even if it were not so in fact, two other states were also feeling the influence of the new spirit and were undertaking promising reforms. Tuscany was the home of some of Italy's most intelligent leaders. For years under the mildly paternal rule of its grand duke it had enjoyed peace and prosperity. In the decade after 1840 men of such widely diverse views as Capponi, author of

The Actual Condition of the Romagna and a Giobertist, Ricasoli, a believer in the sovereignty of the people although an aristocrat, Giusti and Niccolini, the radical *littérateurs*, Mantonelli the legist, and Guerazzi, a follower of Mazzini, were living in Tuscany and exciting unrest among the people and scattering widely the sparks of discontent. The news from Rome started the sparks into flames, and in order to avoid a conflagration Leopold yielded to the popular demands. Between May, 1847, and the end of the year he modified the press law, appointed a commission to revise the law codes, summoned an advisory body of notables, and finally agreed to the formation of a municipal guard. He discarded the Austrian uniform and donned the Tuscan dress, and began the work of reorganising his cabinet by the introduction of two men devoted to the work of reform. The enthusiasm in Tuscany knew no bounds, and the grand duke vied with the Pope in popularity.

Piedmont was slower, but it, too, came into the ranks of the reforming states. Charles Albert, who had always wavered between his respect for kingship and his regard for tradition on one side, and his sincere desire to promote the welfare of his people on the other, came by degrees to the determination that he would act with his people. He was already in dispute with Austria over the salt and wine duty, and this event of the year 1846 had begun a conflict with Austria that was to end only in actual war. The relation became more strained with the occupation of Ferrara, and Charles Albert so far showed his appreciation of the stand that the Pope had taken as to send him letters of congratulation, offering aid and saying, "Whatever may occur, I will not separate my cause from yours." To his people he said, in a letter written to the Count of Castegnette in 1847, "If Providence sends us a war for Italian independence, I will mount my horse with my sons, I will place myself at the head of my army. What a glorious day it will be in which we can raise the cry of a war

for the independence of Italy." It mattered little that the king explained his words as applying to the liberation of Piedmont, that he had hardly as yet reached a positive decision in his own mind as to what he ought to do; the feeling spread, particularly among those reformers who like d'Azeglio had supported the cause of the constitutional monarchy, that Charles Albert would be the future liberator of Italy. They believed that firmness and decision would come to him in time, and that when the important moment arrived the King of Sardinia would not be found on the side of Austria. This conviction became stronger as the king began to respond to the pressure of popular opinion, and to improve by one measure after another the administration of the state. He reorganised the cabinet by dismissing unpopular councillors; in October consented to the revision of the civil code, and in November authorised the reorganisation of the police system and increased the local powers of the communes; and afterwards promised other changes that were greatly needed. In reality, Charles Albert had renewed the liberal protestations of his youth, and was rapidly committing himself to a promise to support the cause of Italy, should revolution or war again break out.

The year 1847 was therefore a year bright with hope for Italy, a year in which the Italians might well be proud of the progress they had made in the direction of a more honourable and a more permanent political organisation. They were rapidly raising themselves to a position deserving of the respect of Europe. While Metternich was announcing in a circular letter to the Powers that Italy was but a geographical expression, and that the complete sovereignty and independence of each separate state of the Italian peninsula must be maintained, Lord Palmerston, the English foreign minister, was communicating to the several princes the satisfaction that the English government felt at the reforms thus far carried through.

The progressive revolution that was exemplifying so suc-

cessfully d'Azeglio's doctrine of passive resistance based on educated public opinion, had not yet reached its height. In the first month of the year 1848 the people of the various Italian states, roused by the concessions thus far made, and excited still more by the Sicilian uprising of the 12th of January, which may be said to have given the signal for revolution throughout Europe, pressed harder than they had done before upon their rulers for further concessions. For nearly a year Sicily had been in a state of ferment, and finally in January, after a number of incipient attempts, an uprising took place which soon became an organised revolution. Naples, responding to the cry from Sicily, raised the tri-colour, and started a movement in Salerno that threatened to embrace the whole of southern Italy. Ferdinand, who was reduced to helplessness because he could make no head against the revolution himself and was deprived of foreign aid, since the papal secretary, Cardinal Ferretti, positively refused to allow Austrian troops to cross the papal territory, promised, on January 29th, a constitution to the province of Naples. On February 10th the constitution was promulgated, and on the 12th the king extended it to the province of Sicily also. The constitution, a weakened form of the French revised Charta of 1830, was not a very liberal one, but it provided for two houses, one named for life by the king, and the other elected by the people, and guaranteed a limited freedom of the press, and amnesty for political offences.

Such was the popular regard for a written constitution that when central and northern Italy heard the news from Naples, excitement knew no bounds. The idea of gradual reform began to give way to the idea of a constitution. Men who a month before had been satisfied with a few changes, now began to clamour for the sweeping changes that a constitution entailed. In Tuscany, Leopold, who though he had already conceded much seemed willing to concede more, consented to consider the petitions that came in to him; and finally when the people

became impatient, agreed to grant them a representative government. When, on February 17th, the constitution was promulgated it was found that the grand duke had done better than Ferdinand, for he had added to the other liberal constitutional provisions religious toleration and commercial and industrial liberty. In Rome, Pius IX., tortured by the fear of going too far in his work of reorganisation, was as ever inconsistent, and wholly unable to determine how far he should tolerate the demands of his people. But events were pressing hard upon him, and fearing a popular uprising he continued his work of increasing the lay party in his ministry. By this means he hoped to satisfy the popular demands, but when the news of the revolution in France of February 24th reached Rome, the excitement was so great that he was obliged to yield, and grant a constitution. The movement was gradually passing from the south to the north, and Sicilian, Neapolitan, Roman, and Tuscan were filled with hopes of constitutional government. And Piedmont was not behind in reaching the goal, even though Charles Albert found it more difficult than had even Pius IX. to face the situation. The question was not wholly one of reform ; it involved a constitutional change in the presence of Austrian troops in Lombardy. The possibility of war with the Austrian Power made Charles Albert hesitate. But gradually the pressure increased ; the cry for a constitution passed from the people to the official body, from the municipal council of Turin to the king's own advisers, to such men as Balbo, Cavour, d'Azeglio, and the decision could not be postponed. Charles Albert at length gave way, and having decided to break the pledge that he had made to Austria twenty-four years before, he made a promise that he never broke, that a constitution should be granted. On February 8th the news got abroad, and Turin, Piedmont, and all Italy rejoiced. Acclamations, processions, festivities of all kinds showed to the king the joy of his people. For three weeks the

councillors of the king were busy preparing the text of the document that was issued on March 4th. That Piedmont gained from the care, intelligence, and political knowledge of her statesmen is evident from the fact that the document, which was put forth in this time of excitement and after long hesitancy on the part of the king, is the present constitution of the kingdom of Italy. It has been slightly amended in order to make it conform to existing conditions, but in the main it is to-day as it was when it was first promulgated. Religious toleration, responsibility of ministers, bicameral legislature, popular elections, control of taxes by the elected chamber, co-operation of the two houses and the king in passing laws, freedom of the press, and individual liberty and equality before the law were the main provisions of this liberal charter, which represents the highest point reached in this era of political education. The body of reformers who had seen no hope either in the doctrines of the Carbonari or of Mazzini had now succeeded through a revolution practically bloodless, save in Naples, in gaining for four of the Italian states constitutional government. The first great phase of the struggle was over, and Italy had won for many of her subjects constitutional liberty ; but the next phase of the struggle was close at hand, for she had still to gain independence and unity.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LIBERAL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY.

THE desire for national unity and independence, which the wars of liberation had created in Germany, was quite as strong, though probably less widespread, than was that in Italy from 1813 to 1815. The German people, who were constantly mindful of their noble past and of the proud position that the Empire had held as a great moral power in Europe, finally realised on the downfall of Napoleon how seriously his supremacy had threatened their nationality. The Confederation of the Rhine, representing fourteen millions of people, had for nearly a decade given itself over to the supremacy of France. In the north-west German speech had been almost driven out of business circles and French officials had filled administrative posts. The intrusion of the foreigner touched the German pride and strengthened the determination of the people to work for the upbuilding of the German state. Men of the most diverse opinions recognised the need of unity, and were willing to sacrifice local prejudice and individual preference if only Germany might once more become a land of brothers. But the task was not so easy of accomplishment as it seemed to those hopeful idealists in whose writings the aspirations of the people found voice. It was one thing to condemn with righteous indignation the low estate into which Germany had fallen and to rouse enthusiasm for the united Germany of the future; it was another to give these ideas and hopes a practical political application and to overcome the obstacles which the existing

situation presented. The states of southern Germany, which had come late into the war of liberation, had little sympathy for those who advocated the gathering together into a common state of all who spoke the German language; the German patriots had no clear and definite plan regarding the work to be performed, the form of the new state, or the limits of the new fatherland; the statesmen of the time, with more directness of purpose and definiteness of aim, were divided in their opinions, many giving the problem up in despair, many looking to Prussia for leadership, others proposing that Austria and Prussia should be made equal, dividing the leadership between them. One proposition after another was made in the vain attempt to solve an insoluble problem; but each new suggestion found more enemies than friends, and it is more than probable that any system that sought to change in any degree the existing order would probably have had to win its way by force. "Political unity can be obtained in only one way and that is by the sword," wrote Clausewitz, not long after the wars of liberation. Others doubtless felt the same, and memories of Frederic the Great and his military methods were not wanting to those who looked to Prussia as the state most worthy to redeem Germany.

But however this may have been, the fact remained that the future of the German states was to be determined not by a military power but by a peaceful congress sitting at Vienna under the direction of that European statesman, who, seeing no good in such idle discussion about national unity, had made up his mind that Austria's supremacy should be maintained and that the *status quo* should be altered as little as possible. Metternich's position as the most influential and powerful of all the German statesmen had already been established, and however much German patriots might wish for a better order of things their longings and plans for constitutionally uniting the scattered states were considered of little importance by the diplo-

mats at Vienna, and especially by Metternich, who was resolved to prevent the creation of any strongly compacted state that might threaten Austrian leadership. Everything worked in his favour; he was aided by the traditions of the Empire, by the hereditary control that the house of Habsburg had exercised for centuries over the affairs of Germany, and by the jealousy of the lesser states, who looked with suspicion upon Prussia and who, having enjoyed autonomy as members of the Confederation of the Rhine, were wholly unwilling to be co-operators in any scheme that threatened to absorb them into a larger state.

When, therefore, the matter was brought by the Prussian representatives at the congress to the practical form of a constitutional draft, the efforts of Metternich were directed to one definite end. He determined to reduce all propositions of a positive character to terms so general and vague that it would be possible to interpret them according to the interests of the dominant power, who, he trusted, would be himself. Popular aspirations, he thought, were one thing, practical government was another, and from the time when in March, 1815, Prussia presented through Humboldt and Hardenberg her scheme, which expressed, not very satisfactorily indeed, the wishes of the North German patriots, to June of the same year when the final act was signed, Metternich, scaling down by one counter-draft after another the Prussian propositions, succeeded in forcing the Prussian representatives further and further away from the popular wishes. The desire for representative government had been expressed with emphasis by such men as Arndt, Feuerbach, Dahlmann, and K. E. Schmid. "All classes in the state," said Feuerbach, "burgher as well as noble, the free possessor of unfree property as well as the owner of free estates must be equally represented before their sovereign before the nation can be considered a representative nation"; said Schmid, "The collective people are the last sources of the

supreme power"; and Hardenberg had expressed his sympathy with the popular view by saying that "democratic principles in a monarchical government seemed to constitute the plan most in harmony with the spirit of the age." Therefore Prussia in the draft drawn up in the beginning of April stated that "in all the German states the existing representative government [would] be upheld or a new one established in which [would] be preserved to the estates the right of levying new taxes, of deliberating on the laws of the land which concerned possession and personal freedom, the right of complaint in case of a misuse of power, the right to defend the constitution and to guarantee to each individual the privileges conveyed by it." Though incomplete, and not promising representation in the modern sense, this was certainly definite, too definite, indeed, for the Austrian chancellor, who reduced it to the following empty form: "In all the countries belonging to the Confederation assemblies will be established based on the system of estates." Such a clause offered little opportunity for an argument concerning popular representation such as the German patriots desired, and it omitted all definition of powers such as the Prussian representatives were willing to concede. Metternich in 1819 freely declared that the congress "never supposed that the unambiguous principle of representation by diets should be changed into pure democratic principles or forms." This modification, though the most important of those made by Metternich, is but one of many.

When, therefore, during the last three months of the congress, the question of the constitution was taken up seriously Metternich rejected all propositions for an empire or for a dual directory in copartnership with Prussia, and presented the scheme of a confederation already foreshadowed at Chaumont and in the first treaty of Paris. His scheme, after discussion, criticism, and hesitation on the part of the Prussian ministers, was accepted, and incorporated as part of the final act of the

congress. In consequence, a constitution was forced upon Germany of such a kind as to lead Count Bernstorff in later years —as Sybel tells us—to declare that it was "the immature result of over-hasty negotiation."

That the underlying principle of the new government should be the sovereignty of each individual state had been the condition, agreed on at Töplitz, upon which the South German States had entered the war of liberation; and it was their insistence upon the maintenance of this principle that gave Metternich his strongest argument against Prussia in the preparation of the final draft. According to this, each state of the Confederation was to have full autonomy and equal rights, and to be limited in action only by its pledge to protect Germany as a whole and each fellow state of the Confederation against attack, and to act with the others in mutually guaranteeing their entire possessions. Furthermore, each was to bind itself not to enter into any engagement that should be directed against the safety of the Confederation or that of any other state within the Confederation, or to make war upon each other, but in all cases of dispute to submit to the arbitration of the Diet. The object of the Confederation was to be the maintenance of the external and internal safety of Germany and of the independence and inviolability of the individual German states. No attempt was made to define the limits of the legislative, executive, or judicial functions, or to determine with any exactness where these functions lay. These matters were left open for settlement at a later time. Austria was given the presidency of the Confederation, but so far as the constitution was concerned her place was simply that of a presiding officer, possessing the deciding vote in case of a tie. The fundamental laws of the Confederation were to be left undefined until the Diet should meet; then they were to be drawn up, and at the same time departments for the regulation of foreign, military, and interior affairs were to be organised. Special attention was to be paid to the drafting

of laws for the freedom of the press, for the security of authors and editors against piracy, for the regulation of internal commerce and navigation and for the improvement of the civil state of the Jews. No guarantee, however, was given that such laws would be passed. Supreme tribunals were to be established for all states containing 300,000 inhabitants and for all groups of states whose aggregate population reached that number. Religious equality was guaranteed.

The most important part of the constitutional machinery was the Diet, that substitute which Metternich and the congress of Vienna foisted upon Germany instead of the strong and national central authority that the German people and the Prussian statesmen desired. The Diet was not a sovereign body endowed with full executive or legislative authority; it was not even a body made up of representatives to whom power had been delegated by the different states; it was merely the mouthpiece of the princes, a kind of voting machine through which the members of the Confederation made known their wishes to Germany. No deputy had power to act in any emergency without full instructions from the government, whose wishes he repeated to the other members of the Diet. To the princes sitting in the persons of their representatives in the Diet the constitution gave not only legislative but constituent powers. The Diet was to concern itself with all matters of general concern, with the regulation of war with outside Powers, with all arrangements necessary to promote intercourse between the Confederation and all foreign states, and with the settlement of all disputes between the states of the Confederation. In this definition of functions no attempt was made to confer on the Diet in a clear and definite manner either the power to enact or the authority to carry out suitable and necessary legislation. The Diet could not compel a recalcitrant member of the Confederation to obey its decrees, although Metternich claimed in 1819 that if one member of the Confedera-

tion refused to fulfil his common duties the Confederation had the right to coerce him.

The machinery of the Diet was as complicated as its powers were uncertain. Although a single body, it sat under two different forms, one for the transaction of ordinary business, the ordinary assembly or close council (*engere Rath*), the other for extraordinary business, the general assembly or Plenum. As ordinary assembly the Diet considered all legislation of any kind whatsoever, and decided what measures were to be reserved for the occasion when it sat as a general assembly. In the main, the difference between these two forms lay in the number of votes allotted to each member, the number required for passing a measure, and the character of the measures discussed. In the ordinary assembly there were but seventeen votes cast; and inasmuch as there were thirty-nine members of the Confederation, it is evident that there was a large amount of collective voting. The eleven larger states had one vote each; the remaining twenty-eight were arranged in six curias, to each of which was allotted one vote. Single states had, therefore, from one-half to one-twelfth of a vote each, and unity in casting the vote of each curia was demanded. When the vote was taken in this way a majority carried, and it will be seen that any three of the lesser states in combination with the smaller states could out-vote the five kingdoms with Austria; that is, states possessing only one-tenth of the population of Germany could out-vote the states possessing nine-tenths of the population. Thus in the ordinary assembly state sovereignty without regard to extent of territory held the balance of power. This did not, however, hold true in cases relating to the adoption and amendment of fundamental laws, to the organic institutions of the Confederation, to individual right, or to matters of religion. In these cases a unanimous vote was demanded.

When fundamental laws of the Confederation were to be enacted or measures were to be adopted relating to the Act of the

Confederation itself, then the Diet sat as a general assembly or Plenum. In this capacity it cast sixty-nine votes, and to each state, no matter how small, was given one vote. But as there were but thirty-nine states, it is evident that a considerable number possessed more than one vote. The distribution was, however, in this case based on the territorial extent of each state, although no attempt was made to apportion the votes with any exactness. Austria and the five kingdoms, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg had four votes each; Baden, Electoral Hesse, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, Holstein, and Luxemburg had three votes each; and Brunswick and Mechlenburg-Schwerin had two votes each. For the passage of ordinary measures a two-thirds majority was required; that is, the six kingdoms with three other votes could block legislation favoured by all the other states. In all matters in which unanimity was required in the ordinary assembly, unanimity was also required in the general assembly.

The defects of the Diet may be readily determined. In the first place its organisation and functions were vague and indefinite, and the articles of the constitution were open to various interpretations. Metternich, who, as we have seen, was determined to control German affairs and to repress all expressions of national feeling, was able to make it a constitutional machine to carry out his policy. Having no will of its own, it simply sanctioned and gave legislative efficiency to the measures that Metternich was applying throughout Europe. If in Spain and Italy he employed the congresses of the Powers to support him in his work of repression, in Germany he employed the Diet of the Confederation to the same end. In the second place the organisation of the Diet was ill-adapted to an efficient exercise of executive and legislative functions. It never won the support even of the German princes whose instrument it legally was, and from the beginning to the end of its career it seemed to the people but a means of oppression, an appliance of tyranny.

Its deputies were named by the princes or their governments and never by the people either as individuals or as estates; they were under instructions drawn up by the princes and were liable to be recalled by them at any time. As no powers were delegated to these deputies, and as the states resigned none of their control over matters of common concern, and vested in the Diet none of their sovereign powers, the Diet was practically impotent. The machinery of the assembly neither ran smoothly nor accomplished its work with dispatch; rapidity of movement was unknown, and the passage of the most important measures was practically impossible. Inasmuch as unanimity was demanded for all measures touching changes in the organic law of the Confederation, amendment of the constitution was out of the question. The result of such a system was inevitably a great dragging of business, endless bickering and discussion. It was difficult for the curia to get its members to agree; delegates were constantly sending home for instructions; and often the home government would leave its representatives uninstructed, and months would pass before a particular delegate would be able to cast his vote. Delays were, therefore, of daily occurrence, and business was referred to committees or was pigeon-holed, and important measures lay forgotten, buried in the records. Never could the Diet act definitely, positively or rapidly, and in consequence during the dreary fifty years of its existence it accomplished scarcely one good thing for Germany and nothing for German unity.

This was the body that was set up by Metternich and the lesser states to satisfy the longings of the German people for unity. So far as the letter of the constitution was concerned, there was no hope of anything better. Appointed to meet on September 1, 1815,—though in point of fact it did not meet until November of the following year—it was to be permanent and never to adjourn for more than four months at a time. In it particularism was in the ascendant and individualism could

scarcely get a hearing. In Germany, as in Italy, the popular desire for a fundamental law that should express the national need was almost entirely overlooked. As regards the famous clause that guaranteed assemblies in the different states, Stein could well say that by it every principle was abandoned "upon which the political arrangements of the nation might be based." Religious liberty was guaranteed, freedom of the press was promised, and the subjects of the confederated states were given certain rights in respect of property and emigration; but these were a poor recompense for the wars of liberation, a scant return for the sacrifice and suffering of the preceding period. It is little wonder that this "empty document," as Sybel calls it, "was received by the people of Germany partly with cold indifference, partly with patriotic indignation."

By this constitution Austria and the lesser states had made known their determination to defend particularism and the rights of princes at every point, and to resist the democratic tendencies that were showing themselves so prominently in Germany as well as in Spain, Italy, and France. Though by no means partial to a written constitution, the statesmen of Prussia, convinced of the necessity of making concessions to popular feeling, had shown themselves markedly in favour of representative institutions, and had tried to gain for their fatherland a more liberal constitution. In this they failed. It is interesting, therefore, to turn from the work of the congress of Vienna to Prussia herself to determine how far she was able to give to the people of her scattered provinces that which she was unable to obtain for Germany as a whole. In the affairs of the Prussian state Metternich could not interfere, and the opportunity was offered for the establishment of such a form of constitutional government as would set a standard for liberalism in other states of the Confederation. And Prussia seized the opportunity. On May 22, 1815, three weeks before the close of the congress of Vienna, while the committee on

German affairs was busily engaged in modifying the Prussian draft Frederic William, King of Prussia, issued an ordinance, countersigned by Hardenberg, in which he declared that a written constitution should be granted to the people of Prussia and a representative assembly of the people should be established. The members of this assembly, the ordinance continued, should be chosen from the provincial estates, which were to be restored where they had already existed and to be organised where they did not exist; that to this representative assembly should be granted the right of deliberating upon subjects of legislation which concerned "the personal and proprietary right of the citizens of the state including taxation"; and that in order to carry out this promise a commission should be appointed to meet in three months after the promulgation of the ordinance to organise the provincial estates, to arrange the system of representation, and to elaborate the new constitution.

This document breathes the spirit which prompted the drawing up of the Prussian drafts for a federal constitution, and characterises the liberal policy of Prussia from 1813 to 1815. Although to the extreme liberals it seemed to make but meagre promises and to present an outlook far different from that which they in their dreaming had anticipated, by the people it was received with demonstrations of delight, and by the conservatives with consternation and dismay. No sooner was the ordinance issued than a cry arose from certain influential circles that were animated by the spirit dominant at Vienna, against any representative constitution. "One might possibly get into shape the provincial estates," said Ancillon, "but for Heaven's sake let us have no common estate." "We have," said Klewitz, "the best king, we are rich in most promising princes. In their virtue and in the education of future kings, we have a constitution and greater security against abuse than this [representative constitution] can ever grant." To the

view of these men, each of whom was to be a member of the future commission, Frederic William was inclined to listen, and Hardenberg seems to have lacked from the beginning sufficient strength and determination to resist the opposition that arose. Suggestions from Metternich began to come in from Vienna, and so energetic was the reactionary party that by effecting the postponement of the commission for a period of two years it succeeded in winning a first victory, thus gaining time for the party of reaction to recruit its forces. Finally, however, the question could be no longer postponed; in the spring of 1817 a commission of twenty-two members was appointed, and three commissioners, Altenstein, Klewitz, and Beyme were sent through the provinces to find out what the inhabitants thought of the project. The work of these men was slow and arduous, and the results were so varied that from the opinions gathered it is almost impossible to determine whether the provinces wished a representative constitution or not. The weight of opinion in Westphalia and along the Rhine was in favour of a representative assembly; in the east, farther away from the influence of France, it varied; and in many quarters great ignorance of the subject was found to prevail. While the commission was thus carrying on its investigations, Frederic William was feeling more and more the influence of the reaction that was spreading through Europe. Upon the king's pliant nature Metternich played with all the subtlety of a trained diplomat, and the court and aristocratic party brought its influence to the aid of the Austrian chancellor. The latter advocated the establishment of provincial diets only, and inasmuch as the members of the proposed central assembly were to be chosen from the local diets and not from the people, it followed that the adoption of his plan was possible without violating the ordinance, for it would be, naturally, the first step to be taken in case the ordinance were to be carried out. The real question was, would the king go any further than this?

As time went on, as the work of the commission dragged wearily along, and the real difficulties of the task became increasingly apparent, the feeling grew that a central assembly was under the circumstances impracticable. In 1818 and 1819 the spirit of reaction increased in Prussia as well as in the rest of Germany, the aristocratic and landholding class gained steadily in influence, the king listened more readily to Metternich's suggestions, and Hardenberg gradually lost the royal confidence. Liberals whose hopes had been raised by the promises of 1815 lost heart as they saw month after month passing and no attempt made to put the ordinance into execution, and as they saw Prussia, too, enter the ranks of the reactionary states.

With the failure of the statesmen of Germany to win the sympathy and support of the liberal forces by a policy of even moderate concession, these forces began to gird themselves for a struggle. "It will be now German Confederation against German Nation," said an anonymous writer of 1815; and already was the nation preparing itself for the conflict, under the leadership of a small group of its people, in whom still burned the fire of the days of the liberation wars. This was the class of students, who turning back to their student work after the wars were over, bore with them the glory and scars of conflict. Feeling that they had been deceived by the German princes, who during the wars had promised so much and after the wars had accomplished so little, they became revolutionary agitators in their determination to exercise freedom of thought and speech, freedom of meeting and association, freedom of fraternal co-operation. As early as 1807 the Tugendbund or league of virtue had been founded for the purpose of keeping alive the national life of Germany during the period of Napoleon's supremacy. Jahn, in organising the gymnastic associations, gave direction and purpose to much of their activity; the muscular strengthening and Spartan training of

the German youth were in the mind of his followers a preparation for the restoring of German freedom. But more influential than anything else was the Burschenschaft or association of students, which originated at Jena in Saxe-Weimar. Here was the centre of the literary life of Germany; here lived and wrote Herder, Goethe, and Schiller; here had gathered the free and independent spirits who were attracted by the liberality of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar; here constitutional government was free and representative; and here in this centre of German national feeling were high-mindedness, enthusiasm, and joyful anticipation of the future. The Burschenschaft thus organised took on a national character; it threw off all sectarianism, all provincial narrowness, and pledged its members not only to lead upright lives but also to work for the national upbuilding of Germany. In the midst of drinking beer and smoking pipes they made vows for the liberation of Germany and swore oaths against the Holy Alliance. Through the press and public utterance they expressed their opinions, idealistic and impractical; and that they might make a more open and united declaration of their love of liberty and hatred of reaction, they combined with certain of the followers of Jahn to celebrate on October 18, 1817, the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation and the memorial day of the battle of Leipzig at the Wartburg, the castle to which Luther had retired after the Diet of Worms. In the hall of the Minnesingers, where according to tradition the old song contests had been held, the main exercises took place. "After the singing of 'Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott' a representative of the Jena Burschenschaft, who had won the iron cross at Waterloo, welcomed the guests; they, he said, as a living symbol of national unity, had come together to celebrate jointly the memory of two great events of the past, the renascence of free thought and the delivery from foreign oppression, and to inspire themselves with high resolutions for working out a better future of

the fatherland. There followed speeches in honour of Luther, of the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, of the heroes of the war of independence, of the teachers of the German youth. Not a single word was spoken, which by fair-minded men could have been construed as an expression of unlawful or unreasonable aspirations. And even the lamentable event which was to mar the close of the festive day was an act of juvenile folly much more than of premeditated malice. In childish imitation of Luther's burning of the papal bull at Wittenberg, some members of the Burschenschaft took occasion of the torchlight procession in the evening to throw a number of reactionary writings, which had excited the patriotic anger of academic circles, into the fire, and to perform a wild farcical scene around the burning *auto da fé*. But how ridiculously harmless even this performance had been became soon apparent, when the perpetrators confessed that they had not even read the books on which they had vented so much of moral indignation, and that they had burned not the books themselves but a number of old rubbish, dictionaries, novels, and the like, bought in second-hand book stores, with the titles of the offensive writings affixed to the covers."[1] Harmless as the meeting was and barren of any danger to Germany, nevertheless it was enough to draw from Metternich an expression of his opinion regarding the Prussian representative scheme and the threatening character of all student societies and all gymnastic associations; and it strengthened, in no small degree, his determination to force upon the diplomats at Aix-la-Chapelle the policy of repression as part of the public law of Europe. It was the unfortunate fate of German liberalism, that in the events which followed this innocent outburst of student enthusiasm Metternich found the desired opportunity to apply this law to Germany.

Another centre of the Burschenschaft movement was the

[1] Kuno Francke, *Karl Follen and the German Liberal Movement.*

university of Giessen ; but here the character of the student life was essentially different. Stern, unrelenting, and joyless, that life stands in marked contrast with the freer and more generous spirit that dominated the Burschenschafters of Jena. Of the leaders at Giessen none was more determined in his revolutionary views, more positive in his radical convictions than Karl Follen. Fanatical in his belief in the injustice of all existing forms of government, he was equally uncompromising in the measures that he advocated for the accomplishment of his ends. Lying, assassination, and rebellion were all pardonable, he believed, in the struggle for liberty, and "murder and perjury" became the maxims of the "Unconditionals," as Follen's intimates were called. Inasmuch as these Burschenschaft Nihilists were small in number they were not able to carry out any of the many schemes that were at one time or another drawn up for execution ; but their fiery eloquence, their irresistible fervour and zeal won over many disciples who brooded over the woes of Germany, and were willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause of German liberty.

While the Burschenschaft organisation was gaining associates in northern Germany, and while the brothers Follen by their simple earnestness and steadfastness of purpose were strengthening the faith of the Unconditionals, the party of reaction, which was already beginning to boast of its victory over Frederic William of Prussia, was claiming a greater conquest in the conversion of the Czar Alexander to the cause of repression. While in reality this victory was not yet complete, to the liberals, who based their opinion upon the results of the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and upon a pamphlet of a Wallachian named Stourdza, it seemed to be quite so. This pamphlet, in which Stourdza prophesied a German revolution, and declaiming against the universities on the ground that they were centres of agitation recommended an entire change in the methods of instruction and a restriction of the freedom

of the press, had been distributed among the ministers at Aix-la-Chapelle, and was supposed to have received the sanction of the Czar and to represent his views. At once a great outcry arose against those, who, as was supposed, had influenced the Czar to desert the liberal cause, and suspicion fastened upon the dramatist, Kotzebue, who having in his earlier days been on the side of the patriots against Napoleon, had turned reactionist and taken Stourdza under his protection. The liberals branded him as an apostate, a turncoat, a spy in the pay of despotism. His position as Russian *staatsrath* in Germany, which called for frequent political reports to the Czar, laid him open to the charge of having circulated extravagant and even false statements at the Russian court. To the Burschenschafters he was the most hated man in Germany and to the Unconditionals a man deserving of their vengeance. On March 23, 1819, Karl Sand, one of Follen's intimate friends and a member of the Burschenschaft at Jena, a man of pure life but unbalanced mind, entered Kotzebue's house at Mannheim and stabbed him to the heart. Three months later an apothecary, Löhning, who had come under the influence of the Giessen spirit, and had been in close contact with the radical members of the Burschenschaft, attempted to murder the Hessian minister of state, von Ibell, at Schwalbach, but failed to accomplish his object. "It is impossible," says Francke, "not to trace both these events back to the teaching of Karl Follen;" and there is reason to believe that Follen knew beforehand of Sand's intention.

The opportunity that Metternich had anticipated had now come. Had he not always warned the German princes against the dangerous Burschenschaft and the Turnerbund, and against the evils of freedom of the press and a liberal government? And had not the proof now been given that his suspicions were correct? It is true that he had always expressed great contempt for revolutionists of the pen, but that did not alter the impor-

tance for him of the present occasion. Liberal statesmen at once recognised the lamentable character of these unfortunate acts. Hardenberg, already discouraged about a Prussian constitution, gave up all hope of carrying through his measures; Varnhagen von Ense feared for their effect on the Czar and on all ministers of state in Germany, who would now stand in dread of attack at any time; and Gersdorf, regretting the unfortunate affair, sought to persuade the princes, notably the King of Prussia, that there was no danger of a student revolution; but his efforts became wholly vain when after the attack on von Ibell a reaction of fear seized upon Germany. Thus was the way prepared for Metternich's intervention. He was in Florence when Kotzebue's assassination took place and was not informed of it until the end of the first week in April, when Gentz's dispatches, dated April 1st, finally reached him at Rome. He saw in the murder the spectre of a monstrous conspiracy concocted in the universities. Not that he feared that the revolution would be engendered by the universities, but he saw that by them "a whole generation of revolutionaries" would be brought into existence. Therefore his aim was directed against the professors, whom he considered most unsuited to be conspirators but dangerous as instructors of the youth. Convinced by Müller's statement that the "murderous band" would not allow itself to be intimidated by a few measures, he determined to apply his policy with the utmost rigour. "It will be my care to draw from the affair the best possible results," he wrote to Gentz, "and in this endeavour I shall not be found lukewarm." He rejoiced at the embarrassment of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar and thought at once of the good effect that "this loving treatment of his *staatsrath*" would have on the Czar. He therefore proposed the calling of a congress at Carlsbad, to which the German states should send their representatives, and drew up a careful statement of the remedies that he thought the occasion demanded.

The congress met on August 6, 1819. Metternich had already completed his victory over Frederic William in a meeting at Töplitz in July, when he had refused to aid the king against demagogic uprisings unless the latter relinquished his determination to introduce a central representative government into his kingdom. He had charged the king with the responsibility for all that had happened, and had so far succeeded in turning him away from the Hardenberg policy that it had been possible to bring about a common agreement between Austria and Prussia for the regulation of the internal affairs of the Confederation. As this "punctation" embodied Metternich's own remedies, he was able to come before the congress of Carlsbad assured of the support of Prussia. Thus strengthened he felt confident that his recommendations would be accepted. The sequel proved him to be right; by all the representatives the necessity of common agreement was acknowledged.

The measures passed by the congress, made up of representatives of only the larger states, related to the universities, the press, and such disturbance as might break out in the future. For the universities, the special objects of Metternich's alarm, regular state supervision was to be established. A state officer was to be appointed to enforce the law, to overlook the instruction, to eject professors, whose influence over the youthful minds was deleterious or whose doctrines seemed to be "hostile to the public order or subversive of existing governmental institutions." This same official was to put into force all regulations—hitherto more or less of a dead letter—"against secret and unauthorised societies in the universities, and to pay special attention to the Burschenschaft," since, as the decree says, "the very conception of this society implies the utterly unallowable plan of permanent fellowship and constant communication between the various universities." No professor once removed could be reinstated or allowed to hold a position in any other university in the Confederation, and no student once

expelled could enter any other university. Regarding the press the regulations were equally severe and reactionary. Upon this point Metternich had already expressed himself very strongly, and agreed with Gentz that the press was the most disintegrating influence in the Confederation, the mainstay of the liberal party. Gentz had already drawn up an elaborate paper on the subject based on the proposals of Metternich, and this was made the basis of the work of the congress. All daily and serial publications of less than twenty-four pages were to submit to the censorship of the state officials. If at any time unsuppressed publications were allowed to appear, which in the opinion of the Diet seemed inimical to the honour of the Confederation, the safety of the individual states, or the maintenance of peace and quiet in Germany, the Diet had the right to suppress such on its own authority. Other publications were liable to suppression in case complaint were entered by any individual state against them as obnoxious. Lastly, an extraordinary committee was to be appointed to sit at Maintz for the purpose of investigating all associations and plots of a revolutionary character. Aided by the local authorities this commission was destined to become an elaborately organised detective bureau, established to collect evidence and follow up clues. It was to furnish the Diet with information upon which to base repressive legislation. As a system of espionage it was eminently successful, for it not only placed Austria, and consequently Metternich, at the head of an organised committee for terrorising Germany, but it also gave to the chancellor the practical control over the separate states of the Confederation, which were pledged by this measure to submit to the higher authority of the commission. This struck down the foundation principle of the Confederation, the sovereignty of the individual states. As a detective bureau the commission failed signally. Although it sat for many years and watched with eagle eye for evidence of plots and conspiracies, it never succeeded in accomplishing any single important result.

When completed the decrees were placed before the Diet for acceptance. Here pressure was brought to bear upon the smaller states, which, hearing of the Carlsbad measures for the first time, were not wholly disposed to accept them. They saw in them a danger threatening their sovereignty, and looked with ill-favour upon an action which promised to increase the power of Austria and the larger states. Particularism stood face to face with an increase of centralised authority exercised by Austria and Metternich, and it is little wonder that while the latter obtained a formal vote from the Diet in favour of the new measures, a considerable minority of the representatives secretly adopted a protest against them.

With the acceptance of these tyrannical measures the work of the Carlsbad congress was brought to an end: but even yet the remedies of Metternich and the propositions contained in the "punctation" of Töplitz had not all been acted upon. The time had now come when it would be safe to do that which Metternich in 1815 considered dangerous—because of the prevalence of liberal opinions in Germany—that is, to elaborate the organic law of the Confederation. Beginning on November 9, 1819, a series of ministerial conferences was held in Vienna, at which representatives of all the German states were present, to determine, as Metternich said in his opening address, "the functions of the Diet, the extent of its jurisdiction, the limits of its powers and the forms to be followed in the most essential part of its work." This of necessity involved the revision of Article XIII., upon which Prussia and other states had based their right of establishing representative assemblies. That Metternich and the German Ultras intended to use this conference as an instrument of further oppression there is no doubt, but, fortunately for Germany, the upholders of state sovereignty joined with the liberals to oppose any interpretation which might increase the power of Austria. In consequence the victory at the conference lay rather with the moderates than

with the extreme reactionists, and many attempts of Metternich to construe the letter of the constitution in the spirit that dominated at Carlsbad proved unsuccessful. In the main the upholders of state-rights won the victory, and as might have been expected the popular cause received no more consideration at Vienna in 1819 and 1820 than it had in 1814 and 1815, a fact that becomes evident from the new interpretation put upon Article XIII; "Inasmuch as the Germanic Confederation," so runs the new article, "with the exception of the free cities, has been formed by the sovereign princes, the fundamental principle of that union demands that all sovereign powers shall abide in the supreme head of the government, and by the term assemblies of estates (*landeständische Verfassung*, the term used in Article XIII.) it is to be understood that the sovereign is bound to permit the co-operation of the estates only in the exercise of certain specially determined powers." In such an interpretation representation of the people found no place and sovereignty of the people was denied without reserve. Particularism had saved Germany from extreme and oppressive reaction, from a repetition of the Carlsbad decrees, but it had retained for itself all the results of the victory. The Vienna Final-Act, drawn up May 20, 1820 and made a fundamental law of the Confederation by a resolution of the Diet passed on the 8th of June following, marks the final downfall of the liberal hopes in Germany.

But the disappointment of those who were longing for German unity based on a broad constitutional foundation was not yet complete. Although to the student of the period it has long since become evident that Frederic William of Prussia had broken with Hardenberg and the moderate liberals, nevertheless the work of the commission that had been appointed in 1817 was still going on for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made by the king. But the murder of Kotzebue, followed by certain uprisings in Berlin in July of the same year, and the

threats and persuasions of Metternich, had changed Frederic William's mind and had made him an easy prey to the reactionary projects which Metternich had made to him at Töplitz. With the passage of the Carlsbad decrees and the Vienna Final-Act the liberals began to realise that a central representative assembly was no longer to be hoped for, and they were entirely convinced of this fact, when in 1821 a new commission was appointed, composed of men of reactionary tendencies under the presidency of the crown prince, for the single purpose of organising the local assemblies of estates according to the principle laid down in the revision of Article XIII. The hope died out entirely when in 1823, after Hardenberg's death, the law organising the provincial estates was promulgated, and it was officially stated that the question concerning the summoning of the general estates—that is the central representative assembly—and its development out of the provincial estates, was a matter that would be postponed until a later period. Thus did the Prussian government evade its promise of 1815, and by its submission to Metternich and the landed classes furnish one more illustration of the strength of conservatism and of class policy.

Thus at the very time that the Ultras in France were winning their victory over the moderates by the fall of the second ministry of Richelieu and the establishment of the ministry of Villèle ; at the time that the Austrian troops were conquering the constitutionalists in Naples and Charles Felix was restoring absolutism in Piedmont ; at the time that the French troops were suppressing the liberal movement in Spain, and the congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona were declaring repression to be a part of the public law of Europe ; at the time that all these reactionary movements were taking place, the cause of German unity was rendered for the moment hopeless by the victory of the landed aristocracy, which demanded the maintenance of privilege and state sovereignty, over the com-

mercial classes, which were demanding reorganisation and reform. The cause of constitutional government was retarded by the all-influencing power of Austria, who sought not only to crush out all traces of liberalism by direct interference but also to persuade the separate states to copy the principles that she laid down for her own guidance. From 1819 to 1830 was the heyday of reaction in Germany as well as in Europe at large.

But at the same time there was evidence during these ten years of the existence of forces as well in Germany as in France, Italy, and Europe generally, that seemed to promise a better future. Politically speaking each state was quiet, watching with alternate anxiety and enthusiasm the course of events in other countries. The reactionists had won their victory, but they had merely forced the radical elements into secret rather than into open action and had quickened rather than destroyed the liberal aspirations. Every movement in France, every stirring of the Carbonari, every success of the Greeks in their struggle for independence against the Turks, every diplomatic victory of Canning, in a word, every expression of hostility to the doctrines of Metternich was noted and studied. Already had the states of Bavaria and Würtemberg granted fairly liberal constitutions to their subjects, and in Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, and a number of the smaller states that had acted under the influence of the Prussian ordinance of 1815, written charters similar to the French Charta of 1814 had been prepared and put into operation. After 1822 constitution making suddenly stopped, and was not resumed for seven years, but the remaining states of Germany had at least had the opportunity of seeing the advantages of constitutional rule in the states where it had been tried.

Though Germany was for the time being to make no progress in the direction of constitutional liberty, yet the period to 1830 was far from being a time of social or economic retrogression

or lethargy. The princes of Germany were by no means forgetful of the welfare of their people, and there existed in Prussia and all Germany peace and general happiness. It is true that the universities were watched, that professors were occasionally subjected to removal, that publishers were prosecuted and pamphlets suppressed. But these events were of comparatively infrequent occurrence and scarcely touched the mass of the people. It is true that political affairs were temporarily dormant, that there was little to rouse enthusiasm for the cause of liberalism; but there was on the other hand a great deal to rouse enthusiasm in other fields of human activity. There was increasing prosperity and wealth in nearly all the states of Germany. Economic reforms were begun notably in Prussia, and a remarkable revival in literature and art had taken place in larger and smaller states alike. But in no particular was this spirit more active than in the departments of history and philology. The Germans despairing of the present turned to the past, and writing under the influence of the romantic spirit applied their energies to the early history of their race, and by appeals to the greatness of by-gone days endeavoured to rouse a greater pride and loyalty. In this work Germany was contributing most richly to the sum of human knowledge. At the same time the supporters of liberalism grew more hopeful as it became more evident that such progress in art, literature, and the sciences must be followed by a similar advance in the direction of political liberty and economic reforms. The change of ideas brought about by such an intellectual movement was itself a force destined to break down the narrowness of the governments in matters of privilege and constitutional right.

Of far greater importance, however, because more directly connected with the development of German unity and national feeling, was the economic movement known as the Zollverein, or customs-union, which represented in Germany the workings of those same economic forces that had already begun to make

necessary new legislation in England and France. The evils of a restricted intercommunication between the many states of the old Empire had already led the representatives of those states at Vienna to incorporate in the organic act a clause which declared that the members of the Confederation at the first meeting of the Diet should treat regarding matters of trade and commerce among the different states. But nothing had been done looking to a simplifying of the existing tariff-system, and in consequence domestic industry had come to a standstill. Trade could not flourish in the presence of the obstacles that the numerous tariffs and the diverse legislation of the various states placed in the way. Illegal traffic, smuggling, and evasion of the laws were everywhere prominent. The expenses of so many customs houses, of as large a number of officials as was needed to guard the numerous frontiers, weighed heavily upon the states and the people, while the difficulties of travel and of communication increased the local prejudices and made political unity all the more difficult to obtain. Furthermore, such annoyances and impediments hampered industrial growth, and in the presence of an increasing interest in economic undertakings requiring the employment of large capital, Germany was far behind France and England. Uniformity in economic matters was therefore coming to be recognised as necessary to the welfare of the German people.

The matter had been energetically discussed as early as 1817, but Austria had opposed all measures looking to a commercial union between the states. But while the deputies in the Diet debated and Austria opposed wholesome measures, Prussia, quicker to respond to public opinion, began to act. To her, owing to the scattered location of her various provinces, a closer commercial union had become a matter requiring immediate action. Within the limits of her territory, the boundary of which was 1073 miles in length and touched twenty-eight neighbours, sixty-seven commercial and excise systems were in

full operation, and swarms of smugglers successfully evaded the tariff laws. In 1816 the reform of the customs-system was definitely decided upon, and in 1818 Maassen, a pupil of Adam Smith's, brought forward his scheme for free trade in Prussia, which, later embodied in a law, provided that all internal customs should be abolished, foreign goods that had once crossed the frontier should circulate freely, and domestic goods should pass without restriction. This law, by which Prussia became commercially free, raised a great outcry among the other states, who seeing in it a new division of the fatherland tried to effect the repeal of the law at the conference held in Vienna the next year. In this, however, they were not successful. Having thus reorganised her own system, and confident that the Diet would never take any action favourable to the economic unity of the German states, Prussia began to make commercial treaties with her neighbours. The union with Schwarzburg-Sondershausen on October 25, 1819, was the first step in the formation of the great alliance, which was destined to do much to prepare the way for political unity.

The influence of Prussia was felt outside her own boundaries, and other states began to recognise the need of a freer commercial intercourse. After three years of negotiation between Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and other states, which came to nothing largely because of the fear in which these states stood of Austria's displeasure, a treaty was made between Würtemberg and the Hohenzollern *enclavès*. In September of the same year a treaty was arranged between Baden and the Grand Duchy of Hesse. In 1826 Würtemberg and Baden entered into a similar commercial agreement, and this was elaborated in a formal treaty the next year. About the same time Prussia extended her union by a treaty with Hesse Darmstadt, and thus two commercial groups were formed—the Bavaria-Würtemberg and the Prussia-Darmstadt—each of which sought and successfully, to enlarge its boundaries. By the addition of

other states to one or other of these groups the way was prepared for the final step, the alliance between the two associations and the erection of a single Zollverein to include the greater part of central Germany. After long negotiation, in which fear of Prussia and an unwillingness to accept in full the Prussian system were the main obstacles to action, this was finally accomplished in 1833. Gradually other states of Germany, urged on by economic necessity, joined the association, and by 1836 the latter embraced nearly all the northern and southern German states and the free cities.

The object of the union was primarily the removal of all barriers to intercommunication and trade, the abolition of internal tariffs and customs houses, and the establishment of a common set of officers and a common tariff-list. But in its indirect influences it went much further than this. Because of the community of interest that it developed, internal improvements became possible; roads were made, canals dug, postal arrangements improved, railways and steamship lines constructed, transportation was made quicker and cheaper. Above all, by removing many causes of interstate hostility and controversy, it helped to destroy local feeling and prejudice; it widened the field of economic activity, and created a public weal to take the place of the many petty and isolated interests; in a word, the introduction of a common commercial and trading system not only laid the foundation for the erection of other common organisations, such as the military and the educational, but also prepared the way for the more rapid Germanising of the people. It began to make real what the patriots of the earlier period had hoped and longed for, the growth of the German nationality. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the Zollverein, but it did at least form a new union outside of the Confederate Diet founded upon interests of a pecuniary and social character, of which Prussia was the recognised head. Such a union could not fail to become in due time

an influence powerful enough to overcome the political inertia of the Confederation. Though to other causes final unity is to be attributed, nevertheless economic unity under Prussian leadership made it easier in the end for the German states to look to Prussia for leadership in political things.

An opportunity came for testing the strength of Prussia's position. The revolution of 1830 in France, with the abdication of Charles X., and the transfer of power from the Ultras and Right to the Centre and moderates, gave the signal for popular agitation and revolt in different parts of Europe. The Belgians rose against the house of Orange, under whom they had been placed by the congress of Vienna ; the Poles revolted from the house of Romanoff, to which they had been attached by the same congress ; and the inhabitants of Piedmont, Romagna, and Milan began an insurrection. In the presence of so much agitation abroad it would have been a matter of wonder had Germany not shown some signs of disturbance ; yet it is remarkable to note how temperately the liberals acted and how in nearly every case agitation took the form of a demand for constitutional government. In Hanover, Hesse, Saxony, and Brunswick the movements were successful, and four more constitutions were added to those already granted. With moderate concessions all further disturbances ceased, a fact that bears witness to the anti-revolutionary character of the German people and to the peace and prosperity that had come as a result of the reforms, economic and social, of the preceding decade. But to the conservative element every movement was a source of anxiety. To Metternich the granting of the new constitutions was "an unpardonable error" ; the revolutions in France, Poland, and Italy proved to him that the Europe of 1830 was "a world of ruins," as he wrote to Apponyi at Paris ; and he was apparently ready at any moment to join with the Czar Nicolas in a crusade for the defence of legitimism. However, Germany as a whole and Prussia in particular wished for

peace because of the new economic activities in which they were engaged, and it was not until the Belgian difficulty seemed in danger of entangling Europe in a general war that the proposal was made to take measures for a military defence. It is noteworthy that Bavaria and Würtemberg began to arm without regard to the military provisions of the Confederate Diet, a fact which shows that when it came to the test, these and other states had no confidence in the system that the Confederation had set up. It is more noteworthy that these states, which were already negotiating with Prussia regarding the tariff union, and were therefore beginning to look to her for leadership in economic matters, realising that in case of a French attack the weak point of the frontier was along the Rhine, began to make known their desire for Prussian protection and for the organisation of a military defence separate from that of Austria and the Confederate Diet.

This was a striking incident from a number of points of view. It showed that the states of the Confederation believed that the military system established by the Diet was impotent in the presence of danger; that Austria was not to be depended upon in such an emergency, partly because she had opposed the best interests of Germany in the Carlsbad decrees and had attempted to do the same in the Vienna conferences, and partly because she stood in a sense outside of Germany and had as a state more to do with the south and the southeast than with the north; that Prussia was already looked upon as the defender of the Rhine and therefore the natural military leader of Germany; and that the effort to erect a tariff union was already having an influence upon the political destinies of the Confederation. Progress had certainly been made in the decade from 1820 to 1830. But Prussia had not as yet sufficient firmness and self-reliance to take advantage of the situation, although the opportunity was offered of assuming the military headship of Germany. Frederic William lacked the strength of convic-

tion that the occasion demanded, and was unwilling to negotiate with the South German states for a separate military organisation without the permission of Austria. In the interviews that followed, Austria managed to put off the decision until after the Italian revolt was suppressed, and then, flatly rejecting the proposition, reduced Frederic William to submission at Töplitz in 1831, just as she had done at the same place in 1819. Bernstorff, the Prussian minister, failed as Hardenberg had done before him. For the third time Prussia yielded to the influence of Austria, and, giving up the idea of a limited confederacy for military purposes, accepted once more to the full the organic act of the Confederation.

Metternich was again victorious and was only waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of his position. "Germany," he said, "is a prey to frightful disorders. The princes by listening to the counsels of the liberals, deceiving themselves with the idea that they are carrying on a democratic rule, have reduced their power to zero. Happily the Confederation exists and we are about to set it in motion." But as yet complete evidence of the "frightful disorders" was wanting. At first, in consequence of the unrest engendered by the revolution in France and the other countries, the Diet contented itself with a revival of the Maintz commission, and with the passage of laws forbidding the spread of political petitions. As a result, many pamphlets were suppressed and newspapers were put under the ban; but as by these means free expression of opinion was prevented the liberals were forced to find some other way of making their demands and wishes known. In the autumn of 1831 public meetings were held at which speeches were made and songs sung. Finally in 1832 a monster meeting was held at Hampach in the Palatinate. "From all parts of the country," says Sybel, "the people streamed in thousands to the slopes of the Schlossberg; German and Prussian banners were unfurled amid loud flourishes of music, and the orators of the

day celebrated approaching liberty, German unity, and the fraternisation of all free nations. Boisterous huzzas followed, spirited songs were sung, many a bottle of the good wine of the Palatinate was emptied; and then after such brave deeds the people dispersed and went home in high spirits. A few days later Prince Wrede appeared with four thousand soldiers to curb the raging revolution, but he was not able to find any revolution anywhere in the Palatinate." This was the evidence for which Metternich and the Diet were waiting. Here was "the first attempt of Radicalism to display itself in all its bare deformity." Between June 25th and July 5th, 1832, reactionary measures were passed by the Diet supplemental to the Carlsbad decrees. All political meetings were expressly prohibited; all revolutionary songs and insignia—the latter referring to the badge of black, red, and gold, the symbol of German unity—were forbidden, under penalty of fine and imprisonment; the press was placed under a rigid censorship; and universities were once more subjected to governmental supervision. Finally, it was decided that the Diet had the right to interfere in the affairs of states if at any time a deadlock occurred between the prince and the estates. This precaution was taken in order as far as possible to limit the privileges of the assemblies in the constitutional states and to rectify the mistake that these states had made in such an unpardonable act as granting liberal constitutions. The significant fact in connection with this attempt to limit the sovereignty of the individual states is that it was received by the states as well as by the people with an ill-grace that augured badly for Metternich's power in the future. So great an increase in the police powers of the central authority was looked upon as a presumptuous interference in the internal affairs of the separate states.

But the reaction was not quite complete. One more evidence was to be given of the "frightful disorder" of Germany, and

Metternich was to have one more opportunity of effectually applying, almost for the last time, his theory of repression, and through the aid of the Czar, who felt bitterly toward the Germans, because of their sympathy for the Poles, of bringing the King of Prussia to an official declaration of belief in the more general and by this time almost discarded doctrine of intervention. In April, 1833, a conspiracy was discovered, a kind of Gunpowder Plot, planned by some seventy radicals of central and southern Germany for the purpose of capturing or blowing up the Diet itself at the place of its meeting, Frankfort. The conspirators hoped for the co-operation of peasants of Hesse Cassel, soldiers of Würtemberg, and refugees from Poland. On the spot where the Diet had sat they intended to proclaim the German republic. This was the event that strengthened Metternich's hand. It did not matter that the attempt failed ridiculously; that the conspirators actually numbering only about fifty were captured without difficulty by the Frankfort police; that the remainder of the Germans showed no sympathy for the movement and persisted, contrary to Metternich's expectation, in remaining perfectly quiet. The fact of a conspiracy was enough. The Diet, thoroughly frightened, passed laws forbidding emigration into Switzerland, where Mazzini was planning his attack on Savoy, or into France and Belgium, where revolutionary ideas were rife. It appointed a committee of investigation at Frankfort to examine into the affairs of the individual states. Metternich, who was convinced that a "great network of conspiracy was covering Germany," and that the failure of the first attempt would not discourage the agitators from continuing the revolution, met the representatives of Prussia and Russia at Töplitz and there came to a "complete understanding" with them as to the attitude to be taken in Germany and Poland—all rebellion was to be put down, and the efforts of the Powers were to be directed to the maintenance of peace and order. But Metternich demanded

a more definite expression of opinion than this. In October the monarchs themselves met at Münchengrätz and agreed to oppose any application of "the false and dangerous principle of non-intervention," in favour of which England and France had already declared themselves. Metternich felt that he had scored a great victory against the King of Prussia, for by the formal treaty drawn up a little later at Berlin that Power, which had so recently sought to oppose Austria in the matter of the military affairs of the Confederation, promised to act in concert with the other Powers and to assist when called upon in the overthrow of revolution in any other state. It also promised to consider any attempt of another Power to prevent Russia's or Austria's application of the doctrine of intervention as an act of hostility against itself, and to take up arms to resist such aggression. This was indeed a reversal of Bernstorff's plan proposed three years before.

In January, 1834, the last step was taken. A second conference of German ministers was called at Vienna to strengthen still further the Confederation, in the presence of the revolution abroad and the threatened disorder at home, and to find such remedies as seemed necessary for the states to apply in case of any disturbance of the peace. This meeting was in reality summoned for the purpose of working out with greater definiteness and in greater detail the decrees of 1819 and 1832, and of getting the states to agree to a policy of rigid repression. The conference lasted from January to June, and a final protocol of sixty articles was drawn up, which corresponded and was supplemental to the Final-Act of 1820. The only part of the protocol that was made a law by the Diet referred to the establishment of a court of arbitration, by means of which Metternich hoped to limit the influence of the representative assemblies which he so thoroughly disliked. The establishment of this court was a deliberate and well conceived attempt to uphold the full sovereignty of princes and to destroy the

efficiency of parliamentary government, by making it a law of the Confederation, that in all cases where a dispute arose between the princes and the estates the matter should be referred to a board of arbitrators, chosen of course by the Diet. The other parts of the protocol, in which were repeated the old provisions regarding the press, the universities, and the police, never became law. They remained entirely secret to the western Powers and served as guides according to which each state was to instruct his representative in the Diet. By this act all the German states seemed to give their consent to the policy of the Austrian chancellor and to submit their will to his, although it is worthy of note that not a few of the princes were ashamed of the part they were playing, and sought to atone for their political narrowness by a renewed interest in the social and intellectual condition of their people. Frederic William, however seemed fully satisfied with the political situation. A week after the close of the conference he wrote to Metternich a congratulatory letter, in which he expressed his joy at the result of the conference and ventured the opinion that its work would "add considerably to the moral influence of the Confederation" and would "raise it higher in European estimation."

The work of reaction was now complete and Metternich could well look upon this, the last really important action in which he was to take a leading part, as one of his greatest victories. All hope of an extension of constitutional government in the non-constitutional states was gone for the present in Germany; and seeing that as Frederic William grew older he became more conservative and less willing to consider political changes, the people of Prussia turned their attention to their individual and personal affairs and waited expectantly for his successor. For the time being the country at large was, so far as politics were concerned, quiet; no commotion was disturbing the public order, and the commissions of Maintz and Frankfort found little to justify their existence. But at the very time that the

reactionary party was winning its victory it was rousing new forces against itself. The apparent completeness of its success was productive of good to the liberal cause. The majority of the constitutional governments, seemingly dissatisfied with the position that they had taken at Vienna, sought to turn the thoughts of the people from their political condition by furthering the general happiness and prosperity of their countries. In Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden the finances were improved, administration became more efficient, and beneficial measures were passed regarding agriculture and manufactures. Liberal ministers were given the direction of affairs, and inasmuch as many of the princes were showing themselves more progressive than the assemblies, there seemed to be no opportunity for the court of arbitration to interfere. But the reactionary victory from 1831 to 1834 not only promoted in this manner the internal welfare of many of the individual states but it also hastened the growth of the commercial alliance. In 1833 the Zollverein proper was formed by the union of the Bavaria-Würtemberg and the Prussia-Darmstadt branches, and from 1833 to 1836 most important additions were made to the union. Furthermore the effect of the reaction upon the people was equally striking. Many thousands who had hitherto been opposed to all agitation were driven over to the side of the liberals, and were now willing to promise that if revolution should break out they would no longer remain passive. Metternich's policy was training the Germans to be radicals in spite of themselves and it is estimated that now nine-tenths of the population of Germany were filled with democratic ideas. The cause of liberalism was becoming steadily stronger, and the period from 1834 to 1840 shows us many indications of increasing firmness and good sense in regard to all matters that looked to the attainment of political liberty.

A striking proof of the growing hostility of the German people to all arbitrary and wilful exercise of autocratic power

was given in Hanover. The king of the state, William IV. of England, yielding in 1830 to the demands of the citizens and students of Göttingen, had granted a liberal constitution, which had been carefully drawn up in 1833 by the professor and publicist Dahlmann. In 1837 William IV. died, and through the operation of the Salic law the personal connection between Hanover and the English Crown was broken and the succession passed to the youngest brother of the king, Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland. The duke was a strong tory in feeling, profligate in character, and had been a source of considerable trouble to the English royal family. He hailed the succession to the Hanoverian throne as a welcome opportunity of gaining money wherewith to pay his debts, and, a man of boundless avarice, he cared little about the means employed, so long as money was forthcoming. Unfortunately for him the new constitution had substituted payment from the civil list for the revenues from the Crown domains; and the duke, thinking that by this arrangement his income would be reduced, determined to nullify the constitution on the ground that he had not agreed to it. The overthrow of the constitution was patiently accepted by a majority of the people of Hanover, although the act was a violation of Hanoverian law and of the Vienna Final-Act. But seven professors of Göttingen—Dahlmann, Albrecht, Gervinus, Ewald, Weber, and the brothers Grimm—protested vigorously against it, on the ground that they were bound by the oath which they had sworn to the constitution, and they refused to accept any other constitution, declaring that they "could not appear before their students as men who had played with their oaths." In consequence of their attitude, these men were deprived of their positions and three, Dahlmann, J. Grimm, and Gervinus, were banished from Hanover. An appeal was made at once to the Federal Diet by the Hanoverian estates for the restoration of the constitution. Of the seventeen votes cast in the

ordinary assembly eight were in favour of restoration and eight were against it. To Austria, therefore, fell the deciding vote, and she voted with the opposition. Consequently the Diet refused to interfere, and the people of Hanover had to submit to the revival of the old constitution of 1819, somewhat remodelled to suit the king's fancy.

This incident stirred the feelings of the German people very deeply. They felt outraged by the attack on the constitution; they resented the treatment to which such eminent men, standing in the first rank of scholars, were subjected; and they saw no hope for constitutional government anywhere, if at will a prince could overthrow a constitution and be upheld in his act by the Diet. The moderate conservatives began to weaken in their loyalty to the Confederation, and to consider with more sympathy the views of the national liberals. The articles written by Dahlmann and Jacob Grimm in their own defence were everywhere read with approval, and had no slight effect in creating a healthier public opinion. These men were no "abominable Jacobins"; they were learned, thoughtful, and consistent upholders of the law, and their vindication of their conduct led to a good deal more sober thinking than had been done hitherto in Germany. Among the liberals the feeling of indignation was accompanied with expressions of scorn and hate for the dissolute Hanoverian monarch. Mass meetings were held to pass resolutions of sympathy for the banished professors and a society was formed for the purpose of raising a fund to meet their material losses. Public opinion was without exception in their favour; Ewald was at once called to the university of Tübingen by the Duke of Würtemberg, who had voted with the minority at the Diet, and three years later William and Jacob Grimm were called to Berlin. Absolutism had won a Pyrrhic victory. German liberals were more scornful than ever of all things savouring of the policy of

Metternich, and German constitutionalists, notably in the southern states, were more than ever convinced that if the confederate government was powerless to act in the present emergency, then it was high time to abolish it, and to establish in its place a new central authority, stronger and more liberal.

Such was the situation when in June, 1840, Frederic William III. of Prussia died, and was succeeded by his son the crown prince, as Frederic William IV. The old king did not pass away unmourned, for his loyal people were ever ready to ascribe to his ministers the reactionary acts committed in his name. He had always shown a very practical interest in the material welfare of the Prussian people, and a kindly love which, even in the moments of extreme reaction, won their hearts and their support. For forty-three years he had been their king, and the memory of Jena and Lützen and the wars of liberation went far to lessen their disappointment when they found that he did not share their political aspirations. If he had often failed to carry out the promises he had made, and had submitted himself too readily to the will of Austria, he had, at the same time, associated his name with noteworthy movements and reforms in art, literature, administration, and commerce. Under his rule the state had made wonderful progress, and the people were grateful for it. So that while they undoubtedly looked forward with hope to the accession of the new king, from whom it was confidently believed important political changes could be expected, they refrained from troubling the declining years of the old king with useless radical agitations.

The character of Frederic William IV. was a striking contrast to that of his father. Anything but military in nature, he combined with a wide learning and exceptional versatility a magnetic personality that attached to him men of all ranks. Taught in his early years by Niebuhr, Savigny, and Scharn-

horst he became a patron of art and scholarship, and loved to surround himself with such men as Rauch, Ranke, Humboldt, and the Grimms, or Bunsen, Gerlach, and Radowitz. Berlin became through his influence a centre for famous men, and at that time were laid the foundations of its literary greatness. Romanticism had won its final victory over classicism, and in the person of the new king seated itself upon the throne. The condition in Prussia at the beginning of this period of exceptional activity stands in marked contrast to that in Austria at the same time, where there was no encouragement of native genius, no enthusiasm for literature or for art, no independence of thought, no historical investigation, no poetry. Vienna, so far as the literary movement in Europe was concerned, was intellectually dead.

But although Frederic William IV. was a patron of the new learning and a royal enthusiast in matters pertaining to the higher interests of his people, he was in no way different from his father in his conception of government and in his attitude toward all things political. He never lost his hatred for revolution and a bitterness of feeling for all political movements that tended to limit the prerogatives of royalty. Imbued with a love for the past, he rejected all projects that aimed at lessening the power and the glory of monarchy in order to substitute a form of government in which the theory of the divine authority of princes was discarded for the dangerous and erroneous doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Because of the love he bore his people he was willing to limit the absolute authority which of right belonged to him, and to make concessions to his ministers and assemblies of estates; but he demanded that such concessions be accepted as royal favours rather than as rights belonging to the people, and insisted upon the personal co-operation of the king in all matters of administration. In art, education, literature, in everything that pertained to the material welfare and culture of his people, Frederic William IV.

was an ardent and progressive sympathiser and critic ; but in all matters relating to the political and constitutional government of his kingdom, he belonged to the past, and was opposed to the ideas that were rapidly becoming dominant. He resented any effort to gain by argument or force that share in government which the larger number of the people were beginning to claim as their right.

The reign of Frederic William IV. ushered in that period in the history of Germany during which were gathering those forces that were to produce the momentous outbreak of 1848. Metternich, an old man of wonderful vigour for all his seventy years, was still actively interested in the affairs of nearly every state in Europe; but the fact was becoming evident that in many quarters his influence was decreasing and his political theories and opinions were less readily received. Beginning to be discredited in Europe the old statesman was still less of a power in Germany, where political, intellectual, and religious interests were stimulating independence of thought, arousing national enthusiasm, and increasing the tendency toward radical agitation. The German people, phlegmatic and slow to move, were at length roused to a pitch of excitement hitherto unknown to them. Schlosser, in his *History of the Eighteenth Century*, appealed to their national spirit, and by portraying in a picturesque yet scholarly manner the immorality of the old state system, increased the hostility to all things absolute, broke down the historical basis of legitimism, and weakened the respect of the people for restored rulers. He endeavoured to impress upon the people of Germany the fact that their redemption lay in their moral and material upbuilding, in their independence of other countries, and in a higher order of native statesmen and publicists. About the same time the religious world was excited over the conflicting opinions that were agitating the people. On the Protestant side Schleiermacher was preaching his brave and patriotic sermons and was bringing peace to the

church in Germany by his doctrine of the harmony of faith and research. Neander, writing the history of the Christian Church, influenced the younger generation of Germany by the depth of his learning, the sincerity of his piety, and the simplicity and purity of his life. Schelling by his mystical pantheistic philosophy in which individuals were recognised as but instruments predestined to carry out the designs of Providence, and Hegel by his doctrine of the supremacy of the Idea greatly increased philosophical speculation. But these philosophies not only brought about a wholesome reaction against the dead abstractions of deism, but stirred up the religious world by their atheistical and fatalistic tendencies.

Their influence was, however, not to be compared with the religious bitterness and fury that was aroused by the publication of the *Life of Jesus* by Strauss, and by the iconoclastic writings of Bauer, Vischer, and others of the Tübingen school, who threatened to undermine the very foundations of faith by declaring the Gospels to be unhistorical and the Epistles uninspired. From Roman Catholic and Protestant came anathema and invective, warfare was waged relentlessly and without compromise on both sides. The Roman Catholic Church appealed to a spirit of mediævalism in matters of faith and sought to strengthen the devotion of the faithful by the exhibition of the "Holy Coat of Trêves." This exhibit had the undesired effect of starting a new religious controversy that led to a schism in the Roman Catholic Church and the inauguration of a reformed Catholic movement. The state as well as the people was drawn into the religious war by the determination of the Pope and the Jesuits to free the church from the control of the civil authorities, and to remove the clergy from the jurisdiction of the secular courts.

The events of the decade from 1835 to 1845 show that the German people, slow to act when political and constitutional questions only were at issue, were quick to respond to anything

that touched their philosophical or religious faith. In consequence of the diversity of views Germany became the scene of angry and violent religious discussion, and this increased the general agitation by stimulating radicalism and generating political discontent. Attempts to suppress the popular feeling led to uprisings of either a political or a religious character in one or other of the states of the Confederation. On the occasion of the review of the municipal guard at Leipzig, August 12, 1845, a crowd gathered before the hotel of Archduke John of Austria, crying "Down with the Jesuits!" and in the encounter that followed seven men were mortally wounded. This incident gave new life and additional numbers to the radical party, which had been for a number of years perfecting its organisation, and in conjunction with the republicans of France, Switzerland, and Poland was spreading its doctrines not only through Germany but through Europe in general. Outside events hastened the crisis. The uprising in Galicia, which was brutally suppressed by Austrian soldiery, and the annexation by Austria of Cracow, increased the sympathy of the German liberals for the Polish cause, and intensified their hostility for all absolute governments. In the north a new influence was to make itself felt. On July 8, 1846, Christian VIII. of Denmark announced in a public letter his determination to extend the Danish law of succession, which recognised female rights of inheritance, to Schleswig, Lauenberg, and some parts of Holstein. This meant the incorporation of the duchies into the Danish state, and at once an outcry went up from Germany against what the liberals considered a violation of the express rights of the duchies. The new controversy, in which all joined either on one side or the other, was not lessened when it was known that the Diet, acting under the influence of Metternich, decided to consider the matter as a "purely internal affair of the kingdom" and to leave the settlement to the judgment of the Danish king; and this, too, in the

face of the fact that Holstein was a member of the Germanic Confederation.

It was at this time when Germany was keenly alive to every new movement in the intellectual world and every new experiment in politics, that Frederic William IV. drew the attention of conservatives and liberals alike to his project of a united provincial diet at Berlin. The circumstances under which this diet was held were these. Prussia had made rapid economic progress in the decade since 1836, and the question of railways was becoming a vital one to a state whose provinces were so widely scattered. Frederic William had always felt a strong desire to promote the material happiness of his people; and as France, Italy, and even Austria had already begun to grapple with the railway problem and had introduced lines of communication with various points, it behooved Prussia to act with promptness, that her economic welfare, so splendidly advanced in the Zollverein, might not suffer from a want of easier methods of transportation and more rapid means of communication. Railways might be built either by the state or by private corporations, but in either case it would be necessary for the government to negotiate a loan; for if the work were done by private individuals, the state would be expected to subsidise the undertaking or to guarantee the interest. Now, according to a law which Hardenberg had succeeded in carrying through in 1820, the consent of the estates of the realm was necessary in order to negotiate a loan or to pass a law levying new taxes.

The king was in something of a quandary. He wanted the railways; but how was he to get the required consent of the estates? He might summon committees from the provincial diets to meet him in Berlin; or he might have the matter passed upon by the provincial diets themselves, acting separately; or he might fulfil the promise which his father had made in 1815, and summon a representative assembly, that is, a gathering of representatives of the general estates at Berlin. The

first method was tried, and proved wholly unsuccessful. But how about the other two plans? During a voyage that he took with Metternich in 1845 up the Rhine from Stolzenfels to Johannisberg, he had talked over the whole matter and had made clear his determination. He told Metternich that he had no intention of summoning a representative assembly because he did not consider it practicable to do so, and because he was certain that there was not a single Prussian who thought that such a system was suitable for the country or wished to see it established. He declared his own intention of bringing together the eight separate provincial bodies at Berlin to treat in common regarding the matter of the loan and the direct tax. Metternich did not wholly agree with the king in his opinion regarding the condition of Prussia, and told Frederic William that if he summoned his 600 deputies as members of the provincial diets they would go home as representatives of the general estates (*comme états généraux*). "Even your majesty cannot prevent that," he added. But the king persisted in his determination. He wished to improve his state by suitable encouragement in all important enterprises, but he wished to do it in his own way. Something had to be done to allay the prevailing discontent, and, at last, toward the end of the year 1846, supported by the favourable report of a commission appointed to consider the question, he decided to summon the provincial diets. On February 3, 1847, the letters-patent appeared, and on April 11th there gathered at Berlin, in addition to the members of the higher nobility, 553 representatives of the knights, the burghers, and the peasants; representatives in that they had been chosen in each of the eight provinces to represent in the local diets the three estates of each province. In consequence of this form of representation—a very imperfect one from the modern standpoint, because suffrage largely depended upon the ownership of land—very few of the people of the provinces actually took part in the election.

Even before the members came together the popular dissatisfaction with the king's scheme found expression. The United Diet was not a States-General, as had been promised in the ordinance of 1815 and implied in the law of 1820. By the letters-patent it was seen that the Diet was to possess no real legislative functions; that it was to discuss and approve but not to decide; to present petitions, but not to initiate bills. Then, too, it was clear that it had no guarantee for the future; that no assurance was given that it would be summoned again; that in the mind of the king the summons was an act of royal favour; and that in all matters the king was to keep the final decision in his own hand. No wonder that a deadlock ensued as soon as the body met for actual deliberation. The king and the deputies were working at cross-purposes; one was doing everything in his power to avoid putting into force the ordinance of 1815 and the law of 1820, while the others were equally determined that these laws should be enforced; the king declaring with great vehemence and feeling against a constitutional government in his opening address, was asking for their approval of his measures; the deputies in their reply saying nothing about loans and taxes, were stating their grievances and demanding the recognition of their rights based on the old laws. In the end the deputies won the victory. Guided by men whose oratory, diplomacy, and parliamentary methods won even Metternich's admiration, the United Provincial Diet rejected the king's proposals and refused to sanction either his tax or his loan. The king was astounded, the people of Germany were delighted, and Metternich was rather pleased than otherwise at the verification of his predictions. For the liberals it was a great moral gain, for the king a cause of disappointment and discouragement, for Prussia, to whom so many were looking for guidance and protection, it meant a serious loss of prestige. With the dissolution of the United Provincial Diet, and the failure of constitutionalism in Prussia,

there was added one more cause of dissatisfaction to the many already agitating the German people.

Thus Germany of the year 1847 was in a condition not merely of unrest but of disquietude greater than at any other time since the close of the Napoleonic wars. The country was distracted by the breaking down of all the old religious and political standards; the commercial and industrial classes, growing each year more powerful and influential, were resenting their exclusion from the right of suffrage and from a share in the government of the state; conservatives were clinging with greater tenacity to the past; and those in authority were searching in vain for principles of government to meet the present emergency. Even Metternich had a presentiment of coming disturbances. "The world is very sick," he wrote to Apponyi, "every day proves that the moral poison is increasing. The general condition of Europe is dangerous; the era in which we live is one of transition and the present moment bears all the characteristics of one of those crises which necessarily present themselves in periods of transition. One can predict what the orderly elements of society will do, but one cannot predict what the disorderly elements will do; and the latter now rule the world. What is clear to me is that things will undergo great changes." This forecast was written on the eve of the revolution of 1848.

CHAPTER VII.

THE JULY MONARCHY TO 1840.

THE question of the constitutional liberty of the individual that had been raised by the revolution of 1789 was settled by the French people earlier than by the other nations of Europe, and with the reign of Louis Philippe France entered upon the solution of problems, quite new in that they related not to the winning of political liberty but to the use of it when acquired. France was not seeking unity and independence as was Italy, nor was it necessary for her to struggle for constitutional rights as were the people of Germany. Both of these stages she had already passed. Under the July Monarchy the people of France were enjoying the advantages of a liberal constitution and an advanced parliamentary system, and were making use of those forces, political, social, and economic, that are the characteristics of the modern state life ;—of forces which were not created by the revolution of 1830, but which existed in spite of it. The democratic tendencies of 1814 had been hastened rather than retarded by the events of the Restoration, and France as a whole had not been altered by the revolution that had followed these events. She had simply thrown off a mediæval incumbrance that had been in a sense forced upon her in 1815, and was now prepared to make another test of the doctrines of the Constituent Assembly. If the only logical interpretation of these doctrines is a republic, then it may be said that the reign of Louis Philippe was a period of transition to the establishment of the second republic ; but if, as is more

true, such principles are quite in accord with a monarchical form of government, then this reign must be looked upon as a period of political experimentation which failed from causes inherent in the character of the government itself.

The reign of the new king opened well, and gave promise of a long life because it seemed to be supported by those of the French people who were committed to the maintenance of the Charta and of the liberties that it guaranteed. In the first session of the Chamber, even before the question of the new head of the government was settled by the election of the Duke of Orléans, the constitution was carefully revised in the interest of liberty, and all that seemed indefinite or reactionary was struck out or changed. Prévôtal courts were permanently abolished; the annual renewal of the Chamber of Deputies was done away with; the age of deputies was reduced from forty to thirty and that of electors from thirty to twenty-five; the property qualification was left to be defined by law; the presidents of the electoral colleges were to be named by the electors rather than the king; and the president of the Chamber of Deputies was to be elected by the Chamber. These were among the minor changes and some of them were of a distinctly decentralising character; but there were others of greater importance and interest. The sessions of the Chamber of Peers were made public; royal initiative in the matter of laws was abolished and the Chambers were admitted to this privilege equally with the king; the article making the Roman Catholic religion the religion of the state was struck out; the liberty of the press was permanently established by the annulling of the censure; and finally the preamble, in which Louis XVIII. voluntarily and by the free exercise of his royal authority granted the Charta to the people of France, and Article XIV. upon which Charles X. had based his right to issue the ordinances of St. Cloud, were removed bodily. In additional articles it was provided that no cockade except the tri-colour

should be worn; that all who had been made peers by Charles X. should be deprived of their titles; and that laws should be passed relating to the extension of trial by jury, to the responsibility of ministers, to the organisation of the national guard, to the increase of powers of local government, to public education, and to the definition of electoral qualifications involving the abolition of the double vote. In consequence of these changes the revised Charta marked a positive advance in the direction of parliamentary government, and the acceptance of this Charta became one of the conditions of the elevation of the Duke of Orléans to the throne of France. The July Monarchy was therefore committed to the support of a body of true political liberties, which in the main were not infringed during the whole of the reign of Louis Philippe. But though peace and prosperity were on the whole the fortune of the country for eighteen years, yet in 1848 the Orléans dynasty was driven from the throne. The task, therefore, before us is to examine the character and acts of the government itself, to study the new economic and social forces that the situation created, and to explain why a government, liberally founded and conducted by men of high character and unquestioned ability, was able to stand but three years longer than that of the Bourbons which it replaced.

The events leading to the succession of Louis Philippe are from the constitutional standpoint remarkable. The Chamber of Deputies, chosen in the general elections a month previous, had, as we have seen in discussing the revolution of 1830, been dissolved by the second of the ordinances issued from St. Cloud by Charles X. before it had entered upon its session. Immediately a certain number of the deputies of the opposition who were present in Paris met to discuss the situation; about forty were at the first meeting, though afterwards the number sank to twenty-five and even to twelve, and but twenty-five were present at the seventh meeting when Lafayette was appointed

head of the national guard. By this small number Louis, Duke of Orléans, was named lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and he in turn, having been invested with authority at the suggestion of a group of journalists, and by a body of men who had no definite warrant from the nation, and whose acts had no validity except as they acquired it from the exigencies of a revolution, summoned the Chambers to meet on August 3d. The Chamber of Deputies thus called together, and sitting with only half its numbers, first revised the Charta, and then, in its turn, called the lieutenant-general to be the King of the French, an act in which the Peers concurred. Louis having taken the oath to the Charta and signed the formula of the oath, ascended the throne as Louis Philippe—a name reminding no one of anything in particular—and entered upon his duties as the head of a new government.

In view of these facts it is evident that the king owed his elevation for the most part to the activity of a small body of men who represented the interests of but a part of the population. His name was connected with no great deeds, and he stood for no principle, either historical or revolutionary. His title did not rest upon tradition and the doctrine of legitimacy as had that of Louis XVIII. and Charles X.; it had no connection with the pre-revolutionary past; nor did it rest on military and administrative genius as had that of Napoleon. Louis Philippe owed his election to the accident of birth, and to the belief of a few men that he alone could offer everything that the party of the moderates demanded of the King of France at this juncture. The title was, therefore, neither hereditary nor based on special merit; it was a gift, and as such carried with it no residuary rights, no peculiar royal privileges born of the nature of things. The king drew his authority from the body of electors who had chosen the deputies by whom he had been named. But even this statement must be qualified. Only about half the deputies had been present when he had been

chosen, and these had represented not all of the French people, but only the upper middle class, which, to the exclusion of the republicans who had been associated with them as victors in the revolution of 1830, had been able to secure for itself all the benefits of the victory. Although the republicans had at once demanded that the choice be confirmed by the nation meeting together in primary assemblies on a universal suffrage basis, the government refused, and the name of Louis Philippe was never submitted to the people at large, or even to the body of electors possessing the right of suffrage under the revised Charta. In consequence, not only the republicans but all the revolutionary elements felt that the entire affair had been prearranged and that the nation at large had been deceived. It is true that Lafayette, whose acceptance of the Duke of Orléans prevented further outbreaks on the part of the republicans, did not accept their view, and that Guizot, speaking from the standpoint of the government, denied that the omission of the vote of the primary assemblies was ever a cause of weakness for the Orléans dynasty. Nevertheless, it is equally true that this refusal of the government increased the republican hostility to Louis Philippe and gave a certain basis of right to the republican cause.

From these facts it is evident that Louis Philippe's government rested on the support of the middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, a class ambitious to carry on the work begun in the revolution of 1789. But the *bourgeoisie* had had a very limited experience in government, had little political ability, and was easily swayed by party leaders, of whom Casimir Périer, Lafitte, Guizot, Thiers, and Molé were the most famous. It had no strong convictions, either religious or political, and allowed its economic ambitions, its pretentiousness, and its love of power to blind it over and over again to its duty toward the nation at large. At the same time it was powerful, for, limited to no special class or caste, its members were to be found everywhere.

Though more numerous and influential in the towns, it counted many adherents in the villages and country districts and possessed the greater part of the wealth of France. In its ranks were men of reputation in letters, in the professions, and in industrial circles; and it included some of the most illustrious, the most intelligent, and the most enterprising of the people of France. It was the sponsor for the new king; to it he owed his power; from it he received the Charta. The *bourgeoisie* was, therefore, the sovereign body of the state, and its members adhered to their sovereign rights with all the tenacity of the most stubborn supporters of the doctrine of legitimacy.

On this point of sovereignty, however, there was not complete accord even among the members of the *bourgeoisie* themselves. In a government originating as had that of Louis Philippe it was easy for differences of opinion to arise regarding the position of the king. Was sovereignty wholly in the body of electors, that is, the *bourgeoisie*, or had a part of it been surrendered in the form of supreme rights to the king? The most natural supposition was that sovereignty lay with those who had actually given the Charta and had elected the king. But such a theory was unacceptable to those who believing it to be inexpedient to reverse entirely the form of government of the Restoration, by recognising full sovereign powers in the people and none in the king, not only supported monarchy as a necessary part of the state system, but also insisted that it ought to be invested with sufficient powers to guarantee the establishment of a strong administration. To men of this opinion the arrangement of 1830 had been a kind of contract between king and people, in which each retained a part of the sovereignty, the two parts making up one whole, indivisible because neither part could exist without the other. "We did not choose a king," says Guizot, "we treated with a prince whom we found beside the throne, and who alone was able in mounting the throne to guarantee our public law and the revolution. An

appeal to popular suffrage would have given to the reformed monarchy precisely the character that we desired to avoid ; it would have put election in the place of necessity and contract." The view here expressed—which may be considered a conservative view—was that which the king himself held ; and it was the doctrine of the government, not because the conservatives were always in power—for they were not—but because the king took a personal part in government and identified himself with the conservative party. Made up of members of the old Left Centre, this party became known as the " party of resistance." It was anti-revolutionary because it believed in the maintenance of peace abroad and of constitutional monarchy at home ; it was liberal because, though it did not believe in a rapid extension of popular or parliamentary liberties, it accepted and respected the essential conditions of free government.

Over against this view is to be placed that of the other wing of the Left Centre, of the opposition, which endeavoured to minimise the personal authority of the king. According to this party the king possessed no other guarantee for his royal rights than the support of the middle class ; he had no right to lay claim to any powers not expressly granted, or to follow any policy that was not closely identified with the interests of the *bourgeoisie ;* and whatever might be the difficulties attending the administration of the new government, they ought not to be due to the king's following a peculiarly royal policy. Such policy, said this party, could not exist, for the king was bound to follow the policy of those upon whom his power rested. In the main the doctrine, which was exactly the reverse of that in which the Ultras of the Restoration had believed, may be stated as follows : the king was the figure-head of the state ; the ministers were the creatures of the majority, the Charta was the gift of the nation, and the policy was that of the prime minister and his cabinet ; or as expressed in the more succinct and famous phrase, " the king reigns but does not govern."

This party became known as the "party of movement," because it advocated an extension of parliamentary and electoral reform in the interests of the people at large. Of the first view Guizot was the best representative, of the second Thiers. In the development of the parliamentary system from 1830 to 1848 those who held the second of these views became the liberals and from 1840 to 1848 were continuously in the opposition. In a strictly parliamentary sense this division of the Left Centre into two well defined groups did not take place until 1836; so that for the first six years the two divisions of the old party worked in harmony, each having members in the most important of the ministries, and in the main agreeing on the policy to be pursued. This unity was made necessary by the fact that the victory of 1830 had been the victory of the whole Left Centre; and that all the remaining party elements, in being opposed to the constitution, were naturally opposed to the victors. The Left Centre could not afford to divide in the presence of this non-constitutional opposition, which became more antagonistic as the government became more *bourgeois* and illiberal.

The old parties of the Right and Right Centre now disappeared, but their members reappeared as the Legitimists or supporters of the Bourbons, that is, of the Duke of Bordeaux and the Duchess of Berry. During the early years of the reign of Louis Philippe they were in a more or less constant state of agitation and caused the government considerable trouble. They were, however, much less to be feared than were the other non-constitutional groups,—the republicans, the old Left of the Restoration, and the socialists, who were at first hardly to be distinguished from the republicans—because the former were warring in favour of reaction, while the others were seeking to reap what they considered to be the legitimate fruits of the revolution. The republicans who, though destined to grow rapidly in numbers and power, were comparatively few and insignificant both in Paris and in the provinces in 1831, considered

the retention of monarchy but a half-way measure, and believed that further agitation was necessary to hasten the movement toward the republic, the only logical form, so it seemed to them, that the principles of 1789 could take. To their minds, progress toward a truer form of government seemed inevitable, and the sooner the July Monarchy should cease to exist, the sooner would the rightful order of things be established. Having aided in gaining the victory they made demands which, too often revolutionary in character, were at first accompanied with threats and conspiracies. They demanded the abolition of the hereditary peerage, the establishment of a universal suffrage, entire freedom of worship, popular election of all officials, administrative or judicial, and the practical supremacy of the Chamber of Deputies. But they accomplished little for they lacked unity; they were divided into secret societies, of which the most important were the *Friends of the People*, to which was in large part due the uprising of 1832, the *Society of the Rights of Man*, which was responsible for the insurrection of April, 1834, and the *Society of the Seasons*, which led a revolt in 1839. These societies denied the right of the government to exist; the government in its turn repudiated their demands, and put down their uprisings by force of arms. Nothing but antagonism could exist between the republicans and the *bourgeois* government.

Thus at the beginning the *bourgeoisie* was opposed by the two extreme elements of the society of France, and at the same time was unable to call in the party of the Right to aid it against the radicals as in 1830 it had called in the party of the Left to aid it against the Ultras. It was opposed by the landed aristocracy, the clergy, the Legitimists, the Bonapartists, the members of the secret societies and all those who were following socialistic or communistic doctrines; it stood confronted by an excited and disturbed populace, which felt that it had reaped none of the benefits of a victorious revo-

lution, and that the new government had not received the sanction of the popular will.

In the presence of this opposition the policy of the government was of a dual character. It was aggressive, in that it resisted all revolutionary uprisings, and all movements against the government; and peaceful, in that it sought to pursue a middle course, and refused to be drawn into war abroad, either by interfering to aid revolution or by co-operating to aid reaction. From whatever point the view be taken it will be seen that such a policy had but one object before it—to maintain order and peace within and friendly relations abroad; and this the government promised to do. But in order to give guarantees for its word it saw that it should be obliged to strengthen itself as an administrative power, to oppose with a firm hand all attempts of party or secret society to overthrow or set aside existing institutions, and, by preserving a definite foreign policy, to show Europe that France did not intend to endanger the European situation; and at the same time to convince the Powers, whose confidence had been disturbed by the recent revolution, that France was able to take care of herself. In other words, the foreign policy of the government was to reassure Europe both without defying her and without showing fear of her. But in adopting this policy the government was not entirely disinterested and unselfish; for if, founded as it was on the July revolution, it was to cease being a provisional and become a permanent government; if it was to pass from a revolutionary to a constitutional state; if it was to have all the force and authority of a regular *régime;* and if as a *bourgois* government it was to protect its own interests and those of its powerful constituency, it must guarantee to France freedom from disorder and anarchy. The *bourgeoisie* was essentially a capitalist class; it was taking advantage of improvements and inventions to gain wealth; it was promoting transportation and intercommunication; it was extending in-

dustries, manufactures, and commerce; it was buying, and selling, and speculating in stocks; it was, in other words, the class with vested interests, whose welfare depended upon the safeguarding of the economic situation, and these interests the government was bound to protect. Therefore, when we take into consideration the origin of the government, and the fact that its policy, distinctly a class policy, could not do otherwise than increase the discontent of those classes that were opposed to it, we are not surprised to find that the dissatisfaction in France tended to increase with every year; and inasmuch as men of exceptional ability were needed to guide successfully the course of the July Monarchy, placed as it was midway in point of constitutional development between the state of the old *régime* and the state of modern times, and surrounded by enemies, some even of its own household, it is not remarkable that some of those upon whom it depended fell below the standard that necessity set for all.

The history of this monarchy falls naturally into two periods, for during the first period, from 1830 to 1840, the ministries were shifting and the party support was uncertain; while during the second period, from 1840 to 1848, the government had a definite policy, a single ministry, and an unbroken majority in the Chambers. The governmental program, which required nearly a year for its formation, was brought to perfection by Casimir Périer; but under his immediate successors it was carried to such an extreme as to lead to a division in the old Left Centre, the party that had up to this time supported the government. This policy, after being alternately accepted and discarded by the rapidly changing ministries from 1836 to 1840, was finally made the fixed policy of the government by Guizot from 1840 to 1848. His ministry, relying upon the support of the conservative element of the old Left Centre, found itself confronted by a general though disunited opposition; and partly because of its own corruption and doctrinairism, partly

because of the union of the liberals with the republicans and the socialists, it went down in the maelstrom of 1848, and the monarchy was abandoned for a republic. Such in brief is the history of the July Monarchy.

Turning to a more detailed examination of the first period we find that the new government, born of a revolution, began its career in 1830 with no certainty as to its future. The revolutionists in Italy, Poland, and Belgium, who had followed the example of France, were now looking to the French people for encouragement and aid; and this fact was sufficient so to disturb the revolutionary elements in France as to make uncertain the position of any moderate government. Furthermore, the revolution had directly disturbed the condition of the kingdom; commercial distress was increasing; there was a general stagnation in business, a scarcity of work among the labouring classes, and consequent distress among the poor. The first ministry, composed though it was of such influential men as Broglie and Guizot of the conservatives, or party of resistance, and Dupont de l'Eure of the liberals, or party of movement, was quite unable to master the situation. To meet the emergency large sums of money were voted wherewith to provide work for the people; loans were offered for the purpose of stimulating trade or of relieving necessity; and in order to undo the injuries of the past, the sacrilege law and the edict against the regicides were repealed, and all press offences forgiven. But although this ministry desired to alleviate the economic distress and to make itself secure by acts of propitiation, it accomplished neither of these things. It was weak both because it had no definite program, and because, containing representatives of parties that held different views regarding the position of the king, it was unable to act with promptness and effect. Its inefficiency became apparent when it was confronted by the revolutionary uprisings. Spanish refugees were stirring up commotion in southern France; Belgian patriots were appeal-

ing for French aid from the north, and Paris, her streets crowded with hungry labourers seeking for work, her clubs spending their time in tempestuous discussion regarding what France ought to do to aid the struggling revolutionists in other countries, and her populace already demanding the heads of the old ministers of Charles X., shouting "Down with Polignac!" "Down with the ministers!" was a hot-bed of disturbance. Yet on one occasion at least the government did act with boldness and dispatch. When the Belgians, who had been united to Holland by the congress of Vienna, had risen in revolt against the imprudent rule of the house of Orange, and had in consequence threatened to disturb the peace of Europe, a situation was created demanding of France great circumspection. Inasmuch as the government was unwilling to aid the revolutionists, the minister of foreign affairs, Molé, let it be distinctly understood that France would follow a policy of non-intervention; and, when King William of Holland appealed to Prussia for aid, declared that if the Prussian army put a foot upon the soil of Belgium a French army would advance towards the frontier. But this honourable firmness on the part of the king and his ministry, though winning praise even from the republicans, could not unite the discordant elements within the cabinet itself; and in August, 1830, feeling that the fusion ministry was too loosely united to meet the crisis, the king accepted the resignation of the members of the party of resistance, and called Lafitte, who had been the president of the provisional government at the Hôtel de Ville, to reorganise the ministry. This act placed the power in the hands of the party of movement.

But the ministry of Lafitte, of which Thiers, as under secretary of state, was an important and influential member, was not strong enough to ensure the government of July a stable existence. Lafitte himself lacked experience in administration, and in the serious crisis through which the government was

obliged to pass, was without firmness and resource. The inactivity of the ministry, together with its inclination to drift with the tide caused Carrel to dub its policy *par abandon*; but it was rather one of hesitation, one naturally adopted by a cabinet that had not made up its mind how it ought to deal with the turbulent elements that disturbed the peace of the state. Nevertheless enough was done to show that the general policy of the monarchy was gradually undergoing definition, and if maintained and developed was to become a policy of moderation, and of resistance to all that was revolutionary and anarchical. The trial of the old ministers of Charles X. offered the first opportunity for the government to show to France that it meant to avoid excesses and to have nothing to do with men of either extreme, for in its determination to save the ministers who had brought on the revolution of 1830, it became involved in a conflict with the savage mob of Paris which would be satisfied with nothing less than the heads of the accused men. A second revolution nearly followed the decision of the government to banish Polignac and to imprison the others for life, and was only put down by the intervention of the national guard and the courage of Lafayette, who risked his popularity in order to support the municipal authorities.

The success of the government in this particular did not decrease the agitation and unrest. France had been roused by the struggles of the Italians and Poles to a sympathy with other nations that were struggling for independence and unity. The hot-bloods of France were most desirous that their country should take a leading part in aiding revolution at the very time that the government had decided in favour of non-intervention, and cared little for the fact that the government was as yet doubtfully established, that its army was ill-organised, its treasury empty, and its credit ruined; they would willingly have involved France in a war with Russia for the sake of aiding the Poles, with Austria for the sake of aiding the Lombards,

with the Pope for the sake of aiding the Bolognese. Not only were the republicans organising war in the streets of Paris, but in February, 1831, the Legitimists and the people actually came into open conflict. The church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois was pillaged, the palace of the archbishop was sacked and left in ruins, and whatever bore the cross or the fleur-de-lys was the object of the fanatical wrath of the multitude. The excesses sealed the fate of the ministry. It remained in office long enough to pass an electoral law, suppressing the double vote and placing the property qualification at two hundred francs for electors and three hundred for deputies; but as the revolutionary agitation extended from Paris to the departments and as the ministry, which had already heavily increased the financial burden of France, showed itself incompetent either to check the rioting or to allay the discontent, it lost the confidence of the king and resigned March 13, 1831. With its retirement the history of the July Monarchy as a stable institution begins.

Although France had been making her policy known, she had up to this time been unable to carry it out effectually in matters relating to internal affairs. The country in 1831 was without direction, the general welfare without security, public peace without guarantee. There was but one man who was able to take the leadership and that was Casimir Périer, the president of the Chamber of Deputies; to him the public turned instinctively, and with him as its chief minister the monarchy took its place as a recognised institution in Europe. Though his ministry lasted less than fifteen months, it left its mark upon the history of France; for it created a situation, started a tradition, disengaged the monarchy from its perils and its complications, and founded a government strong enough to survive the death of the head of the cabinet. Casimir Périer was a statesman who belonged, properly speaking, to the party of movement. He was a bold man, with the power to command obedience and respect from others, and carried his responsibili-

ties without the show of weakness that had characterised the actions of Lafitte. He did not believe in arbitrary authority or its exercise, and was consequently the enemy of the old *régime;* he opposed recourse to extraordinary measures as indicating feebleness in the government; and he found his strength in resolutely maintaining the law of the nation. "The nation is not a party," he said, "and we are the representatives of the nation." He was convinced that the policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs ought to be upheld abroad, and order and obedience to the law secured at home; and though his indomitable will led him at times into situations that belied his policy, he succeeded in winning the respect of the foreign Powers, and for the people of France temporary peace. In foreign affairs he acted with care and yet with a firmness that at times approached rashness. He co-operated with the Powers to obtain the independence of Belgium, and when King William of Holland marched into that country against the newly elected king, Leopold of Coburg, he sent an army of fifty thousand men across the Belgian frontier and compelled the Dutch to retire without battle. When Portugal, under the usurper Don Miguel, refused satisfaction to France for indignities committed on French subjects, he dispatched a fleet to the Tagus, which destroyed the forts and prepared to bombard Lisbon. In the affairs of Poland he offered the mediation of France; but when Warsaw fell, after the Poles had proclaimed the dethronement of the house of Romanoff, he resisted the patriotic outcry in Paris, and, though the government allowed the country to become an asylum for the Poles and appropriated money to supply their needs, refused to interfere directly. Again, when an insurrection accompanied with serious excesses took place in the Papal States and the Austrians were called in by Gregory XVI. to suppress the movement, Périer, interpreting the doctrine of non-intervention to mean that if Austria would not retire France would enter to

protect the interests of the Legations, sent a fleet to capture Ancona on the Adriatic. But the enterprise, "the whole conception of which," according to Metternich, "outraged the tenderest feelings of the Austrian Emperor" and threatened for the moment to bring about a European war, was chiefly important in that it seemed to the enemies of the monarchy to be a breach of the policy of non-intervention. The early death of Périer prevented the consummation of his policy of compelling the Pope to inaugurate reforms in his provinces, and in consequence it is probable that the occupation of Ancona, which was prolonged for seven years, did more harm than good to the cause that it was sent to support.

In home affairs the ministers acted with vigour and dispatch. When the insurrection, long smouldering in La Vendée, broke out at the instigation of the Duchess of Berry in favour of the Bourbon Duke of Bordeaux, and again a short time after at Marseilles, it was put down with a firm hand. But a more serious difficulty than the opposition of the Legitimists threatened the peace of the kingdom. The rising of the weavers of Lyons was not a political but an economic movement, one based on the misery of the working classes. Foreign and domestic competition in the silk manufacture had injured the business at Lyons and the burden of loss was passed down from manufacturer through the master-weavers to the workmen, who were working eighteen hours a day and receiving but eighteen sous. Complaints increased, murmurs grew louder, until to the cry of "Death or Work!" (*Vivre en travaillant ou mourir en combattant*) 45,000 of the poorer classes rose against the municipal authorities and seized the city. An army under Marshal Soult and the Duke of Orléans finally established order; but unfortunately the harshness of the government, relieved by no expression of pity for the miseries of the people and by no legislation aimed at the relief of the economic situation, tended only to embitter the class that was already seeing in the exist-

ing political and social order a system unjust and repressive. The Périer ministry was undoubtedly efficient and accomplished its work thoroughly and well; but it failed in one most important particular—it made no effort to search out the causes of the discontent; it repressed but did not eradicate the evil; it compelled the insurrectionary forces to be quiet, but it did not convince the republicans and revolutionists of the error of their doctrine or its application. After Périer's untimely death in May, 1832, insurrection again appeared more threatening than ever; the distresses of the labouring classes received no alleviation, and the men of the Fourth Estate were more ready than before to listen to radical doctrines regarding the obligations of government and the relations of capital and labour. Much as the ministry of Périer has been lauded for its firmness and decision, it left the country open to the same party divisions, the same economic dangers, the same discontent and bitter feeling that it found when it began its work. It did nothing to promote the liberties that the Charta promised and that the monarchy of Louis Philippe was bound to defend.

The best proof of this interpretation of the work of the Périer ministry lies in the revolution that broke out, June 5, 1832, on the occasion of the funeral of General Lamarque. Nearly all the prominent societies in Paris, under the leadership of the *Friends of the People*, gathered in force to the number of 3000, reinforced by the anarchists of Paris and by a number of political refugees from Poland and Italy. To the cry of "Down with Louis Philippe!" "Long live the Republic!" an organised attempt was made to seize the chief buildings of the city; but with the rallying of the national guard and the entrance of the regular troops into Paris, the insurrection was put down after a bloody struggle continuing for two successive days. As a movement the June uprising gained little sympathy from the people of Paris as a whole, but the harshness of the government, which was successful in so far as it over-

threw the uprising by force, turned the sympathies of the people in the direction of the revolutionists. The ministry placed Paris in a state of siege; prisoners were deprived of their natural judges, and were tried by martial law; and an order was issued commanding physicians and surgeons to report such wounded persons as claimed their assistance. Against this application of the Périer policy public opinion reacted, and so strong was the feeling aroused by this merciless treatment that the government was obliged to withdraw from its position, and permit to the prisoners a legitimate trial according to the Charta.

The Périer tradition was taken up by the new ministry of October 11, 1832, which was made up of members of both parties—Broglie and Guizot standing for the conservatives, and Thiers for the liberals. United by a common determination to resist the Legitimists on one side and all demagogic revolution on the other, it confronted a situation that did not materially differ from that of the year before. But the forces that were arranged against each other were becoming more irreconcilable; the government was inclining more and more toward a policy of repression, the radicals toward a doctrine of socialism, which found support in the writings of St. Simon and Fourier, and a *raison d'être* in the industrial disorder that had not ceased to trouble the kingdom since the revolution of July. As yet, however, the influence of the socialistic writers was rather intellectual than political, and the industrial opposition was disunited and scattered, acting only sporadically. The situation was on the other hand becoming distinctly simpler. The death of the Duke of Reichstadt (Napoleon II.) practically destroyed for the time the hopes of the Bonapartists, for, although they recognised Louis Napoleon as standing at the head of the Bonapartist cause, the people at this time looked upon him as a republican in that he had become a citizen of the Swiss Republic. The cause of the Legitimists also had suffered defeat

in the arrest of the Duchess of Berry and the suppression of the insurrection in Brittany, where the old royalists, rising at the instigation of the duchess, had forced the government to put some six departments in a state of siege.

The Bonapartist and royalist opposition, thus in a degree silenced and unable to continue its agitation, openly fell back into the ranks of the enemies of the government, and though wholly antagonistic to the cause of the republicans, aided them by using every opportunity to discredit and to embarrass the ministry. The republican party was further strengthened by the hostility aroused among those with moderate opinions by the arbitrary conduct of the government, and by the reorganisation and increased harmony of the secret societies, which were fast becoming the centres of revolt and the chief promoters of insurrections. From 1832 to 1834 attempts were made to ameliorate the condition of the poorer classes, and by the increase of public improvements to provide work for the breadless labourers. But concessions of this kind, which the ministry made under pressure of necessity, did not have the effect of attaching the industrial classes to the government, but rather strengthened them in their opinion that the government owed the labourer work, and made them cling more firmly than before to the *droit au travail*, or obligation of the government to provide work for those who were without it, as a cardinal feature of the socialistic doctrine. These concessions were meant in good part, but unaccompanied with any lightening of the cost of living to the labourer, or with any reduction or any shifting of the incidents of taxation, they failed to accomplish the desired effect. The same was true in the case of educational matters. Even the famous law of 1833, whereby primary instruction was extended in the communes of France and free competition was allowed between the religious and the secular schools of this grade, seemed inadequate to those who desired to see the same freedom admitted in secondary

education also. The endeavour to obtain this "liberty of education" was in chief part made by the Roman Catholic Church, which saw in the governmental control of the higher schools and the University the supremacy of the irreligious element. Many of the liberals as well opposed the state control of the University as a monopoly, and charged the institution with intellectual despotism. But the *bourgeoisie* opposed any measures which would have admitted the clergy to the council of the University and feared a revival of the ecclesiastical monopoly of the Restoration. The question did not cease to be discussed during the entire reign of Louis Philippe; four times were laws regarding secondary education introduced into the Chamber, but as many times withdrawn; and the religious and educational agitation only served to embarrass still further, notably after 1840, the government and its ministry.

In these cases and in others of less note the position that the government occupied was open at many points to the cynical and supercilious attacks of the opposition. The press with few exceptions was against the ministry; and by its wit, effrontery, and brazen denunciation of the monarchical policy it called down upon itself the wrath of the Chamber of Deputies. On one occasion stormy debate followed the declaration of the *Tribune*, the most fiery of all the journals, that the Chamber was a "prostituted Chamber, which cheated and laughed at the people," and the offending journal was brought to trial. The conservatives won the victory, but it did them more harm than good; for the heavy penalty imposed upon the editor—three years' imprisonment and a fine of a thousand francs—was felt to be out of proportion to the triviality of the offence, and popular passion was only inflamed the more by this imprudent act. The ministry was still further compromised in the eyes of the people by the passage of two additional laws, one placing public criers and venders of political pamphlets under the surveillance of the municipal authorities, the other forbidding

all associations, whether religious, political, or literary, to exist without sanction of the government. Even Guizot confessed that the methods employed to enforce these laws, though necessary and legal, were sometimes brutal.

Such a negative policy of resistance and repression, persisted in by a government from which the people had expected positive action in the direction of liberal legislation, was alienating the moderates, and fast driving the republicans to revolution. The *Society of the Rights of Man* was already adopting as its program the doctrines of 1793; others were dreaming of the regeneration of society, and were interpreting the actions of the government as treasonable to the people by whom the revolution of 1830 had been fought. Between men of these ideas and the *doctrinaires* and other supporters of the monarchy there could be no agreement. The republicans and the socialists, repudiating monarchy, and denying the right of the government to exercise authority over them and to demand obedience from them, asserted their own right to resist despotism, and declared themselves willing to suffer martyrdom, if by so doing they might ensure the fulfilment of the promises of the Charta. Believing in a republic they urged the necessity of an extension of the constitutional liberties of the French people as the solemn duty of the party in power, and they saw no defence for a policy that did nothing but establish order, or as they would have preferred to phrase it, did nothing but violate the real intent of the Charta, the real wishes of the popular majority. Republicans, democrats, socialists, and anarchists, men of talent and social standing, men of the *noblesse* as well as of the people, were united in the endeavour to solve either by peaceful or revolutionary means the problem of the organisation of modern society. The uprising of 1834, one of the bitterest outbreaks of the whole decade, was one of the attempts that the revolutionary party made at a solution of the problem. It began at Lyons, the scene of the riot of 1832, and

took there the form of a civil war in which the weavers joined with the more purely political revolutionists to resist the municipal authorities. For five days the rioters held out, and owing to the success of this revolt, others broke out almost simultaneously in Lunéville, in the form of a military insurrection, and in Marseilles, Grenoble, and other smaller towns. But these insurrections were checked because none of them had sufficient strength to exist by itself. In Paris, under the leadership of the *Society of the Rights of Man*, the republicans gathered, and advanced to an attack on the national guard and the troops of the line; but the government had taken unusual precautions and the attack was met with firmness. For two days the struggle continued between the revolutionists in their homes and the soldiers in the streets, and was stained by the horrible massacre of the *rue Transnonain*.

Again the policy of repression had won a decided success, for the immediate victory lay with the government and the ministry of October 11th, which had been reorganised a month before in consequence of the retirement of Broglie. The reprisal following the insurrection was of so stern a character as to reduce the republican forces to silence. Two repressive laws were passed, one relating to the increase of the military forces, the other to the possession of arms or the munitions of war. Toward the end of April, 1835, some 2000 republican offenders were brought up for trial; of these, however, all were dismissed but 164, who were tried before the bar of the Chamber of Peers, presided over by Pasquier. The scenes in court were of the stormiest, for the republicans fought every point of the trial with arguments, threats, denunciations, and with a violence which more than anything else justified the policy of repression and injured the cause of the republican party. One hundred and six offenders, including twenty-six condemned for contempt of court, were sentenced to transportation or to imprisonment for terms varying from one to twenty years, or

were placed under the surveillance of the police. The defeat for the republicans was decisive, and the government, for the first time in its history, began to feel secure, and the moderates began to hope that a further employment of the policy of repression would be unnecessary. In this, however, they were doomed to disappointment; the revolutionary spirit was only temporarily suppressed and although the government had no reason to fear public uprisings, it was still in danger of radicalism working in secret against the lives of those in authority. Circumstances seemed to force the ministry to a constant activity in the direction of repression.

In July, 1835, the most fiendish of many attempts to assassinate the king was made in Paris by Fieschi, whose infernal machine, like the dagger of Louvel, struck down for the time being the liberal cause, and confirmed the conservatives in their determination to continue the policy that was needed if the established order were to be maintained. Fieschi's attempt failed of its chief object; but this atrocious act of a fanatical assassin, which sacrificed eighteen persons—among them Marshal Mortier—outraged the French people, and turned the tide of feeling strongly in the direction of the monarchy and the throne. It was a time when a moderately repressive policy suited to the occasion would have received popular support and have given strength to the government; but unfortunately this was just what the government was incapable of applying. Instead of considering this act as that of a fanatic with few accomplices, instead of passing laws merely to protect the royal person and the royal family, it chose to blame the entire republican party with the attempt, and to take it for granted that the attack had been directed against all legislative and executive authority. The laws adopted in September, 1835, were far from moderate. The ministry, not content with increasing the power of the courts by a simplification of procedure and a strengthening of the jury system,

struck a severe blow at the liberty of the press and the rights guaranteed by the Charta, by endeavouring to control dramatists and caricaturists and to prevent press attacks upon the king and the ministry, by increasing the responsibility of editors and subjecting them to exorbitant penalties for breaches of the law. Furthermore it roused intense opposition by refusing a trial by jury to certain classes of press offenders, thus seeming to infringe section 69 of the Charta, which guaranteed to all such offenders a regular trial by law. This tampering with the freedom of the press was construed by all those of the opposition to mean that the policy of resistance instead of being temporary, instead of being a mere expedient for the preservation of order, had become in fact a permanent policy, a means whereby the party in power might retain its supremacy. The effect of these laws is noteworthy. They alienated a large number of the voters upon whom the monarchy had been able to depend,—a defection which made itself felt in the elections of the next year; and they completed the division between the party of resistance and the party of movement, the latter of which now began to turn away from the *doctrinaires*, and to attach itself more firmly than before to the party of the Left. The old Left Centre had become hopelessly divided, and this breach in the ranks of the monarchical supporters weakened the ministry of October 11th, which had adopted the Périer policy and had carried it to extremes in the laws of September. Consequently when in February, 1836, the Chamber by a majority of two votes declared itself against the ministry on a financial question, the latter resigned; and the "heroic" period in the history of the July Monarchy came to an end.

With 1836 we pass to a period of four years, a "period of difficulties," when nothing was stable; when that which seemed strong was in reality weak, and that which seemed weak was in reality strong; when parliamentary government

gave place to a scramble for office, and political expediency became the policy of ministers; when the longest ministry was that of an opportunist; and when coalitions of rivals in policy were effected for no other purpose than to obtain a majority in the Chambers. As regards the internal condition of France the period was one of striking contradictions. The monarchy, fully confident that it was at last permanently established, was in point of fact entering upon its decline. The king trusting in the security of the monarchy, was endeavouring to exercise a personal influence in the government of the kingdom, but was instead simply attracting to himself the hostility that had hitherto been directed against the ministry, and was compromising the very existence of the monarchy. In the Chamber three parties struggled for constitutional supremacy: the *doctrinaires*, now become the Right Centre, the progressionists, now become the new Left Centre, and a new group—the *tiers-parti*, based on an opposition to the policy of resistance,—that after an existence of two years had become strong enough to be reckoned as a constitutional party. The attitude of this party was in the main one of censure and criticism, its faith was opportunism, and its policy, based on expediency, was conciliatory in that it sought to win the majority by acts of amnesty and by personal influence, and eclectic in that its program, so far as it was definite, was made up of parts of all the other programs. The ministerial chicanery of these four years was fast bringing the parliamentary system into discredit and was compromising the Chamber. And, finally, the republicans, silenced but not convinced, though seemingly inactive from 1834 to 1839, were in reality husbanding their resources and awaiting their time when a new uprising should by its success cancel previous failures.

The interest of the period chiefly centres in the rivalry of parties, which was encouraged and increased by the determina-

tion of the king to play off one party leader against another for the sake of strengthening his own position as the ruler of France. It was this attitude of Louis Philippe that made impossible any fixedness of policy or permanence of ministry. With the downfall of the Périer tradition in February, 1836, the king tried first a ministry from the party of movement under Thiers, but when the latter wished to aid the uprising of 1836 in Spain, in consequence of which Queen Christina had been forced to accept the constitution of 1812, Louis Philippe drew back, and accepted in August the resignation of his minister. The retirement of Thiers only aggravated the situation, and the *tiers-parti* was called into power in combination with the party of resistance, that is, Molé in combination with Guizot. But this union could not last; the rivalry of the party leaders soon led to dissensions in the cabinet itself, and when in March, 1837, the ministry suffered a defeat, and it became evident that a fusion of the two parties could not command a majority in the Chamber, the king appealed first to Guizot and then to Thiers in the hope that a ministry might be formed which would command the confidence of the deputies. But in this each failed, and Molé therefore retained office; but in the reorganisation of the cabinet doctrinairism was dropped, and the policy of the *tiers-parti* became more conciliatory and more expedient than ever. Its one aim seems to have been to obtain a parliamentary majority, and in the task of winning governmental supporters from the different parties in the Chamber, it forgot entirely the internal welfare of the country. Against the king and the Molé ministry all the other parties ranged themselves in a famous political coalition made up of the Right Centre represented by Guizot and Duvergier de Hauranne, the Left Centre represented by Thiers, and the Left represented by Odilon Barrot. At the same time the radical party with Garnier-Pagès, the elder, as its spokesman, and the Legitimists led by Berryer and Béchard threw their

whole weight against the government. Guizot attacked the ministry on the ground that the supremacy of a policy without system had thrown the country and the Chambers into uncertainty and confusion, that is, into anarchy, and he apologised for his attitude by saying that politics was not the work of saints. Thiers warned the country that the cabinet was allowing the personal influence of the king to increase too rapidly. "Take care," he said, "with time, with success, with peace you will have another Restoration." Duvergier de Hauranne accused the government of electoral corruption, and Garnier-Pagès repeated all the charges against the monarchy that the radicals had been emphasising for nine years. It was a curious situation. The monarchy which had seemed so strongly founded was attacked by all parties—except the *tiers-parti*—without regard to policy or program; and when in 1839 Molé appealed to the country for support, Guizot and the *doctrinaires* worked side by side with the radicals in their efforts to turn the majority against the ministers. Such political inconsistency for the sake of manipulating the parliamentary majority was fast destroying confidence in the governmental system of the July Monarchy. The party selfishness of the political leaders, who expended time and energy in combinations and coalitions for political purposes, the inertness of the ministries, the lack of close union between the government and the people increased disunity in the state at large, and encouraged the hopes of the republicans and revolutionists. It is not surprising, therefore, that the radicals should have taken advantage of the embarrassment of the government, when it was seen that the coalition, after having overthrown the Molé ministry in March, 1839, had been powerless to take advantage of its victory, because of the inability of Guizot, Thiers, and Odilon Barrot to agree on a common policy. In May, under Barbès, Blanqui, and others, who directed the *Society of the Seasons*, they made a furious attack upon the prefecture of police, the

Hôtel de Ville, and other public buildings. Though the revolt, a bloody one, was suppressed after a day's continuance, it both showed the activity of the radicals, and forced the formation of the ministry of May 12th. This ministry, made up of less important members of the *doctrinaires* and the *tiers-parti* under Marshal Soult, seemed to be well supported by the Chamber, and during its tenure of eight months took into consideration many important measures relating to railways and parliamentary reform. But at the beginning of the next year the old question of the prerogatives and privileges of monarchy was opened by the proposal to grant an annuity to the Duke of Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, on the occasion of his marriage. The defeat of the measure was followed by the resignation of the ministry in February, 1840, and the Left Centre entered upon its career of ministerial power under Thiers. In October of the same year this ministry went down in consequence of the attitude taken on the Eastern Question, and a stable ministry was at last obtained which lasted for eight years under Guizot.

In the final success of the party of resistance the monarchy seemed to have won a great victory, and to have passed successfully through a dangerous crisis. But the situation in 1840 at the close of the second Thiers ministry was more strained than ever. Not only was there the strong party hostility that made itself evident in the Legitimist movement, in the republican uprisings, in the two attempts of Louis Napoleon to excite a Bonapartist insurrection; but there was also a widespread dissatisfaction among the people at large. The industrial class as well as the republicans were far from contented with the selfish class policy of the *bourgeoisie*; they resented the police system of the party of resistance, and the aimless policy of the *tiers-parti*. The *bourgeoisie* were themselves divided on the subject of monarchical supremacy and a large body of them was strongly opposed to the part that the

king was taking in affairs of state. It was a divided country which confronted the Soult-Guizot ministry when it entered upon its long career in October, 1840.

Nor had the strength of the monarchy been increased by the foreign policy pursued by the various ministries up to this time. The plan of the government to give to France a peaceful rôle in the councils of Europe, to reassure the Powers that the revolution of 1830 meant little more than a change of monarchs, to maintain harmony abroad that prosperity might prevail at home, was not construed as either dignified or noble. When the Louis Philippe government refused to aid the Italians, the Poles, or the Belgians with anything besides sympathy, the young republicans of France accused it of cowardice, and called to mind how in 1792 France had taken her place as the protector of European liberties. When Périer said, "French blood belongs only to France"; Louis Blanc could reply, "Impious words! The genius of France has ever consisted in her cosmopolitanism, and self-sacrifice has been imposed on her by God equally as an element of her might and a condition of her existence." In spite of its policy of non-intervention, which offended the radicals, the July Monarchy found it no easy task to establish peaceful and satisfactory relations with the foreign Powers. Nor are the reasons hard to discover: the monarchy had been founded on a revolution which, by engendering other revolutions, had endangered the stability of states; the overthrow of the Bourbons had offended the supporters of legitimism; Russia was estranged; Austria entered into diplomatic intercourse with misgivings, for Metternich looked on London and Paris as "a couple of mad-houses"; and even when harmonious relations had been finally arranged, the government often weakened its influence by pursuing what seemed to be an inconsistent policy. In 1830 it joined with the Powers to support the independence of Belgium, but in 1839 agreed to the "twenty-four articles" whereby the territory of the young

kingdom was considerably curtailed. In 1834 it entered into an agreement with England, Spain, and Portugal to compel Don Carlos of Spain and Don Miguel of Portugal to withdraw from the Portuguese dominions; but the next year, when direct French intervention was requested, Louis Philippe refused, an act which England construed as a breach of the French agreement, and the radicals of France—for Don Carlos represented the reactionist policy—as a desertion of constitutional government. In 1831 France had sent her troops to Ancona to promote reforms in the Papal States, but in 1838 the troops were withdrawn before anything in the way of the betterment of the people had been accomplished. This though done strictly according to diplomatic arrangement was considered as a desertion of Italy by the radicals, who had hailed the occupation in 1831 as a promise by the government to aid in the cause of liberty. The radicals, seeing in each of these acts submission to the will of Metternich and the reactionists, charged the government with criminally neglecting and abandoning the principles for which all had fought in the revolution of 1830.

But no phase of the foreign policy of the French government during the period under discussion was more disastrous than the attitude taken by Thiers on the Eastern Question, which, as we have already indicated above, brought about the fall of the Thiers ministry in 1840. Mehemet Ali, viceroy of Egypt, who had been dissatisfied with the territory allotted to him at the close of the Greek revolution, in which he had aided the Turks, began in 1831 to extend his dominion by force. In this attempt he was wholly successful; Syria and Armenia fell into his hands, and in 1832 he prepared to cross into Europe to complete the overthrow of Turkey. In this crisis the Powers ranged themselves according to their interests. Russia took the initiative in supporting the Sultan, and in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833) practically reduced Turkey to a condition of complete dependency; England, resenting Russian

interference, and determined to maintain British commercial supremacy in the Levant, supported the integrity of the Turkish dominions; and France, from a desire to play an important rôle in the East, to gain a foothold in Egypt, and to extend the influence she had already acquired in the conquest of Algiers, supported the cause of Mehemet Ali. The diplomatic situation was a strange one. Russia and England, wholly out of accord in their motives for defending Turkey, were allied for the maintenance of the Sultan's dominions against Mehemet; France and England, who agreed in the policy of resisting Russian encroachment, took different sides on the question, because they were already becoming competitors for the control of Egypt; Austria and Prussia defended what they chose to consider a legitimate dynasty and took their stand upon the side of the Sultan. In 1839 Mehemet had but one ally in Europe, France. When, therefore, at the conference of the Powers called at London in 1840 it was found that the policy of Thiers was irreconcilable with that of the other Powers, a treaty was made with the Sultan to which France was not a party. This isolation of France in the presence of Europe wounded the pride of the French people, for it seemed like a return to the situation of 1815 and 1830. Many of the populace would have been willing to begin a war with all Europe, but they were obliged to content themselves with the downfall of Thiers, the minister who had brought upon them this humiliation.

We have thus far examined the policy of the government of Louis Philippe, both in its internal and its external relations, to the close of the second ministry of Thiers and the beginning of that of Guizot. But another phase of the situation must be taken up before we can pass on to a discussion of the Guizot ministry and the new problems that it was called upon to solve; and that is the antagonism which the king himself was arousing by his endeavour to become the real governor of France.

Louis Philippe—for he had never liked the firm and independent attitude of Casimir Périer—had seen in the downfall of the Périer tradition an opportunity of applying the doctrine of the conservatives, that the king was head of the state in fact as well as in name, and by his efforts to carry it out made possible in large part the disorders of the period from 1836 to 1840. The coalition of 1838 and 1839 was an attempt on the part of the liberals to resist this abuse of personal government, and Guizot, chief supporter of the royal prerogative, by opposing the supremacy of the *tiers-parti*, had unwittingly aided in the attack. Thus it was that the opposition which had at first been directed against the government as a whole and against the ministries as such, was turned against the king himself; and in the period from 1840 to 1848 it was the dynasty that was threatened quite as much as was the supremacy of the *bourgeoisie*. The reason for this will be found not merely in the desire of the king for a personal rule but in his character, in the origin of his government, and in his dynastic policy. Let us examine these.

Louis Philippe had not been chosen because of his birthright but in the face of it. He was a Bourbon of the younger branch who had known adversity during the Revolution and the Napoleonic *régime*, and had lived in France under the Restoration as a private citizen without display and without ambition. His title rested neither on principle nor on military genius, but on an accident; and it was therefore inevitable that no one should stand in awe of him, no one reverence him, no one bow to him. Generally speaking, the monarchy was disliked because it was a compromise, because it was neither legitimate nor Jacobin; it was railed at by men of letters whose influence in France was extensive; it was alternately laughed at and abused by the press because it was a *bourgeois* monarchy founded on vulgar commercialism. Had the king possessed a powerful individuality he might have made the monarchy royal, have

cast a glamour of mystery about it that would have relieved it of its commonplaceness, and have given to its court-life something of the lustre of the *régimes* of Louis XIV. and Napoleon; he might even have won from the people of France that respect which genius commands, and have led them to forget the circumstances under which he had risen to power. But this he was manifestly unable to do. He could not raise monarchy from its place, because he stood on its own level; he had none of the chivalry of the French nature, and he could not give to his kingship any of the sparkle and brilliancy of which the French are fond; he lacked the power to inspire personal devotion, and without this quality all his other estimable traits availed little. He was an exemplary father, an economic householder, a man of spotless character in private life; he walked the streets as a well-to-do member of the *bourgeoisie;* he sent his children to the public schools, and in general conducted himself without extravagance and without pretence. But the people were not satisfied with the every-day character of the man who ruled over them, with the sombre, economical, and burgherlike court which surrounded him, just as they were not satisfied with the policy of peace and class aggrandisement which the government had thus far followed. The July Monarchy never seemed in harmony with the genius, the social environment, or the traditions of the French people.

In this, however, the hostility of the nation was chiefly negative, because there was nothing in the character of the king or the court at which positive offence could be taken. But when it came to the king's dynastic policy, the discontent took a more aggressive form. France accepted as inevitable a king without magnetism and a throne without dignity, but she was offended when the house of Orléans sought its security rather in an increase of wealth and in royal alliances than in the attachment of the French themselves. Louis Philippe certainly looked after the fortunes of his children with an industry,

which, while reasonable and natural in a citizen, was not wholly commendable in a king. Before he ascended his throne he left to them his whole fortune of one hundred millions of francs, reserving to himself only the right of use. Such an act deeply injured the people who saw in it evidence that the king distrusted the durability of the new order, and their resentment found expression at the beginning of the reign when the king was allowed from the civil list only about one third of the amount that had been granted under the Restoration to Louis XVIII. and Charles X. It was made insultingly evident at the close of the decade, when, on the occasion of the marriage of the Duke of Nemours, the Chamber refused to grant an annual allowance of 500,000 francs to the prince. The various attempts of the king to obtain a marriage alliance with one of the great Powers were in themselves reasonable and pleasing to the French people; but when he failed in all his negotiations, and was obliged to fall back upon connections with petty German principalities, France was less pleased. The king wished to place the Duke of Nemours upon the throne of Belgium, but when the other Powers objected, he accepted Leopold of Coburg on the condition that the king-elect marry his daughter Louisa. He sought for his eldest son, the Duke of Orléans, an alliance with the Austrian royal house, but when the negotiations failed he accepted a princess of Mecklenburg-Schwerin as his daughter-in-law. In 1840 the Duke of Nemours married a princess of a branch of the house of Coburg, but the advantages of this excellent alliance were offset by the unfortunate discussion over the allowance and the dowry. The undignified controversy that arose from these and other similar events, together with the charges of stock-jobbing and commercial speculation unworthy of a king, only served to separate more widely the nation and its constitutional chief. At no time were they in close accord; at no time did there exist among the people a real and permanent sympathy for royalty, or a strong tie bind-

ing together the governor and the governed. These were the reasons why the general discontent was not merely with the ministries; why the hostility of the nation glanced from the policy of the government to the policy of the king; and why the watchword of the coalition, "War on personal government," was able to serve as the battle-cry of so many rival parties. The discontent of France was quite as much with the monarchy as with the ministers, and the question was soon to be agitated whether the best interests of the state did not demand a change of government rather than merely a change of cabinets.

This was the tendency of affairs in the year 1840, when, after four years of changing ministries and an uncertain policy, a stable government was at last obtained under Marshal Soult and Guizot. The latter was, however, the real head of the cabinet; he it was who directed the policy and held in his hands the reins of power to the end of the eight years that followed. As one of the foremost historians of France, Guizot may be said to exemplify Madame de Staël's statement that "a great historian is almost a statesman even if he has no training whatever in the governmental service." He was a brilliant orator, an influential politician whether in power or in the opposition, a man of upright and honourable personal character, yet when put to the test, he showed a lack of some of the qualities most necessary for statesmanship. As a *doctrinaire* he was unable to appreciate the importance of a governmental program adapted to the national needs, and failing to understand the social forces that were working within the country, he seemed unwilling to listen to the voice of public opinion or of national sentiment. Moreover, he was deficient in tact, and in important crises was without resources and political wisdom. His ministry was the strongest since that of Casimir Périer, whose traditions it followed, but it made mistakes at a time when mistakes were dangerous and indeed fatal; it laid itself open to charges of inconsistency that destroyed its repu-

tation for reliability and a disinterested regard for the welfare of France, and alienated many of its supporters who were attached to the monarchy less from sentimental than economic reasons; it committed faults that were more than errors of judgment, and laid itself open to charges of dishonesty and intrigue. Guizot did nothing to reconcile the people to the monarchy; and, instead of binding the various classes together into an harmonious and closely compacted national whole, he only succeeded in widening the breach to the point of entire separation.

Although the Guizot ministry was made up of men from different political groups it was animated by one unchangeable purpose, to return to the policy of Casimir Périer, to re-establish a conservative majority in the Chamber, by means of which the stability of the July Monarchy might be assured, order be maintained within, and peace be obtained without. After his overthrow in 1840 Thiers went into the opposition, for though he agreed with Guizot as to the end in view, he differed with him in regard to the methods to be used to gain it. Guizot opposed constitutional changes and reforms, Thiers supported them; to Guizot the cry was "Peace everywhere and always"; Thiers on the other hand advocated a progressive reform, not in the interest of any class, but in the interest of France. The parliamentary history of these eight years consists in the struggle between the supporters of these views; for the monarchical party, inclining toward dogmatic conservatism, fearing reform because it encouraged revolution and offering resistance almost for resistance' sake, tended more and more toward the Right; and the party of the constitutional opposition, animated with a desire to adhere to the Charta, to maintain the house of Orléans upon the throne, placed a different interpretation upon the revolution of 1830, and in advocating reform, tended more and more toward the Left. What these leaders did not see was that parliamentary antagonism in the presence of the discon-

tent existent in France was aiding the enemies of the monarchy to effect its overthrow, and that they themselves were destined to disappear with the monarchy itself when that object was attained.

The real issue of these eight years was not, however, a parliamentary but an economic one. Peace brought prosperity, beneficial improvements were promoted, lighthouses were built, highways improved, railways constructed, commerce and industry were encouraged, and renewed efforts were begun in the interest of an extension of the educational system. Such activities were in the main carried on in the interests of a class, and the government of Guizot, even more than those that had preceded, took on the form of a class government. In the minds of the people, whose attention had been directed to the glorious days of the first Napoleon by the recent return of his body to France, the government was maintained in the interests of trade, of money-making, of concentration of wealth; it was without ideals, without national pride, without a broad, large-minded concern for the glory and honour of France. They said that the English alliance was sought because English capital was invested in French railroads; that the parliamentary majority was maintained because the government purchased the adherence of voters. They charged the ministers with using their powers to promote speculation and stock-jobbing, with bribery and sale of office; they believed that the ministerial patronage was employed for the single purpose of maintaining the supremacy of the ministry. Lord Normanby voiced this feeling when he said that "there was hardly a corner in France to which a ministerial candidate did not present himself with the most extravagant promises of what was to be done for the district through the intervention of the ministry." The people also maintained that the *bourgeoisie* gained money at the expense of French dignity, and spent it at the expense of French honour. If they were dissatisfied with the external

policy as humiliating, they were enraged at the way the internal policy was carried on as dishonest.

But there was another consequent of the *bourgeoisie* supremacy of greater moment than the unpopularity of the government, and that was the creation of a new set of problems, to solve which the government proved itself to be wholly incompetent. The interests of the *bourgeoisie* were essentially commercial and industrial. This class was the great employer of labour, the promoter of great financial undertakings. In the revolution of 1789 it had won its first great victory; it had overthrown feudalism and class privilege; it had broken the monopoly which the landowners had exercised over the right of suffrage and the right to govern; it had rescued trade from its narrow confinement of the old *régime* and had obtained for it freedom and a chance for normal development. But its victory was not complete until 1830; then it was that the *bourgeoisie* entered upon its supremacy, became the governing power, and made its interests the dominant interests. Italy was still struggling with feudalism and the autocratic rule of petty princes; Germany was still agitated by the conflict between the patriots who desired unity and the upholders of the sovereignty of each individual state, by the attempt of the commercial and industrial classes to gain a share in the government which the landholders were monopolising; but France, having unity, having thrown off the last vestige of monarchical absolutism, and having secured for its citizens political rights based on other conditions than class privilege and the possession of land, was now advancing to the solution of another set of questions which concerned not the political but the social and economic rights of the individual. France began the settlement of this problem of to-day, because under the July Monarchy the production and distribution of wealth and the relation of employer and employee had become integral parts of that movement which the *bourgeoisie* represented. The interests of

this class were economic, its members were the monopolists in capital and land ; it was not only a political power but an industrial power also ; therefore the struggle for the economic rights of the individual became an inevitable concomitant of its rule. With its elevation to power we are brought into the presence of a conflict that is only indirectly the result of the Revolution, the conflict between capital and labour. The *bourgeoisie* had set in motion new forces that it could not control ; it was called upon to reorganise trade and industry in the interest not of a class but of society as a whole, and its failure to meet the problem, and the necessity of finding a solution, called into being the various schemes of the socialistic writers.

The first to present a system that was in the true sense of the word socialistic was St. Simon, whose primary object was to ameliorate as soon as possible the moral and physical condition of the most numerous class. He and his followers advocated universal peace and the brotherhood of man ; they denounced revolution, and at the same time protested against all privileged rights particularly those of birth ; they believed that the state should own the means of production and should organise industry on the principle embodied in the motto, "Labor according to capacity and reward according to services." Toward such an organisation St. Simon believed that humanity was advancing, and the Simonian scheme was intended to further this progress. But the system was never a practical one ; experiments based upon it failed ; it had no political support, and its influence was intellectual, stimulating socialistic thought rather than inciting political action. The same can be said of the writings of Fourier, whose schemes, although fantastic, contained many noble ideas. Society living in *phalanstéres*, imbued with a common desire for work, was not only to quadruple the products of industry but to effect universal association, the union of inequalities, and the cessation of revolution and poverty. The organisation of industry and

the division of products was to be in accord with the principle, "Labor according to capacity and reward in proportion to exertion, talent, and capital." Inasmuch as Fourier's plan retained inheritance and private property it was less pure as a form of socialism than that of St. Simon.

But St. Simon and Fourier never posed as political reformers; they exercised an influence more through their own writings than through any attempt to utilise the governmental machine for the carrying out of their theories. Their ideas were rather abstract than concrete, their style flowing but not popular, and their logic was often too subtle for the popular understanding. The real part that the doctrines of St. Simon and Fourier played in increasing the popular discontent at this period is difficult to determine. With Louis Blanc, however, the case is different; he was not merely a social reformer, he was a politician, who endeavoured to solve the problem of the organisation of labour not by fanciful theories but by a system of state aid that was definite and tangible. But first of all he endeavoured to rouse the people to an appreciation of their actual condition. In his *Organisation of Labour*, and again in his *History of Ten Years* he brought home to the labourers the evils that resulted from the *bourgeois* government. "Struggles between producers for the possession of the market, between the members of the working class for the possession of employment; struggles of the manufacturer against the poor man on the subject of wages, of the poor man against the machine, which by supplanting him devoted him to starvation; such under the name of competition was the characteristic feature in the situation of things regarded from a commercial and manufacturing point of view. . . . Here markets glutted and capitalists in despair; there workshops closed and the operatives starving; commerce degraded by tacit consent into a traffic of tricks and lies. . . . All the conquests achieved by the genius of man over nature converted into weapons of strife and tyranny multiplied in some

sort by progress itself. . . . There was no longer any community of faith or belief, no attachment to traditional uses; while the spirit of inquiry denied everything and affirmed nothing, and religion was supplanted by the love of lucre. The nation turned to mercantilism, marriage was made a speculation, a matter of bargain. . . . The newspapers daily presented to the eyes of the public the lamentable spectacle of brothers wrangling for scraps and fragments of the paternal property. . . . Among the labouring classes . . . penury figured as the principal primary cause for debauchery. . . . It engendered concubinage and concubinage infanticide. . . . In a society in which oppression like this was possible charity was but a word and religion but a bodiless remembrance."

Such is Louis Blanc's arraignment of the July Monarchy, the three aspects of which he summed up in one sentence, "In social order there was competition, in moral order scepticism, in political order anarchy." No wonder he became an influence, when with such power he disclosed to the people of France the character and work of the *bourgeois* government. The volumes of his history, published continuously from 1841 to 1846, passed through many editions, and each volume, a small duodecimo, became in the hands of the people a party pamphlet furnishing facts and figures of a nature damaging to the party in power. The history has, it is true, all the characteristics of party literature; it is badly proportioned, lacks perspective, and is unjust and one sided; nevertheless, because it was written with an evident attempt at impartiality, because its statements were supported by a wealth of evidence, it carried conviction among the enemies of the government.

The social theories which attempted to solve the problem that the new economic situation presented found supporters who sympathised with the high ideals of their authors, and were willing to make sacrifices in order to test the truth of

the doctrines. But it was not from these men that the July Monarchy had to fear an attack. St. Simon might hope to leaven the mass of society in time, but he positively opposed revolution; Fourier anticipated the millennium in ten years, but it was to be attained by the law of spontaneous attraction and not by insurrection. The chief socialists were men of peace, but the doctrines, more or less ideal when presented by the writers themselves, became materialistic when interpreted by the radicals. In a society where the opinions of Robespierre, as contained in his speeches and in his *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, were becoming the standards of thought, and the methods of 1793 were becoming the standards of action, theoretical schemes for the reorganisation of society had little place. Whereas the socialistic writers were endeavouring to bring about a better social condition, the men of the street and the factories, suffering from penury and aware that the government was making no effort to alleviate their miseries, saw that the construction of the new society must be preceded by the destruction of the old. The existing order they believed to be unjust, uneconomical, and oppressive; and while it should last they saw no hope of a more equable relation between employer and employee, between governor and governed; while in its overthrow there was at least the chance that up from the ruins there might spring a social order of which economic liberty and justice would be recognised as fundamental principles. Herein lay the inspiration to revolution. As the resultant of all these forces a hitherto unappreciated factor began to rise to prominence in France. The growing supremacy of economic interests, the selfish class policy of the *bourgeoisie*, the misery and want attendant on the introduction of machinery, on the increase of competition and unequal distribution, the strivings of the idealist to discover the principles of a better order of society, the arraignment of the *bourgeois* government by Louis Blanc, the powerful invective of the newspapers, the spirited

opposition of George Sand, the efforts of the pen-artist of the proletariat, Eugène Sue, combined to revive once more in France the revolutionary spirit of 1793 and 1830, to rouse to life the labouring classes, and to give a consciousness to the Fourth Estate.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN FRANCE.

IN studying the period from 1830 to 1840 we have seen that the July Monarchy, already out of sympathy with the spirit of the nation at large, was threatened by dangers that the various ministries, notwithstanding their strenuous efforts to obtain peace and order, were unable to avoid. This was due, as we have seen, to the fact that the revolutions of 1789 and 1830, undertaken in defence of the liberty of all men, had in reality given supremacy into the hands of the upper middle class, which in turn was accused by the radicals of a governmental and economic tyranny as grievous as had been that of the feudal *régime*. This accusation is to be traced in large part to the presence of a new group of problems, logically deducible from the events that had gone before, yet now made prominent for the first time, which the dominant class seemed unable or unwilling to meet. We have seen that the progress of invention, the introduction of machinery, the factory system and the division of labour, the increase in the rapidity of transportation and the growing internationalism in trade, which enlarged the field of competition, were making economic relations more complex, and were creating a schism between the labouring and the capitalist classes; that the new social order was endangering the position of monarchy not so much because of any hostility to monarchy as such, but because monarchy was supported by the capitalist class and was identified with it; and because Louis Philippe by his efforts at a personal government was lay-

ing himself open to the charge of acting in the interests of this class and not of the nation of which he was king. We have seen that the danger was increased by the unwillingness of the government to control the situation by representing the movement, or to meet it by measures of amelioration or conciliation; that to the radicals the government seemed to exist for no other purpose than to suppress popular agitation, which was actuated more frequently than otherwise by motives that were just and reasonable; and that in consequence of this narrow and unelastic policy it had roused against itself a party antagonism, not only radical and socialistic, but also constitutional, and had deprived itself of all support save that of the conservative wing of the *bourgeoisie*. Thus the monarchy of 1830 was without that reserve strength which a government must have if it is to preserve itself in the presence of danger.

From these facts it is evident that a monarchy thus situated could ill afford to weaken itself still further, either by adhering to a reactionary system of government and so increasing the bitterness of its enemies, or by alienating its remaining supporters by any neglect of the safeguards which made possible the success and happiness of the middle classes. Yet it did both of these things. The foreign policy of the government from 1841 to 1847 destroyed the confidence of the very class whose support it needed, and provoked among the people as a whole a feeling of opposition and hostility.

The fact was evident to all that the maintenance of the alliance with England, the only government in Europe that had consistently befriended France during the period from 1830 to 1840, had done much, because of the similarity of the economic interests of the two nations, to insure and make possible the prosperity of the *bourgeoisie*. Ever since 1836 Metternich had been endeavouring to break this alliance and to attach France to Austria, but without success; in 1841 Guizot made a special effort to maintain the harmonious relation with England,

which had been threatened by the failure of France to stand by the agreement of 1834 regarding Spain and Portugal, and by the exclusion of France from the quadruple alliance of 1840. His concessions, particularly in regard to the questions of the right of search and the protectorate of the Society Islands, which came up in the period from 1841 to 1843, had been made for the purpose of preserving the *entente cordiale*, and, while they drew down upon the government the attacks of the press and the radicals, both of whom charged the ministry with a too ready submission to England's demands, they did prevent a rupture between the two nations. This amicable relation, though strengthened by the visit of Queen Victoria at Chateau d'Eu in 1843, and that of Louis Philippe the next year, when he met the Czar and the King of Prussia at Windsor Castle, was destined to be of but short duration. A new crisis confronted the ministry when in 1846 the question of the Spanish marriages, which had been under discussion since 1841, was brought to a settlement in a wholly unexpected manner.

The principle involved in this question derived its importance from the doctrine laid down at the treaty of Utrecht that France and Spain should never be united under one dynastic head. In 1833 Ferdinand VII. died, and according to the royal decree of 1830, which confirmed succession in the female line, the young Isabella succeeded her father under the regency of the queen-mother. But Don Carlos, the younger brother of the king, contested the title on the ground that the Salic law applied to Spain, and civil war followed. However, in 1839 the Carlists were defeated, and after a regency of four years the majority of the young queen was declared. At once the question of her marriage became one of international importance. The dynastic ambitions of Louis Philippe involved the king in a project to join the two Bourbon houses, and to increase the importance of the younger French branch by the marriage of the infanta to one of his own sons. To this arrangement Eng-

land objected, declaring such a union to be contrary to the provisions of Utrecht and injurious to the peace of Europe; and the plan was given up. However, after considerable negotiation, an agreement was reached that the queen should marry a Spanish or Neapolitan Bourbon, and that the Duke of Montpensier, fifth son of Louis Philippe, should marry the queen's sister, provided such marriage were solemnised after that of the queen, and after an heir to the throne had been born. This was a compromise; England was determined to exclude from the throne of Spain the sons of Louis Philippe, and France was equally determined to exclude any prince who was not a Bourbon. In 1845, when another visit was made by Queen Victoria at Chateau d'Eu, Lord Aberdeen, the foreign minister, declared that the English government would not support any other claimant than a Bourbon for the hand of the queen. But the matter was taken more or less out of the hands of the governments by their respective ambassadors at Madrid, and in the intrigues that followed, the English ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, showed his strong sympathy for the candidacy of the Prince of Coburg. In 1846 Aberdeen was succeeded by Palmerston, and in consequence of the more aggressive foreign policy that was introduced, France claimed that the plan of the English ambassador at Madrid had received sufficient encouragement from the home government to be regarded as a breach of the agreement. Consequently in 1846 Europe was astonished to learn that the marriage of the sister of the queen to the Duke of Montpensier had taken place simultaneously with that of the queen herself, and that the house of Bourbon had gained thereby a double guarantee for its control of the throne of Spain, England was enraged at what she considered a violation of the compact, and denied strenuously that Palmerston had ever given his assent to the Coburg candidature. English historians charge Guizot with duplicity and deceit; French writers throw the blame on Palmerston, whom they accuse of desiring

the humiliation of France, on the ground that the French were unreliable allies instigated by an overweening ambition. Wherever the truth may lie, it is certain that the affair resulted in injuries to the French government that had been unforeseen by Guizot, who had lost sight of the ulterior consequences in his loyalty to the house whose interests he was promoting. There is not a hint in his *Mémoires* of the ruin which his policy caused or of the attempts that the king made afterwards to justify his conduct in the eyes of the queen of England. He was at least guilty of a suppression of these facts of the case, even if he was not intentionally deceitful in his attitude toward England. The results of this breach of the alliance were exceedingly disastrous. The *bourgeoisie* charged the king with dynastic selfishness in his willingness to sacrifice the welfare of France in seeking to strengthen his own family, and the government with breaking the peace and with endangering their interests. They argued that Guizot having first compromised his country's honour in his concessions to England in order to maintain the alliance, had further compromised France by a dishonourable intrigue against England for the benefit of the house of Orléans.

This act of Guizot, which, in estranging the *bourgeoisie* from its own government, gave joy to the radicals, increased in its remoter consequences the radical hostility, and deeply offended the liberal party. The rupture of the English alliance meant the separation of the two Powers that had in the main supported the liberal cause in Europe since 1827, and was seized upon by the eastern and reactionary Powers as offering a fit opportunity for a bolder prosecution of their plans of repression. The constitution of Poland having been overthrown in 1831, in consequence of the insurrection of the year before, that country had remained quiet until 1846, when a revolt broke out in the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria. As a result the three eastern Powers did not hesitate to violate the

conditions of 1815 by overthrowing the independence of the free city of Cracow, which had been guaranteed by all the Powers at Vienna. This was not only an act of high-handed aggression, but it was also a discourtesy to the western signers of the treaty, who were not even invited to discuss the question. Both France and England protested against it, but as the recent rupture made joint action impossible, their protests failed of any effect. In consequence, the radicals declared that liberalism had lost its place as an efficient principle in the councils of Europe; and seeing in the unfortunate Spanish affair the cause of all the evil, they accused the ministry of Guizot of sympathising with the policy of Metternich, of deserting the liberal program, and of violating the doctrines of 1830.

The peril of the government was not lessened by Guizot's attempt to strengthen his position in Europe by a new alliance. Cut off from friendly relations with England, he turned to the very Powers against whose action he had just protested, and made overtures to Austria in the hope of isolating England by forming a union of the Powers without her. In so doing he took a decided step in the direction of reaction, and, hoping to win the friendship of Austria, joined Austria, Russia, and Prussia in supporting the reactionary movement of the Sonderbund in Switzerland. He agreed to meet the three Powers at Neufchâtel, where Metternich was desirous of proclaiming anew the doctrine of intervention, and even declared himself willing to depart so far from the Périer policy as to take part in an armed interference to aid the Jesuits and the Sonderbund against the progressive and liberal party of the Union. About the same time he expressed his approval of Austria's occupying Ferrara in order to check the reform work of Pius IX., and wrote to Metternich that the French policy of resistance was in closest harmony with the policy of Austria. No wonder that Lamartine could say to Guizot in the debate that followed the opening of the session of 1847 and 1848: "Since

the day when you entered upon your policy in regard to Spain, your actions have been one long contradiction. As a result France contrary to her nature, in opposition to her interests has become Ghibelline at Rome, sacerdotal at Berne, Austrian in Piedmont, Russian at Cracow, French nowhere, counter-revolutionary everywhere." It is remarkable, as Martin says, that Guizot, who was "so fine an analyser of past events," should not have been able "to grasp things going on before his own eyes; he saw them as he would have them, not as they were."

Adherence to such a policy was suicidal. For the French government to turn deliberately from the alliance with England and to join itself to Austria; to sacrifice the interests of France for those of the Orléans dynasty; to commit the state to a defence of the principles of Metternich, when the majority of the French people were supporters of the cause of political liberty and constitutional progress, was in itself enough to destroy its moral influence if not to undermine its political supremacy. The bitterness became more intense when, with the retirement of Marshal Soult, in 1847, Guizot became the real chief of the cabinet of which hitherto he had been minister of foreign affairs. This advance of Guizot to the presidency of the council made it clear that the king was determined to persist in a course the unpopularity of which had been evident for many years.

But though an unpopular foreign policy may be a source of weakness to a government, it is rarely enough in itself to provoke insurrection and revolt. It is true that France was rapidly approaching that condition described by Normanby, when he said that there existed "neither political attachment to any individual, nor the slightest respect for any existing institution"; that the state of society was one in which a revolution might easily break out, if only the occasion should arise which would demand unanimity on the part of the diverse elements

forming the opposition, if only the governmental policy were applied to some question that concerned intimately the political liberty of all classes of citizens. Such a situation had not, however, arisen until the question of the suffrage, that is, of parliamentary and electoral reform, which had been discussed from time to time since 1818, became of sufficient interest and importance to demand immediate settlement. The grievance was threefold: in administration, that is, in the management of the business of the state as a whole, centralisation was too great; in the organisation of the Chamber of Deputies too many members were dependent on the government for official positions, and were, in consequence, supporters of the governmental policy less from conviction than from necessity; and lastly, in the elections the right of voting was limited to too small a part of the population.

Of these grievances, which we shall here examine in turn, the first was important, not only because it tended to make the state all-powerful at the expense of the community and the individual, but also because it increased the governmental patronage and made possible the long-continued governmental majority. Such administrative centralisation had made difficult in the past any development of local self-government, and had rendered it inevitable that matters of purely local concern should be under the control of the central authority. In the revision of the Charta and in later laws certain steps had been taken to secure greater local initiative; but even with these changes, which increased the powers of the departmental and municipal councils, the smaller bodies had very little actual power. The liberals were led to make this question a part of their program, not so much because of their desire to obtain local administrative rights, as because they felt that the government was trying to gain party supporters by bartering its offices for votes. They advocated decentralisation, believing that by throwing more responsibility upon the deputies from the provinces it would

increase their experience and efficiency, and would make them more independent in their opinions and ballots.

The question was thus closely connected with that of parliamentary reform, whereby the majority in the Chamber should be made more representative, even of that small body of electors who, under the limited franchise of the Charta, were given the right to vote. This body of electors, the legal nation (*pays légal*), was defined by a property qualification of from two to three hundred francs, and consisted of about 200,000 voters, mainly of the *bourgeoisie*. It was the governing body of the country, and exercised its legal rights in spite of the opposition of republicans and socialists. This opposition would, however, have been less effectual had the management of the elections within the *pays légal* itself been strictly honourable, and had the majority in the Chamber been actually an expression of the will of the majority of the 200,000 electors. But such was not the case. The majorities that the government gained in 1846 and 1847 were obtained, not by a fair and free casting of ballots at the polls, but by the exercise of ministerial patronage, by personal influence, and, what is much more serious, by the use of corrupt methods. By promising office to those who were candidates, by promising advancement to those who had been elected, by granting advantages and privileges to constituents, honours to relatives, opportunities for wealth to those who had capital to invest—by such means the government was able to attach to itself the deputies who were willing to be thus bought and sold It is estimated that of the 450 deputies who sat in the Chamber of 1847, 193 were holding offices under the government. "This majority," says Normanby, "is notoriously obtained by the grossest corruption. . . . Many of [the members] are brought up, to the neglect of their various functions in different parts of the country, to support the government. A portion of them are removable at pleasure,—all depend upon the government equally for promotion. . . .

They are called upon to vote upon a question which directly affects their own position in the Chamber, and against a government, which unscrupulously exercises control on their actions; and by the present manner of voting, each of these dependent creatures has to walk up one flight of steps to the tribune, and standing within a few paces of the minister of the interior, with his eyes fixed upon him, to place a ball either in a white or black urn, and then descend the opposite flight of steps, and pass close by the ministers on returning to his place."

It is little wonder that under such circumstances the government should have been able to maintain its majority vote in the Chamber; and it is clear why the enemies of the party in power should have stigmatised the ministers and the deputies as a close corporation, selfishly determined to retain by corrupt means or otherwise its grasp upon power. If Guizot was not directly implicated in this buying and selling, he at least laid himself open to the charge that was brought against him in the Chamber at the time, of having participated in an affair of a very doubtful character; and he was undoubtedly guilty of conniving at corrupt practices for the purpose of preserving the policy of resistance to which his ministry was committed. By reason of this manipulation of the parliamentary system France was reduced to a condition of political torpor. It is estimated that not more than one-fifth of those privileged to vote took part in the election of 1847, that is, the Chamber of Deputies was returned by 40,000 actual electors, and the will of the kingdom was expressed by a body of deputies who represented only one in five of those legally entitled to vote, and only one in two hundred of the adult male population of the state. Parliamentary practices in France in 1847 presented some striking contradictions. The government adhering strictly to the Charta, and in no way troubling itself about the origin of the majority in the Chamber, believed that it was maintaining a

free parliamentary system so long as it had this majority. On the other hand this majority was worthless as a representative of the people, nor was its existence a guarantee that the ministry had the sympathy and support even of the *bourgeoisie*. It was not representative because it did not voice the will of the nation; it was not constitutional because it did not express the views of the majority of those legally entitled to vote. Guizot, with that deplorable lack of insight that he had already shown in the matter of the Spanish marriages and the Sonderbund war, failed to realise that the majority upon which he depended was not a veritable representative majority, such as the free parliamentary government for which he pleads in his *Mémoires* demands. His doctrinairism, his want of the habits of a man of the world, his contempt for the opinions of others, and his faith in the legality of his own position, blinded him to the crisis that confronted him.

But let us pass on to the third grievance. The ministry made a serious blunder when it refused to consider the question of parliamentary reform, that is, the reduction of the number of those who, holding office under the government, were at the same time members of the Chamber; but by stubbornly standing out against an extension of the franchise, it precipitated the revolution and drew down ruin upon itself and the monarchy alike. In nearly every session since 1842 had this question under one form or another been discussed. The radicals, notably Arago in his paper, demanded universal suffrage, but this the nation at large did not desire. The constitutional opposition led by Thiers, though likewise opposed to any such sweeping change, desired that the government should definitely pledge itself to a measure for extending the franchise to certain classes of citizens qualified by intelligence and education; and tried by every parliamentary means to break down the passivity of the government, and to effect the passage of a measure of this character. But as long as the majority voted down all

bills brought in by the opposition, Guizot refused to bring in a bill of his own; for both he and the king believed that the policy of resistance was necessary to prevent revolutions and to give France peace, and both thought that, were concessions made to the liberals, the control of the government would fall into the hands of another party and the policy would be sacrificed. The king was too old to enter heartily into the spirit of progress which dominated France, and there still lingered in his mind a horror of revolution and a belief in the will of the prince. To grant measures of reform would be, he believed, to make concessions to anarchy. When it was reported to him that many deputies had voted against the measure brought in by the opposition in 1847, because of the promise of the ministry to bring forward the next year a measure of its own, he replied, "Ah! they said that, did they, my ministers! But I have promised nothing. Never will I consent to a reform; consider that as definitely said." Guizot on the other hand did not share the king's objection either to parliamentary or to electoral reform, for he considered them both to be "the natural and legitimate consequences of the upward movement of society and of the continued exercise of political liberty." But he was convinced that the time had not come for such reforms. "I cannot find among us to-day," he said, "in the actual state of society, any real or serious motive, any motive worthy of a free and sensible country, to justify the proposed electoral reform." He thoroughly believed that all abuses would disappear with a gradual improvement of political habits and customs, and declared that the proposed measure was an outrage upon the majority, inasmuch as the excitement attending it had been stirred up by newspapers and journalists, and was in no way expressive of the real feeling of the legal body of electors. Upon the existence of a constant majority in the Chamber of Deputies Guizot based this opinion. "As a result of many elections," he says, "the liberty and legality of which cannot

be seriously contested, the preponderating influence of the middle class has led, both in the Chamber and in the country, to the formation of a majority who approved the policy [of resistance], wished it maintained, and supported it through the difficulties and tests both internal and external to which circumstances subjected it." This was a strictly parliamentary position, and would have been tenable, had not the minister been the dupe of a mistake. The king and Guizot were superstitious believers in something that was unreal. The parliamentary majority was a fiction; yet upon it they based their adherence to a policy of immobility and inertness, and opposed the demands of constitutional liberals and republicans alike.

It was a striking situation, the more so because of the age and experience of the king and the superior intelligence of Guizot. While Germany was increasing the number of her constitutional states, and was progressing rapidly along economic, social, and administrative lines; while Holland and Spain were improving their governments and adopting measures of reform; while the liberals of Switzerland were winning victories over the Sonderbund; while Pius IX. was opening his pontificate with promises of better government; and while England under Palmerston was encouraging liberalism abroad and was reaping the fruits of electoral and industrial progress at home—while the liberal movement was thus gaining ground everywhere, France stood unchanged, because her leading statesman, having by corrupt means gained a governmental majority, thought that it was a representative and truly parliamentary majority, and defended his position by reference to it.

When the cabinet was brought face to face with the Chambers in the spring of 1847, it came unprepared with a program, for the discussion of the two previous years, over the question of the Spanish marriages, had so absorbed its time and energy that it had paid but little attention to the many indispensable

measures that must confront any legislative body at so critical a period. But the government, making no attempt to rectify its mistake, shielded itself behind its time-honoured policy. Its position, supported as it was by a legal majority of votes in the Chamber, seemed invulnerable, and against it the opposition hurled itself in vain. Compare the measures proposed during that session with those actually passed. In the group of rejected laws were projects to reduce the tax on salt, to reform the postal system, to reform prisons, to lighten the military burdens, to extend liberty of education to secondary schools, to regulate the relations between employer and employee, to increase ministerial responsibility, to revise the jury system, and finally to reform the electoral and parliamentary system. Of the laws passed Guizot mentions but three, and these relate not to social and political amelioration but to railways. Rightly could Montalembert sum up the work of the session in the three famous words, "Nothing, nothing, nothing!" and with justice could Lamartine say that so far as the government was concerned "the genius of statesmen consisted solely in planting themselves in the situation created for them by chance or revolution, and in remaining there motionless, inert, implacable to every amelioration."

Thwarted in the Chamber the liberal party turned to the country, determined to test the reiterated statement of the ministry that the country neither wanted nor was ready for reform. "If we are wrong," said the opposition, "and the ministers right, then we will cease to pursue the question. It is important for us to be instructed upon this point—do the people wish reform or do they not?" In consequence of this determination a series of "reform banquets" were planned in July, 1847, under the general direction of Duvergier de Hauranne, an ex-*doctrinaire*, and Odilon Barrot of the Left, to be held in the various cities of France for the purpose of finding out the wishes of the people upon this important

question. Every effort was made to avoid extravagance and to escape any entanglement with the party of the extreme Left—a difficult matter, for Thiers by refusing to associate himself personally with the movement, had made it appear, for the moment, that the Left Centre was unwilling to co-operate. This fortunately proved not to be true, for a number of Thiers's friends expressed their sympathy with the plan and rendered hearty assistance. Toasts were drunk at the majority of the banquets *au roi constitutionnel*, and in but one instance, at Lille, was there any marked attempt of the radical and revolutionary forces to control the meeting. Beginning as had the movement between the sessions of the legislatures of 1846–7 and 1847–8, it took the form of a campaign manœuvre for the purpose of sounding popular opinion, and of increasing popular interest in the projects for reform. By means of it the constitutional opposition had no other object than to accomplish a legitimate end by legitimate means; but they soon found that they had given to the revolutionary agitators an instrument of which they were not slow to avail themselves. Banquets for revolutionary rather than constitutional purposes were held at Châlons, Dijon, Autun, and other places; and on these occasions speeches were made of a radical, anti-constitutional, and even anti-social character, full of the bitterness that had been accumulating for eighteen years. Among the leaders was Lamartine, whose *History of the Girondins*, better called *A Glorification of the Reign of Terror*, was strengthening the cause of revolution by minimising its horrors. At a banquet in Mâcon, his birthplace, Lamartine prophesied that in consequence of the outraged public conscience there would be a new uprising against the government; and in the Chamber a few months after, he said to the ministry during the debate on the right of the government to suppress the banquets: "Who gave you authority to place the hand of the police upon the mouth of France? Have you forgotten that the meeting

in the tennis court, which though but a meeting to effect reform, ended in a revolution?"

But in the general discussion the constitutional opposition had not committed itself to the cause of the revolutionists, for it had conducted its campaign strictly according to the principle of "reform to avoid revolution." The banquets did, it is true, stir the passions of the people and rouse the country out of the political lethargy into which it had fallen, but they did not precipitate a revolution. One more expression of the policy of resistance was needed to complete the rupture with the nation, and to render hopeless the cause of the monarchy. When in December, 1847, the Chambers again came together, those who had studied the political and social condition of France saw clearly that the future lay in the hands of the king and the ministry; that there were two currents of opinion moving in France, one toward reform, the other toward revolution, and that it lay with the government to choose between them. Legally the government was still strong: it had scrupulously observed the letter of the Charta; it had followed in its acts all the required legal forms. What would the new session bring forth? Would the ministry retire, or would it, even against the will of the king, support reform? The acts of the month of January, 1848, would settle irrevocably whether the policy of resistance or the policy of reform were to triumph. Should the government recognise the importance of yielding to the wishes of the country, as unmistakably expressed in the agitation aroused by the "reform banquets," the continuance of the July Monarchy would be assured, inasmuch as the revolutionists, encouraged by the death in 1842 of the Duke of Orléans, the only able son of Louis Philippe, had agreed to take no action till after the death of the old king. But should it persevere in its doctrine of inaction and oppose the wishes of the nation, the issue would be uncertain. It might be, as Lamartine said, revolu-

tion. Soberer men simply knew that things could not last as they were, and awaited with anxiety the results of the new session.

The debate in the Chamber, which followed the king's opening speech, began on January 17th, and lasted with few intermissions until February 12th. The gravity of the crisis called forth from the opposition oratory of the most brilliant character. Lamartine, Odilon Barrot, Thiers, and Billault led the hostile forces, and attacked the governmental position with all the vigour and eloquence at their command. They made use of all the past charges: they outlined the policy of resistance; they analysed the motives of Guizot; they discussed and criticised his desertion of the liberal cause, his sacrifice of the interests of the nation for those of the dynasty, his methods of obtaining a parliamentary majority; and lastly, they denied the right of the government to suppress the banquets. Through all this verbal castigation the ministry sat unmoved, and scarcely tried to enter upon any defence. It met the charges with a shrug of the shoulders, and declared its intention of applying still further the policy of resistance. Guizot, who was well aware of the seriousness of the situation, proposed to the king that the cabinet retire, saying that men sincerely attached to the dynasty could certainly be found in the opposition, who would make reform and the defence of the monarchy their main objects. But the king would not agree to any change, saying that he needed the old ministers to save him from this first concession, which he was convinced would be a fatal one. Guizot therefore remained, and in his resolve not to abandon the king he took his stand once more on the parliamentary majority and refused to commit the government to any promise of reform. Although from the larger point of view the ministry and the *doctrinaires* generally were responsible for the calamities that followed, the fault in this crisis rested with Louis Philippe, and with him alone.

When it became known that the ministerial policy was unchanged, and an amendment favouring reform, which had been appended to the address to test the Chamber, had been rejected by the majority; when the ministry in an infamous speech of Hébert, keeper of the seals, denied the right of Frenchmen to meet in political discussion; the opposition determined to turn once more to the people to test the legality of such a doctrine regarding public meetings, which, Lord Normanby says, "no minister for the last 150 years would have ever ventured to pronounce in England." The challenge was given and accepted. Two large banquets had already been planned at Paris, and in one of these, that of the twelfth arrondissement, the constitutional opposition determined to take part. Its object in the first instance seems to have been to test the constitutionality of the government's position by means of a banquet reunion on the 22d of February, which should be followed by peaceful arrests and a trial before the court of cassation. To this plan the government agreed, and it was hoped that the crisis had been peacefully averted. But when on the 21st of February it became known that a procession of large proportions was planned to accompany the meeting as a manifestation of public feeling, the consent of the government was withdrawn. When this was made known to the opposition the deputies after a long discussion decided to give up the banquet altogether; because, feeling sure that a collision would take place between the populace and the police if such a popular demonstration were made, they preferred to risk their own popularity rather than to run the chance of a civil war. The memoirs of Normanby and Odilon Barrot show how alive the deputies were to the dangers that threatened France from the formidable radical and revolutionary elements in Paris. They knew that their own plan for electoral reform fell far short of the views of the most extreme radicals, who were only awaiting the opportunity of the king's death to excite another

insurrection. The immediate danger was the more serious from the fact that the streets of the city were thronged with crowds of people, large numbers of whom had come up from the provinces ready to take part in any movement against the government.

When the decision of the deputies to give up the banquet was known throughout Paris, the excitement instead of diminishing increased. Lamartine and other deputies, who had voted against the decision, declared that they would not be bound by the opinion of the majority. Officers of the national guard, which was to have accompanied the procession as originally planned, were enraged by the news, and vowed that this new insult would cost the king dear. Deputations of students from the schools came to the house of Odilon Barrot and charged the deputies with "desertion in the presence of the enemy." Partly to appease the people the deputies of the opposition drew up an injudicious accusation against the cabinet, in which were repeated all the old charges of corruption at home and humiliation abroad,—an unfortunate act in that it in no way aided the reform cause, and only served to increase the popular excitement. During the 22d the events were unimportant. Crowds wandered about the city, crying, "Down with Guizot! Long live reform!" Windows were broken and a few barricades were built; but nothing serious happened. It was not until the afternoon of the 23d that the national guard refused to act against the people in the service of a government that it detested. Its defection, accompaning a movement that was rapidly becoming an insurrection, roused the king from his position of fancied security. The revolt was not yet revolution, and Louis Philippe, struck with consternation at the situation, determined to prevent trouble by sacrificing his minister. On the same afternoon Guizot was dismissed. The insurrectionists awaited with expectancy Guizot's successor. He was the opportunist Molé, an appointment which in no way bettered the situation. The secret societies, notably the

Rights of Man and the *Seasons*, were urging the revolutionists to complete their work thus auspiciously begun. The new minister lost valuable time in his attempt to formulate a program; for while the king was grudgingly conceding a few of the many demands of the opposition, barricades were rapidly rising in all parts of the city, and the republicans, organised, armed, and determined, were already preparing for definite action. At last, on the 24th the king called Barrot and Thiers to the ministry, but unfortunately placed the regular troops under the command of Marshal Bugeaud, who was hated by the people. This attempt to provide adequate military defence came too late. Already had the regulars come into conflict with the crowd in a wretched *mêlée*, in which about a hundred men had been killed or wounded; and the people, exasperated and suspicious, would listen to no proposal that had for its object the preservation of the king's power. In vain did Odilon Barrot attempt to harangue them as he drove from point to point in the city. "They are deceiving us now as they did in 1830," the people insisted, and already the cries of "Down with Louis Philippe!" "Vengeance for our slaughtered brothers!" were accompanied with, "Long live the republic!" Said Arago, "Unless the king have abdicated before evening there will be a revolution." The situation had passed beyond the control of the liberals; it was now in the hands of the men of the sections, of the faubourgs. Reform had become revolution, and with the mob already at the gates of the Tuileries, with Émile de Girardin declaring that nothing less than the abdication of the king could prevent a more violent outbreak, with the king's sons urging him to the act, Louis Philippe hurriedly wrote that blotted document that closed his rule over the people of France. "I abdicate that crown, which the national voice called me to bear, in favour of my grandson, Count of Paris. May he succeed in the great task which has fallen to him to-day."

Thus, after a blunderingly inadequate defence on the part of the government, the July Monarchy fell at the hands of an audacious Parisian mob aided by revolutionary recruits from the provinces. In all the arrangements from the 22d to the 24th of February the government seemed always one day behind the revolution. The republicans, entering upon the last of many insurrectionary movements, brought experience, organisation, and confidence to bear upon the situation; while on the other side the king was hampering the ministers by his indecision and stubbornness. But however many were the mistakes committed by those in authority during those eventful days, the fact remains that no amount of promptness, efficiency, or show of authority could have strengthened the foundations of the monarchy or have given it a long lease of life, unless a very radical change in policy had been made. In reality the July Monarchy was not overthrown, it crumbled away. In appearance strong, it was in fact wanting in that which alone could give it permanence, a place in the sympathies of the people of France. One by one during its eighteen years of power had the bulwarks of its strength been removed, until now scarcely anything remained to support it. One act after another had alienated the different portions of the population. Those who were not hostile or dissatisfied were weary of the prosaic *bourgeois* rule. Where one class saw an enemy, and another a constitutional opponent, a third, and that by far the largest, saw vulgarity and commonplaceness. France lost all respect for the monarchy that ruled over her, and when a Parisian mob threw itself against the weakened structure, it became evident that no ties of loyalty bound together the king and the people. As the government of the king collapsed and his own personal power vanished, France looked on indifferently, and saw without a sigh the passing away of a leadership, the memory of which recalled only the humiliation of the state.

But the populace was not satisfied with the retirement of

Guizot and the abdication of the king. When the Chambers took up the question of the dynasty, and Dupin and Odilon Barrot tried to save the crown for the young Count of Paris, in whose favour the king abdicated, popular feeling expressed itself more emphatically than before. Inasmuch as the Chamber was in no sense the true representative of France, because its majority was the result not of a fair election but of governmental abuse, and had been created in the face of the opposition not merely of a party but of the nation as well, such a Chamber was not the mouthpiece of the nation and should no longer be allowed to exercise power and to impose its will upon France. So the people argued. "The right of regency," said Ledru-Rollin, "appertains only to the sovereign people"; and the crowd cried, "Down with the Chamber!" "Disperse the deputies!" The mob, fresh from the assault on the Tuileries, invaded the Chamber, shouting, "No more Bourbons! a provisional government and after that the republic!" and in the midst of the confusion, the regency of the Duchess of Orléans and the dynastic rights of the Count of Paris were lost sight of, the president of the Chamber disappeared through a convenient door, deputies of the Centre silently took themselves away, and out of the uproar and the turmoil, in the same chamber where so long had reigned the policy of resistance, there gradually arose a new government, the so-called government of the people. Born of a republican orgy, named by two or three republican leaders, and confirmed by some forty or fifty deputies and a band of a few hundred excited revolutionists who had crowded into the chamber with butcher knives and muskets, this government placed itself at the head of affairs, although it had received no authority from the people it was supposed to represent. The control of France passed into the hands of the extreme Left, the seat of power was removed from the Chamber of Deputies to the Hôtel de Ville, and the last trace of the July Monarchy disappeared.

The new government was from the outset under the leadership of Lamartine, to whom more than to anyone else was due its success in controlling the people. It claimed for itself no other powers than those of a provisory character, exercised for the purpose of organising the victory of the revolutionists, and of conserving the public safety. It knew that it had no constituent powers, that it had no right to determine the form of the new *régime*, and it fully understood that its functions were administrative and not constitutional; yet, forced on by the pressure brought to bear by the Parisian populace, against the better judgment of many of its own members, without consulting the wishes of the nation, without waiting for the opinion of any other element than that which surrounded the Hôtel de Ville, it took a step of the most momentous character,—it assumed all the prerogatives of a constituent assembly and changed at one stroke the form of government in France. Not content with dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, and with forbidding the Chamber of Peers to reassemble, it issued a proclamation establishing the republic, granting to every citizen the right to vote, and authorising the summons of a National Assembly as soon as the voting system should be put in working order. Thus was founded the second republic, based on the right of universal suffrage; and the remarkable fact is that the new order never at any time received the legal sanction of the people of France, for when the National Assembly met it was not even asked to consider the question. The people accepted the new government less from conviction than from fear. As Normanby says, "No one likes the Republic or was the least prepared for it; yet everyone is determined to support it through disgust of all of which they have got rid, and from nothing else presenting itself that would be better borne." Such a fact hardly augured well for the long tenure of the new system.

The establishment of the second republic completed that cycle in the political history of France, which having begun in 1815

with the doctrine of divine right and with power in the hands of the Right and Right Centre, passed on to government by constitutional fiction with power in the hands of the old Left Centre, and finally entered upon the government by the people in the hands of the republican and socialistic Left. The old republican party now became the conservative supporters of government, and all the other parties, Orléanists, Legitimists, Bonapartists, socialists, and anarchists, as parties, not as individuals, became the opponents, the enemies of the republic. The small body of seven, afterwards eleven, men composing the provisional government found themselves at the head of a republic that stood for no guaranteed liberties, for no liberties denied by the preceding government, and represented no definite progress as had the government of 1830. It was an experiment, and its leaders looked into a future more uncertain than any since 1793, and faced problems darker than any since those of the first republic. That the provisional government, which was without national foundation, without other authority than that which it assumed to itself, and without that sense of conviction which comes from the unanimous adherence of parties, was able to maintain its power during four eventful months, in the face of odds that would have crushed many a more stable government, was due in the main to the want of a definite plan among the opponents of the republic, and to the firmness and ability of the chief men who made up its government,—to Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, Arago, Garnier-Pagès the elder, Louis Blanc, Marrast, Marie. To the first more than to any other man was it due, in those early days when the red flag was waving conspicuously at the head of the insurgents, that the revolution did not end in a reign of terror. "For sixty hours," says Normanby, "the government was in the presence of an infuriated rabble, half drunk, and almost all armed." But by the force of his eloquence Lamartine held back the people, and by his wit and personal courage turned every opportunity to his

advantage, put the masses to shame, and at the same time won their respect and admiration. His calmness and moderation in the work of administration equalled his presence of mind in the face of danger. As the fact became evident that the republic meant order and not anarchy, the adherents to the new government increased in number. Supporters of the old monarchy, members of the late opposition, Legitimists, and others rallied to the defence of the republic, believing that in so doing they were acting for the best good of France. Deputations came from the schools, the bar, the church, the army, and the labouring classes to express their approval of the firm attitude taken by the new government; and the more intelligent men of France were willing in the emergency to give a speedy encouragement to the men who, sitting in the Hôtel de Ville, were endeavouring by every means in their power to guarantee order at home and to inspire confidence abroad. Whether their adherence would be permanent was another question; whether the nation as a whole desired the republic and would support it at the polls was yet to be tested; the important fact for the moment was that the new government stood for order as over against anarchy, moderation as over against radicalism, security of person and property as over against revolution accompanied with conflagration and pillage. These reasons, rather than any loyalty to republican principles, account for the fact that the provisional government received the support of so many diverse elements at this critical period; and truly did it deserve the respect it inspired. If it was the outcome of a hasty and ill-judged movement, and was in respect of the cause it represented an error from the point of view of political progress; if it reaffirmed the old principles of 1793, and made liberty, equality, and fraternity its watchwords; nevertheless, accepting the situation as a *fait accompli*, it set its face deliberately against further disturbance, whether reactionary or revolutionary, announced its determination to maintain

tranquillity at home and to avoid war abroad, and to trust to the progress of intelligence rather than to the force of arms.

But the government had social as well as political problems to deal with. The real question at issue in 1848 was not that of electoral reform, but that of capital *versus* labour, which the government of Louis Philippe had made more difficult of solution by its partiality to the interests of the *pays légal*. The electoral limitations had drawn a sharp line between the capitalists with full electoral privileges, and the working class with none. The latter had thus been set apart by themselves, and struggling against the new conditions of labour, fighting poverty and distress, they had come to look with envy and hatred upon the *bourgeoisie*, who, themselves prosperous, had upheld a selfish electoral policy and refused to pass laws lightening the burdens of the oppressed. Masses of books, pamphlets, and leaflets, circulating with rapidity during the months preceding the revolution, had reached these classes, and had furnished them with theories much more practical than those of St. Simon and Fourier regarding the organisation of society and the right to work. These theories, definite and simple in themselves, meant one thing to their author and another to those who put them into practice. To the conservative in 1848 socialism meant more than a public control of production, accompanied with distribution according to some ideal standard; it meant defiance of order, disregard of the rights of individuals, the employment of revolt for the gaining of ends, pillage, terror, and all the other accompaniments of those republican uprisings that had threatened France for eighteen years. The speeches and acts of those who seemingly represented socialism tended to confirm this view. "We demand," said Marche, the spokesman of a deputation that forced its way into the Hôtel de Ville, "the extermination of property and capitalists, the immediate installation of the proletariat in community of goods, the proscription of the bankers, the rich,

the merchants, the bourgeois of every condition above those of wage earners . . . [we demand] the acceptance of the red flag to signify to society its defeat, to the people its victory, to Paris the Terror, to all foreign governments invasion." Such a doctrine indicates what the more conservative elements of France feared from the supremacy of the socialists, and explains in large part why they rallied around the provisional government, when it was found that a majority of its members was determined to resist any such application of the socialistic doctrine.

But the government could not summarily dismiss the question that had been the real issue of the revolution. It owed its own existence to a body of radical deputies and a mob to whom the republic meant socialism or nothing. Among its own members were Louis Blanc and Albert, who enthusiastically advocated governmental support of socialistic doctrines; while around it for sixty exciting hours at the Hôtel de Ville raged a mob of socialists of the most radical type, whose apostle was Louis Blanc and whose argument was force. Although there can be little doubt that the majority of the government was opposed to the doctrines and schemes of Louis Blanc, it took up the new problem, either from necessity or from a hope of bringing the whole system into discredit. Aided by the shouts of the mob outside the minority won the day: it was agreed that the plan of Louis Blanc should be tried. Government aid was to be extended to the furtherance of the new schemes, in accordance with the doctrine of the *droit au travail*, the right of the unemployed labourer to demand work of the government, and the obligation of the government to furnish such work when demanded. On the 25th of February, in order to satisfy some five or six thousand clamouring socialists, an address dictated by Louis Blanc was issued to the workingmen containing this paragraph: "The government agrees to guarantee the existence of the workman by labour and work to all citizens; it

recognises the fact that the workmen ought to form associations among themselves in order to enjoy the benefits of their labour, and it will give back to the workmen, to whom it belongs, the million which will soon become due on the civil list." That the decree might be put into execution Louis Blanc demanded that a "minister of labour and progress" be appointed to concern himself with all labour problems that might arise, and that arrangements be made for the formation of co-operative associations. But instead of a minister a committee was appointed "to study ardently and to solve," so reads the commission, the problem of the long and unjust sufferings of the labouring classes. At its head was Louis Blanc, its vice-president was Albert, its seat, the Luxemburg. Instead of taking the initiative in reform, and performing its work with rapidity and dispatch, it could only recommend. With the committee sat delegates sent from trade-unions of the city, and at this labour parliament were discussed projects for the betterment of the relations between labour and capital. Something was accomplished. A few of its proposals, one concerning the sweating system, another limiting a day's work to ten hours, were adopted by the government, and became laws. In other instances the commission brought a moral influence to bear in the settlement of disputes, and made a number of interesting experiments in co-operation. The Great Northern railway, for instance, reduced the hours of its workmen from ten to nine and admitted them to a share in the profits of the railway. Far as all this was from the socialistic ideal, it proved to be too extreme for those who looked with dread upon all socialistic experiments. On one side the socialists claimed that the government desired to embarrass Louis Blanc, to get him out of the way by locating him and all his schemes across the river at the Luxemburg, and so destroy his influence with the crowd by taking away all power to act, thus making him and his debating club ridiculous in the eyes of the revolution-

ists. On the other the anti-socialists, who considered the commission a menace to the city, and the Luxemburg a rallying point for all the revolutionary and anarchistic elements, censured the government for allowing so dangerous a centre of radical opinion to exist.

But the government could not stop at this point, for having guaranteed the *droit au travail* it was obliged to make some attempt to fulfil its promise. Owing to the crisis brought on by the revolution, and to the speculation and stock-jobbing that had preceded it, the number of idle labourers was exceptionally large. Failures were imminent, industry was at a standstill, factories were closed, loans were difficult to obtain, and workmen were thrown out of employment. On March 9th, four thousand tradesmen came to the government to complain of the ruin that had come upon their business. In Rouen alone it was estimated that 20,000 workmen had been dismissed from the factories. When therefore the government opened the great buildings—*ateliers nationaux*—that had been constructed on the banks of the Seine, and promised two francs a day to all workmen actually employed and one franc and a half a day to those obliged to remain idle, labourers hastened to Paris in such numbers that by April 9th there were 59,000 enrolled in the workshops. By the 15th this number had risen to 66,000, and by May 14th, according to the *Moniteur* of that day, from 115,000 to 120,000 were in Paris supported by pay from the state. Of these many were needy workmen who were willing to earn their wages, but many more were idlers who meant to work as little as possible for the wages they received. The result of this governmental guarantee was that the private workshops in the large cities of the provinces as well as in Paris were deserted by those who might have obtained work there. Inasmuch, therefore, as the national workshops could not provide occupation for more than 14,000 men a day, the situation took the form of a general strike of

about 100,000 men supported by the government. The wages of the idlers amounted to strike pay, the wages paid to those who were set at work excavating in the Champ de Mars, were equally a drain on the government, inasmuch as the labour was unproductive, netting the government no return. The immediate effect of receiving into the workshops the good and the bad, the skilled and the unskilled labourers alike, without regard to ability, honesty, or deserts, was to pauperise the working classes, and to encourage conspiracy and revolution. And the danger was the greater in that each of these workmen was a citizen of the new republic and a member of the national guard. Possessed of the right to vote and to carry arms, this body of 100,000 labourers became the army whose leaders were at the Luxemburg, whose camp was the street, whose recruiting ground was the workshops, and whose grievance was that the government had deceived it. It received its instructions from the three hundred clubs that were organised during the revolution, which in turn were directed from the central revolutionary committee, the club of clubs.

Thus it is evident that Paris was divided into two hostile camps: one the majority of the provisional government, supported by the better elements in the city and the country, anti-socialistic, without sympathy for the proletariat to whose relief and organisation the government had officially committed itself; the other, the commission of the Luxemburg, the national workshops, and the clubs, representing an organised proletariat ready to turn and rend the government that had called it into existence. In the face of such a threatening body, the organised and armed supporters of doctrines which the *bourgeoisie* believed to be subversive of peace and order, it is little wonder that the government of the republic appeared to be the only mainstay of society. Imminent as the danger was it proved in reality greater than could have been anticipated. For four months the republic was called upon to defend itself

against the distrust, hatred, and organised hostility of the very body into whose hands it had given the weapons of attack.

The war between the proletariat and the government increased in intensity as the cause of the radicals became more and more hopeless. The first struggle was, however, due less to social grievances than to the fear that the new elections would endanger the gains that the radicals had made in the revolution of 1848. The government had proclaimed universal suffrage, which was a cardinal feature of the radical doctrine, and in the elections that were to be held on April 9th the opportunity was given to the French people to express without limitation or qualification their approbation or disapprobation of the work of the government in organising the republic and in establishing the system for the relief of labour. As yet this approval had not been given. In the revolution of 1848 France, indifferent to the July Monarchy, had left the task of overthrowing that government to the radical and socialistic elements in Paris. Did the nation approve of what the republicans of Paris had done? Would the sober second-thought that must inevitably follow the bewilderment of a revolution be socialistic or anti-socialistic, republican or anti-republican? This was the question that only the elections themselves could answer, although there was a general feeling among the conservatives and radicals alike that the results would be anti-socialistic. Lamartine and others who made up the conservative wing of the provisional government feeling reasonably certain that the elections would redound to their advantage, welcomed the prospect. But what brought joy to the conservatives alarmed the members of the radical wing of the government, of which Ledru-Rollin, minister of the interior, was chief. He and the radicals throughout the city agreed that if possible the elections should be postponed until the commissioners appointed by the minister of the interior to spread republican ideas throughout the provinces should have had time to accomplish their work; for they were

convinced that it would not do to endanger the results already gained by the election of an assembly antagonistic to their doctrines. "Whoever," said Ledru-Rollin, "is not willing to recognise that the old society has perished, and that it is necessary to erect a new, will be a deputy lukewarm and dangerous."

In order, therefore, to bring about a postponement of the elections that were to be held on the 9th of April a monster demonstration was prepared in Paris under the leadership of Blanqui, Cabet, Raspail, Sobrier, and others, and supported by Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, and Albert of the provisional government. The clubs had decreed that the republican government must be reorganised in the interests of the socialists, and that their tenure of power must not be disturbed by any unfavourable elections. The plan of the leaders was to force an indefinite postponement of the elections, to purge the provisional government of its conservative members, and to erect a committee of public safety that would undertake at once the task of republicanising the provinces, and of preparing the way for an election that would prove favourable to the maintenance of a Jacobin republic. This demonstration was, therefore, in plan a deliberate attack by one wing of the provisional government, supported by 130,000 of the proletariat, upon the other, but in execution it failed to accomplish any important result. Postponed from one day to another the first demonstration was finally made on March 17th and was eminently peaceful; for though the government refused to grant the larger demands of the insurgents, it consented to postpone the elections till April 23d. This did not however prevent a second demonstration of a much more threatening character, which took place just a week before the elections were held. Thirty or forty thousand men met in the Champ de Mars and advanced against the Hôtel de Ville. Fortunately, however, the national guard, whose loyalty had been severely tested by certain unpop-

ular acts of the government, responded to the call to arms and guarded the City Hall with 50,000 bayonets, and was ready in case of need to respond with 100,000 more. The great demonstration became more subdued in the presence of the *bourgeoisie* of Paris, and the day ended, not with the overthrow of the government, but with a review of the national guard, and the slinking back of the socialists of the street to the workshops and the clubs whence they had come.

The grand result of the events of April 16th was to ensure a peaceful election. The struggle between parties was transferred to the polls, where on April 23d France experimented with a suffrage "the most radically universal," says Barrot, "that had ever been recognised or practised in the world." Eight million electors, under a system of direct and universal suffrage for all persons over twenty-one years of age, voted according to the *scrutin de liste* by secret ballot. The results of this election, the first fair and free test of the opinion of France for many years, were remarkable. In Paris, where the hopes of the socialists had centred, but three of the twenty-four workmen whose names were placed on the ticket, were chosen deputies to the National Assembly. Some of the most influential radical leaders, such as Blanqui, Eugène Sue, and Cabet, obtained scarcely a recognition, and even such representative socialists as Albert, Ledru-Rollin, Flocon, and Louis Blanc stood far down on the list of those elected. The moderate wing of the provisional government was everywhere successful, and Lamartine's victory was complete. In the provinces the returns were no less satisfactory to the friends of order, and showed positively that socialism was supported by a very small minority even among the working classes themselves. But the most striking fact regarding the elections is that nearly one-fourth of the persons elected were Legitimists, that is, monarchists. This large monarchical element made it difficult to determine beforehand the future of the Assembly or the policy

of France, should the socialistic incubus be safely removed. For the moment, however, all the newly elected members were willing to try the experiment of the republic, and were agreed in their wish to support the policy of the moderates.

The result of the elections made the socialists desperate, and the fear of losing their grasp upon power precipitated the struggle and hastened the inevitable issue. The beginning of the end was seen when the country declared against a socialistic republic. The socialists denied that the elections had been fair. Said Louis Blanc: "Universal suffrage has been proclaimed. Is it an expression of the will of the people? Yes! in a society where the conditions are equal. But no! a thousand times, no! when master can say to servant, 'If you do not vote as I desire you shall die; your wife and your children shall die!' Call you that liberty? I swear that it is slavery." But if the elections roused the anger of the radicals they did not in themselves indicate what the policy of the Assembly would be on the question of labour. Here lay the supreme test. Would the Assembly favour the new labour scheme or oppose it? Would it include socialism as part of its program or would it repudiate it forever? On May 10th an executive commission was appointed to take the place of the provisional government, and while Arago, Garnier-Pagès, Marie, and Lamartine were chosen, Louis Blanc, Albert, and Flocon were omitted. Ledru-Rollin was retained, but only because of the express intervention of Lamartine. The "purging" had taken place, but it was of a very different character from that planned by the leaders of the demonstrations of March 17th and April 16th. A few days afterwards Louis Blanc, as deputy, resigning his position as head of the Luxemburg commission, moved the appointment of a minister of labour. By an almost unanimous vote this motion was rejected, and socialism received another blow, which was scarcely lightened by the appointment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the situation,

and to discover means whereby the condition of industrial and agricultural labourers might be improved.

By these two acts the National Assembly put itself on record as opposed to any further strengthening of the cause that Louis Blanc and his associates represented. When the news got abroad that nothing was to be expected of the new body, the clubs condemned the Assembly as antagonistic to the interests of the people. The uprising of April 16th, they declared, had been a warning from which the government had not profited; and now the time had come to carry into effect the threat then made, to execute the sentence then imposed. On May 15th, when the Polish question was to be argued in the chamber, the proletariat, ostensibly to present a petition regarding Poland, moved in large numbers toward the assembly hall. Through carelessness or treason the hall was left unguarded, and the mob burst in waving their flags and shouting for Poland. In vain did their own representatives, Barbès Louis Blanc, and Albert harangue them; in vain did Lamartine try the eloquence of his voice. He was greeted with "Enough of phrases, it is action that we demand." The mob pressed on into the chamber. "Immediate war to save Poland, right of work and bread for the masses, who die of hunger," was the cry. Ledru-Rollin, sobered by the threatening character of the crowd, shouted from the tribune that deliberation under the circumstances was not possible, but was answered by jeers and reminded of the revolution of February. Still they came in even greater numbers, bearing with them a banner draped in black, and having threatened to consider as a traitor to his country every deputy who refused to vote immediately according to the wishes of the people, they swept on, and stood a bawling, vociferating crowd before the president, who was flanked on one side by a workman who had aided in the construction of the building, on the other by a noisy ruffian brandishing a drawn sabre. Finally, at the end of three hours

and a half, during which the deputies had remained in their seats, Huber, who had signed the original placard calling out the proletariat, mounted the tribune, and declared in the name of the people the dissolution of the National Assembly. Thereupon a mass of the insurgents precipitated itself upon the president, overturned his chair, and established in his place the man with the drawn sabre. The president and many representatives withdrew, but for two terrible hours those remaining stood their ground though in constant danger of personal attack. But the *rappel* summoning the national guard had been sounded, and the proletariat, taking alarm, hastily named a provisional government and started off *en masse* with Barbès and Albert at their head to establish the new government of France, the government of the mob, at the Hôtel de Ville. But the national guard under Lamartine's leadership was close upon their heels, and scarcely were they established than their government was overthrown and they themselves put to flight. So great was the wrath of the armed *bourgeoisie* that even Louis Blanc narrowly escaped lynch-law. The very class which the republicans had ejected from power only three months before had come to the defence of the new government, and the second attempt of socialism to seize for itself the reins of power had failed.

The crisis had been a terrible one, and the Assembly had learned by bitter experience of the danger that threatened the republic. Again the forces of law and order had won the victory, but there was no assurance that it would be permanent until the roots of the evil should be eradicated, and socialism—which had now become what its worst enemies declared it to be, a conspiracy for the overthrow of the state—should be driven from its stronghold. The workshops offered the best ground of attack, for through bad management they had come to be considered by all as a menace not an advantage to the city. For nearly a month the question of their disposal was hotly debated, and at length on June 19th it was made clear that the government

was determined to break up the working element concentrated at Paris. Fifteen thousand individuals, who had fraudulently entered the workshops, and over two thousand convicts and galley slaves supported there by the government, were immediately dismissed. Then the following decrees were issued. All who had not resided in Paris at least one year were to be returned, with tickets for their journey, to the departments where they belonged; all labourers who could find employment in the free, *i.e.*, the private, workshops were required to do so, and private employers were called upon to engage labourers whenever possible; all unmarried workmen between the ages of eighteen and twenty were given their choice of leaving Paris to work on the railroads in the various departments, or of going into the army. But these decrees were not sufficiently thorough-going to accomplish the desired result, for the numbers in the workshops were reduced by but little more than ten thousand men, while work could be provided for only two thousand. The situation was as bad as before, and the danger even greater, in that the proletariat, roused to desperation, were weaving new plots and forming new conspiracies for the destruction of their enemies.

But at last a decision was reached by the government, and Marie, minister of public works, in replying to the protest of a delegation of workmen, said, "If the workmen will not depart for the provinces, we will compel them to go by force; by force, do you understand;" and on June 22d the Assembly in the same spirit pronounced the words, "*Il faut en finir.*" The struggle between order and anarchy was now at hand. On one side were the proletariat, bound by oath to fight to the death for their cause, organised with all the completeness of an army, and directed by leaders, some of whom were veterans; on the other were the representatives of order, supported by regulars as well as by the national guard, and commanded by General Cavaignac, minister of war. Behind the barricades were not only Jacobins and socialists, but also those who for

nearly four months had been reading Bonapartist newspapers, which with startling audacity had been doing all in their power to strengthen the spirit of revolt in the workshops, to excite the poorer classes against the *bourgeoisie*, and to rouse their hatred for the rich. Men who had already elected Louis Napoleon as their deputy to the National Assembly began the war against the government with the cry of "*Vive Napoléon*," and Bonapartist, Jacobin, and socialist fought side by side in that fearful municipal war. Beginning with the 23d the conflict became each day more bloody; army struggled against army, and the battle raged now in one quarter of the town and now in another. At length the Assembly, despairing either of a reconciliation or of a speedy end of the war, made Cavaignac dictator and authorised the use of artillery. This act, which might well have reminded thoughtful men of the conferring of like powers upon Bonaparte by the National Convention on 13th Vendémiaire (1795), had the desired result. On the 26th the fratricidal war was over, on the 27th Cavaignac proclaimed that "the cause of order and the true republic" had triumphed, and on July 3d the decree closing the workshops was carried. The attempt of the provisional government to carry out the socialistic policy had resulted in a narrow escape from anarchy or a despotism. The June days had not only cost the state two thousand of its citizens, but they had disclosed the ill-omened union of Bonapartists with the proletariat, and had brought to the front that figure ominous for France, the military dictator.

But joy for the victory of the present excluded for the moment any anxious forebodings for the future, and the National Assembly was able to turn its undivided attention to the task for which it had been summoned—the drafting of a constitution for the republic. But new difficulties now began to present themselves. Hitherto the fear of socialism had acted as a bond of unity holding together antagonistic elements; but with the

victory of the June days and the resumption by the National Assembly of its functions as a constituent body, there again appeared all the party rivalries, all the personal ambitions, and all the difference of opinion that had hitherto been kept in the background by the necessity of uniting for the defence of the state. Though the members of the Assembly had solemnly taken their oath to the republic and had expressed their loyalty to the cause of the revolution of February; though in the presence of anarchy all parties had been willing to try the new experiment and had come together shouting "*Vive la République!*" nevertheless, with anarchy removed, the majority of those elected soon showed that not only did they care but little for the republic as a permanent institution, but that they had never renounced their loyalty to one or other of the dynasties that still claimed rights to the throne of France. The republic was therefore brought face to face with a new danger, and the conflict that had been waged with the proletariat in the streets was replaced by the struggle of the republic with its enemies on the floor of the chamber.

The task that now lay before the National Assembly was to give once more constitutional form to the doctrines of 1789, to define popular rights in the terms of a new revolution, and to divide and to balance the functions of legislative and executive in such a way that they should supplement, not conflict with, each other. The task was most difficult; for it had to be done by an Assembly whose members, bound to the republic by scarcely any other tie than their oath, were already distrustful of the results of universal suffrage, and in the presence of a people who, through the exercise of this same suffrage, had just elected more than two hundred supporters of monarchy as their representatives, and by the return of Louis Napoleon from three departments had shown that the Napoleonic legend was beginning to work among them.

The basis of discussion, when the Assembly finally took up

the question of the constitution, was the report of a committee that had been appointed to prepare the first draft of the fundamental law. Of this report two features are of special importance here: the legislative was to consist of one chamber, which was to be chosen by universal suffrage and to be entirely renewed at the expiration of three years; the executive was to consist of a president, a citizen of France, "who had never lost the character of a Frenchman," also to be elected by universal suffrage and to hold office for four years, but not for two consecutive terms. Thus two co-ordinate bodies, each deriving its authority from the people, were to be set over against each other. The critics of the report were quick to detect three points of weakness: the single chamber, the election of the president by the same body of electors that chose the chamber, and the presidential tenure of four years. In denouncing the project of allowing two co-ordinate bodies to come thus face to face Llerbette said: "Is it not possible that a president would not accept voluntarily the passive and subordinate rôle which a single chamber might wish to impose upon him? Then if he should encounter in that assembly opposition that should appear to him contrary to the interests of the country; if despairing of vanquishing by constitutional means he should wish to break down opposition with his sword, would he in order to succeed need to have behind him the victories of Lodi, Montenotte, and the Pyramids? No! it will be enough for him to have before him the deplorable condition into which your constitution will put the country. . . . Blind is he who cannot see that the result of that struggle will be either the military despotism of a president, or the anonymous and multiplex despotism of an assembly." Notwithstanding so clear an utterance, the Assembly failed to see the danger of a single chamber, and tried to meet the difficulty by changing the mode of electing the president,—a proposition which created discord and confusion. Said Grévy in speaking upon this

point: "Are you very sure that in that series of personages who will succeed each other every four years there will not be found one sufficiently ambitious to attempt to perpetuate his power? And if he be the offspring of one of those families that have reigned in France; if he has never expressly renounced that which he calls his rights; if commerce languishes, if the people are suffering; if such an one come to the presidential chair in one of those crises when misery and deception deliver the people to those who mask under their promises projects against liberty, do you reply that such an ambitious man will not attempt to overthrow the republic?" Even after this prophetic utterance the Assembly, believing that the Grévy amendment proposing election by the representatives of the people rather than by the people themselves would make the president the creature of a parliamentary faction, rejected it by a large majority. It is one of the remarkable facts of the period that so few of the political leaders had sufficient foresight to see the dangers of a direct popular election. Léon Faucher in a brilliant speech warned the Assembly of the result of such a constitutional provision. "The French nation," he said, "is only just emerging from the mould of the monarchy. Our manners are monarchical and military. If you summon the whole people to elect a president it will elect, under the title of president, the equivalent of a king; he will perhaps even found a new dynasty. The nation will be dazzled by the power of the sword or the splendour of an historic name; it will choose from the ranks of the pretenders rather than one of our parliamentary celebrities. If you wish to found a republic, give the assembly the choice of the president; if you appeal to universal suffrage, mark my words, you will establish a government which will not be republican."

The truth of the matter seems to be that the republic was in a situation from which it could not extricate itself. Two cham-

bers were indispensable, but, as Lamartine declared, there were not to be found in France the materials for a division of the legislative into two bodies. The republic had obliterated all distinctions and was now in dire want of that which it had destroyed. Even a change in the mode of electing a president could not prevent the discord that was sure to arise between chamber and president. In consequence of this, says Normanby, "I believe that there is hardly a republican who would not now acknowledge, as preferable to an elected president, a constitutional sovereign who, by education and character, should duly understand and appreciate the nature of his royal functions, selecting with patriotic judgment those rare occasions on which it becomes his duty to exercise a direct influence, always respected because never abused." Lamartine, hoping perhaps that the suffrage of the people would raise him to the presidency, pronounced in favour of popular election. "The die is cast," he said, "let God and the people decide. It is necessary to leave something to Providence, she is the light of those who, like us, are unable to read in the darkness of the future."

Such was the situation in October, 1848. An Assembly, summoned to draw up a constitution of which universal suffrage was the foundation principle, was already expressing its distrust of this newly conceded electoral privilege; many of its members, sworn to defend the republic, were already doubting its permanence or were openly expressing their preference for a constitutional sovereign; others loyal to the republic but unable to rescue it from its perilous position, were putting their trust in Providence with no certainty regarding the future; while still others, seeing the dangers and pointing them out with remarkable accuracy, were unable to influence the majority and were awaiting with apprehension the outcome of the experiment. The fate of the republic was already sealed. Its overthrow was foreshadowed when on November 7th this impossible constitution, which Normanby calls "the worst

that ever reached that finishing stage of manufacture," a constitution "with no one original idea, confused in its expressions, contradictory in its provisions, unintelligible to many of its authors, impracticable in its execution," was adopted by the large majority of seven hundred votes.

The revolution of 1848 in its inception and in the sequel followed the lines of that of 1789; for whereas the earlier revolution had been an attempt to realise political liberty by revolutionary means, to put into immediate practice political formulas and doctrines for which France was unprepared, that of 1848 was an attempt to realise social and economic liberty by a similar application of principles for which the opportunity had been furnished by a revolution. In neither case was France willing to await the results of a gradual political and social reform. The attempt of 1789 had resulted first in the revolutionary despotism of the Terror, followed by the weakness of the Directory, and the victory of one man over a government divided against itself. The attempt of 1848 came very nearly ending in the despotism of the proletariat, but France having been saved from a Reign of Terror by the victory of the moderates, became involved in a constitutional experiment of the most unsatisfactory character. The struggle between the president and the assembly, foreshadowed in the debate upon the constitution, resulted in the victory of the former, and France wearied with the party strife, which accomplished nothing either at home or abroad, accepted the despotism of a Louis Napoleon because he promised order and prosperity. The victory for social liberty in 1848 ended three years later in a social and political reaction, and France in 1851 took her place among the other reactionary states of Europe, whose struggle for liberty, as the next two chapters will show, was to prove to all appearances even more hopeless and unsuccessful.

CHAPTER IX.

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.—I.

THE downfall of the house of Orléans, important as it was for the future history of France, was of far greater moment in its effect upon Europe. As the first uprising on a large scale against an unpopular and reactionary government, and as a success rapid and thorough—for at one stroke the republic was erected, and universal suffrage proclaimed—the revolution of 1848 startled the princes and the people of Europe as had no preceding event since the execution of Louis XVI. In dealing with questions of wider interest, both social and political, than had any previous movement of a similar character, it roused to action those states that, independent of any outside influence, were fast approaching a revolution of their own. But it must not be supposed that the French uprising was in any sense the cause of the general movement; it was itself in no small degree influenced by the attempts of Poles, Hungarians, and Sicilians to gain national independence and constitutional rights: nor could it become a model according to which any but the most extreme radicals could shape their action, because it was not a national act, not a struggle for liberties denied or rights withheld. Before Paris rose against the government of Louis Philippe, Palermo had given the signal of revolt, and the Neapolitans, following the initiative of Sicily, had wrung a constitution from the Bourbon king, Ferdinand; the Hungarian Diet having taken into consideration its language-and-nationality bill and discussed questions

of taxation and local government, had made preparation to present its demands to the Austrian Emperor; while Switzerland by her victory over the Sonderbund had already secured the supremacy of liberal ideas, and given encouragement to the revolutionists in neighbouring states. France did not supply the forces that made the greater uprising inevitable; those are to be found in the discontent aroused by the narrow economic and political systems of the countries themselves, and by the inequalities of their social life; in the contradiction between that which was, and that which the majority of the people were coming to believe should be. Convinced that the old views regarding the legitimacy of governments and the divine right of kings would have to be modified to meet the larger needs of society that were arising from the growing importance of commerce and industry and the altered relations of social classes, the people of Italy, Austria, and the Germanic Confederation welcomed the proclamations of the French Republic as an indication that the time had come when they, too, might successfully resist the methods of government based on the doctrines of Metternich. No new ambitions were created, no new ideals; but the success of the French inspired the people of central Europe to make one mighty effort to gain for the industrial and commercial classes a share in the government of the state, to effect political unity where it was wanting, and to win for the subject nationalities, where such had been withheld, a recognition of their ability to govern themselves;—in other words, to transform a progressive and gradual revolution into a cataclysm, and to seize by force those rights and liberties that they were acquiring but too slowly by peaceful means. The attempt may have been premature, but even in its failure it was not wholly unsuccessful.

The general movement of 1848 affected in one way or another nearly every country in Europe. Young Ireland undertook a

rebellion; the Chartists in England presented anew their petition for parliamentary reform; the republicans in Belgium and Spain began agitations, with, however, negative results; the kings of Holland and Sweden voluntarily made constitutional concessions; even the principalities of the Danube felt the revolutionary influence. But in each of these cases the effect was either limited in scope or momentary in character. In none of these states were questions raised of vital importance to the future welfare of the nation at large; in none were the people as a whole concerned in the agitation; in none did the results alter seriously the character of the government or the condition of the people. The real interest of the revolutionary movement centres in the states of central Europe: in Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Italy, where alone were the great problems of unity, national independence, and constitutional liberty in large part unsolved.

This localising of the influence of the French revolution was due in great measure to the part that the government of Austria and the house of Habsburg had played in the history of the preceding thirty years. Of the central European system Austria had stood as the guiding spirit. Placed in such a position that her influence extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean seas, she had been able to control, either directly or indirectly, the political activity and political ideas of the greater number of states between France on one side and Russia on the other. As presiding member of the Germanic Confederation she had controlled the Diet, summoned conferences at Vienna, and acted as the adviser of each individual king and prince of the Confederation. As hereditary head of the Austrian provinces, and dynastic head of Hungary and Bohemia, her Emperor possessed the absolute rights of sovereign over the conglomerate of territories making up the Austrian state; and as overlord of Lombardy and Venetia and accepted protector of all the states of Italy, he was able to

restrain popular movements by a firm military administration as in Lombardy, by direct intervention as in Naples or the Papal States, or by persuasion and diplomacy as in Modena and the lesser principalities. Thus Austria controlled, to a large extent, the politics of the states to the north, the east, and the south of her own particular provinces, and seemed herself in no way affected by the political struggles going on in other countries, and at times even within the disaffected parts of her own territory. As regards government, the principles of the house of Habsburg were clearly and frankly expressed. "Govern and change nothing," was the advice of the Emperor Francis to his son in 1835; and Metternich voiced the same idea when he said that "principles of government were like religious dogmas; any discussion of them was often dangerous and always useless." According to these principles Austria had acted in the past and meant to act now. Determined that the foundations of the state should in no way be disturbed at home, she was equally determined to make disturbances impossible abroad, if in any way she could interfere to prevent them. Yet withal, Austria was hardly more than a government, a kind of administrative machine; her chief was emperor, king, archduke, count, and margrave—many feudal lords in one. The Austrian state possessed neither unity nor homogeneity, it had no national foundations, no natural frontiers; it was a government holding together four distinct races in some twenty separate territorial divisions, which, as a whole, possessed but ill-defined boundaries, were without seaboard of importance, and had no exit by water save at Trieste, Fiume, and by the Danube, whose mouth was not to be thrown open to the free use of the nations for nearly ten years to come. As any encouragement of national independence, any extension of constitutional rights, would serve only to weaken and dismember the state, Austria's safety lay in the permanence of the situation as it was; and in view of this necessity, it is

hardly to be wondered at that her policy should have been hostile to disturbance and revolution. Metternich's doctrines may have been based on conviction, but they were also based on necessity. By holding such doctrines in the midst of a Europe that was progressing politically, socially, and intellectually, and by contributing neither men nor ideas to aid the advancing movement, Austria was inevitably doomed to see her principles discarded, and her policy spurned outside of the sphere within which she had a lawful right to interfere. Now that France had given the signal for the general uprising, it was the Austrian policy as applied in Italy, Bohemia, Hungary, and the states of the Germanic Confederation against which the revolution was undertaken; and however much we may concern ourselves with the details of the struggle that follows, we shall find that it was not the despotism of isolated princes, but Austria and Austria's policy that the people of central Europe were endeavouring to overthrow.

In the states of southern Germany appeared the first indications of that popular excitement which was soon to spread with marvellous rapidity over the whole of central Europe. In Baden, where the liberals under the guidance of skilled political leaders had been pressing hard upon the government, the ministry at the first presentation of the popular demands made the required concessions. Once started, the movement gained rapid headway. In one form or another, after a certain amount of popular agitation, the states yielded to the urgency of the moment, and, as a rule, admitted liberal representatives to a share in the government. In no case was there bloodshed; for the opposition made up of all classes of society, of landowners as well as of burghers and peasants, and fully alive to the righteousness of their cause, drew up reasonable programs in terms of national unity and political freedom; and the princes, aware of the selfishness of their past policy, dared not resist the clamour that broke out against them. With the

news of each succeeding gain the area of commotion widened, the leaders became bolder, the governments, losing courage in the presence of what appeared to be the forerunner of a general popular revolt, dared not employ either threats or force. The various organisations founded for purposes of agitation acted systematically and with dispatch, and the use of the telegraph made possible the rapid conveyance of the news from point to point. State after state and town after town took up the cry until, almost before February had ended and March had begun, the news of the fall of the Orléans dynasty had not only spread through Italy and Germany, but had penetrated even to the farthest confines of the Austrian Empire. As reports of new revolutions and popular victories followed close upon the earlier rumours, enthusiasm rose to fever heat, and it seemed as if the millennium of the people had really arrived.

The news of the French movement reached Vienna during the last days of February, and on March 1st government and people alike were aroused by the report that a republic had been proclaimed. "Europe finds itself to-day," wrote Metternich, "in the presence of a second 1793"; and seemingly unaware of the real character and strength of the popular movement, the Austrian chancellor went blindly on taking measures to protect the Austrian states and the Germanic Confederation from an attack by France. But Europe was in the presence of no revolution of 1793; and it was not necessary for France, when once she had given the signal, to extend liberal ideas by force of arms: for sixty years these ideas had been working in Europe, and in the year 1848 were accepted by nine-tenths of the people from Heidelberg to Agram and from Berlin to Palermo. The Europe of 1848 was not the Europe of 1793; and while Metternich was looking for an attack from without, he was startled by the presence of the revolution at his very door.

While Vienna, so long politically bound and fettered by the

presence of the most conservative government in Europe, was giving expression to her excitement in words and not works, a cry more stirring even than that of France or the South German states thrilled the whole Austrian Empire. It was the cry of Kossuth and the Hungarian Diet. During the months of January and February Hungary had been engaged in a discussion of plans for the reformation of her system of finances, for the improvement of the peasantry, and the representation of the free towns in the Diet. But when, on February 29th, the news from Paris reached Pressburg, the liberals became more aggressive, and determined to commit the Diet to a full expression of Hungarian demands in an address to the Emperor. On March 3d Kossuth, in proposing such an address, uttered that famous speech sometimes called the "baptismal speech" of the revolution. "The suffocating vapour of a heavy curse hangs over us and out of the charnel-house of the cabinet of Vienna a pestilential wind sweeps by, benumbing our senses and exerting a deadening effect on our national spirit. . . . I am apprehensive lest the stagnant bureaucratic system that prevails in the state councils of Vienna should lead the Empire to destruction; and while compromising the existence of our beloved dynasty, should also entail upon our country, which requires all its powers and resources for its own development, enormous sacrifices and an interminable succession of calamities. . . . The future of Hungary can never be secure while in the other provinces there exists a system of government in direct antagonism to every constitutional principle. Our task is to found a happier future on the brotherhood of all the Austrian races, and to substitute for the union enforced by bayonets and police the enduring bond of a free constitution." The effect of this speech upon the Austrian states was immediate and general. On the 11th the Diet of lower Austria presented a petition demanding the regular convocation of a representative assembly, liberty of the press, and the reform of justice

and local government. Kossuth's speech translated into German was circulated among the Viennese, who on the 13th rose in revolt. Then the most momentous of events took place. Without a struggle, and as if Austria had been a petty state instead of the first Power in Europe, the government of Metternich, the mainstay of the European system, fell; and Metternich, deserted by the Emperor as well as by the Austrian statesmen but still faithful to the doctrines he had so long upheld, yielded to "the most invincible of forces, that of events," and withdrew from public life. In one effort the Viennese populace, who up to this time had practically taken no part in the political life of Austria, had overthrown the bulwark of conservatism.

The news ran like a lightning flash throughout not only the Austrian states but Europe as well. Hungary responded at once. The address to the Emperor that had been drafted and passed by the House of Delegates on March 3d, was now amended to include freedom of the press, trial by jury, and annual diets at Pesth; and having been passed on the 14th, by both Houses by acclamation, was sent directly to Vienna by a deputation of which Kossuth was a member. The demand for a constitution was granted by the Emperor, and the Diet, resolving itself, on the return of the deputation, into a constituent assembly in which each individual was to cast a free vote, began the work of drafting a constitution for Hungary. At one stroke, under the leadership of men of peaceful and moderate views, and in no way in sympathy with the radicals of Paris or Baden, the Diet swept away the abuses to uproot which the liberal opposition had been working in vain for years. During the month of March the new constitution was drawn up, containing provisions for an independent and responsible ministry, annual diets, triennial elections, extension of the franchise under certain qualifications to every man, whether tradesman, artisan, or peasant, equal taxation, equality of religions, liberty

of the press, establishment of a national guard, and Hungarian control of the army. These, the March Laws, became in all the later constitutional struggles of Hungary the basis of the Hungarian demands. On the 31st the Emperor gave his consent, and with Batthyáni as the head of the ministry, aided by such conservatives as Esterhazy and Széchényi, and by a moderate as strict and just as Deák, the government of Hungary, which was now bound to Austria by no other than a dynastic connection, entered upon an independent career under most favourable auspices.

The national impulse that had roused the Hungarians to demand autonomy and independence quickened also the Bohemians, who for forty years had been interested in the revival of a national language and a national literature. Overshadowed and subordinated in the past by the large German population and the dominance of the German language in Bohemia, the Czechs had up to this time made little effort to gain either political or educational equality; but animated by the news from France they had begun during the early days of March to draw up quietly and peacefully, in the form of a petition to the Emperor, the national wishes. Through a deputation dispatched to Vienna March 19th they asked for the recognition of the Bohemian nationality; for the political equalisation of German and Czech; for equality of education between the two races; for equality in the distribution of taxes; for increased communal privileges, and improvements in the condition of the peasantry; for liberty of the press, of religion, and the person; for the right of public meeting, and the appointment of suitable persons to public office; and, lastly, for annual diets composed of members from the three provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. On the 24th of March the Emperor conceded nearly all of these wholly reasonable demands.

While Hungary and Bohemia were drafting with remarkable moderation those privileges that they deemed essential to

their existence as autonomous, and not subject, nationalities, the inhabitants of Vienna and the Austrian provinces, quick to recognise their advantageous position, were preparing to force the embarrassed government to make further concessions. After the demands of the Hungarian and Bohemian deputations had been granted with scarcely any qualification, and when the agitation in the city was daily increasing, and reports were coming in of additional uprisings in Germany and of the menacing attitude of the Italian provinces, it was no time for the Austrian government, in disorder, financially embarrassed, without a plan or a resource, its authority gone and its military defence for the moment inadequate, to resist the request of the Viennese for an imperial constitution, and of the people of the upper and lower provinces for increased powers of self-government. A constitution was promised; and there was every hope that with the abolition of the censorship that had been one of the greatest obstacles to the literary development of Austria, and the breaking down of the old bureaucratic government that had so long checked all local life and initiative, an opportunity would be given to the people of Austria to improve the condition of their country, which, intellectually and materially, was far behind the other states of Europe. The future was to bring grievous disappointments: but when the Emperor authorised the formation of a student regiment and the establishment of a national guard; when he authorised the provinces to send delegates to a common assembly at Vienna and lightened the press law; when it was announced that Count Ficquelmont, Metternich's successor, was to begin the drafting of an imperial constitution, Vienna gave herself up to joy and festivity.

Thus far the popular feeling against the government of Austria had been expressed positively but peacefully in demands neither revolutionary nor radical, and by states that were strictly speaking a part of the Empire, in that they accepted the Emperor as their legal sovereign, and had made no effort

to sever their connection with the house of Habsburg. Hungary, Bohemia, and the Austrian provinces, even though they were demanding constitutional privileges of a far-reaching character, remained loyal and willing parts of the Austrian Empire; but this was not true of those southern provinces whose union with Austria had been compulsory and of recent date, whose affiliations were entirely with Italy, and whose desire was not for constitutional privileges but for entire independence of the rule of the Habsburg house. The uprising in Lombardy and Venetia was, in reality, a part of the general Italian movement, in which the people of Italy made their first great effort to throw off the burden of Austrian rule, to rid themselves of the iniquities of Austrian intervention.

Since the days in January, 1848, when the people of Palermo and Naples had risen against the despotic government of Ferdinand, the revolution in Italy had been creeping steadily northward. Already had the impulsive nature of the Italian people been aroused by the liberal reforms of the Pope, and his attitude toward Austria on the Ferrara question; already had the granting of constitutions in Naples, February 11th, in Tuscany, February 17th, the promise of a constitution in Piedmont, February 8th, and further reforms and a constitution in Rome, excited the hopes of the Italians from Sicily to the foot of the Alps, and strengthened their feeling that link by link they were striking off the chains that bound them to Austria, and that, too, by methods moderate and, on the whole, peaceful. But as Metternich saw drawing nearer to the Austrian provinces the movement that was gradually undoing all his work in Italy, he felt that the "reign of Young Italy and the most advanced radicalism" had begun, and that the Powers ought to be called together to consider measures for the defence of the principles of public order. The chancellor's reign was, however, about to close, and the "advanced radicalism" that he saw winning constitutional victories in Italy was gathering

strength to overthrow him in his own conservative stronghold. Against it he made one last effort. Fearing that Lombardy and Venetia might yield to the excitement of the time and enter upon an insurrection, he increased the Austrian troops in the provinces, and during the months of January and February applied his repressive policy more vigorously than ever. When the news of the fall of Louis Philippe, of the granting of a constitution by Piedmont, and of further revolutions in the north came to the Lombards and Venetians, a tremor of excitement seized upon the provinces; but in fear of Radetzky and the Austrian forces they made no sign until the news of the uprising in Vienna, followed by Metternich's flight, encouraged them to believe that the perplexed and entangled Austrian government could lend no more aid to the troops already in Italy. The Italians would not have been human had they failed to take advantage of their opportunity. On March 18th, the day before the deputation left Prague to carry the Bohemian petition to Vienna, with a unanimity of action that displayed long preparation, and a regular correspondence with revolutionists in other countries, Milan rose against the troops under Radetzky with the determination "to break once and for all the infamous treaty that had sold [their] liberties without [their] own consent." The Milanese, after fighting for five days from the house-tops, in the streets, and at the bridges, forced the Austrians to abandon the city; and, aided by bands of revolutionists from other towns of Lombardy, Como, Bergamo, and Brescia, and from the country districts, drove Radetzky to the Mincio. In less than one week the greater part of Lombardy was free. And Venice also was to do what Milan had done. Prouder than all the other peoples of northern Italy because of their historic past, and feeling with especial bitterness their dependence upon Austria, the Venetians received with unrestrained joy the news that reached them on March 16th of the fall of Metternich. Under the control of Palffy and

Zichy, both Hungarians, the Austrian resistance was only half-heartedly conducted, and on March 22d the Austrian troops evacuated the city, and Daniele Manin proclaimed in the great square of the city the Republic of St. Mark.

The success of Milan and Venice was doubly important to the liberal cause. Not only had the Austrian troops been driven to seek refuge along the banks of the Mincio or in the famous fortresses of the Quadrilateral, but the issue had been raised that the other Italian states had up to this time been hardly ready to consider seriously, the issue of a war with Austria. The Milanese knew that in the struggle that was bound to come aid must be furnished by other and more powerful forces than those of the cities of the two liberated provinces. They therefore turned to Charles Albert of Piedmont for help. It was a crisis in the career of a man upon whom history has passed many judgments, and one the more difficult to meet in that Piedmont had no grievance against Austria of such a character as to constitute a *casus belli*. How could Piedmont justify herself in the eyes of Europe if she undertook a war without a cause more tangible than that of a general feeling of bitterness toward a state that had sought to prevent her constitutional advancement? But the decision hardly lay in the hands of the king. National interests outweighed dynastic, and the demands of Italy proved stronger than the objections of the ruler of Piedmont. The wave of enthusiasm that had moved from Sicily to the Alps during the two exciting months just past, now swept back with redoubled force. "The hour for Austria has struck," was the cry that was taken up, and not by Piedmont alone. Tuscans, Romans, and Neapolitans, roused to a patriotic frenzy by the news from the north, threw themselves into the movement clamouring to be led to the aid of the northern patriots; Parma and Modena were in revolt against their rulers; and Mazzini was urging from Paris the necessity of the co-operation of Young Italy in any project for

war against Austria. Finally Charles Albert yielded, but not without many misgivings; and on March 23d, having made known his determination to go to the aid of the Lombards, declared war on Austria. In Tuscany the grand duke, also carried away by patriotic fervour, announced that he would be true to the "holy cause of Italy," and ordered regulars and volunteers to prepare for the march to Lombardy. Even in Rome, through the efforts of d'Azeglio and Durando, the Pope was forced to join the war party, and to give his consent to the arming of his troops. And lastly, Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies, yielding to a situation that he could not control, proclaimed to his people, in a speech full of Bourbon hypocrisy, his conversion to the cause of Italian independence. Under William Pepe, the hero of the uprising of 1820, who was again in Naples after an exile of twenty-seven years, the Neapolitan volunteers started northward, strong in the justness of their cause and the expectation of victory. Thus Italy, trusting solely in her own forces, began her first war for independence. The sequel will show the measure of her success; but for the moment, the armed revolt of the southern provinces of Austria, supported by troops from the four strongest of the Italian states, was of sufficient importance to bind the hand of Austria in Italy, and to prevent her from interfering in the affairs of the north.

In consequence of the difficult position in which Austria was placed because of the concessions made to Hungary, Bohemia, and the home provinces, and of the war in which she was about to enter with Italy, it was impossible for her, even though she was the first state of the Germanic Confederation, to do anything to prevent the steady progress of the revolution in this body which had so long felt the weight of her reactionary policy. The German movement, therefore, went forward unrestrained by any Austrian intervention, and without other obstacles to overcome than those that her own princes and

the conservative parties in her own states placed in her path. Already, before the uprising in Vienna, before Hungary had made known her wishes through the deputation sent to Vienna, and before Italy had declared for war, Germany had begun to act; and the movements in Baden, Würtemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony had no small influence in strengthening the courage of the Bohemians, and in bringing the Viennese radicals to the point of action. In all these South German states the liberal demands, though often excessive, were in large measure granted; and even before the fall of Metternich, the South German governments were becoming liberal in character, and the people even radical and revolutionary in tone. While ministers were conceding liberty of the press, trial by jury, and abolition of feudal dues, and the people, giving themselves up to the excitement and intoxication of success, were too often using the occasion as an opportunity for lawlessness, the moderates, who had the interest of united Germany at heart, were endeavouring to carry out successfully the plan of a German assembly that should be representative not of the estates but of the nation. As the hopes that had centred in the Prussian United Diet were destroyed by the declaration of the king that he would not agree to any form of government based on a written charter; and as the six hundred representatives of the provincial estates separated and went to their homes after a session that boded no good for the future of constitutional government in Prussia, the German liberals turned their attention to the larger questions of the repeal of the hated decrees of 1819 and 1832, the reconstitution of the Germanic Confederation, and the unity of the German fatherland. For the attainment of these ends a meeting of leaders of the constitutional party, as opposed to the radical republicans, was called, October 10, 1847, at Heppenheim near Heidelberg. Here gathered representatives from Würtemberg, Hesse Darmstadt, Nassau, Baden, Prussia, and others of those states that made up the Zollverein,

for the purpose of giving to that commercial union a political character. A proposition, which was, in fact, but another form of Gersdorf's proposal of 1814, to demand an assembly for the states of the Zollverein only, was seen in the existing state of national feeling to be too narrow; for it was felt that the new German assembly should represent all and not a part of the fatherland. When, therefore, Bassermann proposed in the Baden Chamber on February 12th, and Heinrich von Gagern in that of Hesse Darmstadt on the 27th, such an assembly as had been discussed at Heppenheim, both demanded that the area of representation should be extended from the states of the Zollverein to all the states included in the Germanic Confederation. The news of this proposal of a national German assembly, coming at the same time with the report of the revolution in France roused the enthusiasm of the German people; and the summons of the new representative body became not only the chief interest of the constitutional party, but the chief hope of all the liberals. In the unanimity of the desire consisted the strength of the liberal cause.

Thus had the plan for a national assembly been already matured before the uprisings in the South German states, due to the news of the revolution in France, made its consummation a certainty. The leaders of the constitutional party, determined to take advantage of the demoralisation of the absolute governments, issued a call for a meeting on March 5th at Heidelberg, to discuss and decide the question of an assembly. Here it was agreed that all parties should lay aside their differences of opinion as to the future form of the German state—whether it should be an empire or a republic—and unite in the one effort to obtain the consent of the other states and the Federal Diet to the summons. A committee of seven was appointed to arrange for the calling of a preliminary convention, and to agree upon some definite method of electing deputies. After Baden, Würtemberg, and Saxony had consented to the scheme,

a program was drawn up by leading liberals embodying a plan for a temporary central government; and this having been accepted by the various states and conventions as well as by the committee of seven, all that was needed for the successful execution of the new, popular scheme was the consent of Prussia and the Federal Diet.

Upon the position that Prussia should take in this emergency everything depended; for the liberal leaders felt that, as the head of the Zollverein, Prussia was the natural leader of the new movement, and Würtemberg had joined the others with the express stipulation that Prussia should take this position. The history of Prussia's attitude toward liberalism during the years 1847 and 1848 passes through three important stages. In 1847 Frederic William IV. had declared himself positively opposed to a representative assembly, and had refused to consider the proposition of a constitution. The king, firm-bound by the ideas of government in which he had been brought up, and listening with satisfaction to the advice of Metternich, was determined to deal with his people in his own particular way. The news of the February revolution in France only intensified his opposition to the liberal movement; and believing with Metternich that a second revolution of 1793 was at hand, he consulted with him regarding a congress of the Powers to prevent French aggression. At the same time he took advantage of the occasion to repeat in a new form the proposal, made by Bernstorff in 1831, that Prussia should take the military leadership of the Confederation; and to this he added the suggestion that a congress of German princes should be called to consider the revision of the legislative authority and the parliamentary procedure of the Federal Diet. To this proposal, made on March 1st, Metternich, who in his determination to maintain the full supremacy of Austria had flatly rejected the proposition in 1831, deemed it wise to yield, and agreed on March 25th as the time for the meeting of the congress. Thus during the

first period the King of Prussia, determined to yield in no way to the liberal influence, was even willing to co-operate with Austria in any project for intervention, and desired to do no more for Germany than to strengthen Prussia's military position and increase the legislative authority of the Federal Diet. But when, after March 1st, the news of the proclamation of the French Republic came to Berlin, and when one after another of the South German states accepted the liberal program, he was of a different mind ; for he saw the need of making some concession to the popular feeling. Yet as late as March 8th he refused to repeal the law limiting liberty of the press, or to consider any privileges that were inconsistent with his own ideas of government ; and clinging to his own plan of a united provincial diet, he repudiated anything like a representative assembly. Fearful of the growing radicalism of the south, and of the new German assembly that was taking on so threatening a form, he determined to strengthen the United Diet which had proved so obstinate a year before, and, by increasing its powers, to make it a support for monarchy and a safeguard against revolution. On March 12th a patent was issued summoning this body to meet on the 27th of April ; and in order to allay the discontent engendered by the royal attitude of the year before, he agreed that a written definition should be made of its powers. Though such a contract with the United Diet, whereby certain legislative functions and a limited control over taxation were conceded, was in no sense a constitution, it indicates the full extent of the royal liberality at the close of the second stage in the history of Prussia's attitude toward the revolution. But the fall of Metternich on the 13th, and the acceptance by Bavaria of the project of a national assembly wrought a great change. There was now no thought of a congress of princes on the 25th ; Metternich had fallen a victim to "the disorder of an epoch fundamentally perverse," and Frederic William had lost his guide and adviser in reac-

tionary doctrines. No help was to be expected from Austria and the South German states ; and if Prussia were to maintain the respect of the people of her own state, she must take prompt action. It was determined, therefore, to call a new ministry, to repeal the hated press-law, and to issue a new patent. According to this patent, which was drafted on the 17th, the United Diet was to be summoned for the 2d of April instead of the 27th, a constitutional system was to be introduced into the kingdom, and, most remarkable of all, the project of the new national assembly was to be accepted.

It is evident that these liberal concessions were not due to any special desire of the King of Prussia for reform or to any uprising of the people either of Berlin or the provinces, but solely to pressure from without. When Frederic William yielded he did so with doubt and hesitation, and largely for the sake of avoiding a riot in the streets of Berlin. But in the issuing of the patent, a delay, due to the desire that the document be signed by the new ministry, led to an insurrection in the city, which lasted from March 18th to March 20th, and during which the streets were barricaded and the city was in the hands of the rioters. This outbreak has led to no little discussion on the part of Prussian writers, because it seems to have been without sufficient cause, inasmuch as it was generally known that the king had promised a constitution and had accepted the plan for a national assembly. In all probability it resulted from a misunderstanding in regard to the disposition of the troops, and was made more serious by the excitable condition of the people, by an unfortunate gun discharge, and, more important than all else, by the interference of republican agitators from other states who were determined to force a crisis. The effect of this event upon the king was very remarkable. Unable to reach a conclusion after four days of wavering, he at last turned his thought to the larger interests of the people whom he loved, and of the Germany he longed to see once

more an empire surrounded by all the brilliancy of the romantic past. On March 21st, accompanied by the crown prince and by his ministers and generals, and followed by a great throng of citizens, he led a procession through the crowded streets of the city, wearing across his breast the old German colours, black, red, and yellow, and every now and then stopping to address groups of citizens with high-sounding phrases that accorded well with the spectacle in which he was taking the leading part. During the evening of the same day he issued a proclamation which contained these words: "I assume to-day the leadership in the hour of danger; my people will not desert me, and Germany will gather around me with confidence. Prussia henceforth takes the lead in Germany." A few days afterward a decree was issued in which the king promised to summon a representative assembly for Prussia, which should draw up a constitution in accordance with the wishes of the Prussian constitutional party, and in the election of which every male citizen over twenty-five years of age should be qualified to participate. In due time, on the 22d of May, this Constituent Assembly, which represented the nation and not the estates, met at Berlin, and began the task of drafting the constitution.

By these acts the king entirely reversed the reactionary policy, in favour of which he had declared himself only one short month before, and Prussia took her place in the ranks of the liberal states. Already had the committee of seven made all its preparations for the Preliminary Convention to meet at Frankfort, at which definite measures were to be taken regarding the calling of the national assembly. But as yet the Federal Diet had taken no action. It was no time, however, now that Metternich's influence was removed, and Austria was endeavouring to preserve what remnants of authority were still left to her, to think of resisting a project to the execution of which Bavaria and Prussia had given their consent. The Diet desired only to forestall the work of the Convention by

officially determining the form that the national assembly should take, by deciding who should be the president of the new body, Prussia or Austria, by settling the question whether there should be one chamber or two, and by fixing the method of election and the proportion of representation. But the days passed ; the time came for the meeting of the Convention ; and still the Diet had practically done nothing. Therefore, on March 30th, without settling the question of the headship, and having, in a sense, shirked the question of the number of chambers by stating that only one was possible considering the existing popular feeling, the Diet gave its legal sanction to a national assembly, and authorised the states of the Confederation to send representatives in the proportion of one to seventy thousand inhabitants, chosen either by the people or by the assemblies as each state preferred, to meet at Frankfort for the purpose of drawing up a constitution for Germany. The decision of the Diet, it may be well to notice here, was not accepted by the Convention, which, though without official standing, was in fact more influential than the Diet, in that it directly represented the German people whose will at this time was law. Coming together the day after the Diet had issued its decree, this Convention reduced the proportion to one in fifty thousand inhabitants, and voted unanimously that the representatives should be elected by universal suffrage. The Diet, retiring from the position taken on March 30th, confirmed the decision of the Convention, repealed the Carlsbad decrees, authorised Prussia to protect the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and admitted East and West Prussia into the Confederation. With the election of the representatives in the various states during the interval from April 4th to May 18th, and the gathering of the members of the assembly on the latter date at Frankfort, the first great period in the revolution of 1848 in Germany came to an end.

Truly hopes were high at the close of that famous month of

March. With Hungary and Bohemia guaranteed constitutional independence; with the Austrian provinces already awaiting the promised imperial constitution; with Lombardy and Venetia free; with four Italian states possessing constitutions, and all agreed on a war with Austria; and, lastly, with the promise of a constitution in Prussia, and a National Assembly about to draft a constitution for a united Germany; it is little wonder that to the people of Europe the supremacy of absolutism and legitimism seemed to be forever overthrown, and the era of constitutional government begun.

Thus far the movement had been characterised by moderation and unanimity of action; for the demands of the liberals, reasonable in themselves, had been made without undue excitement. In Baden and Vienna there had been a certain amount of violence, in Paris, Milan, and Venice serious fighting and bloodshed; but in the majority of cases the control of the movement had been in the hands of men of moderate rather than of radical views, supporters not of republican nor of anarchical forms of government, but of constitutional monarchy guaranteeing a reasonable measure of popular liberty and, under certain qualifications, a share in government to all classes alike. Such moderation was the more remarkable because it was maintained in the presence of so many disintegrating forces. So long had the patriots of Germany, Hungary, and Italy waited for the day of success, that when it did come, they put aside for the moment all differences of political opinion and of national interest in their great desire to obtain the object upon which all hearts were set. The enthusiasm and courage, which the hope of success engendered, carried the liberals in those exciting March days safely through many perils, and concealed from view still others that were destined to shipwreck the whole cause in the end. Italy in her eagerness for war with Austria did not realise how hollow was the support of many of the princes, who, forced by

the vehement passion of their subjects, had sanctioned a movement in which they had little faith; Hungary and Bohemia, dominated by the single idea of winning from Austria a recognition of their historic rights, did not appreciate, even if they understood, the dangers that were to arise from the diversity of races within their boundaries; while Germany, setting aside all political differences in the one hope that a national assembly would solve all difficulties, postponed many a question of vital importance that was destined to bring about irreconcilable party feeling in the future. This singleness of purpose, concentration of action, and economising of strength that characterised the March days was made doubly efficient by the embarrassment of Austria. Other states made helpless by their long dependence on Metternich, and their long adherence to the system of government that he advocated, found themselves without a guide, and, unable to offer an efficient resistance, were forced to drift with the current of liberalism.

But the liberals had yet to discover that promises unwillingly made and concessions unwillingly granted are but an uncertain guarantee of permanent success. With the close of the March days the countries of central Europe entered upon the most difficult part of their work. The moderates, by whom in large part the victory had been won, had still to make good the advantages thus far gained, a task in which they were confronted by dangers other than those which threatened to create division and discord among themselves. On one hand they had to reckon with the power of a revived Austria, who was determined to take her revenge for the humiliation recently inflicted upon her; on the other, with those radical and socialistic spirits, who, hating the moderates because of their willingness to compromise, were determined to put into operation their own extreme doctrines regarding government. Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc in France, Mazzini in Italy, Giskra in Vienna, Hecker and Struve in Germany, and Kossuth and

the revolutionary party in Hungary, fanatical upholders of inopportune and injudicious measures, were in no small degree a menace to the cause of progress. At the same time the moderates had to reckon with the spirit of conservatism that still possessed so many of those who feared lest liberalism meant radical socialism, and preferred to be on the side of the stable past than to rush to an uncertain future, the character of which they knew nothing.

As it had been the fall of Metternich and the demoralisation of the Austrian government that had given the signal for so many of the March revolts, so it was to Austria *rediviva* that the failure of the revolutionary movement was in the last instance due. It was too much to expect that the Power which had controlled the diplomatic history of Europe for thirty-five years, and which looked back for six centuries over a past more important than that of any other continental Power save France, should be permanently overthrown by even so general an uprising as that of March. Austria stood for established government based upon the past, for security against revolution and disorder, for the maintenance of diplomatic agreements and treaties; and in this position she was supported not only by the strength of her own institutions, by the prestige of her own great name, and by the forces that she could bring to bear upon all movements that aimed at the overthrow of the existing order, but also by the conservative princes of Europe, who, though they had made concessions to liberalism, had done so unwillingly, and with doubt in their innermost hearts as to the expediency of the great changes that were threatening Europe. Austria's power was far from destroyed; for she was destined to recover her efficiency and leadership in a way almost incredible to one who has followed her career during the latter days of March. She was destined to take her place once more as the dominant Power of central Europe, to be again an obstacle in the path of progress, and to over-

throw by military force the liberty which the March days had begun to make real. In speaking of Austria's attack on liberalism Robert Blum once said, that "five men who manage the army cannot understand that though their bullets may kill men they cannot make a single hole in the idea that rules the world"; but the liberals were to learn that popular enthusiasm and popular uprisings could not overthrow at a single stroke ideas that up to this time had dominated the minds and influenced the actions of the greater number of princes and diplomats of Europe.

The material strength of Austria and her last resource lay in her army, that instrument whereby Metternich had so often made good his famous and oft-repeated maxim, *le force dans le droit.* Yet it, too, had suffered in those days of March when a body of untrained citizen-soldiers had driven out of Milan the tried Croats of Radetzky, and had forced that experienced general to the banks of the Mincio. And now Italy, enthusiastically confident of her ability to throw off the Austrian yoke single-handed, was advancing under the leadership of the King of Piedmont to complete the work that Milanese bravery had begun. It was a critical time for Austria, for if the army should fail her and Radetzky be driven from the Quadrilateral up the Adige through the Tyrol, or be surrounded and captured at Peschiera where he was soon to take refuge, not only would Austria lose her control of Italy, but by giving way under this last stroke and separating into a number of independent national states she might disappear as a great Power from Europe. Or, on the other hand, should the war with Italy be long-drawn-out, and the Italians show sufficient unity of action to win the moral support of Europe, Austria would find herself powerless when the final struggle came with Hungary and Germany; and, in case France and England decided to aid the Italian cause, might suffer a diplomatic defeat that would injure her prestige among the Powers. The Italian war

was to test the situation ; for on its issue depended the fortunes of Austria.

On March 26th, Charles Albert left Turin, and at the head of the Piedmontese army hurried across Lombardy to Cremona, hoping thereby to prevent Radetzky, who had not yet crossed the Mincio, from entering the Quadrilateral. In a skirmish at Goito, April 8th, as Radetzky was passing up the river, the Piedmontese won a victory that sent a thrill of joy through Italy and increased the courage of the royal army. But as the Austrian general withdrew into the Quadrilateral it became evident that the task before the king, of defeating the Austrians or of driving them out of Venetia, was a more serious one than had at first been supposed, and one that would require able generalship, and energetic and efficient co-operation of all the Italians, were it to be performed successfully. During the month of April the Austrian fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua were assaulted but in vain, and a desultory guerilla warfare was carried on that did little more than give a much needed experience to the Piedmontese troops, very few of whom had ever been under fire. By the end of April volunteers from Rome arrived, and these, together with a small body of men from Tuscany and about the same number from the Lombard cities, raised the effective force of the king to very nearly ninety thousand men. So full of hope did the cause of Italy seem during these April days, and so embarrassing was the situation in which the Austrian government found itself, that Ficquelmont, the Austrian chancellor, began to treat for peace, and offered to give up Lombardy if Charles Albert would withdraw from the war. It was a tempting offer ; but the king held firmly to his pledge of freeing northern Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, and on April 30th he received at Pastrengo a merited reward, for his troops made a successful attack upon an Austrian corps that had been placed as a guard

in the valley of the Adige to prevent an advance of the Piedmontese upon Verona.

But the noble persistence of the King of Piedmont and the courage of the army fighting against Austria availed little against the forces that were undermining the strength of the Italians. The best ally of Austria was the lack of unity, the jealousy, and the lukewarm spirit that the Italians showed as soon as the war was actually begun. At the very outset of the campaign it was evident that Charles Albert did not have the full support of the people of Milan and other Lombard cities, a state of affairs that was due partly to the over-confidence of the Milanese, who, underestimating the valour of the Austrians, imagined them as fleeing in terror up the Adige back to Austria; partly to the inefficiency of the provisional government of Milan, which failed to do its part in supporting the king; and partly to the opposition of the Lombard republicans, who charged Charles Albert with dynastic ambitions. At the same time the king, though the acknowledged head of the war, had, in fact, no authority over other troops than his own; and in consequence, Tuscans, Romans, Lombards, and Venetians, obeying only when they chose to do so, failed more often than not to co-operate with him when he most needed them. With Garibaldi and Mazzini, each of whom offered his services, relations were far from satisfactory; while to complete the embarrassment of the king, Piedmont became involved in a long-drawn-out diplomatic controversy with the neutral Powers, for Prussia and Russia had shown their sympathy for Austria by withdrawing their representatives from Turin, and England, who supported the Italian cause, was opposed to the war.

The difficulties that confronted the King of Piedmont were vastly increased by other events of the month of April, during which the Italian army was lying practically inactive before the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. The Pope, who had been

urged by his ministers to declare himself in sympathy with the war, had for some time been undecided as to whether his duties as spiritual head of the Roman Catholic Church were not higher than his obligations as temporal prince of an Italian state. In supporting the Italian cause he should be warring not only against the first state of the Germanic Confederation, but also against the first son of the church, thus making possible a loss of spiritual influence, and perhaps, in the end, schism. Finally, on April 29th, he read to the College of Cardinals an allocution, in which he took a definite stand regarding the foreign relations of the Roman state. He practically repudiated the attempt of the other princes of Italy to war against Austria, and declared that the troops under General Durando had been sent north for the single purpose of guarding the papal frontier from outside attack. He rejected the Neo-Guelph plan of a papal presidency of an Italian republic; and in extending a fatherly love to all nations counselled peace, and obedience to all rulers who possessed the legitimate title to govern their people. By this allocution the people of Italy were informed that not only was the co-operation of the Pope no longer to be expected, but that the moral support of the church had been withdrawn. The war was no longer "holy," and the dream of Gioberti, who had seen a federation of Italian states under the presidency of the Pope, was over. Frightened at the effect his words produced, the Pope consented to the establishment of a liberal government at Rome under Count Mamiani; yet he had deliberately cut loose from the cause of Italy, and while antagonising the Neo-Guelphs, had given encouragement to every reactionary prince and enemy of the war. Hardly had the full purport of the Pope's action been realised by the Italians when they were confronted by the rumour that the liberal cause had been defeated in Naples, and that Ferdinand, who had only entered into the war because under the circumstances he could not do otherwise, had taken

advantage of an uprising in the streets of Naples to recall the troops from Bologna. General Pepe, the commander of the troops, refused to obey, but the majority of the soldiers, placing the authority of the king above that of the general, deserted and returned to their homes. This defection was doubly disastrous, for not only did it show that Naples was about to abandon entirely the national cause, but it also weakened the national forces at a time (May 20th) when reinforcements were on their way from Austria to aid Radetzky, and Charles Albert needed the help of every Italian soldier.

Thus before the close of May, the war that three months before had been undertaken with so much enthusiasm was already half lost. A reaction of fear seizing upon the Papal States and Naples had divided the south from the north ; differences of policy, even among those who were continuing the struggle, were preventing efficient action, and forcing the King of Piedmont to carry on the war practically alone ; jealousy and distrust between radicals and conservatives were dividing Italy's forces, for the king disliked the republicans, and Mazzini and the Milanese looked upon the royal policy as selfish, half-hearted, and dynastic :—these were the obstacles in the path of the Italians that, combined with the natural hesitation of Charles Albert, gave Radetzky the desired opportunity to recoup his forces and caused him to urge the Emperor not to negotiate with the Lombards. He was sure of an ultimate victory, he said, and his forecast was true. Even though Charles Albert's victory at Pastrengo (April 30th) and a later advantage at Goito (May 30th) gave to Italy a gleam of hope, and led to a somewhat untimely decision on the part of Lombardy, Venice, and the duchies of Parma and Modena to unite politically with Piedmont ; nevertheless, when at last Radetzky found himself strong enough for aggressive action, and the two forces met at Custozza on July 25th, the Italians, badly defeated, were forced back into Lombardy with all hope of driving the

Austrians out of Venetia destroyed. But even at Milan, whither the king had retreated in the hope of saving the city, a successful resistance to the approaching Austrians was found to be impossible ; and after long hesitation, the king, who through all the campaign had never failed in his loyalty to the cause that he had espoused, negotiated for an armistice. In consequence of this he nearly lost his life at the hands of the frenzied mob of the city. No better commentary upon the failure of the Italian war is needed than that fearful Saturday in Milan, when the maddened crowd sought to take the life of the man who for three months had been defending by every means in his power the cause of Milan and Italy. On August 9th an armistice arranged by General Salasco was signed with Austria, and the king agreed to evacuate Lombardy, Venetia, and the duchies, and to withdraw his fleet from Venice.

Italy's attempt to gain independence under the leadership of princes had been watched by the republicans and radicals at first with sympathy, but finally with distrust ; and now that she had failed they seized the opportunity of wresting from the moderates the control of the Italian movement, and of putting into operation in certain centres their own principles of government. In Venice the people refusing to accept the terms of the Salasco armistice, called Daniele Manin to the headship of the republic, and prepared to resist Austria single-handed ; in Turin the radicals grew daily in influence, and in Genoa, were on the eve of a revolt ; in Leghorn the citizens resisting the authority of the Tuscan grand duke took part in an uprising that for scenes of violence rivalled the insurrection in Paris of the February before ; while in Florence the democrats, taking advantage of the many concessions thus far made, forced the grand duke to flee from the city, proclaimed the republic on the 7th of February, and established a government of triumvirs, of whom Guerrazzi was chief.

But it was at Rome that the victory of the radicals was most

complete. The positions that the Pope had occupied, those of pontiff and prince—were of necessity antagonistic to each other; and in his endeavour to carry out the policy that each demanded, he laid himself open to charges of inconsistency and vacillation. While refusing to war against Austria, he permitted his subjects as individuals to take part in the campaign; he expressed himself as desirous of continuing the liberal government at Rome, yet allowed his ministers to be hampered in the carrying out of important temporal measures by cardinals at home and legates abroad who were known to be trying to win the Pope to the cause of reaction. When Austria, after completing her conquest of Lombardy, entered the Papal Legations and occupied Ferrara, Pius IX. merely protested; and even when Austrian troops advanced farther into the Romagna and entered Bologna, he refused to consider the demand of the Roman people for war. In consequence of this attitude, the Roman Parliament, which had up to this time given him its confidence and support, became distrustful, and more radical in tone. So strained were the relations between the Pope and the Parliament that Count Mamiani, finding his position untenable, resigned on August 1, 1848, and after an interval of six weeks, during which Count Fabbri was prime minister, was succeeded by Pellegrino Rossi, ex-minister of Louis Philippe and friend of Guizot.

In his earlier years Rossi had been a Muratist, and a professor of law at Bologna; but in 1815 he had removed to Geneva, and in 1833, when an effort had been made to establish in Switzerland a stronger central government than that of 1815, had brought his legal training to bear on the problem of the Swiss constitution. His fame as an economist and a lawyer attracted the attention of Guizot, and led to the invitation to settle in France. There he became a professor in the College of France and in the law school, a member of the Institute, and a peer of France, and finally, ambassador to Rome. Relieved of this office by the revolution of February he had remained in Italy

until Pius IX., whose personal friend he was, called him to be the chief of his cabinet; and in September, 1848, he undertook the difficult task of allying the papacy with modern civilisation, and of rendering the Romans free and the Italians united. He tried in large part to do what he had attempted in Switzerland fifteen years before, that is, to find a middle course between ecclesiasticism on one side, and radicalism on the other. But as his work for Switzerland had been rejected because of the opposition of the conservative cantons, so his work for the papacy was to prove a failure because of the opposition of the radicals. He was hated by the ecclesiastics because of his liberal views, his writings, and his protestant wife; and distrusted by the republicans because of his friendship with Guizot, his moderate policy, and his determination to suppress disorder at Rome. Although in the two months of his leadership he made noteworthy attempts to reform the administration of the city and the provinces, to strengthen the finances, the law, and the police, and, in external affairs, to effect a league of the Italian states, he alienated many supporters by his sarcasm and ridicule, and antagonised the revolutionary element by his enforcement of the policy of resistance. After attacking him vehemently in their clubs and their newspapers, the revolutionists dared at last to attack him in person, and on November 15th he was assassinated on the steps of the palace in which Parliament had just convened. This act destroyed every hope of a moderate government in Rome, and threw the power into the hands of the republican party. Emboldened by the death of Rossi, the leaders of this party at once demanded of the Pope the summons of a constituent assembly, the calling of a liberal ministry, and a decree favouring the national war; but these demands the Pope refused, saying that he would do nothing under compulsion. When, however, a riot broke out in the city and a revolution seemed imminent, he yielded, and authorised the formation of a radical ministry. The Roman

movement had, however, passed the limits of papal endurance. What Pius IX. might have accomplished by his honourable attempt to bring the church into touch with modern society, had Italy's advance toward reform been gradual and not revolutionary, can only be conjectured. That he failed was due, in the first instance, to the fact that while this attempt was being made the revolution of 1848 burst upon Europe, and he was called upon, in order to keep pace with the movement, to accept ideas that were tending to establish, without deliberation and without transition, a constitutional form of government. Finding himself out of sympathy with these ideas, and realising that his authority over his people was gone, he secretly left Rome on November 25th, and put himself under the protection of the King of Naples at Gaëta. The republicans, now in full possession of Rome, established a provisional government, and called a Constituent Assembly for the following February. Three days after the deputies had assembled, on the night of the 7th of February, 1849, and after an exciting and tumultuous session, the Constituent Assembly declared the temporal power of the papacy to be abolished ; and following the example already set by the revolutionists in France, proclaimed the Roman Republic.

Thus at the close of 1848 and the beginning of 1849 the situation in Italy was most discouraging to the moderate constitutionalists, and pleasing only to those who like Mazzini, Sterbini, Guerrazzi, and others were determined to force on the people of Italy, without regard to their needs and their education, a constitutional government of the most extreme republican character. This tendency of the revolution to throw the supremacy in each country into the hands of the radical party, which was soon to be illustrated by the course of events in Germany and Hungary, had already made itself evident in Vienna. During the month of May, 1848, after Charles Albert had won the battle of Pastrengo, and the people of northern Italy had

voted for fusion with Piedmont, and when the outcome of the Italian war was wholly uncertain, the situation in Vienna was daily growing worse. The constitution, the promise of which had been received by the Viennese with so much satisfaction, when finally promulgated by imperial edict on the 25th of April proved to be little more than a copy of the Belgian constitution, and consequently but poorly suited to the conditions of Austria. In the opinion of the people of Vienna it gave too much strength to the aristocratic and landholding elements, paid too little attention to the differences of race in the Austrian Empire, and took no account of the recent guarantees given to Bohemia. Dissatisfaction led to agitation, and under the direction of a central committee of professors and students new demands were made. The Emperor was asked to revise the constitution in the interest of popular supremacy, by the substitution of a single representative chamber for the double chamber, which had been arranged for in the constitution in order to preserve the ascendancy of an hereditary peerage. The Austrian ministry, unable to resist, granted these demands; but the movement was becoming too radical for the weak-minded Emperor Ferdinand, and on May 17th he secretly left Vienna and fled to Innsbruck. A momentary reaction took place in the city, and the ministry, taking advantage of this, made an effort to recover its control by decreeing the abolition of the student regiment that had taken the lead in the recent agitation. But when on the 26th another outbreak seemed imminent, the ministry again gave way, revoked its order abolishing the student regiment, and consented to the establishment of a committee of public safety to be composed of members of the middle and peasant classes, under the leadership of Dr. Fischof, one of the agitators of March 13th. By this act the government handed over the control of the city of Vienna to the people and their leaders, and power for the time being fell into the hands of the Viennese agitators.

But Austria's humiliation at home was nearing its end, and the tide was soon to turn in her favour as her strength revived, and the real weaknesses of her enemies began to appear. The first advantage to be taken of that rivalry of the races, which was destined in the end to prove so disastrous to the struggling nationalities, was in Bohemia. In that kingdom there were, as we have seen, two races, German and Czech, the latter of whom were Slavs. The party and racial lines of these two races were far from always agreeing, and their interests were often industrially and socially antagonistic. After the return from Vienna of the deputation that had borne the petition of the Czechs to the Emperor, a serious disagreement arose. The Germans, excited by the appearance of a delegation from the Convention at Frankfort, began to consider with interest the project of sending members to the National Assembly of Germany that was to open on the 18th of May. But this plan the Czechs strenuously resisted, knowing full well that if Bohemia were in any way joined with Germany, she herself could never become an autonomous state, nor use the privileges already granted her in the imperial decree of April 8th. In this crisis the Czechs appealed to Austria, hoping that the imperial government would forbid the election of delegates; but the ministry, already involved in a conflict with the Germans of Vienna, refused to do anything further to offend the German element. Failing of help from this quarter, the Czechs at once put into execution a scheme of their own. On May 1st they issued an appeal to all the Slavs to send delegates to Prague to a panslavic congress that should do for the Slavs what the Frankfort Assembly was planning to do for the Germans, that is, to strengthen the loyalty for the common nationality. To this congress the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks sent 237 delegates, the Poles and Ruthenians 41, and the Serbs and Croats 42. Opened on June 2d by the historian Palacky, it at once began to formulate projects for the union

of all the children of the common Slavonic mother, to discuss a future for Bohemia commensurate with the greatness of her past, and to draw up manifestos to other countries and other governments. But while the congress was peacefully pursuing its work, the deep-seated rivalries of race and class were leading to disturbances in Prague itself. Troubles between employers and workmen, the hatred of Czech for German, the interference of the Slovak radical, Turanksi—who was said to have been sent by the Magyars to effect the dissolution of the congress—,the appointment of Windischgrätz to the command of the imperial forces in Prague—these and other similar causes led to various outbreaks that finally culminated in a riot on the 12th of June, just at the time that the session of the congress was drawing to a close. Shots were exchanged in the streets, barricades were erected, and acts of violence committed. For four days attempts were made, both by the Austrian commander and by the moderates, to effect a peaceful settlement of the difficulties; but as the rioting checked in one quarter broke out in another, Windischgrätz declared the town to be in a state of siege, and turned his cannon against the rioters. The bombardment of Prague, followed by the establishment of a military government over the city and the proclamation of martial law, reduced the city to subjection; but a continuance of the congress was now out of the question. With the dispersion of the members every hope of a union of all the Slavonic peoples vanished, autonomy for Bohemia was no longer possible, and the hatred of the Czech for the German and the Magyar became greater than ever. Thus was Austria enabled, in the main through the rash acts of the excitable populace of Prague, to win her first victory over those who two months before had wrung from her the promise of constitutional liberties.

But in Hungary the national rivalries reached their height. There the dominance of the Magyars had been maintained in

the past at the expense of many subordinate races, each with its own traditions, its language, its literature, and its religion. In the winning of the March constitution the victory had lain entirely with the Magyars, and no thought had been taken of the liberties of those other peoples, Serbs, Croats, Saxons, and Roumanians, who had already begun to realise their national importance, and were ready to struggle for such national privileges as the use of their own language and the exercise of local government. Among the Saxons and Roumanians in eastern Hungary this wish for greater privileges was expressed during the summer of 1848, but it was voiced with greater emphasis by the stronger races of the south, the Serbs and the Croats, who looked to the Diet at Pressburg for those liberties that the Magyars had themselves won from the government at Vienna. The plan of separating the Slavs of the south from the Magyars was not new; for many years there had existed among the Croats and Slavonians a movement known as Illyrism, which had for its object the national independence of a united Slavonic kingdom made up of Carniola, Carinthia, Istria, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Servia, provinces located mainly on the southern side of the river Drave. After the revolution of March, the Magyars had endeavoured to check the growth of this movement by offering to the southern Slavs a share as individuals in the gains of the revolution; but as accepting this proposal meant the sinking of the Slavonic nationality in that of the Hungarian, the Serbs and Croats refused to consider it. The Croats in their determination to preserve their national integrity had as early as March 29th dispatched a deputation to Vienna to ask for the autonomy already granted to the Magyars; and though this request had been refused, another asking for the appointment of Baron Jellachich as governor of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia had been granted by the Emperor. Jellachich, a native of Croatia, had been elected by the Croatians as their *ban* and was known to be a determined enemy of

the Magyars; but even though the Emperor appointed him before the petition was actually handed in, there is no reason to suppose that in doing so he had any intention of casting an affront upon the Magyars or of stirring up a revolt among the Croats, inasmuch as at this time Jellachich was not looked upon as a champion of Austrian unity.

Shortly after the appointment of Jellachich and the rejection of the chief petition of the Croats, a deputation of the Serbs set out from Neusatz, the commercial centre of Slavonia, and another from Carlowitz, the clerical centre, for Pressburg, where was sitting the new Hungarian ministry of Batthyáni, which had been appointed under the March Laws. These deputations asked from Hungary the recognition of the language and customs of Slavonia, and the concession of a separate patriarch and a separate *vojwode*, or old clan lord, of the Serbs. The rejection of these petitions, and the knowledge that the Magyars were determined to enforce the use of the Magyar language in all the provinces, roused the antagonism of the Serbs; and during the months of April and May movements were started in Slavonia that soon took the form of open revolt. On May 13th at Carlowitz the Serbs meeting in assembly voted to organise themselves as a separate nation, and to re-establish without the consent of Hungary, the offices of patriarch and *vojwode*. By this act they became rebels against the Hungarian Diet, and the latter began at once to take military measures to compel their obedience.

In the meantime the Croatian movement was rapidly becoming a rebellion. The natural hatred of Magyars for Croats increased, for the former looked upon the appointment of Jellachich, in regard to which they had not been consulted, as an imperial recognition of Croatian independence, and an unwarranted interference of the Austrian court in the affairs of Hungary. And no sooner was Jellachich installed in office on April 14th than he began to encourage this independent atti-

tude of the Croats and their hatred of the Magyar. He allowed Magyar officials to be driven from the country ; and when the Hungarian government ordered the Croatian authorities to enter into correspondence with the Hungarian departments of state, he advised, and even commanded, them not to do so. This, as a direct contravention of the imperial guarantees of March, was an affront to the Emperor as well as to the Hungarian government ; yet even when, at the request of Batthyáni, the Hungarian premier, an imperial rescript was issued commanding him to respect the Hungarian authorities, he refused. In response to the decree from Pressburg that at once placed him under the ban of the Hungarian government he convened the Croatian Assembly, and when, in consequence, the Emperor declared him a rebel and the assembly dissolved, dared to defy him by threatening to recall the Croats from the army in Italy, and so involve Radetzky in inevitable defeat.

This action of Jellachich would be inexplicable did we not know that the Austrian government had already seen in him the willing instrument whereby the integrity of the Empire might be preserved. After June, 1848, a change took place in Austria's relations with the revolting Slavs ; for Jellachich, having come to an understanding with the Serbs, let it be known that the safety of the Empire lay to no small extent in his hands. Consequently, after June 29th, when he was invested by the Croatian Assembly with dictatorial powers, he was recognised not as the champion of Croatian independence, but as the upholder of the unity of Austria, the soldier of the Empire. No further effort was made by Ferdinand to prevent his assuming the full governorship of Croatia, and but one more attempt was made to effect a peaceful settlement, when in July Batthyáni and Jellachich were brought together at Vienna. But no reconciliation was possible, and the Hungarian premier and the Croatian *ban* parted to begin preparations for war.

Hungary's position was now becoming perilous. On July

11th the Diet, transferred to Pesth, had on the motion of Kossuth granted two hundred thousand men and forty two millions gulden to defend the state against Slavonic uprisings; and it was evident that the pressure of danger was strengthening the hand of the war party, and bringing to the front the revolutionary leaders who, in opposition to the pacific policy of the Batthyáni ministry, were outspoken in their hostility to Austria. At the same time the new policy at Vienna, which had already influenced the attitude of the government toward Jellachich, was taking a more definite shape with those of the ministry, notably Latour, the minister of war, who were antagonistic to Hungarian liberty, and were determined to take every advantage to increase the number of Hungary's enemies and to force the Emperor, whether he wished it or not, to adopt a system of rigid centralisation for the Austrian state. When in August the defeat of Charles Albert at Custozza had by releasing a part of Radetzky's army enabled the Emperor to return from Innsbruck to Vienna, this policy was put into practical operation. In consequence of certain acts of the Hungarian Diet regarding the attitude of Hungary toward Italy and Germany, and its refusal to assume a share of the Austrian national debt, the imperial decree went forth on August 22d reducing the powers of the Count Palatine of Hungary, Archduke Stephen, annulling the loan and recruiting laws, and commanding the Hungarian government to relinquish its hostile preparations against the Serbs and Croats. On September 4th, even while Batthyáni and Deák at Vienna were endeavouring to effect the withdrawal of the decree, and a deputation of one hundred Magyars was on its way from Pesth to supplement the appeal of the premier and his minister of justice, another decree was issued reinstating Jellachich in all his honours. Five days afterward, while the Magyar deputation was striving to influence the Emperor, who had long since ceased to take any guiding part in the affairs of state, Jellachich, confident now of the

full support of the Austrian cabinet, crossed the Drave at the head of his Croats and thirty thousand Serbs, and entered Hungary.

The effect of this invasion was immediate and momentous; it made hopeless the peace policy represented by the palatine and the ministry of Batthyáni, which had up to this time pursued a strictly constitutional course; and it strengthened the hand of Kossuth and the revolutionists, who were in control in the Hungarian Diet. Schechényi, Eötvös, and Deák in despair at once withdrew. On September 21st the palatine, unable to bring Jellachich to a discussion of a peaceful agreement, and convinced that the latter was acting under orders from the Emperor, gave up his office and left Hungary. The position of the March government was rapidly becoming untenable; even though Batthyáni remained and endeavoured to form a new ministry, nevertheless on one side the Austrian government no longer supported him, while on the other Kossuth and the revolutionists, in their desire to obtain from the Hungarian Diet the proclamation of a dictatorship and war with Austria, were working against him. Only one more event was needed to complete the overthrow of the peace party and to bring the revolutionists into full control.

On September 25th new ministerial appointments were made for Hungary: Mailath was substituted for the Archduke Stephen, Bay for Batthyáni, and General Lamberg was created commander-in-chief of all the forces in Hungary, both Magyar and Croat. The appointment of Lamberg was unfortunate, for, as his commission was not countersigned by the Hungarian premier, he was looked upon by the people of Pesth as a military usurper. Pesth was the centre of the radical feeling, and the natural hostility of its people toward the Austrian government had recently been increased by the refusal of the Viennese Parliament to receive the Magyar deputation sent to Vienna a few weeks before. For this refusal, an unworthy act, the Czech

members of the Parliament, who charged the Magyars with having instigated the riot in Prague, were chiefly responsible. The revolutionary excitement in Pesth was at this juncture made more intense by the action of the Hungarian Diet forbidding Lamberg to assume command, and establishing a provisional government under Kossuth. So great was the popular wrath that when Lamberg appeared at Pesth to carry out the imperial orders, he was attacked on the bridge crossing the Danube, and brutally murdered. This act, for which the radical party was indirectly responsible, destroyed all hope of peace; immediately Batthyáni gave up his premiership, and power fell into the hands of the war party.

The Austrian government now threw off its mask. On October 3d the Emperor declared the Hungarian Diet dissolved, and appointed Jellachich to full command of all the imperial forces in Hungary. This decree roused the democrats of Vienna, who had controlled the affairs in the city since the appointment of the committee of public safety on May 26th but who had not favoured the Hungarian movement as long as it was controlled by a conservative ministry. But now revolutionist joined with revolutionist, and the Magyar deputation having been refused an audience by the Viennese Parliament, found a hearing among the radicals in the streets. A report that Latour, the minister of war, was planning to send a regiment of troops to aid Jellachich in enforcing the imperial decree, gave to the Viennese their opportunity. Poverty and distress, financial difficulties, sympathy for the Hungarians, hatred for the Czechs, and above all the policy of the committee of public safety, which by guaranteeing the *droit au travail* had created a situation not unlike that in France under the provisional government, were the influences that roused the radicals on October 6th to an attack on the Austrian government. The insurrection resulted in the revolting murder of Latour, and the temporary success of the revolutionists; and after the flight of the

Emperor Ferdinand to Olmütz, the city remained for three weeks in the hands of the Jacobin element, who were with difficulty prevented by the more sober-minded revolutionists from dissolving the Parliament and erecting a radical government. But this situation could not last : Vienna had reached the last stage in the movement toward radicalism ; and the radicals unable to maintain their position in the presence of the Austrian forces, which under the command of Windischgrätz had been recalled from Prague, were forced, even though a Hungarian army came to their aid, to surrender on October 31st, after a siege of five days. Austria had won her third victory ; for Bohemia, Italy, and now Vienna had, each in turn, failed to maintain the advantages they had gained in the March days.

Austria had now so far recovered as to venture upon a step that was to complete the policy begun two months before,—the strengthening of the imperial government. Emperor Ferdinand was forced to abdicate and his place was taken by his nephew, who on December 2, 1848, succeeded to the throne as Francis Joseph I. At his side was the new Metternich, Prince Schwarzenberg, to whom more than to any other was due the final restoration of Austria to her former authority. An energetic course was at once decided upon,—to reduce Hungary to subjection, and to retract entirely the concessions of March. Hungary, in her turn, took a stand equally decisive, and, on the ground that the new Emperor was a usurper, refused to recognise him as her king, and at once entered into the struggle for the defence of the deposed Ferdinand and the March constitution. This was the attitude of Kossuth and the revolutionary committee of public defence, which, after the murder of Lamberg and the flight of Batthyáni, had assumed entire direction of Hungarian affairs. Although every effort was made to strengthen the military forces of the kingdom, Austrian arms, during the first period of the struggle from January to March,

1849, were in the main successful. On January 1st, unable to hold Pesth, the Diet removed to Debreczin beyond the river Theiss, and Windischgrätz occupying the capital established martial law and began a reign of terror in the city. On February 26th the Austrians gained a notable victory at Capolna, between Pesth and Debreczin, and drove the Hungarian army to join the Diet beyond the Theiss.

These successes warranted the promulgation on March 4, 1849, of a new constitution for the Austrian Empire, which placed the various nationalities, each with its provincial diet, on an equal footing, separated Croatia and Slavonia from Hungary, and established a common commercial system for the entire Empire. Although by this constitution Hungary was reduced to the level of the other states and the concessions of March were entirely withdrawn, nevertheless so strong were the conservative and loyal elements, and so discouraged the revolutionary party by recent defeats, that during the month of March, 1849, the struggle was continued in defence of King Ferdinand and the March constitution. But the republicans and revolutionists grew more confident of their powers, and their chances of effecting a separation of Hungary from the Empire increased in number as the Hungarian armies under Bem won victories, first over the Austrians and Wallachians who opposed them in the south, and then over the Russians who had entered Transylvania. The victory of Görgei over Windischgrätz on April 6th, by which the Austrians were driven from Gödöllö back to Pesth, completed this series of successes, gave renewed strength to the war party, and made of no avail further resistance on the part of the moderates to the project of separation.

Then it was that the Hungarian Diet, roused to a frenzied enthusiasm by the recent victories, took that step which the moderates and constitutionalists had so strenuously resisted a month before. On April 14th, acting on the motion of Kos-

suth, it issued from Debreczin a declaration of independence, deposing King Ferdinand, for whom they had up to this time ostensibly fought, abolishing the constitution, which they had thus far supported, and declaring Hungary to be a free and independent state. "The house of Habsburg-Lorraine as perjured and treacherous is forever excluded," said the declaration, "from the throne of the United States of Hungary and Transylvania, and deposed, degraded, and banished forever from the Hungarian territory." Power was now wholly in the hands of the radical revolutionists, and, although the name republic was not expressly mentioned in the declaration, the form of the new government of which Kossuth was chosen the president was republican. The successes of the Hungarian army continued. On May 19th Welden, the successor of Windischgrätz, was defeated and driven from Pesth ; and once more the Hungarian government returned to the capital city. But the general situation had changed ; the Hungarians were now fighting for independence, not for their king and their March constitution, and in the eyes of the reactionary Powers had become the enemies not of Austria alone, but of all established governments. After the declaration of independence, when the other Powers of Europe had taken a neutral stand supporting neither Austria nor Hungary, the Magyars hoped to be allowed to fight out the struggle alone, and in this event, even with dissensions among their own leaders, they would probably have succeeded. But this was not to be. To the appeal of the young Francis Joseph the Czar, who had already sent Russian troops into Transylvania, replied favourably, and on May 1st it was learned that he had placed his troops at the disposal of the Austrian Emperor. The reasons for this are clear : by the terms of the treaty of Münchengrätz Nicolas was bound, if called upon, to aid either Austria or Prussia against revolutionary uprisings ; he was, moreover, the natural protector of the Slavonic peoples against the Magyars ; and he feared that

success in Hungary would lead to an inevitable revolt in his own subject states, particularly in Poland.

With the entrance of the Russian troops upon the scene, the war took the form of a struggle for life or death. Haynau, the Austrian general, attacked from the west, Paskiévitch with 150,000 Russians from the east. In these desperate straits Hungary made heroic efforts to gain support; she sought help from Turkey but in vain; she promised equality to the disaffected Slavonic nationalities, but they refused to respond. Forced from Pesth the revolutionary government moved from one town to another, until, finally seeing the hopelessness of the struggle Kossuth resigned the presidency and made Görgei dictator. On August 13, 1849, the latter surrendered unconditionally to the Russian general, Paskiévitch, who handed over Hungary to Nicolas, who in turn placed it at the disposal of Francis Joseph. The vengeance of Austria was frightful. Under the direction of the pitiless Haynau, Hungarian patriots, even those of high rank, were shot or hanged; thousands were imprisoned, and those who escaped the bloody tribunals of Pesth and Arad did so only by flight into other lands. The constitution was abolished; the country was divided into military districts, and for ten years was governed with despotic severity. So Hungary waited, making no sign until other events should rouse her to gain, by truer methods and under leaders who were statesmen and not revolutionists, constitutional and political independence.

CHAPTER X.

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.—II.

WITH the overthrow of the Hungarian army at Vilagos and the reduction of the Hungarian state to military subordination, Austria was able to establish once more the unity of the imperial government, and to revive and give efficiency to the bureaucracy and centralised administration that had been to the liberals of central Europe so obnoxious a part of her government in the days of Metternich. During the year 1849 Europe was beginning to feel once more the supremacy of the old conservative ideas. France, with Louis Napoleon as president of the republic, was already proving false to the principles declared after the revolution of February, and was committing herself to acts that foreshadowed the destruction of the newly-established government. The monarchists of the French Assembly, elected under the most democratic of suffrages, were already determined to undo all that the revolution had accomplished, and were fast bringing the country into that condition of political confusion which was to make possible the erection of an empire, itself in form and spirit a return to the past, a hindrance to the cause of political and social progress. In Russia, Nicholas I., ruling tranquilly during these months of disturbance and esteeming himself the divinely appointed protector of thrones and legitimate governments, was declaring himself ready to interfere, as he had just done in Hungary, to put down revolution, and to support the principles of the Holy Alliance wherever such interference seemed

necessary. Embodying in his own person all the characteristics of absolute power, both civil and ecclesiastical, he stood at this time as the grand upholder of all those political ideas and theories that the revolutionists of 1848 had sought to overthrow; and, uninfluenced by the desires and claims of the liberals in other countries, he encouraged his brother princes to resist the popular demands, and to maintain intact their royal and imperial prerogatives. Thus France on one side and Russia on the other, although differing absolutely in their motives, were alike in offering no encouragement to the liberal cause. The ebbing of the tide of revolution was nearly complete, and only in Italy and the states of the Germanic Confederation had Austria still to make good her supremacy, and to regain the position of leadership in central Europe that she had held before the revolution of 1848 began.

It will be remembered that on the 9th of August, 1848, the campaign upon which Italy had entered with so much promise the March before, was brought to an end by the Salasco armistice; and that this cessation of war released a large portion of Radetzky's army for service against Hungary, and strengthened Austria in her determination to recover the position that she had lost four months before. It will be remembered, also, that during the period of the armistice, which lasted seven months, republicanism gained ground in Italy, destroying the unity of the Italian cause and alienating the sympathy of the moderate constitutionalists, notably at Rome. It was evident before the close of the armistice—so sharply defined had become the position of the reactionists on one side and the revolutionists on the other—that the governments of Tuscany and Naples would furnish no aid to the national cause, and that if the war were to be renewed, Piedmont must do battle alone against the common enemy. And for many reasons the King of Piedmont was willing to renew the struggle. He was desirous of bringing the matter to an issue

of one kind or another, for the armistice, in compelling Piedmont to hold herself in readiness for war at any moment, was becoming unendurable; and as his army during the truce had been increased to 117,000 men, he felt reasonably sure of success. Furthermore, the democrats of Turin were clamouring for war, and from Lombardy, where the military government of Radetzky was harsh and unrelenting, appeals for aid were frequent and pitiful. Therefore, on March 12th, Charles Albert, who had cancelled all his earlier failures by his unflinching devotion to Italy during the later days, declared the armistice at an end, and on March 19th entered upon his last campaign for the independence of his country. Of all the other states only Rome and Venice stood by him. Mazzini, practically dictator of Rome, in a speech that will always redound to his honour, declared that "There should be only two kinds of Italians in Italy, the friends and the enemies of Austria. Republican Rome," he added, "will make war by the side of monarchical Piedmont." Daniele Manin promised that Venice also would render all the assistance in her power; but unfortunately, before the troops of either Rome or Venice could come to the aid of Piedmont, the struggle was over.

The war, which destroyed for the time being all hope of Italian freedom, lasted but five days, during which at no single instant was there a chance of success for Piedmont. The brief campaign was filled with instances of bad management, inefficient generalship, and mutual distrust. The Piedmontese forces under the leadership of a Pole, Chrzanowski, were outmanœuvred by the Austrians under Radetzky, who, while Chrzanowski was entering Lombardy at Buffalora, invaded Piedmont at Cava. The Piedmontese turning back received their first check at Mortara, and then risking all in a general battle, were entirely defeated at Novara, March 23d. No alternative remained to the king but to submit to the harsh terms of the conqueror and retire from the struggle; but hoping to

lighten the punishment that would be inflicted upon his country, and seeing in himself the chief obstacle to her welfare, he determined to abdicate. In the Bellini palace in Novara, which had served as the royal headquarters, in the presence of his military staff, he gave up his title in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel, and in so doing brought to a pathetic close one of the most eventful and unhappy reigns in the history of modern Europe. Withdrawing from the field of battle, the old king journeyed to Oporto, where he died two months afterwards; while the young Victor Emmanuel, fully aware of the difficulties of the task before him, made terms with Radetzky that were hard but not disgraceful, and returned to Turin, there to take up, in the face of Austria's opposition, the burden of kingly rule. In this crisis his policy was a dual one; an one side he rejected all advances of the Austrian government, preferring the position of a prince honourably conquered to that of a vassal of Austria; on the other he maintained loyally the Statuto, as the constitution of 1848 was called, and after the retirement of Alfieri, summoned the leader of the party of reform, Massimo d'Azeglio, to the first place in his new cabinet. By one act he proclaimed himself the defender of Italy against Austria; by the other he brought to his support the liberals of the peninsula, who watched with expectation his attempt to convert Piedmont into a strong constitutional state and the Italians into a free and united nation. From this task Victor Emmanuel never drew back, and the history of his reign is the history of the consummation of Italian unity and independence.

With the defeat of Piedmont Austria's work was greatly simplified. No organised army confronted her in Italy. The centres of resistance were only the revolting municipalities, Bergamo, Brescia, Florence, Venice, and Rome, and for their overthrow nearly eighty thousand troops were ready under Austria's most redoubtable generals, Radetzky, Haynau, and Nugent. With Bergamo success was speedy, but the resistance

of the Brescians was heroic. For twenty-four hours, March 30th and 31st, they defended their city against twelve thousand troops under Haynau; but Brescia fell, and the vengeance of the Austrian commander began for him in Europe that unenviable reputation for atrocity that the war-tribunals of Hungary were to complete. In Tuscany, where liberals and revolutionists were already at each other's throats, there was practically no resistance save at Leghorn. In April, Grand Duke Leopold in Gaëta appealed to Austria for aid, and in reply the Austrian general, d'Aspre, entered Tuscany in May. Leghorn after a two days' struggle capitulated, and in two weeks Austrian troops entered Florence. All that had been gained in 1847–48 was lost; the constitution was abolished, all liberal decrees were annulled, and Leopold on his return put into force all the old reactionary institutions.

Austria was steadily pushing her way southward. In May, Bologna was invested, and on the 20th fell; Ferrara and Ancona were occupied, and Austrian troops were in Umbria and the Marches prepared to march to the aid of the Pope. At the same time Ferdinand of Naples was ready to support the papal cause, and to assist, if needed, in the overthrow of the Roman Republic.

But at this juncture another actor appeared. France, who had been watching with disquietude the growth of Austria's power in the peninsula, now determined to revive the old policy that had led to the occupation of Ancona in 1831. Louis Napoleon, wishing to conciliate the ultramontane element and to gain the support of the conservative and monarchical parties, had proposed to his minister, Odilon Barrot, that an expedition be sent to Rome "to maintain the legitimate influence of France in Italy, and to obtain for the Roman people good government founded on liberal institutions." The ministry, in supporting the measure before the Chamber, declared that France was trying to save the Romans from the extreme re-

action that would inevitably follow a restoration of the Pope by Austrian bayonets; and at the same time it did not hesitate to say that if the Roman Republic refused to accept the friendly intervention of the French, then such intervention would have to be effected by force. A favourable vote having been obtained in the Chamber, eight thousand men were dispatched to Civita Vecchia under General Oudinot to carry out the ministerial plan. No act shows more strikingly than this the inconsistent character of the second republic, and the fact that it was a republic only in name. When the republicans of Rome, detecting the real nature of the ministerial plan, declared that they did not believe in the friendly words of the French ministry, Oudinot attacked the city; but so vigorous was the defence and so loyal the support received from other parts of Italy, that on April 30th the French were repulsed and compelled to retreat. To Garibaldi in large part is due the honour of this success.

At this juncture the ministry in France found itself seriously embarrassed. The Chamber was not so conservative as not to resist any further extension of this policy of coercion and require of the ministry a change of program. Many of the deputies were already feeling that the republic had broken one of its own fundamental principles, its pledge that never—as the constitution said—would it use its arms against the liberty of any people. On this account, the ministry resolved to temporise until the results of the May elections should be known. Ferdinand de Lesseps was sent to Rome to mediate, and succeeded so well that, contrary to the intentions of the ministry and to its further embarrassment, a treaty was arranged with the Roman Republic, according to which the French were not to interfere in the affairs at Rome, and were even to repel foreign attacks if necessary. But when, on May 28th, it was found that by the new elections a Chamber had been returned more conservative than before and more favourable to the ministerial

policy, the treaty of de Lesseps was repudiated as contrary to instructions and injurious to the interests and dignity of France; and Oudinot was ordered to continue the attack. On June 30th, after a brave resistance, the second Roman Republic was overthrown. Mazzini, escaping first to Marseilles, finally contrived, after many perils, to reach neutral territory, and took up his residence at Geneva; Garibaldi and four thousand followers fled to the mountains; and a government of cardinals was established, awaiting the return of the Pope. But it was not until April, 1850, that Pius IX. dared to venture back to the city thus restored to him. In November of the same year Louis Napoleon completed the drama by announcing to the French Chamber that French "arms had overturned that turbulent demagoguery, which had compromised true liberty in all the Italian peninsula, and that [French] soldiers had the peculiar honour of having restored Pius IX. to the throne of St. Peter."

Venice alone remained to commemorate the victories of 1848, yet around her, too, reaction had already drawn its lines slowly but with pitiless certainty. The siege by land had been begun by Austria as early as April, and the blockade by sea as early as June; and when one by one the Italian cities fell, and the surrender of the Hungarian army, August 13th, destroyed all chances of help from abroad, Venice, torn by factions, afflicted with cholera, cut off from all supplies, finally realised that her struggle was hopeless. On August 24th, Manin, resigning the presidency, turned over his authority to the municipal government; on the next day the Venetians, reduced to helplessness by sickness and starvation, surrendered to the Austrian general; and three days later Austria entered into full possession, and the victory of the reactionary forces was complete. One by one all the strongholds of the liberals had fallen, and in every case, save that of Piedmont, the constitutional gains of 1847–48 had been swept away. In Naples, Rome, Florence,

and Venice, as in Bohemia and Hungary, the old system was restored, and the old rulers took up the exercise of their absolute authority. In Piedmont alone, where ruled the future King of Italy, was constitutional government maintained; there alone were preserved the safeguards of the modern state.

While thus the Austrian army and the Austrian military authority had been for more than a year proving its power in Hungary and Italy, a different struggle, one of ideas rather than of arms, was taking place in Germany, where Austria was destined to recover her supremacy rather by diplomacy and the influence of her great prestige than by the exercise of physical force. Her victory, however, if less brutal, was in the end no less complete.

It will be remembered that in Germany the victory of the March days—the consummation of thirty years of active agitation—was in the main the victory of the people, who desired a united Germany with free and representative government guaranteed by a written constitution, over the princes of the separate German states, who stood for state sovereignty, royal rights, and the supremacy of the landed classes in the administration of affairs. After a number of preliminary meetings and the appointment of a committee of seven to complete the arrangements, five hundred representatives of the people convened without any official authority in a preliminary assembly at Frankfort, March 31, 1848, to take more definite measures for the calling of the larger body, the national assembly, which was to represent the German nation rather than the German states. The assembly was entirely distinct from the Federal Diet, which, made up of deputies sent by the princes and not the people, was at this time the only legal central authority in Germany. Although the Preliminary Convention sat but five days, adjourning April 4th, it accomplished an important work. It decided to summon a national assembly, but recommended to the Federal Diet, who alone

could give official sanction to its acts, the reduction of the unit of representation from seventy thousand to fifty thousand inhabitants; it also recommended at the request of Prussia the admission of East and West Prussia into the Germanic Confederation, and at the request of the Holsteiners, expressed in an address issued from Altona, March 15th, the admission of Schleswig, also. Of these recommendations, which were immediately accepted by the Federal Diet, thus confirming the victory of the liberal party, one only in any way endangered the peace of Germany. The admission of Schleswig into the Confederation was a direct defiance to the public letter that Christian VIII. had issued in 1846, and to the constitution that Frederic VII., his successor, had published in January, 1848, in both of which the annexation of Schleswig, Lauenberg, and parts of Holstein to the kingdom of Denmark was definitely proclaimed. This proclamation had led to the insurrection of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, the establishment of a provisional government, and the issue of the Altona address mentioned above. Although the admission of Schleswig was in the interest of a rebellious people, the Federal Diet, unable to resist, was forced to sanction the movement; and inasmuch as this rebellion of necessity involved the duchies in a war with Denmark, the Diet authorised Prussia to protect them against Danish attack. This is the first stage in the history of the complicated Schleswig-Holstein question that was destined to play so important a part in the later history of Germany.

The members of the Convention, although amicably agreeing to these recommendations, found themselves confronted with problems more difficult of solution, and with party hostilities that boded no good for the future. There was in the Convention a large group of radical republicans who were opposed to all monarchical and imperial forms of government, and there was serious disagreement, even among the conservative members themselves, regarding the question of the

admission of Austria into that new German state, for which the National Assembly was to draft a constitution. Many felt that it would be impossible to create a federal union containing both Prussia and Austria, while others, representing Prussia and the South German states, were determined to oppose any arrangement that left Austria out of account. But these differences, however ominous they may have been for the future, were not allowed to destroy the unanimity of the Convention, and when on April 4th that body broke up, the members parted in harmony. The only discontents were the Baden republicans, who, influenced by the socialistic doctrines of the French radicals, were endeavouring to transform the Germanic Confederation into a republic. As Struve's proposal to proclaim the one indivisible German republic and Hecker's motion that the Convention remain *en permanence* until the meeting of the National Assembly had been voted down by large majorities, it was clear that the Convention, although opposed to all absolute forms of government, was in no sense willing to commit itself to republican or socialistic doctrines. In consequence of this failure of the republican agitators to influence the Convention, revolutions were inaugurated by Hecker, Struve, and the poet Herwegh in Baden, and by Mieroslawski in Poland, but both movements were put down, though not until after considerable fighting on the part of the Confederate and Prussian troops. Unable to carry through their doctrines by force and hoping to consummate their plans by constitutional means, the republicans turned their attention to the coming National Assembly.

During this agitation, verbal in the Convention, revolutionary outside, Austria involved in the threatened ruin of the imperial government, had remained inactive, and had, in consequence, exercised practically no influence in German affairs. But by the end of April, having recovered a little from the effects of the March uprisings, she succeeded in effecting the postpone-

ment of the meeting of the Assembly until the 18th of May, hoping by that time to be able to enforce her doctrine of Austrian leadership in an unrestricted German state, organised as a loose confederacy after the old scheme of Metternich. It may be well to add here that before the Assembly met Austria was placed *hors du combat*, by the uprising in Vienna of May 15th, which drove the imperial family to Innsbruck and made it impossible for her to take any important part in the coming discussion.

When on April 4th the Convention broke up it left behind a committee of fifty to carry out the arrangements already made for the election of members to the National Assembly. After this committee had completed its work there met at Frankfort, on the 18th of May, 586 representatives of the German people, sent from nearly every part of the German-speaking world. Immediately committees were appointed to draw up reports upon nearly every subject more or less closely connected with the work of the Assembly, of which by far the most important was that one chosen to prepare a preliminary draft of the new constitution. But while these committees were performing their work, it was necessary that a provisional government should be established for Germany, to take the place of the Federal Diet, which was ready as soon as such government were organised to bring to an end its official existence. At once the question arose as to what form the head of such a government should take. Should it be a regent, or a directory of three or more persons? If a regent, should he be one of the princes or a member of the Assembly? Should he be made irresponsible, that is, invested with full powers, or should he be held responsible to the Assembly? After a long debate, lasting from June 3d to June 28th, the Assembly agreed to accept a regency of one person who should be invested with full executive, military, and appointing powers. Archduke John of Austria, whose hostility to the imperial government, even in the days of

Metternich, had won him the favour of the liberals, and whose independent attitude was at this time a matter of concern to the cabinet at Vienna, was chosen as regent. This choice was generally recognised by all except the members of the Left side of the Assembly as an excellent one. Invested with the power of selecting his own ministers the archduke named men of fairly moderate views: Schmerling for the interior, Heckscher for foreign affairs, von Peucker for war, von Mohl for justice, and others who, though strong opponents of particularism, were wholly out of sympathy with the principles of the radical republicans. When on July 12th the archduke took the oath to the decree of the Assembly, the new government, thus legally inaugurated, took the place of the old, and the Federal Diet, though not abolished, ceased for the time being to exist as an official body. The different states of Germany, whose creature the Diet had been, recognised the new regent, and transferred to him the powers that the Diet had formerly exercised. The archduke and his ministers were to govern Germany until the National Assembly should complete its work, and a new government under a liberal constitution be erected.

Having now safely passed this its first crisis, the Assembly took up as its next work the consideration of that for which the representatives of the people had been gathered together—the framing of a constitution. For two months they had sat, debated, and discussed, and had only succeeded in forming a provisional government. Above all things now haste seemed desirable and necessary. On the very day that the question of the constitution came up for discussion, Windischgrätz reduced Bohemia to subjection; the provisional government in Paris had already won its victory of June over the proletariat in the streets; the states of Germany were recovering from the fear that the March uprisings had created; and the old ideas were once more pressing hard for recognition. It was no time,

therefore, for delay and dispute; it was imperative that the National Assembly lay firmly the foundations of its own strength by drafting with speed and unanimity a constitution to express the will of the German people, and to make possible a strong government for the fatherland. But in this particular the Assembly committed its first serious error. It is true that even under the most favourable circumstances the task would have been exceedingly difficult; but it was made infinitely less likely of successful accomplishment by continued postponement. The Assembly, confident of its own strength and anxious to postpone the solution of the many difficult problems that the work involved, put off the evil day by taking up the discussion of a question that it would better have left untouched—that of the fundamental rights of the German people. It not only did not take advantage of the time when enthusiasm and a general willingness to make concessions might have made it possible to agree to some common measure, and failed to seize the opportunity when Austria was embarrassed and unable to interfere; but it introduced a subject that was sure to deepen party lines, to create personal hostilities, and to antagonise the supporters of the rights of the individual states.

For more than three months, critical months in the history of Europe, this body continued its discussions. It took up the questions of national citizenship, of equality before the law, of an independent judiciary, of freedom of the press, of religion, of education, of association; it discussed the necessity of popular representation in the separate states, of a new organisation for the local communes, of a new canon law for the established church. Heated controversies arose; motions were made followed by interminable discussion; German professors and lawyers revelled in the spinning of wordy arguments, in the analysis of abstract principles more or less remotely connected with the subject in hand. In two weeks three hundred and fifty amendments to the twelve original articles of the bill of

rights were proposed, and the debate that Gagern, the president of the Assembly, had believed would end in three weeks, threatened to prolong itself indefinitely. The results were disastrous; within the Assembly rivalries increased, party hatred grew stronger, and new party lines were drawn; without, the people watched with a daily decreasing enthusiasm and interest this ceaseless logomachy, the industrial classes growing more and more enraged at the vacillation on the part of the Assembly, which was injuring business, blocking trade, and bringing German traffic to a standstill.

The harmony of parties within the Assembly and the relations of the Assembly with the various German governments were subjected to a still heavier strain by the outcome of the controversy between Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. A brief review of this question is, therefore, necessary here. We have already noticed that in 1846 Christian VIII. of Denmark had announced in an open letter his determination to annex the duchies, by extending to them the Danish law of succession, which recognised the female right of inheritance. This act had been confirmed by Frederic VII. in the constitution promulgated January 28, 1848. Inasmuch as the inhabitants of the duchies had confidently expected that a male heir to the Danish throne would soon fail—for Frederic VII. was childless—in which case the duchies would separate from Denmark under a prince of their own, this decree of annexation, together with the influence of the March revolution, roused them to resist Danish aggression by force; and they appealed to Germany for aid. At the recommendation of the Convention, the Diet had authorised Prussia to protect the duchies, and the latter state, somewhat imprudently accepting the offer, declared in favour of a separation between the two parts of the Danish kingdom. In the war that followed, which lasted from April to August, 1848, Prussia was not content with protecting the duchies, but, taking the offensive,

pushed her way across the Danish frontier and advanced to Jütland. The question thus became one of international importance, and the Powers, England and Russia, ranged themselves on the side of Denmark, in defence of the integrity of the Danish state. Prussia was supported by the Confederation and the duchies, but not by Austria, who, determined to act as a European Power and not as a member of the Germanic Confederation, refused to be drawn into the controversy. Russia threatened to interfere if Prussia carried on the war, and Sweden was already arming. In August, 1848, when the Assembly was entering upon the second month of its debate regarding the fundamental rights of the German people, Prussia found herself in an embarrassing position. To prolong the war not only meant giving serious offence to the Powers, which might involve her in a larger struggle, but it also meant continued injury to her commerce, which had already suffered much from the Danish blockade. On the other hand, to bring the war to a close was to arouse the anger of the National Assembly, and to offend the liberals of Germany, to whom it was a matter of honour to secure the independence of Schleswig and its admission into the Confederation. In this crisis Prussia, considering the latter the lesser of the two evils, decided to withdraw from the war, and, calling back her troops from Denmark, agreed to the armistice of Malmö, August 26th.

This act came like a thunder-clap upon the members of the Assembly, causing bewilderment and rousing animosity. Dahlmann, the leader of the constitutionalists, vehemently refused to yield to the will of Prussia, and to commit the Assembly to so cowardly an act as that of retreat in the presence of danger. In the exciting debate that followed, the Left, giving up for the moment its former attitude of hostility toward the conservative leader, joined with Dahlmann in its desire to bring about the rejection of the treaty and to effect the discomfiture of Prussia and the conservatives. In the first outburst of anger, although

the moderates in large numbers deserted their leader, the opposition succeeded, on September 5th, in carrying by seventeen votes a motion not to accept the treaty of Malmö. This meant of course the downfall of the Schmerling ministry and the formation of another by Dahlmann, who, deserted by his own party and supported chiefly by the radicals, found himself in an anomalous position. For three days he attempted, but in vain, to form a new cabinet, and the old ministry, somewhat reorganised, returned to office. When the Assembly, already cooling in its indignation toward the so-called treason of Prussia and frightened at its own audacity, learned of this fact, it took the question once more into consideration, and on September 16th, after a brilliant discussion of three days' duration, reversed its former decision, and to the wrath of the radicals voted to accept the truce.

The effects of this incident were most disastrous: the parties in the Assembly became hopelessly divided, and the radicals were in full revolt, ready to oppose every measure and to resist every compromise short of a republic. At the same time the Assembly was losing its prestige, for it was giving unmistakable evidence of its inability to impose its commands upon the individual German governments, who were far from willing to yield to the authority of a national government (the regency) that, as yet unrecognised abroad, was proving to be, when brought to the test, uncertain of its powers and without efficiency at home. Particularism was fast regaining its former strength in Germany.

This was the position of the National Assembly, when, on October 19, 1848, five months after it had been summoned, the work of drafting the constitution was begun. Under strikingly changed circumstances the attempt was made to solve all the difficult problems, the consideration of which, put off from month to month, could not be longer deferred. It is no part of our task to follow the various phases of the discussion upon

this important matter. The first question that came up related to the admission of Austria; and on October 27th the *Klein-deutsch* party, which advocated a restricted Germany, won a victory by carrying through a measure whereby only German Austria (without Hungary and her dependencies) was to be admitted into the new German state. This as a direct blow at Austria might have been efficient had it been given three months before; but delayed until October, it had lost all its force. Austria had won at Prague, had defeated Charles Albert in Italy, had overthrown the revolting Viennese, who had risen out of sympathy for the Hungarians and murdered the war minister, Latour. The Austrian army had begun the restoration of the Austrian power, and it was the army that made the first reply to the defiant act of the Assembly. On November 9th Robert Blum, a member of the Assembly who had taken part in the Vienna uprising, was condemned to death and shot, to remind the Assembly that Austria would not recognise the inviolability of the Frankfort delegates. Toward the end of November, Austria took a firmer stand. With her army everywhere victorious over her rebellious states, she was ready to effect that change in the reorganisa- of the imperial government that the situation made possible and necessary. Ferdinand was forced to abdicate, and Francis Joseph came to the throne. The vigorous policy upon which the new minister, Schwarzenberg, at once decided to enter was not in its application limited to Hungary. While the National Assembly was engaged in its discussion of the constitution, Schwarzenberg was secretly bringing all his influence to bear upon Frederic William IV., and at his request drew up in clear and unmistakable terms the imperial demands: Austria was to be admitted in its entirety into the Germanic Confedera-tion, and in conjunction with Prussia should draw up, without regard to the wish or decision of the National Assembly, a con-stitution based upon a confederation of states. Thus the civil

power of Austria deliberately set its face against all that the representatives of the people sitting at Frankfort were endeavouring to accomplish, and ignored the constituent authority of the National Assembly as completely as the military power had ignored the inviolable privileges of its members.

During the next two months, while the members of the Assembly were discussing the articles of the constitution, various plans for a constitutional reorganisation of the Confederation were passed between Prussia and Austria. Though no definite conclusions were reached it was becoming evident that the princes of the lesser states, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, who had been from the beginning lukewarm in their support of the National Assembly, were awaiting the favourable moment to turn once more to Austria and accept her leadership. Finally, in February, 1849, strengthened by the victories of Windischgrätz, which drove the Hungarian government from Pesth to Debreczin, the Austrian government felt that the time had come for definite action. Schwarzenberg proposed to the other kingdoms of Germany that they should unite with Austria to reject, by military force if necessary, whatever the National Assembly proposed, to draft a separate constitution, based on the old ideas, and to force it unconditionally upon the remaining German states. And Schwarzenberg's plans gained strength with success. After the victory of Capolna, February 26, 1849, by which the Hungarian army was driven to join the Diet at Debreczin, believing that the imperial supremacy was at last assured, he first issued in the Emperor's name, on March 4th, the new constitution for the whole Austrian Empire, and then, five days afterwards, made known Austria's plan for a reorganisation of the Germanic Confederation. Having by the imperial constitution declared to Europe that the Emperor was determined to be master once more in his own house, he also made it known by this proposal for Germany that the Emperor was to become once more the

leading prince in the Germanic Confederation. By the new plan Austria with her thirty millions non-German population was to be admitted into the new German state, a directory of seven members, under Austrian and perhaps occasionally under Prussian leadership, was to be established, and a chamber of deputies to be organised that should represent not the people but the states, in which Austria, by virtue of the increase of her population, would possess thirty-eight votes, while the other states altogether would possess but thirty-two.

This thoroughly military and unnational scheme waked great wrath in the National Assembly, where the work of drafting a constitution for the German people, and not for the German states, was going steadily on. On February 3d the final draft had passed its first reading, but through Austrian influence the second reading had been postponed, and time had been lost during February and March in a further discussion of fundamental rights, of the question of suffrage, and proposed amendments to the constitution. Finally on March 27th, nearly a year after the meeting of the Preliminary Convention, the second reading of the constitution was reached, and after long debate the Assembly voted that the head of the new government should be an hereditary emperor and not a directory. On the 28th, amidst great excitement, Frederic William of Prussia was chosen by the Assembly as the first emperor under the new constitution. A deputation with the president of the Assembly (Simson, the successor of Gagern) at its head was immediately appointed to receive the king's acceptance. It was an important moment for Germany. Austria's defiant act of March 9th, to which the vote of the Assembly was in a sense a reply, had lost much of its force from the unexpected defeat of the Austrian army by General Bem in the south and south-east, and the entanglement of the Austrian government in a war that promised to be indefinitely prolonged. It was an opportunity that a strong king, a second Frederic the Great,

might readily have seized and turned to his own advantage; and no one doubted that Prussia wished to take the leadership in Germany. What, therefore, was the situation in Prussia, and what were the influences dictating the answer that the king was to make to the Frankfort delegation?

By his unnecessarily theatrical submission to liberalism on March 20, 1848, Frederic William had undoubtedly lost caste in the eyes of the conservative and feudal parties of Prussia and the Confederation; at the same time it can hardly be said that he had gained a very loyal support from the radical republicans who were gathering in increasing numbers in Berlin. When on May 22d the Constituent Assembly that was to draft a constitution for Prussia convened, it became clear that the best and ablest members of the constitutional party had gone to the National Assembly at Frankfort, leaving the Constituent Assembly in the hands of men of mediocre abilities, who were powerless to control the radical members. During the months of June and July disturbances arose in the streets outside of the building in which the Assembly was sitting; and finally, on July 31st, in an attack by the mob upon the arsenal and in a bloody conflict with Prussian troops, fourteen of the citizens were killed. This unfortunate encounter led to disagreements between the Assembly and the Prussian government as to the disposition of the troops, and the rapid increase in the audacity and power of the radicals in the chamber. When in October the constitution, which had been for some time under discussion by the eight provincial groups into which the Assembly was divided, came up for general debate, the radicals, zealous to imitate the work of the French National Assembly of 1789, carried through motions to abolish all feudal privileges, all orders, titles of nobility, and differences of rank, to strike out the words "by the grace of God" before the title of the king, and, finally, when the news of the uprising of October 6th and the murder of Latour came from Vienna, to ask

Frederic William to send aid to the "heroic people" who had just driven the Austrian Emperor to Olmütz. This was more than the King of Prussia, with his ideas of the sanctity of rulers, could endure; and when, therefore, the agitators in the streets began to threaten the moderate members of the Assembly with death after the fashion of Latour, and it became evident that Berlin was fast approaching the condition of Vienna, the Prussian ministry determined to put a summary check upon any further radical proceedings. The attack of Windischgrätz upon Vienna gave the authorities in Berlin their cue, and in the early days of November a new ministry was formed by the king under Count Brandenburg with Manteuffel as minister of war. When the Assembly, denying the authority of the ministry, refused to be prorogued, the city was placed in a state of siege; and when the Assembly, enraged at this employment of force, passed measures forbidding the regular payment of taxes, it was dissolved, and a body of radical members that refused to obey was dispersed by the police. The movement in Berlin, as well as that in Vienna, had passed beyond the limits of reason and justice, and had become a menace not only to the peace of the city but also to the constitutional development of Prussia. On the day that the king announced the dissolution of the Assembly, he issued a constitution, based on a plan that he had submitted to the committee of the Assembly the May previous, but which the committee had rejected. This *octroyed* constitution, put forth under such circumstances, was no reactionary document; it contained many of the features of representative and parliamentary government, and as revised by the legislative body, which met under its provisions in February, 1849, it is the present constitution of Prussia.

These events increased the confidence of the Prussian government in its own strength and intensified the hostility of the king toward all revolutionary and radical movements. Now that he had of his own free will and accord granted a constitu-

tion to Prussia, Frederic William felt himself able to act independently regarding the offer that had come from the National Assembly at Frankfort. The situation would have been different six months before; but in April, 1849, he was free to follow the promptings of his own nature, uninfluenced by the events of the year just past, except as they had strengthened his belief in the divinity of kings and the principles of kingly honour. In the first place, as a man of mediocre statesmanship, with a distinct aversion to warlike measures, it is evident that he would have been unable to take the prompt and decisive action that the situation demanded, and would not have dared, even had he been willing, to assume so great responsibility at so critical a juncture. To have accepted the imperial title, and to have taken the headship of a Germany from which the greater part of Austria had been excluded would have led to a struggle, not only with Austria, but with Russia, for the Czar Nicolas was opposed to the policy of his brother-in-law, the King of Prussia, and had been ready for a year past to advance to any point, whether Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, or Vienna, where revolution threatened the established order. "I am not a great sovereign," said Frederic William to Herr von Beckerath; "Frederic II. would have been your man." Then, too, so keen was his sense of honour among kings, and so great his abhorrence of revolution, that he would have scorned to take advantage of Austria's embarrassment, entangled as she was in a war with Hungary. Even if he had been willing to receive the imperial crown from the National Assembly, whose election of Archduke John as regent and whose attitude toward Prussia in the Schleswig-Holstein affair had offended him, he doubted the right of this body, which had just proclaimed universal suffrage as a concession to the radicals, to choose an emperor. That he would have accepted the title had it been offered by the princes of Germany, acting without compulsion, is probable, but, imbued with a certain mystical liberalism and an extravagant

veneration for the imperial office, he was unwilling to accept such a title from an Assembly whose authority came from the people alone. He was willing to admit the people to a share in government—as he had done in the liberal constitution just granted to Prussia—but it was quite a different matter to receive from them a title associated with the most august traditions of the past. It is probable, therefore, that the king's solution of the problem before him was dictated quite as much by scruples of conscience and doctrines of kingship as by fear of consequences. His admiration and respect for Austria, his veneration for the divinity of sovereigns, his loyalty to the principles of the Holy Alliance, and his unwillingness to accept such an office without the consent of all the German states, influenced him to put aside that which the delegation from the Frankfort Assembly offered to him. On April 3d he replied, but not categorically ; on April 21st, after Austria had withdrawn her deputies from the Assembly and had suffered her greatest defeat at the hands of the Magyars at Gödöllö, April 6th, he announced to the Prussian Chambers, which on February 26th had met for the first time under the new constitution, that he rejected entirely the imperial scheme drafted at Frankfort.

This decision of the king destroyed, as far as the acceptance of the constitution was concerned, all the work that the National Assembly had accomplished during the past year. Even though Würtemberg and twenty-eight of the minor states of Germany accepted the Frankfort draft, and the assemblies of Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony, which in the main represented the people and not the princes, were wholly in favour of the new imperial constitution, nevertheless, the hostility of the Austrian government, and the opposition of the kings of Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, and Bavaria gave the last blow to the liberal cause, and new energy to the reactionary movement that had begun during the last months of 1848. The end of the National Assembly had come ; one by one the states

withdrew their representatives until only the radicals were left in control. Transferred from Frankfort to Stuttgart, and no longer a grand representative body of the German people working for the unity of the fatherland, it became merely a revolutionary committee, ready to promote radical uprisings, and during the months of May and June, 1849, was the leader in the last struggle of the revolution in Germany. With the failure of the moderates, the radicals took up the task, and in Prussia, Saxony, Baden, Würtemberg, the Palatinate, and some of the minor states entered upon a desperate attempt ostensibly to defend the Frankfort constitution, in reality to effect the overthrow of the existing governments and to found a republic. On June 18th, the members of the Assembly at Stuttgart were dispersed by Würtemberg troops; but it was not until the end of July, a month before the Hungarian army surrendered at Vilagos, and five weeks before the capitulation of Venice closed the struggle in Italy, that the last body of the revolutionists was defeated by Prussian troops, the last fortress held by the radicals, Rastadt in Baden, surrendered, and southwestern Germany reduced to submission. By the 1st of August the victory of the governmental troops was complete. With the rejection of the imperial constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, with the defeat and dispersion of the revolutionary party, the old state governments, liberalised it is true, and benefited by the lessons that the liberal movement had taught them, resumed once more full sovereign powers.

But the failure of the National Assembly to form a strong government for Germany left the country without an permanent central authority. In July, the regent, Archduke John, resigned, and on September 30th, after much discussion, a provisional government, the "Interim," was established, in accordance with which Austria and Prussia, receiving from the archduke the powers that the states had transferred to him from the Federal Diet in July, 1848, governed jointly the Con-

federation. Such an arrangement could be, however, but temporary. The national attempt to solve the difficult problem had failed, owing to the opposition of the sovereign princes. Union spontaneously and voluntarily entered into by all the people of the separate states had proved to be an unrealisable ideal in Germany as in Italy, and the only thing that remained to be done was for the two leading Powers to present their solution of the problem. Thus far the struggle had been between the states and the nation, between sovereign princes and the National Assembly ; but now it was to be a contest between Austria and Prussia over the form that a federal government for Germany should take. Should such a government be the old, loose confederation enlarged to include Austria's non-Germanic provinces, as Schwarzenberg had already demanded? Should it be a compactly united federal body, with a strong central authority similar to that suggested in the Prussian draft, which Metternich had successfully opposed in 1815? Or should it be a restricted federal union without Austria, under Prussia's leadership, similar to Gersdorf's plan of 1814, or the Zollverein plan of 1847?

It will be seen that the new turn that affairs had taken may be looked at from two points of view ; that on one hand it may be considered a continuation of the attempt begun as early as the congress of Vienna to give Germany constitutional unity ; or, on the other, a phase of the revolution of 1848–49, the final scene in the drama of reaction in which Austria was to complete her victory over central Europe by forcing Germany to accept once more the doctrine of political immobility and stagnation that Metternich had so long supported.

No sooner had Frederic William rejected the imperial constitution of the National Assembly, than he announced his own scheme for a federal union of the German states. Unwilling to accept the plan that Schwarzenberg had presented on the 9th of March, which involved the admission of an entire Aus-

tria, and confident that the Austrian government would not agree to any project for a strong union in which the Austrian state should be even in the slightest degree subordinate to any other prince or central government than its own, he proposed having a federal union without Austria that should be made up of such states as would unite voluntarily under Prussian leadership to form a single federal state with Prussia for president. It was Frederic William's desire that this restricted German union, when organised, should enter into bonds of close alliance with Austria for mutual protection, support, and intercourse, and should with her have a common government, in the composition of which each should share equally. This plan was elaborated by the king during the months of April and May, at a time when Austria, owing to the prolongation of the war with Hungary, was unable to act effectively. Even though Schwarzenberg let it be known that he would not for a moment agree to any such plan, Frederic William called at Berlin, May 17th, a conference composed of representatives of such states as were willing to co-operate with him in forming such a union. Inasmuch as Würtemberg, as well as many of the minor states, had accepted the imperial constitution drawn up by the National Assembly, the only large states that could accept Prussia's invitation were Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover. Representatives from these states appeared at Berlin, but when the Austrian representative withdrew after the first session, and the Bavarian, on learning of the character of the proposed scheme, declared that he was without authority to enter into any definite agreement, Hanover and Saxony alone were left as Prussia's partners in the new venture. On May 26th these kingdoms agreed, hurriedly because of the progress of the revolution in the southwest, to form a league, known as the "league of the three kingdoms," that should last for one year. A diet and a constitution were promised for the new federal organisation, and an invitation was extended

to all the remaining states of Germany to enter the union. The final adoption of the Frankfort constitution seemed farther off than ever, and as the Prussian scheme became better known, and Prussia continued to be successful in putting down the revolutionary uprisings by force of arms, the minor states of Germany began to consider with more favour the idea of the new federal union, and by September 1st nearly all had joined the league. Arrangements were immediately made for the calling of the promised diet, and the new scheme of a federal German state, which corresponded very closely to Gersdorf's plan of 1814, seemed in fair way of being realised.

But during the period from May to October, 1849, important events were taking place in the Austrian state. While engaged in war with Hungary, Austria had been unable to do more than protest against the formation of such a union as this that Prussia proposed, and express her exceeding annoyance that Prussia should have taken the military leadership of Germany in suppressing the recent revolutions. Schwarzenberg was confident, however, that the jealousy which the other kingdoms felt for Prussia would eventually frustrate the scheme, and awaited the time when, with Austria freed from the war and once more mistress of all her dependent provinces, he could bring all his powers to bear upon the German situation. With the defeat of the Hungarians, August 13th, and the reorganisation of Hungary during the months of August and September, the opportunity was given, and Schwarzenberg turned his entire attention to the overthrow of the Prussian league. On October 20th, Saxony and Hanover, who had apparently joined the league more from fear of the radical republicans than from an honest interest in the league itself, and were only waiting for Austria to recover her authority at home, withdrew and went over to the side of Austria. Prussia, deprived of the support of the two kingdoms, was left with only the twenty-eight minor states, and as the term "league of the

three kingdoms" was no longer applicable, it was changed to the "federal union." Schwarzenberg having gained this important advantage over the King of Prussia, immediately organised a counter-league, known as the "league of the four kingdoms," composed of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and Würtemberg; and in December, 1849, a new constitution was drawn up, closely modelled upon that suggested on March 9th. Two leagues were thus in the field: one, the Prussian Union, based on the idea of a restricted German federal state under the protectorship of Prussia; the other, the "league of the four kingdoms," based on the idea of an entire Germany, loosely confederated, of which Austria should be the president. On March 20, 1850, the promised diet of the Union met at Erfurt and elaborated the constitutional compact, which had been drawn up when the league was first formed in March, 1849, revising the articles in accordance with the wishes of Prussia, and incorporating a supplemental act that had been drafted after the withdrawal of Saxony and Hanover.

To bring about a permanent establishment of the Union would have been at best a difficult if not a hopeless task, owing to the jealousy that so many of the states, large and small, felt toward Prussia; but it was made an impossible one by the policy that the Austrian government immediately adopted. Schwarzenberg, fully aware of the weakness of the tie that bound together the members of the Union, acted in this emergency in a manner thoroughly characteristic of him. Setting aside the "league of the four kingdoms" and all other schemes of a similar nature, he issued a circular on April 19th to all the governments except Prussia, announcing that inasmuch as the government of the "Interim" would expire on the 1st of May, it was necessary to take some action whereby a common government for all Germany might be established. On the 26th, in a second circular, he summoned the German governments to send delegates to Frankfort, and although he did not in so

many words state that the object of the conference was to revive the old system, nevertheless it was evident that he meant to demand the restoration of the old Federal Diet, which had been in a state of suspended animation since July, 1848, and to revise the old Confederate Act as far as it was necessary to put it once more into operation in Germany. That is, he purposed, as Metternich had done thirty-five years before, to prevent the establishment of a strong central government that might weaken Austria's supremacy, and in the end crowd her out of Germany. The Prussian king, angered at this illiberal and reactionary project, which took no account of what Germany had thought and done for thirty years, at once denied that the Federal Diet had any existence whatever or could be revived, and in answer to Schwarzenberg's conference of deputies at Frankfort, having declared that he would never abandon the Union, he called a meeting of German princes at Berlin on the 8th of May, 1850, to discuss the matter.

The situation thus created was further aggravated by the reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty, which had been temporarily settled by the armistice of Malmö, in August, 1848. On April 3, 1849, Denmark, declaring the armistice at an end, had begun preparations for war; and during the months of April, May, and June, while the negotiations had been taking place looking to the formation of the "league of the three kingdoms," the Schleswig-Holsteiners, aided by Prussia, had taken up arms to resist the Danish attack, Prussia standing loyally by the revolting duchies, and Austria supporting, without pretence at secrecy, the cause of the King of Denmark. But in July, 1849, Prussia, finding herself in the awkward position of being opposed by both her former associates in the Holy Alliance, Austria and Russia, and supported only by France, the very Power against which the Holy Alliance had been formed, had agreed to a general peace, although in so doing she had by no means deserted the cause of the duchies, but

stood ready, in case diplomacy failed, to solve the difficult problem by war. During the months following the armistice negotiations for final settlement had been conducted with alternate rapidity and slowness; but so little trust had the Schleswig-Holsteiners placed in the diplomatic interference of the Powers that at the time Austria was demanding the revival of the Federal Diet, and Prussia was summoning the princes to Berlin to discuss further the matter of the Union, the inhabitants of the duchies, having renewed the struggle, were fighting Denmark single-handed.

Thus in May, 1850, Germany was divided into two camps: on one side Austria and the lesser states, committed to the revival of the old Federal Diet and to the support of the Danish cause, were demanding the maintenance of the old governmental methods and the principles of particularism in a loose confederation; on the other, Prussia and the minor states, committed to the defence of the Union and the cause of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, demanded constitutional government in a restricted federal union freed from the dominance of Austria. Prussia's policy, although selfishly upheld in this as in later instances for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the union of Germany under Prussian leadership, represented in the main the ideas in defence of which the revolution of 1848 had been undertaken, and recognised the social and political progress that Austria with astonishing blindness persisted in ignoring. Although, like the constitution that Frederic William had just granted to Prussia, this policy was distinctly a compromise between the traditions of the past and the necessities of the future, nevertheless in comparison with that of Austria at the same time it was both liberal and national; although it had little of the Pan-Teutonic policy of the National Assembly, nevertheless its maintenance would be an important victory for the party of progress. The test was soon to be made, for the struggle with Austria was inevitable, and the incident which

actually brought matters to a crisis had already taken place —the quarrel between the elector and the people of Hesse Cassel.

Of all the princes of Germany Frederic William of Hesse Cassel had been least in sympathy with the liberal movement of 1848. Fettered by the liberal constitution that Hesse had received in 1831 and by the liberal ministry that he had been forced to appoint in 1848, he had taken advantage of the reactionary movement of 1849 to recover his control of the government. He had joined the Prussian Union, but on discovering that his sovereign independence was still further curtailed by the alliance, he had made it his chief ambition to overthrow the Union, and to destroy the democratic institutions of Hesse. To accomplish his purpose—for he was opposed by both his ministers and his people—he dismissed his ministry in February, 1850, and called Hassenpflug, an old, free-thinking Burschenschafter turned reactionist, for the second time to take the management of affairs. Hassenpflug's previous career as chief minister of Hesse had earned for him the hatred of Germany and the unenviable title of the curse of Hesse (*Hessenfluch*), and his appearance at this time worked, as he himself wrote, "like a Spanish fly on an open wound." The popular indignation that was roused by this appointment was followed by popular resistance when the minister, effecting the withdrawal of Hesse from the Prussian Union, began to override the constitution and to quarrel with the estates sitting at Cassel. In consequence, an uprising in Cassel seemed imminent, and Hassenpflug sought the aid of Austria and the deputies at Frankfort, to whose side he had led Hesse after the withdrawal from the Union.

In this crisis Austria and the Frankfort deputies, who had already been organised as the Plenum of the revised Federal Diet, threatened to send confederate troops to force obedience upon the rebellious people of Hesse. Against such an action

Prussia vigorously protested, and, influenced for the moment by the war party in the Prussian cabinet represented by General Radowitz, took measures to protect the people of Hesse in their constitutional rights, and sent word to the princes of the Union sitting at Berlin to prepare their troops for war. When, therefore, Austria, to the indignation of Europe, carried out her threat and dispatched Austrian and Bavarian troops to Hesse, Prussia sent a considerable body of men to prevent their entrance into the state. In November, 1850, the two armies stood face to face on Hessian territory, and fighting at Bronzell, described as a "military misunderstanding," had already begun. All Europe stood in suspense awaiting the issue. Would war actually be undertaken by the two great Powers? Would Prussia dare to take up the gauntlet that Austria had so often thrown down, and, yielding to the importunities of the war party, dispute Austria's supremacy in Germany? Not for forty years had the relations between the Powers been so strained as at this juncture; never had Prussia advanced so far in her open defiance of Austria. In the establishment of the Union, in the defence of the Schleswig-Holsteiners, and in the maintenance of the constitutional rights of the Hessians, Prussia had taken a definite stand. But now that the crisis had come, it was a question whether after all such a policy could be upheld in the presence of the strong opposition of the peace party in the Prussian ministry, of the unquestioned financial and military weakness of the Prussian state, and of the very unfavourable attitude of the European Powers.

There had been a long struggle between the two parties in the cabinet. Count Brandenburg, believing that to involve Prussia in a war with Austria would be disastrous to the future well-being of the state, favoured a policy of peace, while Radowitz and his colleagues, feeling that Prussian honour was at stake, and that to withdraw was cowardly and humiliating to Prussia, insisted on a policy of war. After a sharp controversy,

during which both ministers threatened to resign, the peace party won the victory, and a decision was reached that it was absolutely necessary for Prussia's offensive policy to cease, that the order for the mobilisation of the troops be immediately countermanded, and that the best terms possible be made with Austria. Awkward as this decision was and humiliating as it was to Prussia's pride, nevertheless it was unavoidable if Prussia were to be saved from a struggle for which she was unprepared. Even had Frederic William been willing to take up arms against Austria, as he was not, Prussian finances, and the Prussian army, which not only had scarcely seen war for thirty years, but was also badly equipped and wretchedly organised, would not permit such a dangerous enterprise. Abroad the situation was even less favourable. Prussia could not have counted on the support of a single European state, with the possible exception of France, whose friendship Frederic William vehemently rejected. Three months before, the four great Powers and Denmark and Sweden had met at London and had decided (August 2, 1850) as against Prussia, in favour of the integrity of Denmark. In October of the same year, in an interview with Count Brandenburg at Warsaw, the Czar, refusing to take the part of a mediator, because he did not wish to meddle in German affairs, declared that if Prussia continued her interference in Holstein he would take up arms himself; and expressing his anger at the Holstein rebels, applauded the action of the elector and Hassenpflug in turning to the re-established Federal Diet for aid. Shortly afterwards he announced his determination to recognise officially the Federal Diet as the chief central authority in Germany, and in so doing declared his disapproval of Prussia's attempt to establish any other form of central government.

The disputes in the Prussian cabinet, the wavering of the Prussian king, and the favourable attitude of the Powers increased the audacity of Schwarzenberg, and made him more

determined than ever not to compromise with Prussia in any particular. Taking advantage of the skirmish at Bronzell, and tired of the delay incident to the long discussion in the Prussian cabinet, he had, on November 9th, sent his ultimatum according to which Prussia was to dissolve her Union, to recognise the Federal Diet, and to recall the troops from Hesse. In the meantime, in consequence of the defeat of the war party and the resignation of Radowitz, the Prussian cabinet had been reorganised; Count Brandenburg was given charge of the department of foreign affairs, but as he was already on his death-bed, his place was temporarily filled by Baron Manteuffel, minister of the interior, a man who had long been opposed to the Prussian Union, a defender of the sovereign rights of princes, and a believer in the policy of repression at home and of peace at any price abroad. He began by making two important concessions—by pledging Prussia to withdraw from Holstein and abandon the duchies to such penal measures as Austria desired to mete out to rebels; and to give up the Union and bring before the princes at Berlin the official proposal to abandon the constitution of May 26, 1849. On the question of the evacuation of Hesse a long discussion ensued, Austria maintaining that the presence of the Prussian troops was an obstacle to the application of penal measures by the Confederation in Hesse and Holstein; Prussia resisting this last concession through fear that the employment of the confederate troops was for something more serious than the mere restoration of order.

Again did Schwarzenberg send in his ultimatum, this time on November 25th, which demanded a decision on the Hesse question in forty-eight hours, by noon of the 27th. At once Manteuffel was dispatched to Olmütz to meet the Austrian chancellor, who, with ill grace, consented to an interview and to the postponement of the date named in the ultimatum. On the 28th the ministers met, and in less than twenty-four hours Manteuffel, who had been given definite instructions to obtain

concessions regarding a remodelling of the Confederation, and a peaceful settlement of the Holstein and Hesse questions in a general conference rather than in the Federal Diet, outmanœuvred by the Austrian statesman at almost every point, conceded all that Austria demanded. Prussia suffered at his hands a signal defeat. Having already yielded to Austria in the matter of the Union and the abandonment of the Holsteiners, she now further promised, in the Olmütz agreement drawn up on the 29th, to withdraw her troops from Hesse, to recognise the Federal Diet, and to join with Austria in calling a conference at Dresden to settle the Hesse and Holstein questions. In this agreement, as in the previous concessions, some of the principles for which the people of Europe had been fighting for two years were rejected without consideration. The constitutional rights of the people of Hesse were abolished; the rights of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which the King of Prussia had solemnly promised to maintain, were ignored; and when, in 1852, the Powers met at London to settle the Danish question, Prussia, with the other Powers, signed the protocol that handed over the duchies to Denmark and established the integrity of the Danish kingdom. At the same time the Prussian Union was dissolved, and although the protests of England and France prevented Austria from bringing her non-German population into the Confederation, yet when at Dresden a few months later agreement upon any other form of central authority was found to be impossible, the Federal Diet was fully restored, and was recognised by all the states of Germany. The victory was complete; reaction to all outward appearances was everywhere successful; and all that Prussia had saved to represent her ambitious designs of earlier years, was the Zollverein, which, steadily increasing in strength, gained an important victory in the accession of Hanover the next year. The defeat of Prussia, disgraceful as it was then considered, was probably a fortunate termination of the

struggle. Neither the Prussian king nor the Prussian ministry was sufficiently in sympathy with the matters in dispute to carry a war through to the bitter end; and although the economic strength of the state was greater than that of Austria, nevertheless the army needed a complete reorganisation and the people a thorough military training before Prussia would be able to hold her own against the odds that confronted her—Austria, the South German states, and Russia. A disastrous war would have made impossible the policy of the next decade, and would undoubtedly have cost her greater humiliation than that she actually suffered. Submission in 1850 made it possible for her to preserve intact her institutions, to remain free from excessive financial burdens, and to maintain better relations with the Powers abroad; so that when, under new leaders and a changed diplomatic situation consequent upon the Crimean war, the time came to test the power of Austria, Prussia found herself ready to reverse the decision of Olmütz.

With the close of the struggle between Prussia and Austria, the revolutionary movement begun in 1848 reached its end, and the years that followed from 1851 to 1853 are the dreariest of the century. To all appearances the imperial government at Vienna had more than recovered its control in central Europe, and the political system in the majority of the states from the Baltic to the straits of Messena had become increasingly illiberal. Austria returned to a despotism more severe and arrogant than before; Hungary, Bohemia, and Lombardo-Venetia sank to political insignificance as parts of a great machine; the rule of Ferdinand of Naples became tyrannous and cowardly, that of Leopold of Tuscany, who was despised by all Italian patriots, followed slavishly the Austrian model. In Germany many of the princes, seemingly ashamed of their former sympathy for German unity, sought to erase all traces of the revolution; in Saxony the old estates were restored; in Mecklenberg the constitution was abolished and the old feudal

practices were introduced ; in Hanover the Junkers gained their old privileges ; and in Würtemberg the older and less liberal constitution was revived. The Federal Diet reëstablished the organic law of the Confederation, annulled the bill of rights drawn up by the National Assembly, and demanded that all liberal measures passed since 1848 not in conformity with the organic law be repealed ; in consequence of which there took place a general narrowing of political privileges even in those states that preserved intact constitutional government. The liberals, disheartened by failure and losing courage in the presence of so complete a reaction, relapsed into silence and took little part, even in the more liberal states, in political affairs. The Roman Catholic Church, strengthened by the victory of dogma and authority in matters of state, reasserted the supremacy of the church, and won concessions from the governments of France, Austria, Bavaria, and some of the minor states that increased its control over many matters of purely secular concern ; and in 1850 Pius IX. dared to issue a Bull reëstablishing the papal hierarchy in England. Ultramontanism took its place beside political absolutism and prepared to outline its creed and press its claims more vigorously than ever.

Nevertheless the revolution of 1848 had been far from unsuccessful. As an expression of popular feeling it had been too widespread, too definite for its meaning to be misunderstood by the upholders of the old *régime*. Even though many of the reforms of the previous decade were done away with and absolutist princes restored to their thrones, yet the Europe of 1850 was in many respects far in advance of the Europe of the earlier period. The political atmospere had became clearer, a sentiment of sympathy for the popular cause, of willingness to recognise the popular claims, had became more prevalent. A healthier public opinion condemned the tyrannous policy of repression, and resented the employment of military force as an

insult to the civilisation of Europe. The best gains of the revolution had not been lost; the struggle for unity in Italy and Germany and for constitutional independence in Hungary had became an historical fact; the work of Mazzini, Manin, and d'Azeglio made possible the success of Cavour; the work of the National Assembly, that of Bismarck, the work of the Hungarian Diet, that of Deák. And the immediate advantages had not been unimportant; governments had been liberalised, many constitutions were retained, and the people were admitted to a not inconsiderable part in the management of affairs; permanent changes had been made in matters of inheritance and finance, and in judicial as well as in parliamentary matters; and the importance of the classes engaged in trade and commerce was vastly increased. Piedmont was a constitutional state, and though it is doubtful whether the Piedmontese were ready for the extensive parliamentary privileges granted to them, nevertheless under wise management the state was saved from democratic excesses and the political education of the people became only a matter of time. Prussia also had entered on a constitutional *régime*, and even though the independence of the representatives in parliament and the activities of the people of Prussia were reduced to a minimum by the reactionary policy of Frederic William and the Manteuffel ministry, yet the conditions were favourable for a more progressive government under a new king and a new ministry. Lastly, in economic matters notable advances had been made. Efforts to improve the condition of industry and to promote commercial interchange with other countries characterise this era of political indifference consequent upon the failure of the political revolution. Already had Austria proclaimed free commercial intercourse between her provinces; in 1850 the erection of a German-Austrian postal union prepared the way for the commercial treaty of 1853 between Austria and the Zollverein—the first of a series of international

agreements that altered the economic relations of all the Powers,—and led to an economic agitation in Germany that resulted in the adoption of many inter-state tariff reforms.

Thus the revolution of 1848, though not resulting in a great overturning of society as had that of 1789, was supplemental to it in that it made impossible a long retention by the governments of central Europe of the doctrines and methods of the old *régime* which the greater revolution had overthrown in France nearly sixty years before. It was a political movement as far as it sought to break down the despotism of princes and the old bureaucratic system of administration; it was an economic movement as far as it sought to gain for the commercial and industrial classes, that is, for the Third Estate, that place in the management of affairs that their economic importance demanded; it was a social movement as far as it sought to overthrow mediæval privileges and mediæval distinctions and to give rank to the non-feudal elements. But while it attempted to do for central Europe what the earlier revolution had done for France, it lacked the national unity and territorial compactness that gave strength to the movement of 1789; and it was called upon to deal with problems more numerous and complex than those that had confronted the men of the Constituent Assembly or the National Convention. Hungary sought not merely constitutional autonomy, but entire independence as well; Germany endeavoured to recast, not only the institutions of each particular state, but of the whole Confederation also; Italy tried to carry on two incompatible operations: institutional reorganisation at home, which demanded peace abroad, and war with Austria, which demanded harmony and co-operation of all classes at home. The situation, thus difficult in itself, was made much more intricate by the introduction of those newer problems that the reign of the *bourgeoisie* had created in France, problems that were not feudal but modern, not political but economic, not

constitutional but industrial, that concerned the relation of the state to industry, of capital to labour. Theories regarding the reorganisation of industry in the interest of the whole society formed part of the program of nearly all the radical elements. In the majority of cases socialists and republicans, men ambitious to establish, without regard to the training and education of the people, extreme theories concerning the organisation of society and the state, joined in an uncompromising opposition to the moderates, and seizing upon the revolution, gained the control of the movement during the later days. But the final victory of the radical revolutionists, who, in their determination to gain all, imperilled the benefits already won, could not have been advantageous to the cause of national independence and political liberty. These ends were to be attained under other circumstances and by other methods than those which characterised the revolutionary uprising of 1848.

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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO THE PRESENT TIME

II.

1850–1897

BY

CHARLES M. ANDREWS

PREFACE.

IN this, the second and concluding volume on the history of modern Europe, I have resumed the narrative at the point where it was dropped at the close of the previous volume, and carried it forward to the year 1897. Employing throughout the plan and method originally adopted, I have dealt with only those countries that have been influential in shaping the history of continental Europe during the last seventy-five years, and have treated only those phases of their history that concern the historical development of Europe in the larger sense, rather than the historical development of each particular state or country. On the ground that no event can be understood in isolation, and that history is something more than a series of events chronologically considered, I have endeavoured to give logical form to my treatment of the subject, carrying each movement forward to its conclusion before turning to the others; and that due proportions might be preserved, have introduced nothing that did not seem to me absolutely necessary to an understanding of the subject, giving no more attention to any incident, however picturesque or dramatic, than its importance for my purpose warranted.

In my treatment of the various movements I have given little space to descriptions of military campaigns, not because I object to "drum-and-trumpet" history, but because I believe that the details of battles and the movements of troops belong, except in their consequences, to the student of military strategy; and I have omitted, except in a few important instances, all

discussions of a biographical nature, on the ground that a statesman's character can be best understood by his work. Though I have not hesitated to turn aside from the narrative in order to comment upon or to interpret events, I have been able to find no place for personal judgments, which, reflecting merely the sentiments of the writer and based too often on present-day standards, are out of accord with the spirit of modern historical presentation; and while I fully appreciate the value of apt illustration, I have been limited in my use of it by considerations of space, and by the belief that much illustrative matter tends more often to confuse thought than to clarify it.

The first eight chapters of this volume deal with a period which, as productive of great results and filled with complex international and diplomatic situations, is far less simple and easy to interpret than was the period from 1815 to 1850. We are called upon to analyse personal motives, to follow intricate negotiations, to trace causes and tendencies that are often far-lying and obscure. In studying the rise of Napoleon III., the abasement of Austria, the independence of Italy, the unity of Germany, and the entire alteration of the European political system, we are confronted on one hand with the danger of exaggerating the importance of the persons concerned, giving undue prominence to single events or incidents, and taking results for granted without searching for their causes; on the other, with the equally great danger of minimising the personal equation, laying too much stress on underlying and hidden forces, and looking on the great men of the era as dominated by influences beyond their control. Though in choosing between these two extremes I have deemed it more true to a just interpretation of my subject to give the position of greatest prominence to the personal influence of Cavour and Bismarck, nevertheless no careful student of the period can fail to perceive that the events of 1859, 1866, and 1870 were but the logical outcome of those

of the earlier period or will deny that either of these statesmen notwithstanding the genius and masterful diplomacy by which he was able to hasten and give shape to the movement, would have been powerless to accomplish his object had not the forces making for independence and unity been preparing for half a century. It is taking a superficial view of the history of the nineteenth century to say that the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and the war of 1870 were merely accidental occurrences, or that the establishment of the kingdom of Italy, the German Empire, and the Third Republic would have been rendered impossible had other men directed the course of affairs.

In accordance with my original plan I have omitted from the second volume, as from the first, all footnotes and bibliographical references, and even a general bibliography of the works which have been used. As there are very few books in English upon the period in question, such a bibliography would be of comparatively little value to the general reader, while the student can readily turn for admirable lists to Dahlmann-Waitz, *Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte* (6th edition), Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe*, Seignobos, *Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine*, and for more detailed accounts of recent works to the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.* In addition to special monographs and many articles of permanent value in journals and reviews I have used the following works: for the Crimean war, the writings of Rousset, Geffcken, de la Gorce, Martin, Delord, Chiala, and Todleben; for France and Napoleon III., de la Gorce, Delord, Gregoire, Thirria, the works of Napoleon III., the memoirs of de Falloux, de Maupas, Odilon Barrot, Tocqueville, and Persigny, the special writings of d'Harcourt, Darimon, and Ollivier, and the conversations of Senior; for Italy, the letters of Cavour and the prefaces of Chiala, the histories of de la Gorce and Reuchlin, the special writings of Chiala and Bianchi, the lives of Cavour by Mazade and Massari, of Victor Em-

manuel by Godkin, the autobiography of Garibaldi, the memoirs and letters of Ricasoli, and Persano, and the conversations of Senior; for Prussia and Germany, the histories of Sybel, Maurenbrecher, and Oncken, the special works of Thouvenel, Benedetti, Rothan, Lebrun, the memoirs of Beust and of King Charles of Roumania, and the life of Bismarck by Hahn; for Austria, the works of Krones, Leger, and Rogge, the memoirs of Metternich, and the life of Deák by Forster; for Russia the works of Schnitzler, Rambaud, Crehange, Mackenzie Wallace, and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu; and for England's foreign policy the lives of the Prince Consort by Martin, Stratford Canning by Lane-Poole, Palmerston by Ashley, and the *Recollections* of Lord John Russell. For the period since 1870 I have depended largely upon the year books and annuals: Schulthess, *Geschichtskalender*, Daniel, *L'Année politique*, Kippermann-Müller, *Geschichte des Gegenwart.* In addition I have used the following: Coubertin, *The Evolution of France under the Third Republic;* Blum, *Das deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks;* Simon, *L'Empereur Guillaume;* Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question;* Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *The Empire of the Tsars.* In general I wish to express my indebtedness to Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique*, Seignobos, *Histoire politique*, and Lowell, *Parties and Governments in Continental Europe.* Satisfactory maps may be found in Hertslet and in Schrader, *Atlas de Géographie historique* (Nos. 37, 45, 47, 48, 51); excellent modern atlases are those of Bartholomew (in English), Andree, Kiepert (45 maps), and Stieler (95 maps) (in German), while separate maps of the European states, of Asia, and of Africa, can generally be obtained of Dietrich Reimer, Berlin, and Justus Perthes, Gotha, for a small sum.

In the preparation of this volume, as of the first, I have been assisted at every point by my wife, who has not only lightened

my labour, but has criticised freely, and everywhere to advantage, the style and form of presentation.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE,
June 14, 1898.

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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

THE RISE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE.

WITH the year 1850, we reach the close of an important period in the history of that political and material revolution which was to transform the Europe of 1814 into the Europe of to-day. This period had not been one of great accomplishments, nor one in which definite and far-reaching results had been attained : it had been a period of experiment in government as well as in the sciences, one in which preparations were being made, ideas tested, programmes shaped, and materials gathered for the greater movement to come. To all outward seeming, it had been a period of failure ; for, although some tangible results had been obtained in Greece, Belgium, France, Prussia, Piedmont, and some of the minor principalities, and hopeful progress had been made in letters, art, education, and mechanical invention, nevertheless, on the whole, whether the point of view be that of governments or industries, the changes were slight in comparison with the transformations which were to be effected in the era that was to follow.

In material things, the discoveries and inventions that were to affect so deeply the economic and social life of the world in

the latter half of the nineteenth century had scarcely begun to exercise their influence. Machinery, it is true, was already lowering the cost of production and increasing the manufacturing output ; better roads—telford and macadam—were facilitating communication, and enlarging the area of competition ; and scientific processes, though still wasteful and crude, were giving commercial value to an increasing number of the products of the earth, both vegetable and mineral : nevertheless, the great inventions—those which have affected the practices of governments and the composition of society—had as yet hardly passed beyond the experimental stage ; while thousands of improvements in smaller things, which were to touch most closely the comfort and convenience of every individual, were still unknown or untried. Steam, though used in machinery for many years, had been applied to locomotion for less than a decade, and had not yet penetrated deeply into the life of nations, revolutionising, as it was destined to do, the relations of city and country, by quickening travel, and turning the current of movement towards the crowded centres, where was to lie the strength of the democracy. Telegraphy, hardly yet more than an experiment, was to remain for many years a mode of communication available chiefly for governments and the richer classes, and for the mass of the people only on important occasions ; the submarine cable and the other electrical contrivances had not yet made their appearance. The press, which for forty years had been a factor in disseminating ideas and provoking popular discontent, and had, in consequence, been kept to a greater or less degree under the surveillance of the police authorities, had hardly yet entered upon its great career as an educational agent ; for journals were small in size, subscribers few in number, and news was old when printed and older when read : but improved machinery, telegraphic communication, and rapid postal service due to the extension of the railroad system were to revolutionise its influence.

In affairs of war, as in those of peace, system, discipline, and equipment were still those of the earlier period. Armies scientifically organised were unknown ; those of 1854 and 1859 were small, badly provided with arms, ammunition, guns, carriages, and the like, sadly wanting in provision for the sick and wounded, and commanded by officers ignorant of topography and tactics. Rapid mobilisation was impossible before the days of railways and the telegraph ; recruiting was for lifelong service ; the needle-gun had but just been introduced into the Prussian army ; the breech-loading rifle was not known to the English soldiers until 1855; the Armstrong cannon was not invented until 1854; and, of all the heavy explosives, only nitroglycerine had come into use. Increase of wealth and concentration of capital, so prominent a factor in modern economic life, and itself a consequence, as well as a cause, of industrial progress, had not taken place to any appreciable degree ; vast undertakings were unusual ; production, though steadily increasing, was still on a small scale ; and so slight was the increase in consumption, that the articles and commodities which are deemed necessary to the life of to-day were still, in 1850, luxuries to nine tenths of the population. It is significant, that the first great exhibitions of the century were in 1851 and 1855 ; that the first international treaty of commerce was in 1853, and that the practice of resorting to public credit as a source of revenue by the states of Europe did not become general until after the revolution of 1848.

From this brief *résumé* it is evident, that the material progress which, in the ensuing forty years, was to alter the conditions of industry by substituting a world market for a local market ; to alter the organisation of society by individualising the mass of the people, raising the standard of life, and substituting a new relation of labour to capital for the old relation of labour to land ; to alter the practices of governments, by bringing them into closer touch with their administrative and

diplomatic agents, by giving to their policies and acts greater publicity, and by increasing their resources and extending the scope of their undertakings,—had not advanced sufficiently far to break up the political and social habits of the old *régime*, and to make possible its overthrow in 1848. The reaction that followed this revolution testified to the last attempt of the old ideas and methods to retain their supremacy, and to neutralise, as far as possible, notably in central Europe, the progress in political things that had been made up to this time. To this reaction we must turn our attention for a brief space.

After the restoration of the Federal Diet and the re-establishment of the Germanic Confederation, Schwarzenberg, the chancellor of the Austrian Empire, resolved to efface the last traces of the revolution, first in the Austrian provinces, afterwards in Germany and Italy. Inasmuch as at Vienna, Pesth, Venice, and Milan, the imperial authority, which had been so seriously threatened by the revolutionists, had been restored by means of the army, he felt that the time had come to reverse the situation of March, 1848, and to withdraw from the Austrian provinces all parliamentary privileges. He first attacked the imperial constitution of March 4, 1849, which, though it had destroyed the independence of Hungary, and was, as far as it related to self-government in the other provinces, a mere dead letter, denied by its very existence that absolute authority of the Emperor which he was determined to restore. Therefore, by an imperial patent signed by Francis Joseph on August 20, 1851, and supplemented by additional letters of the December following, the constitution was declared suspended, the ministers were made responsible to the Crown alone, and the imperial Parliament became a council of the Throne and not of the Empire. And Metternich, who was at this time returning to Vienna after three years of exile, encouraged by word and precept the reactionary policy.

But not content with this revival of complete autocracy in

Austria, Schwarzenberg turned his attention to the restoration of the imperial influence in Germany ; and on August 23, 1851, effected the passage of a measure in the Federal Diet abolishing the fundamental rights of the German people as drawn up by the National Assembly in 1848, and adopted by many of the German states after that time. Having accomplished so much, with indefatigable activity he hunted down constitutional government wherever it still lingered. Saxony, Mecklenburg, Würtemberg, and Hanover were compelled to remodel their fundamental law in the interest of the feudal classes ; the constitutions of most of the lesser states were manipulated by a committee of the Diet, and, in the eyes of the reactionary leaders, rendered harmless ; while Hesse, whose rebellion in 1850 against the arbitrary policy of Hassenpflug had brought to a head the crisis that had ended at Olmütz, was subjected to severe military punishment by the quartering of troops upon her soil, and in 1852 was forced to receive a new constitution modelled after the wishes of Hassenpflug. In all this Prussia co-operated, and Frederic William, though desirous of avoiding even the appearance of illegal and arbitrary interference, declared that his great wish was to cleanse the German constitutions, his own among the number, of the foulness which had come upon them in 1848,—that year of shame for Germany.

In Italy, the policy of Schwarzenberg was even more successful. The constitutional privileges of the Neapolitans were entirely suspended, and a capricious despotism, more galling, perhaps, to the pride of the intelligent classes than to the people at large, characterised the Bourbon rule. In Bologna and Ferrara, in the duchies of Parma and Modena, even in Tuscany, appeared the white coats of the imperial soldiers, guardians of reaction and protectors of the restored sovereigns. In Lombardy and Venetia, after strengthening the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, Austria once more established her authority,

and, in her effort to bind the provinces more firmly to the Empire, proposed in 1851 to bring them into the Germanic Confederation. In Rome, the reaction, though less rapid and less violent, was none the less complete. Gradually had all traces of the recent conflict disappeared, and under a government of cardinals aided by the inquisition, the police, and, above all, by the French soldiery which guarded the peace, the city had become once more a resort for travellers and artists. After the return of Pius IX., in 1850, a few reforms in administration and finance were undertaken, but in no instance was the Pope willing to abate one jot of his absolute sovereignty in the interest of the better government of his subjects. M. Behr could say to Senior with considerable justice: "Never was Austria so nearly the mistress of Italy; never were the Italian sovereigns, with the single exception of Piedmont, so irresistibly despotic, or so resolved to destroy all freedom of action, of writing, of speech, and even of thought," as during the period of reaction that followed Austria's restoration to a position of supremacy in central Europe.

Nor was France, the land of so many popular uprisings in behalf of constitutional government, to escape the reaction; for in 1851 there was erected on the ruins of the second republic an imperial government little more in sympathy with the political ideas of the nineteenth century than was that which Schwarzenberg was establishing in Austria. It seems remarkable, indeed, that after thirty years of political liberty and parliamentary rule, France should witness the rise of an empire and the imposition of a constitution that were, from the political standpoint, absolutely at variance with the events of her history since the downfall of Napoleon I. And yet this event was intimately connected with those that had gone before. That the republic was the creation of a Parisian crowd, and of a provisional government that assumed to itself unwarranted and extra-legal functions; that it in no way represented the will of the majority

of the nation, or stood for political rights denied or wide-spread popular grievances unredressed ;—these facts made it inevitable that its career should be one of social disturbance and political confusion. And, furthermore, the fact that it had been founded upon principles of government more democratic than France was at the time ready for, and had represented the victory of the revolutionary, rather than of the moderate, party, made it equally inevitable that its sequel should be a monarchical reaction. Made a regular and legal government by the adoption of the constitution of 1848, it seemed to have secured for itself a permanent existence ; whereas, in fact, it had hastened thereby its transformation. The constitution, impracticable and unsound, was the immediate cause of a conflict which, in any case, would have resulted in the overthrow of the republic ; but the character and results of the conflict were shaped by the personality and convictions of the man who became the first president of the republic,—Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

When the revolution of 1848 broke out in France, Louis Napoleon, third son of Louis, King of Holland, was forty years old. On the downfall of the imperial *régime*, the prince, then a child of eight years, had retired with his mother, first to Bavaria, then to Switzerland, and finally to Rome. But his participation as a Carbonaro in the uprising of the Romagna in 1831 had led to his expulsion from Italy. The young Napoleon was of a taciturn and meditative nature, at once a dreamer and an intelligent observer; and from 1832, when the death of the Duke of Reichstadt made him the hereditary representative of the imperial dynasty, he never wavered in his belief that he who had been born in the Tuileries, should one day, through one of those changes so common to France, return there as its head, and so fulfil the destiny that lay before him. In 1836, suddenly transformed from a dreamer into an active conspirator, and aided by an obscure army officer, Fialin, afterward the Duke of Persigny, he appeared before the French soldiers at

Strassburg with hopes of arousing them against the July Monarchy by means of the magic name of Napoleon. This attempt to raise the imperial eagle on the soil of France, resulted in the transportation of the prince to America; but in the course of a year he returned, and in 1840, undaunted by his previous failure, attempted the same thing at Boulogne. For this, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life in the fortress of Ham. But the six years of confinement were, on the whole, advantageous to him; for the works[1] that he produced during his imprisonment kept his name before the public, and attracted to him correspondence and visitors, some of whom were leaders of the radical party whom he had won over by the socialistic doctrines and democratic opinions that he subtly mingled in his essays along with eulogies on the First Empire and patriotic appeals to the military spirit of France. Then, too, many things in France were working in his favour. The peaceful policy of the July Monarchy was rousing restlessness and dissatisfaction among the younger generation; the panegyrical history of Thiers and the stirring lyrics of Béranger were stimulating enthusiasm for Napoleon, the Emperor, and pity for his nephew, the exile; the injudicious act of bringing to Paris the Emperor's ashes from St. Helena in 1840, not only vitalised the Napoleonic legend, but also brought into prominence the misfortunes of the heir of the Emperor "groaning in confinement." When, therefore, in 1846, Louis Napoleon escaped from Ham to England, and retired into an obscurity greater than that which had surrounded him in his early days of exile, he left behind him a body of followers eager to defend a cause already partly won.

[1] *Idées Napoléoniennes*, 1839; *Question des Sucres*, 1842; *L'Extinction du Pauperisme*, 1844. Some seventeen articles in *Progrès du Pas-de-Calais*, 1842–43, and three or four in other journals; *L'Idée Napoléonienne*, a monthly publication of which but one number appeared, in 1840, with the motto, "Not only the ashes but also the ideas of the Emperor must be brought back."

After a two years' sojourn in Leicester Square, the prince, in February, 1848, returned to France to offer his services to the provisional government. But unsuccessful in his suit, he returned in discouragement to London, where, at the time of the Chartists' movement in April, he aided the cause of law and order as special constable in Trafalgar Square. But by June things looked brighter; for the executive commission of the National Assembly, believing the fear of Louis Napoleon to be baseless, recommended the withdrawal of the decree of exile. To this the Assembly agreed on June 2d, and five days afterward, the supplemental elections of June 7th, which showed that Louis Napoleon had been returned from four departments, bore witness to the power of a name and to the activity of the imperialist party. The Assembly then took a second momentous step, and through a union of conservatives, republicans, and the personal enemies of the executive commission, voted to admit the pretender to the chamber, on the ground that the revolution had abrogated the decree of exile. But on June 14th, Louis Napoleon, with characteristic adroitness, resigned from the Assembly, and withdrew to London, that he might lull any fears of his ambition. This policy of advancing and then retreating, advancing anew with surer step, declaring his rights and identifying them with those of the people, disturbing his enemies and then reassuring them, but never losing ground, proved on this occasion, as afterward, eminently successful. During the summer of 1848 his cause became astonishingly strong. On September 17th he was again returned to the Assembly, not by four, but by five departments; and it was evident that the Napoleonic legend had become a factor, and Louis Napoleon a personage, to be reckoned with. To no purpose did Llerbette, Grévy, and Faucher, in the famous debate in the National Assembly, point out the dangers of electing a president by universal suffrage; and the Assembly made a vital error when, with Louis Napoleon as a candidate for the

office, it threw into the hands of the people the election of the president.

Many forces were working in favour of the Bonapartist candidate. Earnest, zealous friends, who had everything to gain and nothing to lose, were conducting the canvass with eagerness and skill. They travelled through the country distributing medals, portraits, and newspapers; promising the peasants reduction of taxes, and the veterans abatement of rents. Louis Napoleon, with much wisdom, shunned publicity and newspaper controversies, and breaking with all his socialistic affiliations, made a great effort to conciliate the religious and monarchical parties. He won over Montalembert by his support of the cause of religious and intellectual liberty; he drew to his side Thiers, Molé, and other parliamentary leaders by seeming to be a man easily influenced, an instrument in their hands for bringing back the monarchy; he gained the support of influential journals by his good nature, which pleased those with whom he came in contact, and by his taciturnity, which saved him from incriminating statements; while he reassured all by his apparent intellectual mediocrity, which made him less to be feared than was Cavaignac, his rival, who was committed to the cause of the republic.

Finally, on November 29th, just before the elections, Louis Napoleon issued his electoral manifesto, in which he promised to support the republic and to leave to his successor "the executive power strengthened, liberty intact, and a real progress made." He also made a special appeal to each class in the state. He promised the conservatives to protect religion, family, and property, and the friends of decentralisation, to restrict within just limits the number of employments dependent upon the government; to the friends of social reform, he promised reduction of taxes, the encouragement of agriculture, and the establishment of institutions for labourers in their old age; to the peasants, relief from conscription; to the press, liberty

without censorship ; to the army, devotion to its interests and pensions to the veterans ; while to all he promised peace, which he called the dearest desire of his heart. In a special letter to the papal nuncio he proclaimed himself the defender of the church. But it was not this proclamation that proved his greatest strength, nor yet the aid of parliamentary leaders or influential journals. To the peasantry and the poorer classes of the cities, who, since the proclamation of universal suffrage, had become the real bearers of political power in France, the name of Napoleon was a guarantee of order and prosperity, which the republic seemed unable to preserve, and a guarantee of equality, which the monarchy had put in peril. The writings of those who, like Thiers, were perpetuating the glories of the Empire, gave historical confirmation to the popular estimate of Napoleon ; the act of the July Monarchy in returning the first Emperor's ashes to France ; the portraits of the imperial heroes in the cottages of the peasantry ; the tales of veterans lingering in the minds of the younger generation ;—all sprang as if by magic to the support of the heir to the imperial name and destiny. Lamartine, the idol of the Parisians ten months before, and Cavaignac, the dictator of the June days, were both defeated by a name and a legend. On December 10th, Louis Napoleon, who less than a year before had been an obscure adventurer in England, was chosen president of the French republic by a majority of nearly two million votes. On December 20th, he took the oath to the constitution, and on this occasion said : " My duty is clear ; I will fulfil it as a man of honour. I will consider as enemies of my country all those who endeavour to change by illegal means that which France has established. Between you and me, citizen representatives, there can be no true discord ; our wishes and desires are the same."

The first stage in the history of the Empire was passed ; and Louis Napoleon, still retaining his faith in his destiny, had in

a clear, and apparently sincere, speech identified himself with those whose oath bound them to support the republican government of 1848. Nevertheless, hardly was he in office, when the defects in the constitution began to appear, when there followed the inevitable conflict between the president and the Assembly, predicted in the debate already referred to. Such contention was bound to ensue between two such rival and co-equal bodies, when both were elected by the same constituency, and vested with powers that were incompletely defined by the constitution, when neither could in any way check the other, inasmuch as the president could not dissolve the Assembly, nor the Assembly depose the president or suspend the exercise of his functions. If the two powers could not live in harmony, it was inevitable that they should struggle until one or the other was destroyed: and harmony was impossible, for the Assembly jealously guarded its unlimited authority, while Louis Napoleon, with equal persistence, exercised to the full his presidential prerogative. In consequence, the history of the conflict is one of suspicious, annoying, and often injudicious, resistance on the side of the Assembly, and of steady encroachment on the part of the president. Notwithstanding the president's selection of his ministers from all parties, the condition of things was considerably aggravated at the outset by the Assembly's refusing to dissolve after the drafting of the constitution, though it was in duty bound to do so, and by showing itself, during December and January, exceedingly suspicious, irritable, and sensitive, and intent upon embarrassing the executive government.

But the president was to score the first victory. During the early days of January, 1849, it had been rumoured that the socialists were preparing for some kind of demonstration. This party, beaten to its knees in the civil war of June, 1848, had reorganised for the purpose of taking part in the electoral contest of December; but then, too, it had suffered defeat. It continued,

however, to exist, with the declared purpose of dissolving the Assembly, overthrowing the constitution, imprisoning the Bonaparte family, and establishing a committee of public safety. Inasmuch as there was reason to fear an uprising of some sort on account of the excitement prevailing in Paris and in certain of the departments, the government first ordered, on January 10th, the dissolution of the chief society, *Solidarité Républicaine*, and on the 26th, proposed to the Assembly two laws, one suppressing the clubs, the other dissolving the *garde mobile*, and asked that the matter be hastened, in that it was urgent. The Assembly, fearful, as usual, of a *coup de main*, declared that there was no cause for anxiety, and on January 27th refused to consider the proposition. Therefore, when the socialists, encouraged by this blow at the president, began a somewhat noisy agitation both in the Assembly and in the press, and gathered in crowds in the streets, the government took definite action. Numerous arrests were made, and, on the 29th, troops under General Changarnier were stationed at important points throughout the city. Peace and order were restored, though it does not seem probable that they had been at any time seriously threatened, either by the socialists, as the president chose to think, or by the ambitious president himself, as the Assembly was quite ready to believe. Two important advantages resulted from this incident. On February 14th, the Assembly agreed to dissolve the May following, and a few weeks afterward, when the law for the suppression of the clubs came up for debate, agreed to that measure, the urgency of which it had denied so short a time before. The president had won a double victory: he had conquered the Assembly on one hand, and the radicals on the other.

Interest now centred in the election of deputies to the new Assembly, which was to be held—and for the first time under the new constitution—on the 13th of May. At this time, two tendencies were noticeable in the country, one conservative,

characterised by a growing inclination to undo the work of the February revolution and to discredit the republic; the other radical, expressed by what may be called socialism in politics, though as Jules Favre said, socialism at this time had become "but an immense, loose-jointed hyperbole, employed by some as a cloak for their weaknesses and their obsolete philosophies, and by others, as a pretext for their conspiracies against the republic." While the conservatives organised themselves as a party of order under Léon Faucher, Changarnier, and Bugeaud, the radicals scattered pamphlets and newspapers broadcast among the soldiers in the barracks, the workmen in the factories, and the labourers in their cottages; roused the proletariat against the small proprietor, and the small proprietor against the large; and, working among the more ignorant populace of the east and south, scattered doctrines and rumours true and false, but always hostile to the republic and the conservatives. Between the two parties stood the government, impartial but not indifferent, with its president unwilling to take any personal action that might incriminate him in the future, avoiding all collusion with the party of order, and even disavowing certain of his friends who were becoming too outspoken in behalf of the Bonapartist cause.

And the country, which was kept in a constant state of turbulence by the uncertain condition of its politics, was further distressed by the spread of cholera, the repulse of General Oudinot from before Rome, the heated debates in the old Assembly upon the Roman question, and the duels resulting from these debates and from unsuccessful attempts to impeach the ministry for sending the expedition to Rome. Nor was it to experience relief until the results of the May election should make clear what was to be the character of the new Assembly. Remarkable, indeed, was the verdict of the people of France at this time. The party of order returned almost five hundred members, of whom two hundred were Legitimists; the radicals gained one

hundred and eighty seats ; while the moderate republicans, who alone desired the perpetuation of the second republic, gained but seventy representatives ; in other words, Lamartine, Marrast, Marie, Garnier-Pagès, Flocon, and Dupont de l'Eure, the very men who had made up the provisional government of February, 1848, were overwhelmingly defeated at the polls. On the other hand, Ledru-Rollin, the man who had led the radical wing of the provisional government, who had led the forces of anarchy and disorder during the first four months of the republic, who at this time stood as the chief of those advocating a socialistic republic, was returned from five departments. That within less than fifteen months after the revolution of February, the French nation should repudiate the men who had proclaimed the republic, and that socialism should have been able to elect twice the number of representatives that the friends of the republic could muster, were facts of momentous significance, facts destined to play an important part in the history of the events leading to the *coup d'état.*

After the retirement of the old Assembly in a storm of noisy and undignified debate, and the meeting of the new body on May 28th, the government showed its determination of pursuing to the bitter end the attack on the Roman Republic, by ordering General Oudinot to advance. When, however, after a victory gained on June 3d outside the walls of Rome, General Oudinot prepared to lay siege to the city, the Roman republicans, in despair of the situation, appealed to their comrades in Paris, hoping that an uprising against the French government might lead to a withdrawal of the French troops from Italy, or, at least, to a temporary cessation of military operations. And the radicals of Paris were only too ready to respond. On the ground that the constitution had been violated, and that Louis Napoleon and his ministers had become traitors to the nation and assassins of the Roman Republic, and for the purpose of purging the Assembly and of transforming the Mountain into a

national convention, they rose on the 13th of June against the state. But though the insurgents marched in bodies through the streets, built barricades, and made appealing speeches to the citizens, the government was but little disturbed: and it was not until the movement became menacing, until Ledru-Rollin and a number of deputies of the Mountain seized the Conservatory of Arts and Industries and established a new convention, that it called into action its troops. During the afternoon the national guard made an assault on the radical stronghold, overthrew the mock convention, and dispersed the rioters, securing thereby a complete triumph for the government and for the cause of public order. And the government was likewise victorious even in the provinces, at Strassburg, Toulouse, Allier, and Lyons, where, for the moment, the uprising looked more serious. This radical insurrection only led to the inevitable reaction that has always accompanied attempts of a like character. Paris was put in a state of siege, and laws were passed suppressing radical clubs and newspapers, increasing the military force, and authorising an inquiry into the conduct of the deputies of the Mountain who had taken part in the movement. Most important of all was the general law limiting the power of the press, which was at once scored by the enemies of the government as Jesuitical, and gave rise to a long and acrimonious debate. In the form in which it was passed on July 27th, it was a comprehensive measure forbidding deputies to become journalists, visiting with severe penalties all persons who should encourage desertion from the army or attempt to provoke a civil war, allowing the distribution of pamphlets only under strict prefectoral supervision, and making attacks on the president of the republic a punishable crime. With this accomplished, the Assembly on August 11th adjourned until the 30th of September.

While the Assembly was endangering its popularity by such a wholesale attack upon the freedom of the press, Louis Napo-

leon was reaping the real advantages of June 13th. Ever ready to keep himself in the eye of the public by opening railway lines and expositions, visiting hospitals, reviewing troops, and distributing flags, he now undertook a number of journeys through the provinces to show himself as the saviour of France, the destroyer of anarchy. By conducting his campaign with tact, and by making it clear in his speeches, especially in those delivered at Tours and Ham, that he had no higher ambition than to act as the representative of the nation, always ready to bear any burdens that it might impose upon him, he both reassured the people and allayed the uneasiness of the deputies, who, even at this time, were fearful of some unlawful act on the part of the prince president. This intensifying of his personal importance, this posing before the French people as their sole guarantor of law and order, was accompanied with a change of attitude toward his ministry, which showed very clearly his determination to rule independently of his cabinet, and to disregard, as far as he dared, the restrictions that the constitution placed upon him. Certain disagreements in matters of appointment foreshadowed a conflict with the cabinet, but the most important indication of the presidential policy was a letter, written August 19th, to Colonel Edgar Ney of the French army, which had occupied Rome after the fall of the Roman Republic on June 30th. This letter was in reality an important diplomatic document, an ultimatum to the Pope, outlining the policy that he ought to adopt now that the Roman territory was once more under papal control. Such a communication should have been sent to the accredited minister, as was the practice in all parliamentary countries, not in a personal letter to a subordinate in the French army; and should have contained advice couched in terms of diplomatic courtesy, not recommendations which amounted to commands, as to how another sovereign should conduct his government. It is hardly necessary to say that the letter was received with surprise by diplomats and ministers

in other countries. It seriously embarrassed the French diplomats at Rome, it disturbed greatly the religious elements in France, it led to the withdrawal of de Falloux from the cabinet, and increased the discontent and threats of the majority in the Assembly. Nevertheless, by its apparent independence of tone, by its references to a liberal government, and by its praise of the French soldiery, it was cleverly designed to win the favour of the people at large, who were not quick to appreciate the niceties of diplomatic usages.

But the estrangement between the president and his cabinet became more pronounced when, after the Assembly resumed its sitting in September, there came up for discussion a question well calculated to arouse all the animosities of the deputies against the government,—that of paying the expenses of the Roman expedition. The defence made by his ministers before the Assembly so angered the president, who thought that they were apologising for him and protecting him rather than upholding him, were retaining the real power and leaving him only the outward show, that he determined to break from their tutelage at the earliest possible moment. Before the close of October, so strained had become the relations between the president and his cabinet that many of the latter had given up the direction of affairs, awaiting the inevitable blow. On the 31st it came. Although the ministers still commanded a large majority in the Assembly, Louis Napoleon demanded their resignations ; and in a declaration to the Assembly, gave his reasons for this unparliamentary act. "We need," he said, "stronger men, who are willing to recognise the necessity of a single and firm policy, who do not compromise power by irresolution—men of action rather than of words. France, restless because she sees no guidance, seeks the hand, the will of the chosen of the 10th of December." Furthermore, he outlined the presidential policy, stating that the programme which should be made to triumph was the name Napoleon, an entire programme in itself, one

guaranteeing order, authority, religion, the happiness of the people, and the dignity of the nation.

Thus, by the close of the year 1849, can be clearly seen the conditions that were to make possible the *coup d'état:* the strength and ceaseless activity of the radical republicans, which roused the alarm of those desiring the peace and prosperity of the state; the party divisions in the Assembly, which weakened the loyalty of the nation toward its representatives; the jealousy of the Assembly for the president, which involved it in unfortunate mistakes, and hastened the inevitable conflict that the president was in no wise inclined to avoid; and, finally, the policy of the president himself, who, intent upon substituting a personal for a parliamentary government, was ever preparing new surprises for the country, at one time cutting loose from diplomatic usage, as in his letter to Colonel Ney; at another, breaking all parliamentary tradition, as in his dismissal of the cabinet; at all times currying favour with the people by well-chosen phrases, by vague references to his liberal intentions and his regard for the national interests, and, at the same time, promoting the Napoleonic cause by his attitude toward the army, and by his subordination of his ministers to the position of agents rather than councillors. After October 31st, were formed two distinct parties, one of the Élysée, the other of the Assembly. The first was made up of men like Bassano, Walewski, Murat, Morny, Rouher, and chief of all Persigny, who, though they were without fixed opinions, were ambitious, and devoted to the cause of Bonaparte and the Empire. The plan of this party was to make the Assembly unpopular by forcing it to stand for the old doctrines of government, to burden the deputies with the responsibility for all unpopular and repressive measures, and to give the president the benefit of all liberal proposals. The second party, that of the Assembly, composed largely of monarchists, ultramontanes, and deputies who were ready to accept either a republic or a monarchy, was

huge in size, heterogeneous in character, and wanting in unity of purpose, some of its members favouring the president, others at the same time scorning and dreading him.

During the winter of 1849–50, the presidential party gained chiefly at the expense of its rival. A long discussion regarding liberty of education, called forth by the introduction of a measure to supplement the famous law of 1833, resulted in the passage of a law, March 15, 1850, which broke down the university monopoly and extended liberty of education to secondary schools. The effects of this debate were curious and suggestive. The law, perhaps more far-reaching than any other of the period, originated with the party of the Assembly, and was supported by Louis Napoleon and his ministry only because the former desired to remove, if possible, the bad impression his letter to Edgar Ney had made upon the religious element in France. But the consequences were immediately advantageous to the president. The law, a compromise, a treaty of peace arranged after mutual concessions between the temporal and spiritual authorities, became associated with the name and government of Louis Napoleon ; while the men who had really borne the burden of the labour, who had been most influential in effecting the adoption of so beneficial a measure, the parliamentary leaders, Molé, Thiers, Montalembert, and others, shared the fate of all promoters of a compromise. Bitterly opposed by the radicals, and but half appreciated by the Roman Catholics, who believed the measure to be incomplete, they were loudly condemned by their own party, who resented that such concessions should be made, as they said, to priests and Jesuits. From this time, the influence of these men decreased ; their triumph of March 15th was, in reality, the beginning of their downfall. As Montalembert well said, he offered as his last homage to the church his unpopularity in the state.

While the president was thus profiting from even the suc-

cesses of his opponents, he was actively advancing his own cause by more direct means. He appointed devoted friends to important diplomatic posts; constantly referred in his speeches to the stability of the Consulate and the Empire, and to the passing away of dynasties and charters; and flattered the army by medals and pensions to the veterans, and extra pay to the under-officers, the working classes by promises of credits and superannuation funds, and the people in general by frequent references to their interests and to the glory of France. In this "policy of action" the government was aided by the socialists themselves. Already had the ministry adopted as an important part of its programme an uncompromising hostility to all socialistic or anarchic disorder, partly to efface all traces of the revolution of 1848, partly to gain, under pretense of warding off social perils, a better control of the army and the police. The hostility of the radicals, which, up to this time, had exhibited itself in various interpellations in the Assembly, in agitations in the provinces, and in struggles with the police in the streets of Paris, made itself more strongly felt in the elections held March 10, 1850, to fill the places of the thirty representatives of the Mountain who had been condemned the October before for having participated in the uprising of June 13th. The results were almost stupefying to the party of order; for though the conservatives were victorious in the provinces, nevertheless, in Paris, Vidal, an old disciple of Louis Blanc, de Flotte, a partaker in the uprising of June, and Carnot, one of the most honourable of all the opponents of the educational bill, were successful. But the worst was yet to come. Vidal, who was chosen for the department of the Upper Rhine as well as for Paris, preferred to sit for the former, and a new election, which called forth great unfairness and most bitter personalities on both sides, resulted in a victory for the radicals. On April 28th, Eugène Sue, the romancer of the masses, was elected by a vote but little less than that cast for Vidal.

The first election had terrified the conservatives, the second drove them to desperation. In their madness they demanded all sorts of repressive measures: revision of the constitution, deportation of the most dangerous of the socialists, repression of the excesses of the tribune and the press. The vague desire for retaliation finally took form: the Assembly determined to scrutinise the law of universal suffrage in order to keep from the polls itinerant labourers, vagabonds, mendicants, and criminals, to whom, it was believed, were due the recent successes. That this momentous decision was actuated by a desire to minimise the influence of the president by disenfranchising his constituents, is evident from the fact that of the commission of sixty-seven deputies appointed to prepare the details of the proposed amendment, not one was a Bonapartist or a friend of the president's. The government supported the measure as a part of its policy of action, and on May 18th, the project was reported to the Assembly. A *furie Française* seemed to have seized upon the deputies, and in vain did Léon Faucher remind them that they were not passing a penal code. Rejecting all amendments, they extended the list of disqualifications, and on May 31, 1850, under the influence of great excitement, they passed the law by a majority of nearly two hundred. But when the law was put to the test, it was found, greatly to the consternation of the Assembly, to disenfranchise vagabond and poor alike, to remove from the voting list more than two million eight hundred thousand voters, among whom were many men of intelligence and honour and irreproachable morals. Thus discarding the most important doctrine laid down by the revolution of 1848, by repudiating universal suffrage, the Assembly had disenfranchised its own constituency, and had added to the number of its enemies, not only the republicans and socialists, but also thousands of the poorer classes already deeply indoctrinated with a reverence for the Napoleonic name. But it had done more: the law of May 31st gave to the president an in-

strument of the greatest efficiency in the conflict that was about to come ; it broke up the unity of the majority that had been up to this time the strength of the party of the Assembly, and it severed the last ties of loyalty to the institutions of the second republic.

The events of this summer and autumn of 1850 showed the deplorable condition into which the proclamation of the republic and the adoption of the constitution had brought the people of France. The republic was practically dead, and all the parties in the state were endeavouring to establish in its place their various political systems. The republicans were reorganising in Paris and the provinces in the interest of a radical government based on the constitution of 1793 ; the socialists were continuing their work among the peasant and artisan classes for the sake of spreading their ideas regarding a social republic ; the monarchists, seeing the majority in the Assembly broken, and believing that the disenfranchising law had destroyed forever the popularity of the president, were pushing forward their dynastic representatives, Louis Philippe at Clairmont, and the Count of Chambord at Wiesbaden, and were proposing to unite, for the sake of strength, in a single party in support of a common pretender. But none of these attempts had as yet sufficient strength to become living issues with the people of France. Of far greater moment were the policy and cause of Louis Napoleon. With adroitness and success he made a number of journeys through the provinces during the months of August and September for the purpose of showing himself to the country. Welcomed often as a sovereign by the people, called "prince" and "monseigneur" by those in official position, he was able to impress upon those who were gathered to greet him the fact that he was but a magistrate, with a short tenure of office, of a republic that had lost all place in the hearts of the people. After his return to the capitol, he was greeted at the reviews of the army at Saint-Maur on October 4th and at Sar-

tory on October 10th with the cries of "*Vive Napoléon*" and "*Vive l'Empereur.*"

The deputies, returning November 11, 1850, entered upon their duties in the midst of an ominous calm. Some expected an immediate rupture, but the president, apparently satisfied with the progress that he had made, took no further action. "France wishes repose," he said in his opening message; and holding out to the deputies the olive-branch of peace, he denied in positive language that he had any thought of attacking the constitution. The press applauded the message, and the deputies, reassured by a tone so patriotic, cordial, and conciliatory, put aside all animosity, and entered heartily into the work of legislation. For the moment, president and Assembly discussed greatly needed reforms, and passed measures ameliorating social abuses, improving the civil law, and furthering the economic strength of the country. But the president's policy was only a means for making his own position more secure. On January 9th the storm broke. General Changarnier, commander of the national guard and general of the troops of the first division, was suddenly and unexpectedly dismissed from office, for the reason, which was undoubtedly founded largely on fact, that he was in his turn plotting to overthrow the president, and to establish a dictatorship as a preliminary step to the restoration of the monarchy. Just how far Changarnier had committed himself is difficult to determine, but after the Sartory incident, he had come out openly in defence of the Assembly. Louis Napoleon had endeavoured to win him to his side, but failing in his attempt to bribe him even with the offer of a marshal's baton, he had at first curtailed his powers and his influence, and, finally, on the pretext of a dispute over the issue of certain army regulations, had deprived him of his command. The disgrace of Changarnier was the disgrace of the Assembly. The quarrel was now open and direct; and the Assembly made a last effort to deal an effective blow at the president. But its

weapon was broken ; the majority no longer existed. Instead of a vote of censure against Louis Napoleon, or a vote of confidence in Changarnier—for neither of which a majority could be obtained—it declared its want of confidence in the ministry. Nothing could have been more impotent ; as Thiers said, "Henceforth the Empire is made."

From this time the movement of events was more rapid. The Assembly steadily lost ground; its members, hopelessly divided into three parties, the monarchical Right, the party of the Élysée, and the Mountain, were either indignant or sceptical, disdainful or indifferent. It had lost its chief safeguard, Changarnier ; it was aware of its unpopularity with the nation, and knew that the French love of unity, the prestige of the Napoleonic name, the general weariness of party conflict and desire for repose, were working in favour of the president. Judging from appearances, the people saw on one side their representatives agitated, noisy, and suspicious, already guilty of treachery in disenfranchising nearly three millions of voters, and promising only a continuation of intrigues and useless commotion ; on the other, their president, self-contained, silent, and confident, promising unity, order, and prosperity : and they were rapidly making a choice between them.

This was the situation when, in the summer of 1851, the question of the revision of the constitution came up for discussion. According to the constitution of 1848, the president, who was elected for four years, was ineligible for a second term. Louis Napoleon had been elected December 10, 1848, and in accordance with Articles 46 and 116, and the laws of October 28, 1848, a new election for president would take place in the second week of May, 1852. As the same constitution provided for the renewal of the Assembly every three years, the next election of deputies would take place on April 29, 1852, and the new body be installed on May 28th. Thus the executive and legislative bodies were to be renewed in their entirety at about

the same time, and, in consequence, the whole country looked forward with apprehension to the months of April and May of the next year. With the new Assembly chosen, but not installed, and the old Assembly in office, but about to retire ; with the new president not yet invested with authority, and the old president practically powerless ;—where, during the exciting months preceding the elections, would exist the authority to control factions, prevent socialistic uprisings, and guarantee order and repose ? With nearly three millions of voters excluded from the polls on the day of the elections, might not a riot or even a revolution ensue ? The " crisis of 1852 " became a cause for general uneasiness and anxiety, and a revision of the constitution was desired by all. As early as August, 1850, fifty-two out of the eighty-five departments had declared in its favour, and in the Assembly only two groups, the republicans and the non-fusion monarchists, were opposed.

But grave difficulties stood in the way of revision. No two of the parties were in agreement as to the form that the amendments should take. The president desired an extension of his powers and, as he expressed himself in his pamphlet, *Révision de la Constitution*, a revision in the spirit of the institutions of the first Napoleon ; the Legitimists were clamouring for the restoration once more of the eternal truths of the old *régime ;* the Orléanists, for the restoration of a constitutional monarchy based on the middle classes ; the Mountain, for a radical republic. But these were the least of the difficulties : the existing constitution required a three-fourths majority for its amendment, and decreed that all plans for revision should be submitted during the last year of the legislature ; that they should be discussed at three successive meetings at intervals of a month ; and that after one of these plans had been passed by a majority of three fourths, it should be then given to a constitutional convention of nine hundred members, sitting for three months, which should have power to consider but the one form submitted

to it. Amendment under these circumstances was practically impossible; and knowing this, the president turned to strengthen his cause with the people. As early as March, 1851, petitions began to pour in on the Assembly, many of them demanding the extension of the president's power; prefects and mayors, working in the interests of the president, often made use of their administrative powers to aid him; and at the same time, Louis Napoleon himself journeyed through the provinces, seeking by one means or another to curry popular favour, and to weaken the hold of the Assembly upon the nation. On June 1st, at Dijon, he said: "For three years I have always been seconded by the Assembly when it has been necessary to combat disorder by a policy of repression; but when I have wished to do good, to establish credit, to ameliorate the condition of the people, I have been confronted by nothing but inertia. If France recognises that no one has the right to dispose of her without her own consent, she has only to say so; my courage and my energy will not fail her. Whatever may be the duties that the country imposes upon me, it will find me ready to follow its will. France shall not perish in my hands." These words so bold, so manifestly unjust, and containing so evidently a premonition of a *coup d'état*, aroused the wrath of the Assembly. On June 19th, through a union of the extreme Left, the Left, and the non-fusion Orléanists the project for revision failed by ninety-seven votes of the necessary three fourths. To the republican Left, which blindly hoped by this means to prevent any extension of the president's power, was this result due.

Some extra-legal act was now inevitable; for the president to retire to private life in 1852 was impossible. His own convictions as to his destiny, the drift of events, the advice of his friends, and the express wish of a large proportion of the French people were all against such an action. It was now his plan to gather around himself a band of military adherents and civil

functionaries sufficiently bold and ambitious to carry out his wishes; to terrify the *bourgeoisie* by well-directed references to the red spectre of socialism; to blind the people to his real intentions by decrying the disenfranchising law of May 31st, and further incriminating the Assembly by endeavouring to bring about a repeal of the measure; in short, to make himself strong against the time when he should attack the constitution. From the soldiers of Young Africa he chose Saint-Arnaud, a most audacious and ambitious man, of whom Lamoriciére said, "When you see Saint-Arnaud minister of war, watch for the *coup d'état*." For the command of the army in Paris, he selected General Magnan, old commandant at Lyons and Strassburg, a man known to be as cautious and conservative as he was energetic and pitiless; and Colonels Fleury and Vaudry completed his military staff. For civil functionaries, he selected de Maupas, old prefect of the Upper Garonne, and de Morny, his foster-brother. These formed the nucleus of a working body of conspirators. At the same time his journals discussed the "crisis of 1852," laid bare the weaknesses of the monarchical parties, ridiculed parliamentary government, examined the old claims of all candidates for the presidency, and pictured to the people the horrors of socialism, citing as proof of their beliefs the manifestoes of the radicals, the bulletins of the revolutionary committee of Paris, the rumours of a plot at Lyons, and an outbreak of socialists at Laurac.

So well had the first part of the president's plan been carried out, that by the middle of September, during the recess of the Assembly, some of the conspirators concluded that the time had come to act. But Saint-Arnaud refused to co-operate, believing it to be vitally necessary to await the return of the deputies, lest, at the rumour of an attack on the constitution, they should gather together in the provinces, summon the generals of the Assembly, and prepare for civil war. Then, too, none of the conspirators were as yet in the cabinet, none except Magnan,

in any important office at the centre of affairs, and, above all, no pretext had as yet been given to warrant, in the eyes of the people of Paris, the overthrow of the Assembly. It would be necessary for the president to justify himself by something more than merely general principles, and to do so, he conceived the idea of provoking the Assembly to some further unwise action that would excuse his conduct and exonerate him from the charge of seeking his own interests. He found his opportunity in the refusal of the Assembly to repeal the suffrage law of May 31st. In October the president proposed to his ministers that the repeal should be made the issue of the approaching session ; but they, on the ground that it would compromise their dignity, inasmuch as they had voted for the law the May before, refused to support the repeal, and sent in their resignations. The president had won his first point : with Saint-Arnaud in the department of war, and de Maupas as prefect of police, he at once formed a new ministry. On November 4th the Assembly resumed its sitting, and within two weeks the president had won his second point : by a narrow majority of seven, gained by a union of the parties of the Right, the motion to repeal the law was rejected on November 13th. Rumours of a *coup d'état*, which had been current for six months, were again heard with frequency throughout the city. For what was the president waiting ? He had his military support, his civil functionaries, ready for action ; in the eyes of the *bourgeoisie* he was the only defence against socialism ; in the eyes of the masses, the only champion of universal suffrage. Was he waiting for the Assembly to weaken itself still further ? If so, he did not wait in vain. That body, no longer in doubt as to the future, was now in duty bound to take some measure in its own defence. According to Article 32, it had the right to fix the amount of military force and to dispose of it for its own security. The proposition was therefore made that the Assembly so define this article as to remove all doubt of its meaning, and to give

to itself the authority to make a direct requisition upon the military forces of the state in case of need. But the republican Left, stricken with the same blindness that had characterised it in all its attempts to thwart the policy of the president, enraged by the recent refusal of the Assembly to restore universal suffrage, denied the need of such defence. "You have no faith in the people," cried the Mountain. "There is no danger," cried Michel de Bourges, "and if there were, there is an invisible sentinel that will protect us, and that invisible sentinel is the people." By defeating this measure for defence, the republican Left threw the game into the hands of the president; for no longer had he any fear of civil war. The second republic, which had been erected by force, was now given its deathblow by the very men who had established it.

There was now no need of delaying the attack whereby Louis Napoleon intended, as he said after the *plébiscite* of December 20th, "to issue from legality in order to return into right." The Assembly was hopelessly divided into factions; the president had already organised his forces, had distributed the troops in a way favourable to his own designs, had placed in command at various points men devoted to him, and had assigned to each of his agents the rôle he was to play. The attempt planned for November 20th was put off till the 25th, and then to the 2d of December, either because Louis Napoleon hesitated, or because sufficient preparations had not been made. But at last, on the evening of Monday, December 1st, after a reception at the Élysée, the president, Saint-Arnaud, de Morny, de Maupas, Persigny, and Mocquard, the secretary, withdrew to discuss the measures to be taken. There were five in number: they decided to print the decree announcing the dissolution of the Assembly, and the proclamations to the army and the people; to arrest those of the deputies most influential among the people and most popular among the soldiers; to take possession of the Palais Bourbon; to mass at dawn within the city sufficient

troops to prevent any attempt at resistance; and, finally, to replace the minister of the interior by one of the confidants of the prince, in order to obtain possession of the telegraph. Shortly after midnight the work was begun. The national printing office was seized, and proclamations, distributed sentence by sentence among the different compositors, were, after two hours, ready for posting on the city walls by bands of bill-posters under the charge of the police. While this was being done, a more delicate task was undertaken. About two o'clock de Maupas summoned to his house the commissioners who had been selected, and assigned to each his task. By seven o'clock Generals Bedeau, Changarnier, Lamoriciére, Cavaignac, and Leflô, Colonel Charras, MM. Thiers, Roger du Nord, Baze, and seven members of the Mountain, Cholat, Valentin, Greppo, Nadaud, Miot, Baune, and Lagrange, were arrested either in their homes, or, as in the case of Baze and Leflô, in the rooms of the Palais Bourbon. First a battalion of infantry under General Espinasse took possession of the Assembly hall, and later two more battalions were stationed about the building. The chief part of the work was now accomplished, but more had yet to be done. General Magnan, forewarned during the night by Saint-Arnaud, was already arranging for the disposition of the troops, sending forward some to take their stand at important points, holding others in their barracks ready to march at a moment's notice, and calling up new detachments from Versailles and St. Germain. Lastly, the cabinet itself was purged by force; de Thorigny, minister of the interior, was compelled to resign in favour of de Morny, and it was the latter who, on the morning of the 2d, informed France that there had been a revolution in Paris, and made known to the provinces that the *coup d'état* had been accomplished.

So quietly had all been managed that the Parisians woke next morning entirely ignorant of what had taken place. But the placards furnished them with the information. The first

of these decreed the dissolution of the Assembly and the council of state, the re-establishment of universal suffrage, summoned the people to their polling booths from the 14th to the 21st of December, and placed Paris in a state of siege. The proclamation to the people, after denouncing the perfidious projects of the Assembly, outlined as the program of the president a decennial consulate based upon the institutions of the year VIII., a senate, a council of state, and a *Corps législatif*, all, however, dependent upon a favourable vote of the people, "the only sovereign," said the president, "that I recognise in France." The proclamation to the army, after adroitly referring to the defeat of the soldiers in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, closed with these words: "I count upon you, soldiers, not to violate the law, but to win respect for the only law of the country, the national sovereignty. . . . We are bound by indissoluble ties; your history is my history; there is to us in the past a oneness of glory and misfortune, in the future, a common desire for the peace and grandeur of France." The first feeling aroused by these words was, on the whole, one of approbation mingled with indifference. Some, the less intelligent of the people, were dazzled by the promise of glory and prosperity; others, angry at the Assembly, deemed the act of the president a retribution not undeserved; while the populace in general was gratified by the re-establishment of universal suffrage and the promises to preserve the republic. All failed to see that in order to overthrow liberty, the new master first promised to defend it.

But the conservative members of the Assembly, though unable, for want of leaders and military support, to offer any effectual resistance, were less disposed to take this high-handed action so quietly. Some of the deputies met in private houses, others gathered in the Palais Bourbon, while still others, two hundred and eighteen in number, held a meeting for five hours in the mairie of the tenth arrondissement, and drafted a decree deposing Louis Napoleon. But all were scattered by the police

or by companies of infantry, and some were imprisoned. Even the high court of justice, whose constitutional function it was to bring a charge of perjury against the president, was dispersed in the very act of signing the warrant of arrest. It may be safely said that by the middle of the afternoon of December 3d, all resistance from the conservatives was over. But republicans and socialists had yet to be reckoned with. Skilled in the methods of street warfare, they met force with force. Under the control of a committee of resistance, crowds of insurgents gathered in the streets, and at a barricade in the faubourg St. Antoine shots were exchanged, and a representative, Baudin, was killed. This event gave great strength to a cause that was hitherto wanting in leaders and definite plans, and when, as the day drew to a close, the crowds increased and more barricades were erected, and the movement began to assume the form of one of those radical uprisings already so familiar to the people of Paris, Louis Napoleon and his associates decided to take such measures as would efficiently destroy all resistance. During the night of the 3d, the soldiers were recalled to their barracks, and the city was given over into the hands of the insurgents. On the 4th, decrees were issued putting Paris in a state of siege, ordering all vehicles off the streets, and calling on all crowds of people to disperse. By ten o'clock in the morning all preparations had been made, and the soldiers, refreshed by a night's sleep, stimulated by unusual largesses of money and wine, and excited by frequent references to their defeat on February 24, 1848, were eager to advance. Still the order was not given, and it was not until one o'clock that the army of Paris was put in motion. With determination the soldiers advanced from boulevard to boulevard, pitilessly overthrowing one after another of the barricades, which the insurgents, with high hopes, had erected during the preceding hours of inaction by the government. By five o'clock the struggle was over: the insurgents had been slain, or captured, or put to flight.

This victory of the president's, won without mercy, pity, or moderation, was stained by an unfortunate episode. A troop of soldiers, while marching down the boulevard Montmartre, became excited by the hostile shouts of the bystanders, and the pistol shots from the houses, and fired, without command, for perhaps ten minutes into a crowd of bystanders. About thirty-five were killed. It was a cruel act, though in no way ordered or premeditated, and traceable, let it be charitably said, to a panic of fear that seized upon the soldiers who were already expecting attack from any quarter. Such was Louis Napoleon's remedy for saving the republic; for preserving the country from anarchy and pillage; for re-establishing the public peace. During the following week, the prisons were filled with suspects arrested on the slightest evidence, and a decree of the 8th declared that every member of a secret society or anyone who had defied the proclamations was liable to be sent to Cayenne or Algeria. Paris was cowed; strategy and force had proved effective instruments, and so far the victory was complete.

But another factor had still to be taken into account. Would the people of France support the presidential act; would they express themselves favourably to the project of the decennial consulate that Louis Napoleon had asked for in his decree? What the friends of the president desired was not merely a favourable majority, but a majority so great as to sweep away the stain of the *coup d'état:* a bare success, they felt, would be a half condemnation. To prevent such a result, the party of the Élysée worked untiringly, and never, perhaps, was Louis Napoleon, already much favoured by fortune, more opportunely aided by events than at this time. No sooner had peace and order been restored in Paris, than the spectre of a socialistic revolt arose in the provinces: the fears of anarchy and disorder in 1852, which the *bourgeoisie* had entertained and which the president had considerably increased by his message in No-

vember, seemed already realised. For two years the socialistic doctrines had been spreading through the east and south. In the provinces of the Loire and the Rhone the president's success excited wrath and consternation, and, in some quarters, almost provoked a civil war ; and in the departments of Nièvre at Clamecy, of Hérault at Bézier and Bédarieux, of Drôme, Var, and the Basses-Alpes at Valence, Luc, Manosque, and Digne, the peasant, petty merchant, and artisan, ignorant and easily led, and rendered savage by poverty and misery, rose against local officials and soldiers, and in many cases committed atrocities of the most fiendish character. With the news of each outbreak, the strength of the president's cause increased, and, at this point, the radical party, which had so often unwittingly played into the president's hands, rendered him a last service by furnishing him with a justification that he desired for the *coup d'état*. France, weary of the parliamentary war in the Assembly and terrified by the socialistic war in the provinces, turned to the president as the only one able to preserve peace and order. Not slow in seizing the opportunity, and with the pitiless thoroughness that had characterised his reduction of the city of Paris after December 2d, Louis Napoleon extended the state of siege to the departments, appointed, as local dictators, generals of the army, and countenanced arrests and confiscations "to reassure the good and to terrify the factious." At the same time he redoubled his attentions to the army, visiting the wounded, distributing favours, and making promotions. He sought the favour of the labouring classes, by promising to ameliorate legislation, and the confidence of the clergy, by turning over to them the Pantheon, and by issuing decrees regarding the observance of Sunday. Little wonder is it, therefore, that on December 20th, the people of France, by a vote of 7,439,216 to 640,737 declared it to be their desire to maintain the authority of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and delegated to him the power necessary to establish a constitution

upon the conditions named in his proclamation of December 2d. The republic, still existing in name, was in reality dead ; the empire, concealed under republican forms, was already made.

Properly speaking, the history of the Second Empire begins with January 1, 1852 ; but Louis Napoleon, though possessing by the constitution almost unlimited powers, had yet to make his despotism complete by stilling all opposition, and by gaining the people's consent to his changing his presidential title into an imperial one. To accomplish his purpose, it would be necessary for him to make impossible any further uprisings on the part of republicans and socialists, to strengthen the confidence of the order-loving classes in his disinterested devotion to the cause of peace and prosperity, to induce the labouring classes to believe in his loyalty to their interests, to bind the army more firmly to him, and to draw the church into an alliance with the new *régime*. No sooner, therefore, was the announcement of the victory of December 20th made known, than the new task was undertaken. To still, once for all, the opposition of republicans and socialists, the new government with brutal severity made known its will regarding the prisoners recently arrested. Of those seized during the early morning of December 2d, General Cavaignac only was set at liberty ; the others were either sent to the fortress of Ham or exiled from France, the more famous parliamentary leaders being required, as the decree said, to absent themselves for the time being from the state. The two hundred and eighteen deputies who had been seized in the tenth arrondissement, were released. Especially arbitrary and severe were the decrees against all prisoners who had been found armed in Paris, and against leaders of secret societies, builders of barricades, and fomenters of insurrection, all of whom numbered some four thousand. Many, it is true, were set at liberty ; but the majority were exiled from France or deported to Algeria, Guiana, or Cayenne. For judging the prisoners from the provinces, nearly twenty-

two thousand in all, mixed commissions were established, whose decrees were even more merciless than those of the government. Although many were pardoned, yet, according to the original sentences, 2804 were condemned to reside permanently in the provinces, 1545 were expelled from France, 9769 were deported, 9530 to Algeria and 239 to Cayenne. Some three thousand of these were pardoned eventually, and many of the sentences were never carried out; yet it may be said with justice that the method of destroying for the time being the opposition of republicans and socialists, was inhumanly conceived and savagely carried out. When to the judgments of the commissions be added decrees against workingmen's associations, wholesale removals of provincial officials, the dissolution of the national guard, the creation of a ministry of police, and a general strengthening of the police system throughout the country, we can well understand why, during the period of sixteen years from 1852 to 1868, France produced no socialistic doctrines or leaders; why there were practically no uprisings of republicans or socialists against the despotism of the state, and why this period was barren of any display of those popular forces that make for social progress.

Having thus struck down those who had fought in 1848, Louis Napoleon continued his policy of reaction and despotism by attacking, first, the monarchists, afterward, the press. Acting under the influence of Persigny, and believing the Orléanists to be more powerful than they actually were, he caused two decrees to be issued on January 22, 1852, one forbidding the house of Orléans to hold property in France, the other authorising the seizure of the gift that Louis Philippe had made to his children on ascending the throne in 1830. This act of robbery, which ill-became the "defender of property and the enemy of socialism," roused very considerable opposition; but this was stilled with the despotic determination that was beginning to characterise all the president's acts. On

February 17th, he issued his decree against the press, re-establishing all the old censorial rights of the government, placing all newspapers under official supervision, making them liable to suspension at the least provocation, and imposing upon every journal obligations humiliating to fulfil. In order to control the elections more successfully, the government changed at will the electoral districts, put into the field its own candidates, forced the press and the prefects to work in its interests distributed placards and bulletins, and, in general, held the elections in its own hands, not only by controlling the electoral machinery, but also by so intimidating republican and Orléanist, that neither dared go to the polls. In consequence of these acts, France fell into a state of political apathy that was to continue during the ensuing decade: freedom of thought and of speech were forbidden; opposition to the government was punished without mercy; education was controlled; political progress stopped; and the parliamentary liberty that France had enjoyed for nearly forty years gave way to a centralised government which lacked constitutional check or limit, and had as its head a political despot.

And what return did France receive for the liberty so willingly resigned? She was no longer tormented by the horror of anarchy, which had been almost constantly present since 1848; she was relieved of the uncertainties of parliamentary government, which had never proved natural to France, and of the socialistic uprisings and experiments, which had threatened the country with constant municipal, if not civil, war. To this desire for rest and peace Louis Napoleon appealed. He tempered his despotism with good works, and tried to give the various classes what he believed each wished and needed, that he might bring the nation to look upon him a benefactor, as one who would never forget the welfare of his people. He endeavoured to bind to himself the official world by favours, receptions, and fêtes, and the people by fireworks, reviews, and

free displays which seemed to be endless during the summer of 1852. He thought to justify his seizure of the Orléanist estates by distributing the property : to the poor he gave a part for strengthening the mutual aid societies, for improving the dwellings of the labourers, and for establishing loan funds and the like ; to the church, a fund for deserving members ; to the army, an endowment for the Legion of Honour. During his journeys through the provinces he urged municipal authorities to avoid extravagant display and to give the money to charity ; he showed his good will to the church by promising a credit for the construction or restoration of cathedrals, and by making gifts to chapters and presbyteries. He interested himself in railway affairs, planning to complete old routes and begin new ones ; he encouraged the extension of telegraph lines, established the *crédit foncier* for the benefit of the agriculturists, and founded relief societies and other philanthropic institutions. At the same time he endeavoured to make popular the second empire by exalting the first : the civil code became again the *code Napoléon*, a committee was appointed to gather and publish the correspondence of the first Napoleon, his birthday was made a national holiday, and the date of his death was celebrated with pomp at Notre Dame.

Thus the way was prepared for the assumption of the imperial title. During July petitions demanding the empire were circulating through the provinces, and during August and September the president made a series of journeys that were as gratifying to him and as successful as the efforts of prefects and other officials could make them. Greeted as emperor, accompanied by cries of "*Vive l'Empereur*," regarding which the prefects and mayors had already received instructions from Persigny, the president was pleased to believe that the will of the country had been expressed. At Bordeaux he said, "France seems to wish to return to the empire"; and on the next day, the *Moniteur* declared that the striking manifestations made in all

parts of France in favour of the re-establishment of the empire imposed upon the president the duty of consulting the Senate. That body, with but one dissenting voice, gave its consent, and the nation was summoned to the polls for the 21st of November. By a vote of 7,824,189 to 253,145, the title of emperor was conferred upon Louis Napoleon and made hereditary in his house; on December 1st the president was saluted by the nation through its official bodies as Napoleon III.; and on the next day he made his entrance into Paris.

The causes for the overthrow of the second republic are to be found quite as much in the circumstances of its origin and in the character of its organisation, as in the acts of Louis Napoleon and his associates. Organised by a few, it was immediately placed at the mercy of the nation by the proclamation of universal suffrage. In the first exercise of its new right the nation repudiated the republic by giving to an Assembly, the majority in which were monarchists, the task of drafting a republican constitution, an act which, as might have been foreseen, endangered the very existence of the republic by involving it in parliamentary anarchy. Thereupon the people of France, wearying of parliamentary disorder, fell under the spell of a pretender bearing the name of Napoleon, and accepted, either with content or with resignation, his usurpation of power. Louis Napoleon, making the most of the opportunities that the republican government offered, accomplished the *coup d'état* and made himself emperor. This act was a crime —a great political crime—but it must never be forgotten that it was one in which the French nation concurred. The ignorant peasantry, receiving for the first time the voting privilege, showed that it cared less for liberty than for an increase of its wealth and its profits; and the intelligent classes, who alone appreciated political freedom, having come to look on parliamentary government as productive of quarrels and prejudicial to prosperity, supported whatever would rid France of anarchy. From

1848 to 1852 the French nation rather encouraged than hindered the cause of the man who was depriving it of the institutions it had inherited from the great Revolution.

But in the final analysis of causes, it must be said that the reaction of 1852 was but the logical consequent of the revolution of 1848; that the excesses of the one made possible the excesses of the other, the error of the one, made inevitable the error of the other. Louis Napoleon was no more guilty of a crime than were the revolutionists who had overturned a lawful government and proclaimed in its stead a system and a franchise which France did not want and to which she never gave her consent. Louis Napoleon, a man of conviction though of mediocre ability, was as sincere as were the republicans of 1848: they had their theory of government, he had his; if his methods were deprecable, so were theirs; if he was despotic, they were revolutionary. As in central Europe the victory of the radicals had made possible the reaction of 1849 and the final success of a counter-revolution, so in France the republicans and socialists of 1848, who had decreed the republic and established universal suffrage, had themselves, and themselves alone, to thank for the erection of the Second Empire.

CHAPTER II.

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

THAT Napoleon III. was firmly established as Emperor of the French and his accession recognised by the Powers of Europe, were facts of no little importance in the history of European diplomacy, for into the diplomatic circle was now introduced a sovereign, the very conditions of whose rise to power required of him a foreign policy rather clever and brilliant than sound. During the period from 1847 to 1853, the diplomatic situation had been full of perplexity to those who had desired the maintenance of the European concert; for the revolution of 1848 had not only placed in danger the thrones of the absolutist princes, but it had also so far disturbed the equilibrium of Europe as to lead in many circles to a confident expectation of war. The support which Russia had given Austria in the war with Hungary, together with the reactionary movement of 1849 and the despotic rule of Schwarzenberg, had made more intense the popular hostility in the west for the eastern Powers; while the appearance of Louis Napoleon, the Roman expedition, and the inconsistent acts of the second republic made it impossible to determine whether France would maintain the old friendship with England, or would seek an alliance with Russia and Austria. The latter had been brought to the verge of war with Prussia by the events of 1850, and, though bound to Russia by ties of gratitude for her intervention at Vilagos, was likely at any time to break those ties, owing to the rival interests of the two Powers in the lands of the Danube, and to the con-

straint that the Emperor of Austria felt in holding his eastern possessions at the good will and pleasure of the Czar. Prussia, by her attitude on the Schleswig-Holstein question, had ranged against her the western Powers, who in defending the integrity of Denmark were upholding the principle of the equilibrium of Europe, and, by her attitude toward the revolution in general, had roused the hostility of Russia, through whose interference, rather than that of any other Power, she had been forced to yield to the claims of Austria. The Holy Alliance was already broken, and the eastern Powers, who had so long been united by their common views on methods of government, were far from being on friendly terms with one another. The era was, therefore, one of a general shifting of diplomatic relations, and, consequently, one of great uncertainty ; for there was ever present a fear of a general conflict, which might easily come about, not because princes were capricious and diplomats obstinate or inefficient, but because the history of the preceding thirty years had not yet been worked out, because momentous historical issues had yet to be decided. From 1849 to 1852 the situtation was a very delicate one, and every effort was being made to settle all disputes peacefully, that war might be prevented.

The first quarrel that arose after 1849 was a direct outcome of the war between Austria and Hungary. Even while France and England were trying to settle the Schleswig-Holstein question, their attention was diverted by the appeal of Turkey for aid against the aggressive demands of Austria and Russia for the extradition of Kossuth, Bem, and other Hungarian and Polish refugees who had escaped into Turkey. The appeal of the Sultan was heeded, and Stratford Canning for England, and General Aupick for France, urged upon Turkey the importance of resisting the Austrian and Russian demands. Palmerston supported his minister by declaring that inasmuch as Turkey was not obliged by treaty to deliver up the refugees, she ought

not, in deference to the laws of hospitality and the dictates of humanity, to do so. At the same time the British fleet was ordered to the Dardanelles and the French fleet to Malta, and the former, contrary to the terms of the treaty of the Straits of 1841, entered within the prohibited waters. The eastern Powers, although indignant at this diplomatic error on England's part, consented in November, 1849, to withdraw their demands, and war was happily averted. But scarcely had the controversy over this incident been brought to an end, when there arose a new cause of disturbance, involving the good name of England. The latter Power, angered by what she chose to consider the aggressive and high-handed action of the Greek government toward two British citizens, Finlay, a piece of whose land had been seized by the government for a park, and Don Pacifico, whose house had been pillaged by an Athenian mob, sent a fleet into the Piræus in January, 1850. Greece at once appealed to France and Russia against England, and these Powers, on the ground that England's attitude was unnecessarily aggressive, responded to the appeal of the smaller state, Russia in a letter of remonstrance, France in a demand for explanations; and when no satisfaction was to be had by these means, the French minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, was recalled from London. For the moment matters looked threatening, but the good sense of the Powers asserting itself, a compromise was effected, and England withdrew from her belligerent attitude. Such incidents as these, however, did not serve to make harmonious the diplomatic relations of the European states.

Europe next turned her attention to the question that had been troubling her for the two preceding years, that of Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. England offered to mediate between Russia and Denmark, and invited the representatives of the European states to London to discuss the matter. Having settled their own diplomatic differences, the

Powers were ready to compel Prussia to enter the common accord, and in the interest of peace, to recognise the integrity of Denmark. Although in so doing Prussia was making a concession to Schwarzenberg, she had no other recourse than to submit, and on July 2, 1850, signed a treaty with Denmark by which peace was established between that kingdom and the Germanic Confederation. She then joined England, France, Austria, and Russia in signing the protocol of August 2, 1850, whereby the full integrity of Denmark was confirmed and the agreement entered into, that at a later date international recognition should be given to that protocol, and the question of the succession to the Danish throne, arising from the childlessness of Frederic VII., be settled.

This treaty of 1850 marked an important step in the direction of an amicable settlement of all diplomatic disputes, but it did not bring to an end the period of diplomatic anxiety. No sooner had Austria made sure of the restoration once more of her influence in the Germanic Confederation, than she began to tamper with the delicately balanced European equilibrium by reviving at the Dresden conference (December, 1850, to May, 1851), her proposition to enlarge the Germanic Confederation by introducing into it all her non-Germanic provinces, Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Lombardo-Venetia. To carry out this proposition would have been to break the treaty of Vienna, and so vigorously did England, France, and even Russia protest against it, that even Schwarzenberg was finally compelled to yield. In this piece of diplomacy it is interesting to note that it was Prussia who checkmated Austria, by agreeing not to bring into the Confederation her own non-Germanic provinces, although the privilege of doing so had been granted her by the Federal Diet in March, 1848. Trouble was again avoided, although the mobbing of General Haynau in London on September 15, 1851, and the welcome given to Kossuth by the English populace during the months of October and No-

vember of the same year, had cooled decidedly the friendship between Austria and England.

But the hopes of peace aroused by the great Exhibition in London in 1851, and by the happy solution, up to this point, of all troublesome diplomatic problems, were seriously disturbed by the *coup d'état* of December 2d, and Europe was thrown once more into a state of commotion. What would the new dictator do? Would he, as many feared, follow in the footsteps of the first Napoleon, and throwing to the winds all regard for the state system of Europe, begin an aggressive campaign for the aggrandisement of France? Had he designs upon Belgium, Switzerland, and Piedmont? A Carbonaro, a republican, an ally of socialists in the past, Louis Napoleon inspired but little confidence in the minds of the Powers, while in England, the mention of the name Napoleon was enough to create a popular panic. Frederic William IV. even suggested reviving the Holy Alliance, and only too glad of an opportunity of distracting attention from the humiliation to which he had been subjected at Olmütz, proposed to the courts of St. Petersburg and London that a coalition be formed to act in case of emergency against France. But this plan found no support. England, taking her stand firmly on the doctrine of non-intervention, rejected the Prussian proposal; Russia welcomed the new autocrat as an ally in the work of stamping out the last traces of the revolution; while Austria, rejoicing in the downfall of the second republic, expressed only admiration for the man whose policy was so much like her own. When, therefore, Louis Napoleon made known his determination to labour for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the friendliest relations with the Powers, apprehensions were calmed, and harmony was again restored.

Between Austria and Prussia the old rivalry now broke out in a new form. Schwarzenberg, though thwarted at Dresden, was determined to accomplish his end in another way, and if

he could not bring all Austria into the Confederation, resolved to bring it into the Zollverein, and so gain the supremacy for which he sought. Inasmuch as the treaty of the Zollverein, renewed in 1841 for only twelve years, would expire in 1853, the opportunity was favourable ; and he hoped by means of his influence over the South-German states to make the continuance of the Tariff Union dependent upon Austria's admission to it. But in this he failed. Prussia, knowing that the withdrawal of certain states, notably the two Hesses, would destroy the commercial unity between her central and western provinces, had so far succeeded, by bringing Hanover into the Zollverein in 1851, in making herself commercially independent of the action of the other states, that she rejected Austria's demand. What the outcome would have been is uncertain, for Schwarzenberg was a man of many resources, and his expectation of eventual success was great ; but on April 5, 1852, he died in the prime of life with his reactionary program only partly carried out. With his death the situation underwent a decided change ; for although the impulse that he had given to the movement of reaction was sufficient to maintain Austria for another year in the position that he had won for her, nevertheless, when his task fell into weaker hands, the power of the Habsburg house began to decline. His death marked the beginning of the end of that policy which had controlled the affairs of central Europe since the congress of Vienna ; and Count Buol-Schauenstein, his successor, an arrogant, pompous man, energetic but tricky, and wanting in diplomatic sagacity, was destined to find himself outwitted on one hand by Bismarck, on the other by Cavour.

At this juncture, notwithstanding the fact that Austria's commercial relations with the Confederation were still in dispute, the Powers came together at London to settle amicably, if possible, the question of the Danish succession. The withdrawal of certain claimants had already prepared the way for

a speedy settlement of the difficulty.[1] The princes of Hesse Cassel, whose claims came through their mother Charlotte, aunt of Frederick VII., gave up their rights; the Czar, who was the head of the elder branch of Holstein Gottorp through his grandfather, Peter III., resigned all his pretensions, and compelled his kinsman, the Duke of Oldenburg, to do the same; and the Duke of Augustenburg of the elder Sonderburg branch, for whom the duchies had fought in 1848, signed for himself and his descendants a renunciation of his claims to Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg for 2,225,000 Danish thalers. This left as the only remaining claimant Christian, of the younger Sonderburg branch, who had married Louisa, the daughter of the Charlotte mentioned above. Christian of Sonderburg-Glücksburg was therefore recognised by all the Powers as the successor, in default of issue to Frederic VII., to the throne of the united Denmark. The treaty was signed at London May 8, 1852, and, although two Danish parliaments were dissolved before it was finally ratified by the Danish government, its acceptance by the majority of the states of the Germanic Confederation, during the ensuing months, completed the requirements, and it became a recognised part of the public law of Europe.

With the signing of the treaty of London, the last of the questions raised by the revolution of 1848 was satisfactorily settled, and the promises of international harmony that the exhibition of 1851 had made, seemed fulfilled. Peace had at last come to Europe, and seemed so firmly established, that even the assumption of the imperial crown by Louis Napoleon did not seriously disturb the placidity of the diplomatic waters. Moreover, the new Emperor, wishing to have his title recognised by the Powers, made solemn promises to respect the territorial boundaries of Europe as established by existing treaties. In April of the next year, 1853, the ques-

[1] See Appendix.

tion of Austria's relations to the Zollverein was settled by a commercial treaty, in which mutual concessions were made. Frederic William IV., supported by Bismarck, whose boldness was already beginning to attract the attention of European statesmen, vehemently opposed the admission of Austria into the Zollverein, and carried his point. The treaty of 1853 marks not only an important step in the history of commercial agreements, but also the turning point in the history of the relations between Austria and Prussia. For the first time Prussia had succeeded in carrying a point contrary to the wishes of Austria, and that, too, at a time when other events were about to take place which were to strengthen the position of Prussia, and, by altering completely the relations of the Powers, to revolutionise the public law of Europe.

Thus far, from 1815 to 1853, this public law had been that established at the congress of Vienna; one guaranteeing peace so long only as the terms of the treaty drafted by that congress and the terms of treaties subsequently made and agreed to by the chief Powers, should remain unimpaired; so long only as the equilibrium, established by those treaties after many wearisome negotiations, arguments, and compromises, should remain undisturbed. To maintain this equilibrium had been the guiding principle of European statesmen for nearly forty years. That this nicely adjusted balance should not be disturbed, Greece and Belgium had submitted their demands to a congress of the Powers, England and France had protested against the annexation of Cracow, and all the governments had upheld the integrity of Denmark, and had forbidden Austria to bring her non-Germanic provinces into the Germanic Confederation. It was out of respect for this system, that England, in recognising the Second Empire, had felt obliged to explain her apparent breach of the declaration of Vienna, by saying that the new Napoleon did not come within the terms of that declaration, because he drew his authority from the consent of the French

people, and not from any hereditary right; that Frederic William IV., at first seeing in Napoleon only the Revolution incarnate, was eager to revive the military alliance of 1814, and to treat with the allied Powers for the maintenance of order.

But this public law and the diplomacy based upon it had not taken into account those changes that were now threatening to alter the whole European situation. The treaty of Vienna had made no provision for the unity of Germany and Italy; it had declared that no Bonaparte should sit on the throne of France; and it had not in the slightest way admitted that the Turkish question might become a menacing European problem. The course of events was, therefore, in all these respects, threatening the permanence of the old law. The people of Germany were growing conscious of a desire for national unity that could be gratified only by the destruction of the old Confederation; Italy, whose self-respect required that she renew with Austria the struggle for independence and unity, was merely waiting for a competent leader; a Bonaparte was sitting on the throne of France, and, moreover, one who was destined to play an important part in overthrowing the very treaty that had excluded his dynasty from the throne; while the Eastern Question, already a century and a half old, had given rise as early as 1852 to the fatal controversy that was to bring on the struggle which all had been striving to avoid.

The systematic dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire began with the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, when, after a war with Austria, Venice, Poland, and Russia, the Sultan was deprived of parts of Hungary, Slavonia, and Transylvania, and territory about the sea of Azov. But with Russia this effort was premature; for it was not till the reign of Catherine II., when the Russian territory extended south-westward little farther than the Dnieper, and southward was entirely cut off from the Black Sea, that territorial extension in that direction became a fixed

part of the Russian policy. The treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774, which marks the definite beginning of the Eastern Question, gave to Russia important strongholds on the Black Sea at the mouths of the Dniester and Don, and in the Crimea; allowed her merchants to navigate freely Turkish waters; and conceded to her the right of protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan, whom Russia desired to liberate from the tyranny of the Turk. This famous treaty increased Russia's power and influence in the Ottoman Empire, and prepared the way for a speedy acquisition of all the territory to the north of the Black Sea. From 1774 to 1783, though dreaming of a partition of Turkey which should equal that of Poland, Catherine was forced through the opposition of England, Holland, and Prussia to limit herself to driving the Tartars from the Crimea and the Kuban, and in forcing the Porte in the treaty of Constantinople (1783) to recognise her right to these territories.

Then it was that she began to transform the northern coast of the Black Sea into a powerful military frontier, of which Sebastopol, destined from this time to be a constant menace to Ottoman independence, was the chief stronghold, and, in the war terminated by the peace of Jassy in 1792, to extend her boundary westward to the Dniester. England, whose commercial expansion demanded the integrity of the Ottoman state, and France, whose alliance with the Turks dated from the reign of Francis I. and Solyman, were already deeply involved in affairs in the west, and though Pitt and Frederic the Great had been able to thwart the grander schemes of Catherine, they had not been able to hinder Russia's advance. The catastrophe of the French Revolution and the death of Catherine checked for the time the progress of dismemberment, and it was not until 1806 that Alexander I., himself a participator in the coalitions against France, made an effort to extend still further the Danubian frontier by seizing portions of Wallachia and Moldavia. So little was Napoleon bound by the traditions of French diplo-

macy that at Tilsit in 1807 he consented, so it is said, to the seizure of the Danubian principalities, on condition that Alexander would consent to his own plan for the occupation of Spain. In this agreement, the Emperors utterly disregarded their treaty obligations; for Turkey was a faithful ally of France, and the seizure of the border provinces would be a breach of the treaty of Jassy. In 1812 the Sultan made his peace with Russia by giving up Bessarabia—a part of Moldavia,—thus accepting the Pruth as the dividing line between the two empires, while Russia recognised the principalities as still being under the protectorate of Turkey.

The advance of Russia was now rapid, and a war springing out of the Greek revolution left the Turks so helpless before the might of the Czar, that had it not been for the protest of the western Powers, there could have been little doubt that in the treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Sultan would have been further despoiled of his territory. As it was, he was compelled to open the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all the merchant ships of the Powers, to grant full freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea, to destroy the fortresses on the left bank of the Danube, and to pay the expenses of the war. By the latter concessions, Turkey recognised the independence of Wallachia and Moldavia, saving only the annual money tribute, mark of her legal suzerainty, and also bound herself financially to Russia, as her own treasury was empty. But a worse blow was still to fall. In 1833, when Mehemet Ali was threatening to overthrow the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan sought the aid of Russia, and in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi gave to the Czar so extensive a control over her affairs as to reduce her to a condition of complete dependence. This action led to a vigorous protest from the west, and in the treaty of the Straits (1841) the Powers, in conference at London, closed the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to all foreign ships in times of peace, hoping thereby to prevent any armed interference of Russia in the

affairs of Turkey. England was so far aroused as to declare, that if the stipulations of this treaty should be broken, she should consider herself at liberty to act as the exigencies might demand, meaning that should Turkey's independence be threatened, she was ready to maintain it by force of arms. The first application of this policy has already been noted in connection with the controversy over the extradition of the Hungarian refugees.

Thus far the relations between the western Powers and Russia had been eminently friendly, no question of serious import having arisen to disturb the outward harmony. Each had, however, marked out its sphere of influence, for France was making herself felt in Egypt and Syria; Austria, in Bosnia and Servia; while England and Russia were quarrelling about Turkey, the latter advocating the dismemberment, the former the integrity, of the Ottoman Empire. In 1852, however, a difficulty, in itself insignificant, though destined to lead to momentous consequences, presented itself to Europe. This was the quarrel between the monks and the priests of the Greek and Latin churches regarding the control of the Holy Places in the East. The claims of the Latins dated from certain treaty stipulations of the sixteenth century, whereby they were given exclusive possession of certain venerated spots—the great church of Bethlehem, the grotto of the Nativity, the Holy Sepulchre, and the tomb of the Virgin at Gethsemane. During the two centuries that had followed, the Greeks had encroached upon these rights. But notwithstanding the fact that the old privileges had been restored in 1740 to the Latins, they continued these encroachments, growing bolder as Russia's power increased; for, since 1701, when Peter the Great had assumed the spiritual as well as the temporal sovereignty of Russia, they had been able to count upon the support of the Czar. During the period from 1740 to 1850 the Latins had had no such champion, for, owing to the many revolutions and governmental

changes in France since 1789, to the indecisive conduct of the July Monarchy, and, above all, to the unfortunate discrediting of France in Eastern affairs when the European Powers concluded the treaty of 1840 against France, the chief representative of the Latin church in the East had been unable to act. But when Louis Napoleon became president of the republic, the French government under his direction took a firm stand, and in 1850, having called to the attention of the Porte the solemn stipulations of the agreement of 1740, demanded reparation for the Roman Catholics. The Sultan was placed in an awkward position in being thus called upon to mediate between two Christian communions which Mussulman law commanded him to denounce. For two years the controversy raged. Threatened by Russia, who demanded the maintenance of the *status quo*, and urged by France, who insisted on having the old privileges restored, the Sultan finally resorted to duplicity. On February 9, 1852, he published a firman granting the French demand, and a few days afterward issued a secret decree withdrawing these concessions, and recognising the *status quo* in favour of the Greeks and of Russia.

In itself the question of the Holy Places was unworthy of the consideration of the diplomatic world, and had it not involved other questions which concerned the most vital interests of Europe, would have been left for settlement to the ecclesiastical authorities. But the rivalry between the Greek and Latin churches had now become a rivalry between their respective champions, Nicolas I. and Napoleon, and between the races that they represented; and by his wavering and intriguing policy, the Turk, as arbiter of the controversy, reopened, in a form more than ever dangerous, the question of the relations between Russia and Turkey, at a time when conditions seemed wholly favourable to the policy of despoliation that Russia had unremittingly pursued for eighty years. In its turn, Russia's renewal of her old policy brought before Europe a diplomatic

problem of first importance, and one that was to prove impossible of solution except by a resort to arms: for not only were the Powers, because of their clashing interests, unable to preserve diplomatic harmony, but also the various peoples of the west, whose anger against Russia had been increasing steadily for the past four years, were only too eager to give expression to their hatred of her for the part she had played in preventing a successful issue of the revolution of 1848. Thus, it is clear, that the controversy over the Holy Places led to the Crimean war, not merely because it brought about events that affected the equilibrium of Europe and the commercial supremacy of England, but also because it aroused the bitter feelings of the west against Russia as the autocratic supporter of doctrines of government and methods of aggrandisement such as characterised the old and not the new *régime*. In other words, the causes which led to the war did not spring into being in 1854; they were bound up with the progress of European history since 1815; and the issues of the struggle were to no small degree a victory for those principles of racial unity and independence that were being worked out in other parts of Europe.

Nicolas I., the Czar of all the Russias, lived in a political world that had been singularly untouched by the movements that had made for progress in the western world. Neither Renaissance, Reformation, nor Revolution had wrought any part of their beneficent work upon Russia, and during the uprising of 1848, the political structure had stood undisturbed by the forces, intellectual and political, that were stirring the rest of Europe to its depths. The Czar's authority was a strange mixture of Asiatic despotism and Christian theocracy, of administrative omnipotence and military absolutism, which made him supreme over his people and dictatorial to the world outside. His position as the semi-deified head of a vast empire and a powerful church, made practically impossible the development of high qualities of statesmanship; for the Czar had

but one argument to employ, the argument of an imperious will. Opposition or disobedience at home was followed by severe and cruel punishment; contradiction or affront abroad, where recent events had given him a disdainful confidence in his own power, roused his hostility and stirred his pride.

The thought of completing the work of his predecessors by some *coup de main* against Turkey, had probably been in his mind for some years. He had allowed the opportunity of 1848, when central and western Europe would have been helpless to resist his advance, to pass without action, and he still seemed to sanction the doctrine of the equilibrium of Europe, of which any attack upon Turkey would have been a distinct breach. But after 1852, many reasons were urging him to give body to his inner thoughts. He was probably approaching the close of a long and successful reign, for none of his family had attained old age; he was annoyed by Turkey's resistance to him in the matter of the refugees, and by the disorders within the Ottoman Empire, which Stratford Canning was vainly endeavouring to check; and as head and champion of the Greek church, he shared the anger of the faithful at the Sultan's duplicity in the controversy over the Holy Places. Above all, he felt sure of Russia's position in Europe, and proud of the influence of her diplomats; he had every reason to be sure of the support of Austria and Prussia, and was confident that England, whose prime minister, Lord Aberdeen, had seemed in the past friendly to his plans, would not oppose any project that he might undertake for the solution of the Eastern Question.

After 1852 there is no doubt that Nicolas had determined on his course; indications of such a determination became more frequent, and his tone was more irritable and less conciliatory. He showed intense displeasure at the assumption by Louis Napoleon of the imperial crown; he began to speak of the doctrine of equilibrium as admirable for other states, but as inapplicable to his own; he hazarded suggestions, vague indeed,

but sufficiently definite to rouse the anxiety of those who had watched the uncertain course of European diplomacy since 1847, and knew with what difficulty peace had thus far been preserved; and finally, he dispelled all illusions by the famous interviews with the English representative at St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, in January, 1853. "We have a sick man on our hands, and must prepare for his demise," he said. "As long as Russia and England are in accord, I do not fear the rest of Europe. I have not inherited the policy of Catherine II., for my empire is sufficiently vast; but there are many millions of Christian subjects whose interests I must preserve. I will therefore occupy Constantinople as a gage for the future. and England may take Egypt and Crete." The suspicions of England were at once aroused, for the ambassador naturally inferred from these interviews, that the Czar with the co-operation of Austria, Prussia, and England desired to begin the final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The policy thus secretly made known to England did not long remain hidden. On February 10th, Prince Menchikoff, one of the highest dignitaries in the Russian Empire, left St. Petersburg on a secret mission, the object of which was not even known to Nesselrode, and much less to the political circles of the capital. Passing southward, he made ready the naval force in the Black Sea, visited the army corps stationed on the borders of Bessarabia, and in company with the vice-admiral of the fleet and the chief of staff of the army, entered the Turkish capital on March 1st.

What meant this extraordinary embassy and these elaborate naval and military preparations? Simply the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, or was there an ulterior motive? The issue was soon known. In the name of the Czar, Prince Menchikoff, in an insolent and menacing manner, made demands of the Porte at first secretly, afterward openly, which threatened the independence, if not the existence, of the Ottoman Empire. Not only did he ask for a settlement of the difficulties regarding

the Holy Places, but he went further. He demanded guarantees for the future in the form of an addition to the treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek church should be placed entirely under Russian protection, whereby the rights and privileges of the orthodox Christians in Turkey, by an act equivalent to a treaty, should be conveyed to Russia alone. This demand, as Stratford Canning said, was not amputation, it was the infusion of poison into the entire Turkish system. It meant that Russia, passing the limits of spiritual surveillance, would subtly extend her influence until the Ottoman authority should be threatened with destruction, the sovereignty of the Sultan reduced to nothingness, and he become a dependent on the will of Russia. Such were the logical inferences from the ingenious scheme of the Czar. The question of the Holy Places was no longer in dispute, that difficulty was easily settled through the skilful mediation of Stratford Canning; but the larger question had now taken its place. The Eastern Question in all its fatal simplicity confronted the Powers, and with Turkey herself lay the first decision. Would she grant or reject the demands of the Czar? On May 18th, after many negotiations, she gave her answer; strengthened by the advice of the English ambassador she determined to resist the Russian request in whatever form it was made, and refused to accept the proposal for a treaty. This act completed the rupture with Russia; Prince Menchikoff withdrew from Constantinople, and ten days afterward, the Russian minister, Nesselrode, sent in the ultimatum of the Czar. Turkey should immediately accept Menchikoff's note, or the Russian troops would cross the Turkish frontier.

This piece of arrogance on the part of Russia turned the Powers of Europe against the Czar, and brought about a change of relations. Europe as a whole judged the conduct of the Czar severely. Austria declared herself ready to oppose the Muscovite pretensions; Prussia, more reserved and at first inclined to believe that Nicolas would disavow the acts of his ministers,

rejected without hesitation the project of a protectorate; France who had already so far divined the purpose of the Czar as to send a fleet to the Levant, remained on the whole calm, absorbed in the events that had followed the erection of the new empire; while England, hitherto skeptical and hesitating, but now stirred with anger at the presumption of Russia and believing herself deceived and set at nought by a friendly Power on whose good faith she had relied, adopted the policy of France, and dispatched her fleet from Malta to Besika bay. Thus, by his aggressive policy, Nicolas had turned Europe against him. His old friends were struck with consternation; Nicolas, the upholder of the Holy Alliance, had become the disturber of the peace, and, strange to say, a Napoleon had become the protector of the European equilibrium. A new European situation was developing.

In this crisis Turkey's attitude was admirable. Encouraged by Stratford Canning, she received the Czar's ultimatum without excitement, and on June 17th, while promising to respect all the privileges of the Greek Christians, once more rejected Russia's demand. In his turn, the Czar issued a manifesto, in which he declared that he was entering on war with no idea of conquest, but only for the purpose of securing the desired guarantees; and on July 3d, the Russian troops crossed the Pruth. Though from the Russian standpoint active war was not yet begun, yet, in fact, the peace was broken; and now had come to pass that which Europe had for four years warded off by means of so many compromises—the European equilibrium was threatened with destruction, and threatened by one who had been among its chief supporters.

But the Powers undaunted undertook the task of settling by the old method of notes and protocols, this, the most difficult question since 1815, and accepted Austria's invitation to meet in conference at Vienna to discuss the matter. Austria, standing half-way between the east and west, was well qualified for the

office of mediator, and so conflicting were her sympathies and interests, that she was not likely to commit herself to either side. The quarrel about the Hungarian refugees, the attack on Haynau in London, the hearty reception given to Kossuth by the English people, had made less cordial her relations with England; while it seemed reasonably certain that her old hostility for the first Napoleon would prevent her from becoming intimate with his nephew. Furthermore, even though she felt drawn to Russia by their old relations in the Holy Alliance, by her respect for the Czar, whose name still had great weight in Vienna, and by her gratitude for the assistance given in the struggle with Hungary, yet she was the rival of Russia in the south-east, and was bound to resist any attempt that the Czar might make to gain control of the mouths of the Danube, or to exercise an undue influence in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It therefore happened that from June, 1853, to February, 1854, Vienna became the centre of an exciting diplomatic conference which was vainly attempting to solve this most perplexing problem in accordance with the principles of compromise and diplomacy.

There is no need of inquiring into the history and fate of the eleven plans proposed by these wise European statesmen between June and October, 1853. Everyone had a scheme. "We find," says Lane-Poole, "M. Drouyn de Lhuys full of his scheme in June, while Lord Clarendon is simultaneously dispatching his rival project to Constantinople, where it arrives just as Lord Stratford's own plan is leaving for Vienna, where this is received at the very moment when M. Drouyn de Lhuys's note, after emendation, has been formally adopted by the great Powers." The latter note, which really originated with Napoleon III., and was afterwards known as the Vienna note, was adopted July 27th, and duly transmitted to the Czar, who, to the gratification of the conference, accepted the terms without comment. The diplomats were confident that the Czar was

pacified and that peace was once more restored to Europe. But, unfortunately, the note, prepared with such great care, received a thorough scrutiny at Constantinople, where it was discovered that it had entirely failed to take into account the question of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and so had sacrificed the essential point of the controversy. Notwithstanding Canning's official support of the note, which personally he opposed, the Grand Council of the Porte, by refusing to accept the note until it was amended, again threw the whole question open for discussion.

For the moment this action of Turkey's turned from her the sympathy of the Powers; France, England, and Austria expressed to Russia their profound regrets, and Turkey seemed abandoned. But European diplomats, who with a profound misconception of human nature had so often during the century disposed of peoples and nations as one would the passionless pieces in a game of chess, were now forced to recognise the hopelessness of the game they were playing. On September 7th, when the Czar rejected the Turkish amendments to the Vienna note, he issued an Analysis in which he stated, in the simplest and barest form, that no matter what the diplomats might wish to do, they could not deter him from the determination to obtain such a right of intervention as would give him the desired guarantees in Turkey. Then, at last, it dawned upon the representatives at the conference that the Czar, interpreting the note in terms entirely different from their own, was, in reality, entirely unwilling to submit the question to diplomatic settlement. Immediately the tide of sympathy turned again toward Turkey, who, all the while, had been the only one to discover the ulterior motives of the Czar, and, with an instinct born of danger, to discern the weakness of the diplomatic missive framed to protect her. With a temper characteristic of the old days of her military greatness, she now took matters into her own hands. Weary of the efforts of the Powers, and growing daily more animated with the warlike, even fanati-

cal, spirit that was seeking to arouse the Mussulmans against the infidels, to unfold the Crescent once more against the Cross, the Turk, in the face of financial bankruptcy and administrative corruption, took the initiative, and trusting in the foreign fleets lying in Besika bay, decided to act for himself. He ordered General Gortchakoff to evacuate the principalities, with the understanding that war would immediately follow his refusal to obey.

But even now, with preparations for war already made, with the Russians and Turks facing each other in the principalities, and with the allied fleets lying just outside the prohibited waters of the Dardanelles, the Powers still clung to the hope that this war might be averted, that this conflict, which threatened to involve all Europe, might be arrested on the very brink of hostilities; and though one event after another had shown the impotence of the European concert, they could not bring themselves to believe that the system which had as its *raison d'être* the settlement of disputes between states and the preservation of the equilibrium, and which had maintained the peace successfully for forty years, must now, in the presence of the greater crisis, admit that it had failed.

But the control of the issue was already passing out of their hands. Even while France and England were entering into an agreement to take the part of mediators, a report was brought to the west that on November 2, 1853, the Turks had defeated the Russians at Oltenitza, and that a few days later, as a response to this opening of hostilities, the Russian fleet, setting out from Sebastopol, had destroyed a Turkish squadron that had taken refuge in Sinope bay. Russia's action, which was wholly defensible from the view of military operations, had an extraordinary effect upon Europe. The spirit of the people of the west was, as the Prince Consort said of the English, "furiously Turkish and anti-Russian." Public opinion, for so many years outraged by Russia's autocratic and reactionary policy,

now construed every Russian act an aggression, every Turkish act a defence, made Lord Palmerston and Napoleon III. its heroes, and losing sight of the true proportion of events in its excitement over Prince Menchikoff's mission and the occupation of the principalities, refused to see in this last act of Russia anything but an odious attack by a strong Power upon a weak one, a fleet destroyed without mercy, a village burned to ashes—in short, an allied Power bullied and maltreated in the very presence of the fleets of the maritime governments. No arguments of Cobden, Bright, and the peace party could check the desire for war prevalent among the English, for their moral sense was outraged, their pride and their honour were at stake; and when, toward the end of the year, France, whose people had not at first looked with favour on the war, proposed that the allied fleet enter the Black Sea for the protection of Turkey, England met her more than half-way. Lord Aberdeen, to whom the doctrine of equilibrium was a dogma, was obliged to defer to the opinion of Palmerston, who, if he had consulted merely his personal wishes, would have sent the British fleet at once into the Black Sea, shut the Russian fleet in port, and informed the Czar that there it would remain until the principalities were evacuated. For a moment the English cabinet hesitated, and Palmerston resigned. But in ten days he was recalled in triumph, and was henceforth the inspirer of the national policy. Before the end of December the allied fleets had entered the Euxine, and the Czar had learned, that as the Turks had been driven from the principalities by the Russians, so the latter, in their turn, were to be driven from the Black Sea by the allied Powers.

The situation was an extraordinary one; no one desired war, no rational cause for war existed, all the participants were acting in a measure on the defensive, the Czar was in the principalities to defend the Greek Christians, and the allied Powers were in the Black Sea to defend the Turks. Again the

conference used its influence to effect a compromise, but by February, 1854, it had given up its work in despair, for the Czar rejected Turkey's terms, and insisted on others that the Sultan could not accept. Thereupon the western Powers, whose warlike attitude gave to their opinions exceptional value, made a final attempt to settle the matter. Napoleon III. sent a personal letter to the Czar, stating that the time had come for a decision, for either an *entente définitif* or a positive rupture, and he added that unless the evacuation of the principalities were made one of the conditions of peace, France and England would resort to arms. The reply that arrived on February 13th was characteristic of the man who had refused to call Napoleon *mon frère*. With haughtiness Nicolas replied to his *bon ami* refusing to treat upon the terms proposed, and saying that Russia would show herself to be in 1854 what she had been in 1812. Such a pointed reference to the Moscow campaign destroyed all hopes of peace, and at once the western Powers prepared for war. On the 27th of March, Napoleon III. and Queen Victoria simultaneously announced, one to the *Corps législatif*, the other to Parliament, the opening of hostilities. The next day war was officially declared.

Inasmuch as it was confidently expected that the scene of the war would be the valley of the Danube, where the Turks had already been unexpectedly successful in the winter defence of the principalities against the forces of the Czar, the generals in command of the allied troops, Raglan and Saint-Arnaud, turned their attention to the western coast of the Black Sea as the most suitable point from which to make the attack. By May 20th, over thirty thousand French and twenty thousand English soldiers had been landed in Gallipoli, a small Turkish town at the eastern extremity of the Dardanelles, selected as the first place of occupation because of its nearness to Constantinople and its available character for purposes of defence. In the meantime the Czar, mortified at the inactivity of his

troops during the winter, had determined to prosecute the campaign with greater vigour; and, sending the Russian troops across the Danube into the Dobrudscha, with the evident design of forcing the passage across the Balkans, attacking Adrianople, and perhaps advancing to Constantinople, had begun in May the siege of Silistria. When the allies heard of this move, they at first decided to go to the aid of the Turks by way of Shumla; but soon perceiving the rashness of this plan, had decided to go to Varna, not for immediate operations, but simply to approach the seat of war. In the meantime, while more troops were on their way from England and France, and while the generals were discussing the plan of campaign, the surprising news was spread abroad that on June 22d the Russians had withdrawn from before Silistria, and were evacuating the principalities and returning to Russia. The report was true. By the 1st of July the last Muscovite had crossed the Pruth, and the principalities were free.

To understand this remarkable move, one must examine further the diplomatic relations between the Powers. During the early months of 1854, when war with Russia had seemed a certainty to England and France, it became a matter of tremendous importance to know what would be the attitude of Austria and Prussia. Would a quadruple alliance be formed, or would England and France carry on the war alone? Such an alliance was desired by the maritime Powers, not only because of the advantages that would accrue from such a combination, but also because of the apparent necessity of attacking Russia by way of the upper Danube, a movement demanding the co-operation of Austria. Before, however, any agreement could be reached, England and France had declared war, and had decided to make the attack from the side of Turkey. In this emergency Austria's policy was wholly characteristic; Count Buol, casting aside all feelings of gratitude for Russia, played a clever, but essentially selfish, game of strategy. Believing Russia's pro-

gress southward to be a menace to Austria, he made a great show of military preparation, assumed a warlike tone, and declared that he was ready to aid the western Powers if the Czar should refuse to evacuate the principalities. But underneath this bellicose exterior he concealed a more subtle purpose. Unwilling to commit himself to a positive alliance until it had become evident that England and France had gone too far to retreat, he determined to remain in the rear, and to leave the actual work of fighting to the other Powers. His scheme, which was not unlike that of Metternich's in 1813, was to push France and England to the front as a first line of attack, while Austria, Prussia, and the Germanic Confederation were to form a second line sufficiently imposing to enable Austria to interfere at the proper moment in the capacity of mediator, and in this way to gain the control of the situation, and the right to act as the arbiter of Europe at a general congress. This plan, however, involved the consent of Prussia, and the recent relations between that state and Austria made it wholly uncertain what Prussia's action would be.

Many forces were at work at this crisis in affairs to influence the decision of Frederic William IV. The Prussian liberals, who saw in the Czar an enemy to German unity, and the Prussian statesmen, who sympathised with the liberal party, urged upon the king an alliance with England; the conservatives and the feudalists advocated the position of friendly neutrality that the Czar had offered to both Austria and Prussia the January before; while a third party, of which Bismarck was the chief representative, influenced neither by liberal sentiments nor by conservative prejudices, argued that as the war offered no advantages for Prussia, her position should be one of strict neutrality, as that alone could save her from incriminating herself in the eyes of Russia, whose good will would some day be desirable. Bismarck used his influence to prevent the king from adopting any entangling policy, and especially opposed an

alliance with Austria, on the ground that Prussia would be playing into the hand of that Power without compensation.

On the whole, Frederic William inclined toward neutrality, for much as he admired the Czar as the protector of the Christians, he could not ally with one who was disturbing the peace of Europe, nor could he join with England even though she were a Protestant Power, because he objected to her support of the infidels and her alliance with Napoleon III. Yet he dared not stand alone, for he was as fearful as ever of the "Tiger of the West," and believed that in taking a neutral stand, Prussia would be throwing down her defences and inviting attack from France. So, notwithstanding Bismarck's opposition, he listened with favour to Austria's proposal for an alliance, and on April 20th signed a guarantee treaty promising to protect the Austrian territory in case that state entered the war against Russia. However, by obtaining the addition of a clause stating that the treaty should not become operative until agreed to by the states of the Confederation, Bismarck entirely altered the situation; for as he foresaw, and later events were to prove, the states of the Confederation had no sympathy for Austria's warlike policy, and were strongly in favour of neutrality. Therefore, should England and France demand the co-operation of Austria, and should that Power demand the co-operation of Prussia, the latter could say that she could not move without the Confederation. In short, Buol found himself checkmated by the despised Prussian government, with his plan, which was solely to the advantage of Austria, to all intents and purposes successfully frustrated.

But the treaty of April 20th contained two clauses supplemental to those named above. In the first place, Austria was to demand of the Czar the evacuation of the principalities. This was but a repetition of the agreement into which all the Powers had entered, and which they had reaffirmed on May 23d, when the actions of the Czar had become more than ever

menacing. In the second place, Prussia promised to take the offensive in case the Czar refused Austria's demands and crossed the Balkans. A test of these clauses was soon made. On June 2d Buol notified the Czar that he was to evacuate the principalities, and in reply Nicolas promised to do so if Austria would guarantee him against further attacks from England and France, whose troops had already landed at Varna. But as Austria could not give any such guarantee without the consent of the Powers concerned, she sent an inquiry to London and Paris and enclosed Russia's proposal. In the meantime she continued her preparations for war, and on June 14th made an agreement with Turkey for a joint occupation of the principalities, in case Russia should withdraw her troops, and urged Prussia and the Confederation to come in line with their contingents. But at this point it became evident that Prussia was not interpreting the supplemental clauses to the treaty of April 20th in the same way as was Austria ; for in answer to the latter's request, she expressed herself as satisfied with the Czar's reply, and declared that she was exempt from the second clause, which bound her to take part in the war ; while the Confederation, acting with annoying slowness, showed unmistakably that it, too, was resolved to remain neutral. While chafing under this rebuff, Count Buol received the reply from England and France. The allied Powers, ignoring entirely the proposition of the Czar, which they could not accept because they had already decided to continue the war in order to humiliate Russia, demanded of Austria point blank that she enter into an offensive and defensive alliance against the Czar. Buol was in a sorry predicament. His plan for retaining the leadership without war had failed, because Prussia and the Confederation refused to second him, and now the western Powers were demanding the very thing that he was most assiduously avoiding, the declaration of war against Russia. Fortunately, in this crisis, the Czar, fearing that Austria would join in a triple

alliance against him, and preferring to fight his enemies in a less vulnerable spot than the region of the Danube, decided to accede to Austria's demands without any conditions. To this end he issued the order, the execution of which had caused so much astonishment among the allied forces at Varna. The principalities were cleared, Turkey was relieved, and the pretext for war was removed.

But the Czar was not to escape with so light a penalty. Already had the maritime governments decided upon the continuation of the war, and selected Sebastopol in the Crimea as the most available field of operations; already were the allied troops at Varna preparing for embarkation upon the Black Sea for the purpose of destroying the fortress whence had gone forth the fleet that had destroyed the Turkish squadron at Sinope. Yet even while this embarkation was taking place, between July 14 and September 7, 1854, the Powers were once more considering plans for peace. England and France drew up, and submitted to Austria as the mediator, the terms according to which alone peace could be preserved. In this new conference Prussia had no part, for she had practically committed herself to a position of neutrality, and in so doing had called down upon herself the wrath of France, and of England to such an extent that the Prince Consort wrote on July 29th, very unjustly: "Prussia's conduct is truly revolting, and the king is looked upon by all political men here with profound contempt." The terms adopted by the three Powers on August 8th were four in number, and have become famous under the name of the Four Points. They declared first, that the imperial court of Russia should give up its right of protectorate over the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, while the privileges accorded to these provinces by previous sultans should be placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers; secondly, that no obstacle should be opposed to the free navigation of the Danube, and that the rules laid down at

the congress of Vienna regulating the navigation of rivers should be applied henceforth to the Danube and its mouths; thirdly, that the treaty of the Straits (1841) should be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and, fourthly, that Russia should resign any pretensions to the right of protectorate over the subjects of the Porte, to whatsoever religion they belonged, while the great Powers should assist in obtaining from the Ottoman government the confirmation and the observance of the religious privileges of the different Christian communities, without trespassing on the dignity of the Sultan. These terms were, however, disdainfully rejected by the Czar; and in consequence the western Powers made no further attempt to effect a reconciliation. The embarkation of troops continued, and the invasion of the Crimea began.

The war thus undertaken for the purpose of destroying Sebastopol is almost unique in history. Springing from a dispute over merely abstract questions of influence and political equilibrium, entered into without hate, as far as the feelings of the peoples for each other were concerned, and undertaken without any idea of conquest or of material advantage to those taking part in it, it became a battle to the death, a duel between two gigantic champions. It was a war possessing few of the characteristics of wars in general; it was one which, from the beginning to the end, all desired to avoid; which became more bitter as the diplomats redoubled their efforts to preserve peace; which seemed to be forced on by influences beyond the control of governments or their representatives; which was due to causes more deeply hidden than those alleged; and which was more intimately connected with the events of the preceding forty years than students of mere diplomacy are willing to concede. It was, in fact, a war which found its inspiration in the irreconcilable hostility between the liberalism of the west and the despotism of the east, a war for an idea, as it was called, a war bound up with events dating from the French Revolution. To

those who had taken part in the reform movement in England, or in the war against personal and class government in France, or in the struggle for constitutional privileges in Germany, the Czar's assault upon Turkey had seemed not merely an attack upon the vaguely understood political dogma of the equilibrium, but part and parcel of that series of acts which, from 1820 to 1850, had characterised the efforts of the absolutist governments, whose desire it was to check the progress of liberal ideas. This high-handed attack by a strong state upon a weak one called for something more than the drafting of notes and protocols; the outraged sentiment of the west demanded a positive humiliation of Russia, and that, too, not for the purpose of preserving the independence of Turkey, or of guaranteeing her against further aggression, but for the purpose of weakening the power and humbling the pride of the autocrat of the reactionary policy. In this crisis, something more irresistible than the traditions of England, or the desire of Napoleon III. to turn public attention from his *coup d'état*, was thwarting the efforts of the diplomats in conference at Vienna. Popular opinion, whether for right or wrong, was demanding that the abasement of the Czar be effected by peaceful means if possible; if not, by force. The invasion of the Crimea was to no small degree the revenge taken by western Europe for its failure in the uprising of 1848, and for the hated reaction of 1849; and it was no accident that those who suffered most from the issue of the war were Russia and Austria, the Powers who had been the leaders of that reaction.

After leaving Varna, the allied troops landed on the north-western coast of the Crimean peninsula, for according to the first plan Sebastopol was to be attacked from the north. On September 20th Prince Menchikoff was defeated in the battle of the Alma, and the way to Sebastopol was open; but when the heights above the city were reached, it was found that an attack from the north, with the open roadstead between the

allies and the fortress, was beyond the strength of the forces and resources at command. It was then decided to undertake a regular siege, and by a flank movement the armies were transferred to the southern extremity of the peninsula. The death of Saint-Arnaud on September 29th threw the command of the French into the hands of Canrobert, and under his supervision, in conjunction with the English and Turkish commanders, the siege was regularly begun on October 17th. Through the natural strength of the fortress, and the magnificent defence of Todleben, the Russian general, the struggle was one of the most bitter and obstinate in the history of warfare. The battles of Balaklava on October 25th, and of Inkermann on November 5th, showed stubborn fighting on both sides, but advanced little the cause of the allies. The winter of 1854 and 1855, because of rains, hurricanes, bad housing, and insufficient provisioning and equipment, proved an object lesson for Europe in the inadequacy of the existing commissariat and hospital systems. This experience, though disastrous at the time, had a most salutary effect; for the management of these matters improved, and strenuous efforts were made throughout the west to remedy the fatal defects. And Russia suffered no less; her soldiers had been beaten, her fleet in the Black Sea had been destroyed, and the troops that had been sent from the north had suffered fearfully in the steppes of southern Russia; while within Sebastopol the distress increased with each day of the siege, and as the summer of 1855 drew near, sickness, fire, and loss in battle depleted the garrison at a terrible rate. To Russia, the Crimea became a veritable quicksand engulfing her men and supplies; for the demand for ammunition and provisions constantly increased, and, shut out, as they were, from the waters of the Black Sea, the Russians could receive their stores and transfer their wounded by the land route only, a method entailing a toilsome journey of wearisome stretches over wretched roads.

The victories of Balaklava and Inkermann had an immediate effect upon the course of diplomatic negotiations. England and France, becoming more and more angry because of the neutral attitude of Prussia and the inactivity of Austria, demanded for the third time, in November, 1854, that the latter Power join the alliance, and aid in bringing the war to a close. But as Austria refused to act without Prussia and Prussia without the Confederation, and as Count Buol could not get from Berlin or Frankfort sufficient support to warrant his attempting to carry out his plan of mediation, it seemed as if the demand would be refused again. But at this juncture there appeared a new factor that Austria was bound to consider. Piedmont, who for five years had rejected all of Austria's advice, now entered definitely into negotiation with the allies with the object of taking part in the war; and Austria, already alarmed by the growing strength of the young state along commercial, industrial, and military lines, and by its ability to maintain its spiritual and political independence in the face of great odds, saw that she must act quickly and forestall Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, or lose caste in Europe. Therefore, on December 2, 1854, she signed a treaty with France and England promising neither to depart from the terms of the Four Points nor to negotiate separately with Russia, but to defend the principalities which she was already occupying in accordance with the terms of her treaty with Turkey of June 14th; and, in case peace were not made by January 1, 1855, to deliberate with the others as to the most desirable means of attaining the end for which the alliance had been formed.

Buol was at last driven to do what he had so long avoided; he had committed himself to a treaty with England and France, and had promised to take part, under certain conditions, in the war against Russia. Yet he was determined not to fight, and had in consequence drafted the terms of the treaty in a manner sufficiently vague and elastic to insure much diplomatic discus-

sion and delay. He had signed the treaty to thwart the project of Piedmont, to flatter England and France, and to intimidate Russia; and he still hoped to see realised his dream of an armed mediation. But his diplomacy was at fault. Russia, who had already sent Gortchakoff to negotiate with Austria on the general basis of the Four Points, was enraged at her ingratitude; England and France, at first accepting the treaty in good faith, became thoroughly angry as week after week went by and Austria, offering one excuse after another, refused to take an active part in the war; the Federal Diet, which had been making certain friendly advances in November, took alarm, and instead of yielding to Buol's demand for war contingents, passed a resolution on January 30th refusing to mobilise the troops, and on February 8th, yielding to Bismarck's influence, agreed to put the troops on a war footing, but only for defence against France; Prussia, winning the gratitude of Russia by her neutrality and advice to the Federal Diet, grew suspicious of Buol's crafty methods, and flatly refused to assist Austria in any warlike demonstrations; and, lastly, Sardinia, her despised neighbour, accepted Cavour's plan of an alliance with the western Powers, signed on January 10th a treaty binding herself to take part unconditionally in the war, and on April 21st fulfilled the conditions of the treaty by dispatching 15,000 men to the Crimea, where they fought bravely side by side with the French and English. Austria was preparing herself for a day of reckoning, and to Bismarck on one side and Cavour on the other was it to no small extent due that her selfish scheme for retaining the leadership in Europe was effectually frustrated.

From January to March, 1855, the fortress of Sebastopol under the skilful management of Todleben so successfully resisted the attack of the allies, that the latter redoubled their efforts to effect a peace which, with honour to all concerned, would close the war. But Russia, who had agreed to the Four Points as the basis of discussion the December before for no

other purpose than to alienate Austria from the west, now showed a marvellous power of delay by putting off the conferences from week to week, in order to prevent Austria from carrying out the terms of the treaty of December 2d. But on March 2d, an event took place which greatly hastened the movement making for peace. Nicolas I., to whose obstinacy and pride the people of the west attributed the origin of the war, died, broken down with the cares that he had brought upon himself and the burdens that he brought upon his country, and was succeeded by his eldest son, the Grand Duke Alexander. The latter, though declaring in his manifesto to his people that he would preserve the integrity of his Empire and follow the traditions of his ancestors, was nevertheless very desirous of putting an end to the war. On March 10th he announced through Nesselrode to the courts of Europe his wish to re-establish peace. The western Powers, especially France, hoping to bring the ruinous expedition of the Crimea to an end, urged that the conferences be opened at once at Vienna ; and on March 16th, the representatives of France, England, Austria, and Russia met to discuss the four conditions that had been laid down as the basis of a permanent peace.

Little difficulty was experienced in settling the first two points ; for Russia agreed to resign the protectorate of the principalities, and to throw open the mouths of the Danube to free navigation ; but when, on March 26th, the revision of the treaty of the Straits came up for discussion, many difficulties presented themselves. The western Powers insisted that the maintenance of Turkish integrity could be obtained in no other way than by the suppression or diminution of the Russian fleet that lay in the Black Sea ; and so important did they deem this question to be, that England sent Lord John Russell and France, Drouyn de Lhuys as special envoys to Vienna. At first the envoys advised that all vessels be excluded from the waters of the Black Sea, but to this proposition Austria would

not agree, knowing that Russia would not. Then Buol, in private conference, proposed a system of "counter weights," according to which the ships in the Euxine belonging to the allies should be increased proportionally whenever Russia added to the number of her vessels; but to this proposal the western representatives objected, on the ground that it involved no humiliation for Russia. In default of agreement, the conference came to an end on June 14th, and this last attempt to solve the problem by diplomacy alone proved, as had all previous attempts, unsuccessful. Then it was that Austria resigned her office of mediator, and declaring that she was no longer bound by the terms of the treaty of December 2d, returned to a position of neutrality. Francis Joseph discharged his reserve forces, reduced the number of his officers, dispersed the army drawn up on the frontier, and stopped all further military preparations. Thus Austria closed her career as a leader among the Powers of Europe. She had played her game and had lost. The supremacy which the revolution of 1848 had not been able to overthrow was now threatened with destruction, because Austria had been outwitted in the diplomatic contest.

War alone could now decide the issue, and the siege of Sebastopol, which would have been raised had the diplomats at Vienna succeeded in their mission, was prosecuted with even greater vigour than before. During March, April, and May, at the very time when the negotiations were in progress, the besiegers had been able to accomplish but little, largely because the English and French were not working in perfect harmony. For this state of affairs Napoleon was largely responsible; for having been dissuaded with difficulty from taking the field in person, he was endeavouring to control the movement of his troops by telegraph, and was hampering Canrobert, whose efficiency was injured by his own want of decision, as well as by the commands from the Tuileries. But

the succession of Pélissier, a man who did not hesitate to disobey the imperial orders whenever it seemed necessary to do so, resulted in the adoption of a more vigorous policy; and on June 18th a general attack was made upon the fortress, but without success. The failure of this attempt, followed by the death of Lord Raglan on the 28th, checked for the time being the forward movement, and during the months of July and August the troops were engaged merely in advancing the lines of attack, and in cutting off the besieged from outside aid. On August 15th, an attempt of the Russians under General Gortchakoff to take the offensive and dislodge the French and Sardinians from their position on the Fedioukine heights, resulted in the victory for the allies of the Tchernaya, and prepared the way for a second and final assault. On September 5th the bombardment began: the batteries of the allies opened a veritable fire of hell upon the fortress, and for two days poured a continuous stream of shot and shell into the beleaguered city. On the 8th the assault was made. The English under Codrington attacked the great-Redan; the French hurled themselves on the Malakof, the little-Redan, and the central Bastion. The defence of the Russians was long, brave, and in large part successful; but the capture by the French of the Malakof, which had long been recognised as the key to the fortress, destroyed all hope of longer defending the city, and consequently, on the night of the 8th, the surviving Russians, crossing to the northern side of the harbour, abandoned the southern stronghold, which they had so bravely defended.

From a military point of view this victory, won with so much heroism and courage, with so much loss and suffering on both sides, was in no way final. The Russians were safely intrenched on the northern side of the harbour, opposite the allied armies, and out of the reach of the allied fleets; while as far as other parts of her vast empire were concerned, Russia remained prac-

tically intact. What the allies really had accomplished was this: they had driven Russia from the Black Sea and had captured the most important part of Sebastopol; they had won a victory at Kinburn, opposite Odessa, and cut off an important source of supplies for the troops in the Crimea; they had taken Bomarsund on the Åland islands in the Baltic, and had destroyed the arsenal of Sweaborg in the gulf of Finland. But they had failed in the attack on Cronstadt, and were to lose the fortress of Kars in the Caucasus, which though bravely defended by the English general, Williams, was captured by the Russians on November 24th. Therefore, with the single exception of Sebastopol and Sweaborg, Russia had come out of the struggle uninjured, and, from a military standpoint, might well have been considered, at the close of 1855, as formidable as ever. But by the people of the west, the taking of the Malakof with the consequent fall of the fortress of Sebastopol, was deemed a noble and heroic achievement. The losses of the Russians, the victories of the allies, and the dismantling of the stronghold that had threatened the independence of the Turks, satisfied their *amour propre* and their national pride, and seemed to them the rebuke that the Czar had richly deserved. It was felt that this war, which had been largely political in origin, and had been continued without hatred and national rivalry, had gained its end in humiliating, without dismembering, the great autocratic state of the east, and that further bloodshed would be not only unnecessary, but brutal.

For the moment, however, the governments thought differently. Napoleon, who was dreaming of further conquest, wished to drive the Russians from the Mackenzie Farm and the north side of the harbour; to push them even to Simferopol and the steppes extending to Perecop; and instead of destroying Sebastopol, to hold it in a state of defence as a guarantee for the future. And England was even more determined than France to continue the struggle, for her troops had gained less

glory than those of France, and she had accomplished less than her resources should have enabled her to do. Though unprepared when the war had broken out, she had gradually remedied the defects of her military organisation, and was naturally desirous of making further use of her costly armaments, improved system, and full ranks. She wished to destroy Cronstadt as she had destroyed Sebastopol, to operate in Circassia and Finland and the Persian border provinces, and, above all, to prevent the conclusion of a peace that she felt sure would be to the advantage of the Czar, in case no further measures were taken to cripple Russia. Nor did Russia show a disposition to withdraw from the war. On the contrary, the Czar declared that he would never abandon the Chersonese "where Vladamir had been baptised," and at the reviews of his troops in the Crimea, gave every indication of a determination to make still further requisitions on the resources of his country.

But the warlike zeal of France was only on the surface. The French people desired peace, and were beginning to murmur at the excessive military charges; the speculators and dealers in stocks, many of whom were officials or men of influence at the Tuileries, opposed the continuation of the war, because it was injuring their prospects of gain; the financial condition of the country forbade further sacrifices; while a political magnanimity began to dominate the journals, the salons, private conversation, and public discourses. Napoleon himself, despite his warlike projects, was ready for peace; he had reaped great military glory from the war, his position as an influential monarch in Europe was firmly established, and he was unwilling to expend further the resources of France except for French aggrandizement. Russia, too, was in reality far from ready to continue the struggle that had already cost her dear, if only a reasonable peace could be arranged. She was embarassed both as to her military forces and her finances, the larger part of the educated and middle classes, already in revolt against the autocratic system of

Nicolas, was demanding the adoption of economic and social reforms, the extension of education, the building of railroads, and the reorganisation of the state government; while the fall of Kars soothed Alexander's wounded pride, and made him the more disposed to listen to peace proposals. Hoping to gain more favorable conditions by drawing France from the coalition, the Russian government, through its agents in Paris, and some of the minor princes and diplomats in Germany who wished to effect a reconciliation between France and Russia, made overtures at the Tuileries, and let it be known that Russia was willing to treat on condition that neither indemnity nor cession of territory should be demanded. Napoleon was wholly inclined to accept this proposal, if Russia would concede the neutrality of the Black Sea, though at the same time he let England know, that whatever might be said by the "peace at any price" party in the interests of the stock-jobbers on the Bourse, he would not agree to any peace of which England did not approve.

This statement of Napoleon's had been called forth by the attempt of Austria to regain the position she had lost after the close of the conferences in June, 1855. No sooner had Sebastopol fallen than Buol formulated certain conditions that were to be presented to Russia as an ultimatum; and these he transmitted to Napoleon, whose alliance Austria especially desired, inasmuch as she viewed with alarm the interest that the French Emperor was showing in the affairs of Italy. But Austria's cause did not prosper. England, who was not consulted, was highly indignant at such a method of diplomacy; and Palmerston, declaring that he did not mean to have Austria dictating terms of peace to which England was to agree without discussion, asserted that he would, if necessary, continue the war alone, with Turkey as his only ally. England's warlike tone was very acceptable to Turkey, and to Sardinia and Sweden also; for Sardinia hoped to gain by prolongation of the war a further claim to the amity of the allies, while

Sweden, already in treaty with England, November 24th, and thankful to her for the bombardment of Bomarsund, which had freed the Baltic, was desirous of annexing Finland. Furthermore, though Napoleon had accepted Austria's proposal, he did not hesitate to receive Victor Emmanuel and Cavour in December with demonstrations of friendship, and to remark that he would see what could be done for Italy.

Then Austria, changing her tactics, presented to all the Powers a general ultimatum, and promised to break off diplomatic relations with Russia if that Power did not accept the ultimatum by January 18, 1856. The terms of this ultimatum were simply the Four Points, somewhat extended to allow for a rectification of the Moldavian frontier,—a change which would entail a loss of territory upon Russia,—and for a fifth clause, which stated that the Powers would discuss at the peace congress other matters of general European interest. In Austria's plan all concurred, though England expressed herself as dissatisfied because the ultimatum did not provide that Russia should never again fortify the Åland islands. But when it was explained, that the question of these islands could be discussed under the fifth clause, she yielded, and the ultimatum was dispatched to St. Petersburg. The Czar, enraged that Austria should demand the cession of territory, at first rejected all the conditions not included in the original Four Points. Public anxiety increased, and in Paris the stocks fell and stock-jobbers became desperate. But the position of the Czar was untenable; for Austria had now committed herself to act with the western Powers, England was determined to make the peace conditions as hard as possible for Russia, and Napoleon was ready to stand by his ally. Therefore, when Frederic William IV., fearing lest a continuation of the war should draw him from his position of neutrality, wrote a personal letter to Alexander urging him to accept the proffered terms; and when in the council held at St. Petersburg, January 15th,

the ministers were almost unaminous in thinking that to reject the ultimatum would be to range against Russia England, France, Austria, Sardinia, Turkey, and Sweden, to make possible the loss of Poland, Finland, the Crimea, and Circassia, and to bring about the complete bankruptcy of the state; and especially after it was hinted that, by yielding, Russia might be able to regain in the end all that she would now lose, the Czar gave his assent, and on the 16th sent dispatches to Vienna and the western capitals announcing that Russia accepted the Austrian ultimatum without reserve. Peace was thus practically assured.

In consequence of this decision, there gathered at Paris, February 25th, the representatives of England, Austria, France, Russia, and Turkey, the Powers that had taken a leading part in the Crimean war. Sardinia also was admitted, notwithstanding Buol's desire that she be excluded; for the presence of Cavour at the council table on terms of equality with the representatives of the great Powers, was a source of constant worry and annoyance to the Austrian statesman. Sweden, though by treaty an ally, did not ask to be admitted; and Prussia was not at first invited to participate in the doings of the congress. This exclusion of Prussia, which roused the feeling at Berlin that she was losing caste among the Powers, and becoming isolated in Europe, was insisted on by Austria, Russia, and England on the ground, as the Prince Consort wrote, "that it would be a most perilous precedent for the future to admit the principle, that Powers may take part in the great game of politics, without having first laid down their stakes." In truth, England, knowing that her course in regard to the peace had not been popular abroad, wished to prevent any increase in the number of representatives at the congress who would be friendly to Russia and hostile to herself. But the exclusion of Prussia was only temporary. After the preliminary meetings, it was felt that the presence of Prussia was

necessary for any revision of the treaty of 1841, to which she had been a party; and as Napoleon, in a spirit of generosity that was especially courteous to the man who had called him the common enemy of Europe, wished to spare her further humiliation, an invitation was extended; and on March 16th the representatives of Prussia took their places with the others. This act was an indication of Napoleon's unwillingness to emulate England's hostile attitude toward the Powers that had gained her ill will, and showed that he wished to be on good terms with Prussia and Russia, without giving up his friendly relations with England, and to strengthen still further the position of France as the arbiter of European peace. This transference of prestige from Austria to France, in part indicated by the fact that the congress was held in Paris instead of Vienna, was little calculated to please a man of Buol's ambition. His own attempt at mediation had failed, and his position at Paris was far from pleasant. Russia was hostile, England dissatisfied, France studiously courteous, Prussia inclined to be jubilant, and Sardinia, preserving a grave demeanor, was seeking by a manly and straightforward course to gain further diplomatic advantages, which, if won, would be to Austria's discomfiture. In this spirit the work of drawing up the treaty was conducted.

The terms of the treaty of Paris were based strictly upon a modified form of the Four Points as expressed in Austria's ultimatum. Russia made no objection to the clause excluding all ships of war from the Black Sea, and forbidding the re-establishment of any maritime arsenal. The position of the Christians within the Ottoman Empire had already received the attention of the Porte, who, in a *hatti humayoun* of February 18th, had not only conceded to each communion the free exercise of its worship, but had promised a series of reforms, which, had they ever been carried out, would have revolutionised the administration of the Turkish state. In consequence of this decree,

the crowning work of Stratford Canning, the contracting Powers admitted the Porte to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe; they promised to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and in the famous Article IX. declared, that the Powers had no right "to interfere either collectively or separately, in the relations of his Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of his empire." By this clause, than which none was more fatuous or had less historical warrant, the Powers handed over to the government that for ten years had proved false to the promises it had made over and over again to Stratford Canning, the absolute right to treat as it pleased the Christians in its territory, whom by Mussulman law it was bound to destroy. If the Christians by the Crimean war had been deprived of Russian protection in order to preserve the independence of Turkey, they were now given over, without any reservation except for worthless promises, to the greed and fanaticism of Turkish pashas and Turkish priests. Morally speaking, this act of the allies was an affront to the civilisation of Europe.

A better deed of the congress was the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were granted entire independence under the suzerainty of the Porte, and thus became the first of those independent states, the construction of which is the most important feature of the history of southeastern Europe during the last forty years. The question of the navigation of the Danube was settled without troublesome debate, and that river was placed among the free rivers of Europe, and made subject to the principles laid down at the congress of Vienna governing the navigation of rivers. One question only excited an animated discussion. The proposal to rectify the Russian frontier, so that no part of it should be contiguous to the Danube, touched the Muscovite pride very keenly. The Russian representatives,

trying in every way to avoid the slight humiliation involved in the insignificant cession of territory, made substitute proposals, but in vain. The allies considered this grant of territory as but an equitable compensation for the sacrifices entailed upon them by the Crimean war; and Austria, in particular, who first made the suggestion, supported it as vigorously as if she had been a victorious participant in the war. Russia was deeply offended by Austria's attitude. "The Austrian plenipotentiary," said Count Orloff to Cavour, "does not realise how much that rectification will some day cost his country in blood and tears."

After the settlement of the chief questions and the discussion of certain minor matters, among which was the neutralisation of the Åland islands, which England greatly desired, the congress passed on to the consideration of a number of topics of general European interest. Of these one, which had been the cause of considerable bitterness of feeling in those earlier days when England was threatening the balance of power at sea, was agreed to by all, and, as embodied in a special protocol, which nearly all the states in the civilised world, except Spain, Mexico, and the United States, had before the end of the year promised to support, became a part of international law. Privateering was abolished; a neutral flag was made to cover an enemy's goods except contrabands of war; neutral merchandise, contrabands of war excepted, was declared not seizable when under an enemy's flag; and it was agreed that a blockade to be binding must be efficient—that is, must be sustained by a force really sufficient to prevent access to an enemy's coast. England, whose defiance of these principles had aroused against her the armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800, had agreed with France to respect neutral flags and not to issue letters of marque and reprisal at all during the Crimean war; and this concession had prepared the way for the work of the Congress. Though the new declaration left undefined the words "pri-

vateering" (*la course*) and "contraband," an omission that has still to be supplied in the dictionary of international law; though the United States refused to be a party to the protocol, on the ground that the congress ought to have gone further and have entirely exempted private property at sea; and though occasionally English statesmen regret the surrender of maritime rights as likely to cripple England's sea power in the event of another war; nevertheless, in spite of all its defects and disadvantages, the new decree marked an advance in the development of an equitable maritime law, and went far in bringing about more amicable relations between nations.

The other questions that arose did not pass beyond the point of discussion; but they are of special interest as showing the desire of Napoleon to further the cause of nationalities, and to bring about, if possible, the calling of a new congress to amend the treaty of 1815 in the interests of the smaller states. Napoleon had frequently talked with the English representative, Lord Clarendon, upon the subject, but without making much impression. Now, however, at the instigation of Cavour, who addressed a note to him on March 27th protesting against the occupation of Italy by French and Austrian troops, and against the autocratic policy of the Pope, the Emperor's representative, Count Walewski, who was presiding, had presented the matter to the congress. The questions discussed concerned the amelioration of the political condition of Greece, the evacuation of Rome, the promotion of reforms by the Pope, the suppression of the absolutist reaction in Naples, and the violence of the newspaper press, notably in Belgium, where the attacks on Napoleon III. had been especially violent. Regarding most of these subjects the congress was agreed; but against all that touched the condition of Italy,—and in the discussion of this question England and Sardinia supported France,—Austria vigorously protested, declaring that the matter was not one which concerned the congress. No action was taken; Cavour's

letter of March 27th and another of April 16th remained unanswered; and the name of Italy was nowhere officially mentioned: but the Italian question had been solemnly placed before a European congress as a matter of general European interest; it had aroused no protest except that of Austria; and it had come before the world with powerful protectors as a question to be solved. The diplomatic advantage of all this for Piedmont cannot be overestimated.

The Crimean war and the diplomatic negotiations attending it, if judged strictly by the conditions of the treaty of Paris, can be said to have contributed but little to the progress of European civilisation. The less conspicuous matters, such as the opening of the Danube and the alterations in maritime law, were, it is true, important, in that they served to increase commercial activity and freedom; and the freeing of the principalities was of consequence, in that it set a precedent for determining the attitude of the Powers toward the subject nationalities of the south-east. But that which stands as the most important result of the work of the congress, that which was made the subject of a special treaty between England, France, and Austria, on April 15th,—namely, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, the admission of that state into the concert of Europe, and the solemn renunciation of all right of control over the internal affairs of the Empire itself,—was probably the most ill-advised and suicidal diplomatic action that has ever been taken by a body of representatives discussing international questions. To guarantee the integrity of the state that for two centuries had been suffering steady but certain dismemberment, was to ignore all the lessons of the past, to invite war, and to insure anxiety for the future. In attempting to make a European of the Sultan, to teach the Turks the principles of good government, to transform a state that was corrupt and decayed, and by its very law hostile to Christian religion, into one that was healthy,

progressive, and tolerant, without retaining the right to compel the carrying out of the reforms, the representatives of England, France, and Austria made an absurd and costly political experiment, were guilty of a gigantic political blunder. The charter of reform, which had been secured from the Turk with much diplomacy and skill by Lord Stratford, became "a lifeless paper, valuable only as a record of sound principles"; because, instead of being followed up by that persistent pressure from without which alone could compel the enforcement of its decrees, it was left to the mercy of the indolent and treacherous Turk, who rejoiced to be free from this surveillance of the foreign Powers. No wonder that Lord Stratford could say that he would rather have cut off his right hand than have signed that treaty, and could mournfully write to Lord Clarendon, that when he heard the politicians of the country remark that the troubles of Europe, with respect to the Ottoman Empire, were only beginning, he knew not how to reply. The treaty of Paris not only postponed indefinitely the settlement of the Eastern Question, but it increased tenfold the difficulties of the problem.

If this was the treatment of the state for which so much blood had been shed and so many sacrifices made, what was to be done with Russia, whose aggressive policy had brought on the war? To all appearances she had come out of the struggle intact; she had, it is true, lost the control of the Black Sea, and had been forced to submit to a slight rectification of her frontier: but these were comparatively trivial losses. Her position in the congress was far from that of a defeated enemy: she stood as a great Power whose brave resistance and glorious defence had gained for her the respect of her antagonists. She had come forth from the conflict with new allies: for though toward Austria her tone was hostile, and for England she cherished a bitterness of feeling that time alone could wear away; yet she was on terms of intimacy with Prussia and of

friendship with Sardinia, and was daily growing in the favour of France, with whom she seemed to have come to some sort of understanding. Her position in Europe seemed to be but little impaired. But morally Russia had suffered a signal defeat. Her policy of aggrandisement had received a permanent check; she had lost control of the Black Sea, and the right of protectorate over the Christians; she had been forced to give up her hope of conquest in the south-west, and of dominion over Turkish territory, and to see herself baffled after two centuries of uninterrupted success. Furthermore, the prolongation of the war had seriously impaired her resources, decimated her troops, injured her trade and husbandry, and thrown into confusion her finances; and though still powerful enough to command a hearing in diplomatic affairs from 1860 to 1870, yet in order to recover from her injuries, she was forced to retire, at a time eventful in the history of Europe, from an active participation in the affairs of the west.

But for central and western Europe the war was an agency of pre-eminent importance in furthering the movements for national unity that had been an organic part of the history of the preceding forty years. The diplomacy of the Crimean war effected a veritable revolution in the relations existing between the European Powers. The influence of England, which for nearly forty years had been exerted in behalf of liberalism, now began to decline; and England, finding herself forced into a position of isolation, largely because of her determination to carry on the war against the wishes of the other Powers, turned her attention to her own affairs, and for the next twenty years withdrew more and more from continental politics. But it was Austria whom the war chiefly affected. Autocrat of central Europe in the days of Metternich and Schwarzenberg, she, rather than Russia, issued from the conflict the conquered Power. Aiming to maintain for selfish ends her old position of supremacy without sharing the burdens of the war, she was

forced to see her leadership wrested from her, her prestige impaired, her political influence gone, and herself discredited and without a friend, unless England might be so considered, among the Powers of Europe. Her effort to force her reactionary doctrines upon the states within the sphere of her influence, had roused against her, no less than against Russia, the ill-will of the peoples of the west, and had encouraged Prussia and Sardinia to thwart her policy at every opportunity, and to destroy the power that she had so long wielded. And in this work Napoleon III. was to aid them. Victor in a war that had redounded to the glory of France, head of a congress that had met in his own capital to declare the peace ; the recipient of the homage of the plenipotentiaries when peace had been finally proclaimed ; it is little wonder that he began to exalt himself as the favoured son of destiny, the chief among sovereigns and princes. The birth of an heir during the sittings of the congress strengthened his hold upon the throne of France, and seemed to bind him more closely to the French people. Secure at home and influential abroad, he now thought to carry out his long-cherished plans for aiding the lesser states ; and in his desire to humiliate Austria, from whom for the moment he had snatched the leadership in Europe, he prepared to aid the national movements in Italy and Germany, the future importance of which he hardly appreciated. He did not realise, that in helping to create two states of first rank on the other side of the Alps and the Rhine, he was preparing the way for his own overthrow and for the abasement of France. The real victors, when we consider the ultimate issue of the war, were not Austria, France, or England, but Sardinia and Prussia. The war did not create the forces that led to the national unity of Italy and Germany, but it gave rise to a diplomatic situation which destroyed for the moment the power of Russia and the influence of Austria, and gave to Cavour and Bismarck the opportunity that each was seeking. It cannot be said that a war with such issues was fought in vain.

CHAPTER III.

THE UNITY OF ITALY.

THE revolution of 1848–1849 resulted in Italy in the failure of the moderate party to free the country from the Austrian yoke, and the reaction that followed seemed to bind the Italians more firmly than ever to the narrow and conservative policy that Austria and the petty princes had up to this time pursued. Throughout the peninsula but one state could point to any definite result of thirty years of political agitation and revolution; but one state could boast of having preserved its constitutional form of government; but one had made political progress: in Piedmont alone lay all the hopes of Italy. On the morrow of the day made memorable by the battle of Novara and his father's abdication, Victor Emmanuel found himself as king of Piedmont confronted with the difficult task of choosing between the two policies that lay open to him: of deciding whether to set aside the Statuto, substitute the blue flag of Savoy for the tri-colour, disappoint the hopes of those who looked upon him as leader of the Italian nation, and follow the reaction that was becoming general throughout Europe; or manfully to take up the cause of Italy as well as of Piedmont, preserve the Statuto and the tri-colour flag, bear the displeasure of Austria, Russia, and central Europe, and even at the cost of personal ease and the internal repose of the kingdom, sacrifice the present gains for the sake of a brighter future. The choice was difficult and the responsibility great, for the future of Italy to a large extent depended upon that

decision. Yet Victor Emmanuel never hesitated. Though confronted by a victorious enemy, from whom it was necessary to gain terms that would leave the state and the constitution intact; though obliged to meet at home a radical party and a radical parliament that were unwilling to consider any compromise with Austria, and were ready to reject the monarchy and establish committees of public safety to continue the war; though England and France were inclined to discourage further affronts upon Austria, and Europe as a whole was against him; nevertheless, Victor Emmanuel, largely on his own responsibility, and depending less upon his advisers than upon his own good sense and honesty, rejected the policy of reaction and of submission to Austria, and took up the cause of the constitution and of Italy.

But the king's position was stronger than it seemed. Although prejudiced by all the traditions of his house and the experiences of his early training in favour of the aristocracy and the church, Victor Emmanuel was ever ready to sacrifice his personal inclinations in the interests of his people and his state; and though ignorant of the arts of diplomacy and government, was imbued with a spirit of bravery and truth, and possessed judgment and tact and a frankness of manner and speech that stood him in excellent stead during the important crises of his career. Furthermore, his advisers, d'Azeglio, de Revel, Balbo, and others, though men of varying opinion, all supported a constitutional form of government and were devoted to him and his dynasty; while the hardy and well-disciplined people under his sway, Savoyards, Piedmontese, and Sardinians, accustomed to a simple and frugal life and to a healthy activity, were, though faithful to the church, more faithful to the house of Savoy, and formed a compact social element, which, in certain emergencies, proved a source of singular strength to the king and his government. Then, too, the doctrine of European equilibrium aided the king and pre-

served the kingdom from dismemberment at the hands of Austria; for as early as July, 1849, Louis Napoleon had expressed his interest in the affairs of Italy, and had informed Schwarzenberg, that any attempt to endanger the integrity of the Piedmontese territory, or to threaten in the least the independence of the Sardinian government, would bring France at once to the defence of the Italian state.

After his return to Turin, Victor Emmanuel's first task was to embody in the form of a permanent treaty the preliminaries of peace that he had himself gained from the Austrian general, Radetzky. But the difficulty was not only with Austria; Radetzky, hard and merciless as he had so often proved himself to be, was not so great a menace to the cause of Italy as was the Piedmontese Parliament, which, in its determination to refuse any terms that Austria might offer, was endeavouring by a revolution in Genoa and cries of treachery in Turin to thwart the king's policy. But Victor Emmanuel was as determined to resist revolution as he had been to resist reaction; and having dissolved the first Parliament, he summoned on July 30, 1849, a second, which he hoped would confirm his treaty with Austria. Though his people were showing themselves unskilled in parliamentary methods, and as yet wanting in appreciation of the parliamentary form of government granted them by his father; though the second Parliament, elected by the war party which monopolised the polls, voted to reject the peace; and though Austria, growing weary of delay, was urging the king to dispense with what she considered the unnecessary formality of gaining the consent of the representatives of the people; Victor Emmanuel showed his firmness of purpose by dissolving on November 17th the second body, and issuing a proclamation to his people. The appeal was successful; for the new elections, in securing for the government a firm and stable majority, showed that the masses of the people had little sympathy with the radicals of Turin and

Genoa. The treaty with Austria, in spite of its severe burden of a war indemnity amounting to seventy-five millions of livres, was at last adopted ; and the government was ready, under the leadership of d'Azeglio, to apply itself to the work of strengthening Piedmont's position at home and abroad.

The policy adopted by d'Azeglio, though never so vigorously and audaciously pursued, was the same as that which Cavour made so effective in the period after 1852 : the plan of both men was to bring the state, by one means or another, before the eyes of Europe ; to turn defeat into victory by discrediting the position of Austria ; and, at the same time, to reorganise and strengthen the internal affairs of the state along military, economic, and religious lines, not only that the people might be benefited, but also that there might exist a striking contrast between progressive Piedmont and the reactionary states around her. The beginnings were small but significant. D'Azeglio, ignoring the fact of Piedmont's defeat, spoke in the manner of a victor of the necessity of uniting Parma and Modena to Piedmont, of forming a tariff league with Tuscany, and of preventing Austria from cutting off Piedmont from the centre and south of Italy. Through their own press and the foreign correspondents, the Piedmontese liberals strenuously opposed Austrian intervention in Italy, and denounced her for her interference in the duchies and in the affairs of the papacy, and especially for her audacity in trying to take Lombardo-Venetia into the Germanic Confederation. But in this national policy the little state did not dare to go too far ; for such conduct aroused the greatest indignation at Vienna, and might have resulted in consequences dangerous to Piedmont, had she not used great tact and caution. Fortunately for her, Prince Schwarzenberg, whose diplomatic skill and audacity might have proved a serious obstacle to her progress, died on April 5, 1852, and Piedmont's most dangerous enemy was removed from her path

But while it was to be left to Cavour to carry out, in the main, the foreign policy of the state, d'Azeglio initiated another line of action which combined internal reorganisation with the assumption of the leadership of Italy, and marked the beginning of a controversy with Rome, which, lasting openly for twenty years, is hardly yet finished. Politically speaking, Rome was Piedmont's only rival in the peninsula, and for more than a year Victor Emmanuel had been endeavouring by friendly negotiations with the Pope to bring about a reform of the ecclesiastical conditions of Piedmont. In this he failed, and, consequently, in 1850, the Sardinian government, finding that it could not have Rome for an ally, decided to force the issue and to treat her as an enemy. In order, therefore, to accomplish the double purpose of weakening a rival state and perfecting an important constitutional improvement, the ministry brought forward in February, 1850, a measure abolishing the privileges of the ecclesiastical tribunals, which as defined by old custom and re-affirmed by the concordat of 1831, gave to the church the control of cases relating to betrothals and marriages, and to the clergy, special exemptions in matters of debt and imprisonment that were deemed to be out of accord with the spirit of the constitution. The law was passed on April 9th and duly ratified by the Senate. At once a great outcry arose; complaints were circulated; the papal nuncio demanded his passports; the archbishop of Turin forbade the clergy to accept the jurisdiction of the civil courts; and as a last piece of unnecessary bigotry, the rites of the church were refused to the minister of commerce, Santa Rosa, an act which aroused the hostility of the devout Piedmontese. The government pursued the matter to the bitter end, and having arrested the archbishop, first confined him in the citadel of Turin, and afterward banished him from the kingdom. Then, feeling that it had gone far enough, it opened negotiations with the Pope; moderated the operation of the law, reserving to the church certain

of its original rights; and demanded only such concessions as the papacy had made to France. But notwithstanding this attempt to moderate the effect of the law, the indignation at Rome was intense, for the Pope appreciated the fact that those who had framed this measure meant, not only to benefit Piedmont, but also to humiliate him, to furnish the statesmen of Europe with an illustration of papal obstinacy.

The policy of the government, so far successful in the secret struggle with Austria and the open struggle with Rome, represents the work of Massimo d'Azeglio. But d'Azeglio was not the man to carry such a policy to its logical conclusion. He was too upright, too strictly honourable to employ doubtful or deceitful means, or to adopt those measures that the times demanded of one who would be the leader of a new Piedmont. He had already gone as far as he could; he was already not a little concerned at the results of his controversy with Rome, and of the encouragement which he seemed to be giving to the radical elements in the state, and to the cause of demagogues, whom he hated. Not even for the sake of Italy could he ally himself with the revolutionists. Furthermore, he never desired the unity of the entire peninsula, nor did he foresee the importance of securing for Italy the sympathy and co-operation of the European Powers; and lacking the qualifications needed for the larger task, he shrank before its greatness, and failed to discern the means whereby it could be accomplished. But he had done a noble work for his country, one which prepared the way for the greater achievements of a man who, in no way his superior in honour, probity, and love of Italy, was gifted with those qualities of energy and diplomatic genius that made it possible for him to become the artisan of a new Italy. Cavour built upon the foundations that d'Azeglio had laid, but he enlarged their scope, and made a grander structure than d'Azeglio had dreamed of. He was the man fitted by disposition and experience for the difficult task of reconstruction.

From his early childhood Camillo de Cavour had given evidences of keen powers of observation and inquiry, showing always a decided preference for the exact sciences, and an independent spirit that resented, and was impatient of, restraint or coercion. When but a lad, he had looked upon his appointment as page to Prince de Carignan as an insult, and as a young man of twenty-one,—but a young man of liberal convictions and very decided opinions,—he had resigned his commission in the army, fancying that some disgrace was implied in his being transferred from one fort to another. But ambitious and restless, Cavour could not remain idle; and in 1835 he had travelled in England and France, satisfying his intellectual curiosity by studying the commercial and economic interests of these countries, and by unearthing and collecting documents, for which, as far as he knew, he should have no use. On his return to Italy, he had retired to his farm at Leri, near Vercelli, where, as Mazade says, "he lived for years, syndic of his village and farm; himself directing all the details of a vast system of cultivation, seeking aid in the discoveries of science, introducing new measures and machines, thus converting a dilapidated estate into a model property. It was his work, his conquest—a prelude to many other conquests. To this he owed much of what made his peculiar originality and his weight in politics, his familiar experience of things and men, his practical acquaintance with all special interests, and his ability and judgment in the management of the country's wealth." Although aware of his own ability, Cavour did not at first inspire confidence in the minds of strangers. He was short of stature and stout, near-sighted, and careless in his dress, on the whole a rather commonplace-looking person; but his unfailing good sense, his marvellous power of work, his clearness of vision, and his knowledge of men and ability to take advantage of every instrument that came to his hand, whether peer or common workman, friend or foe,—these qualities soon won

for him the respect and admiration of all who worked with him, or who watched him, first as a member of the Piedmontese Parliament in 1848, and, after the death of Santa Rosa, as minister of agriculture, commerce, and the navy in the cabinet of d'Azeglio. With the expansion of his powers, Piedmont became a world too narrow for him, the ministry of commerce a sphere too confined, and, at the same time, a certain sense of mastery, and a growing conviction that Italy's future depended upon her relations with the Powers, aroused in him a determination to become president of the council and minister of foreign affairs. With each duty he became more prominent and influential, until finally, in 1852, he was able to bring about a shifting of party lines and a change of leaders, in consequence of which he took his own place as master of Piedmont.

During the period from 1849 to 1852, the control of the government had been, in the main, in the hands of the conservatives, who had made up the majority which had accepted the peace after the overthrow of Novara. However, in the course of d'Azeglio's ministry, this majority began to break ; and the extreme conservatives, or the Right, not only opposed the law abolishing the ecclesiastical privileges, but also showed a disposition to thwart the national and liberal policy of the government, though still remaining loyal to the constitution. In this crisis, d'Azeglio did not have the courage to take the step that a progressive policy demanded. He could not bring himself to break from the extreme conservatives,—from men like Balbo, de Revel, Menebrea, his friends in the past,—who had represented the party of reform during the period from 1840 to 1848, when doing so would involve a union with the more moderate of the radicals, who up to this time had been opponents of the government. But Cavour, who was bound by no ties or traditions, by no sentimental considerations of old friendships, had already begun to urge upon the government the necessity of a union with the Left Centre of the Chamber, of which Rattazzi

was chief. The election of Rattazzi to the presidency of the Chamber, chiefly through the influence of Cavour, marked the definite breaking with the Right, and consummated an alliance between the Right and Left Centres, which later became Cavour's main support. Satisfied with this victory, Cavour submitted to a temporary exclusion from the cabinet, and journeyed to England and France for the purpose of making new friends and of extending his ideas regarding the reconstruction of Piedmont. But he was not long to remain away: d'Azeglio was weary of governing, and with that heartiness of appreciation which had always characterised his conduct, made way for his friendly, but more brilliant, rival. On November 4, 1852, Cavour was summoned by the king to form a new ministry. His opportunity had now come. Drawing to himself the moderates of all parties, but never for a moment yielding the supremacy of his own, the Right Centre, he formed a liberal-conservative ministry, and with a parliamentary majority, which grew stronger as the years passed, he put into operation the political program that he unremittingly pursued for nine years, a program admirably explained by his own words. "It is impossible," he said, "for the government to have an Italian or national policy outwardly, without being inwardly reforming and liberal; just as it would be impossible to be inwardly liberal, without being national and Italian in all external relations."

This policy was not original with Cavour; but the form that it took under his hands was new. No one before him had so fully appreciated the desirability of transforming the Piedmontese question into one that should be European; of effecting the reorganisation of Piedmont, that Europe might be impressed with the fact, that at least one of the Italian governments was not given over to misrule, that one was conducted according to ideas essentially modern, and was showing itself in legislation, economic activity, and financial solvency, a model for all the

smaller, and for some of the larger, states. In other words, Cavour strove to bring Piedmont out of the old *régime* into the new, to modernise her, in order to remove the taint of revolution that still clung to her, and to rouse confidence among European statesmen that her reforms were to be permanent. During the years from 1852 to 1855 his one idea was to extend the economic and commercial interests of the country, partly to increase the productivity of the state, that the financial burdens might be met without an excessive economy that would have necessitated Piedmont's withdrawing from the rôle he meant her to play in Europe; partly to bring his country into closer touch with the world beyond the Alps, that through a community of economic interests, closer political and diplomatic relations might be possible. Treaties of commerce were negotiated with France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland, and every encouragement was given to private enterprises. Numerous railways were built within Piedmont, from Turin to Genoa, Lake Maggiore, and Novara; and plans were made for securing a closer relation with France by tunnelling Mt. Cenis, and with Germany by tunnelling the Lukmanier or Mt. St. Gotthard. Delegates were sent to London to study the economic institutions of England, and at the exposition of 1855 in Paris, Piedmont made every effort to be represented with honour. The plans for arming the fortresses and increasing the military resources, which had originated with d'Azeglio, were carried out by his successor. The army was reorganised, military discipline was improved, and fortresses were strengthened or repaired. At the same time every effort was made to avoid indiscretions: all revolutionary speeches were rigorously suppressed, and debate in Parliament was in the main confined to economic and social questions.

And Piedmont lost no opportunity of making her work of reform known to the world. Through refugees from other of the Italian states, who were welcomed at Turin, and through clever

writers with a knowledge of language but no money, who became correspondents of the foreign journals, every petty reform was published throughout the western world, every successful undertaking was commented on in terms of praise. Furthermore, the same pens that lauded the work of Piedmont, did not leave unchronicled the least of the despotic, arbitrary, or foolish deeds committed in Naples, Tuscany, Rome, or the Austrian provinces, with the inevitable consequence, that as the Italian question became known throughout Europe, Cavour was able to strengthen his own position in Piedmont by making use of the comments of the European press based on documents that he himself had furnished. At the same time, he gave every opportunity to diplomats at the court of Turin, to visiting statesmen, even to tourists, to see the progress of Piedmont, to study its administration, to compare it with the bureaucracy, the formalism, the neglectful and arbitrary government beyond the Ticino or the Apennines. Notwithstanding that the burdens this policy imposed frequently aroused the opposition of the radicals, it was on the whole popular. Proof of this was given in various ways, but especially by the reception given to utterances of Cavour. On one occasion, when, in replying to an attack made by Brofferio of the extreme Left, he said: "We are a people small in the force and the physical resources at our disposal, but great in that we faithfully represent the idea of progress and of modern liberty, ideas which must be extended," he was greeted with applause in the Chamber and with praise in foreign journals.

While the industrial and administrative conditions of the state were thus undergoing reorganisation, a question left unsettled by d'Azeglio—that of Piedmont's relations with the church and with Rome—became pre-eminently important. In 1854, Victor Emmanuel entered into negotiations with the Pope regarding a reduction of the number of dioceses, the secularisation of certain ecclesiastical estates, and a more equitable distribu-

tion of the ecclesiastical revenues; but Cavour, confident that an understanding with Rome could not be reached, brought matters to a crisis by introducing a law—famous as the conventual law—which aroused intense excitement in the Piedmontese Parliament, and completed the estrangement between himself and the conservative party. This law provided that all religious communities should be suppressed, except those of the Sisters of Charity and other orders especially mentioned; and that the revenues from their endowments should revert to the state, to be kept apart from the other public monies for the increase of the salaries of the poorer priests, and the payment of certain religious services and certain life annuities granted to members of the secularised orders. Bitter was the opposition that this measure provoked in the Chamber of Deputies, and from January to March, 1855, the debate raged fiercely. While this discussion was taking place in Parliament, the king lost in rapid succession his mother, his wife, and his brother, losses which, to the superstitious, seemed to be but the divine rebuke for the warfare against the church. But under the masterful leadership of Cavour, the Chamber, unshaken by the terrors which the deaths in the royal household caused among the people, passed the measure by a considerable majority, and turned it over to the Senate. In this more conservative body the combat was even fiercer; for the struggle was not only for a law, not only for a parliamentary majority, but, above all else, for the constitutional independence of Piedmont. Cavour, thinking the Senate to be against him, resigned; but his opponents could not form a ministry, and the king once more summoned him to take office. In thus recalling Cavour and pledging himself to adopt his minister's policy, Victor Emmanuel made one of the greatest sacrifices of his life; for his act was equivalent to a public admission that he was willing, for the sake of country, to lay aside all that tradition and training had made dear to him, to make any concession of personal feelings that would in

any way benefit Piedmont or Italy. The effect upon the Senate was immediate: the law of convents was ratified May 22, 1855. The passing of this law marks the beginning of a new history for Piedmont; for it gave the victory in Parliament to the moderate party, which was committed to a liberal program, and enabled Cavour to show that his policy in opposing concordats did not disturb ecclesiastical independence in matters concerning the regimen of souls,—in short, allowed him to make good his famous saying, "a free church in a free state,"—and inaugurated a *régime* that soon made Piedmont recognised as one of the most progressive of the constitutional states of Europe. It is an interesting fact, that during the very period when Piedmont was developing her liberal political system, Austria was growing more despotic and reactionary; and that within three weeks after the passage of this law which made Piedmont independent of the papal authority, Austria should have bound herself more closely than ever to Rome by the concordat of 1855, which made the bishops the autocrats of education and masters of the intellectual life of the people, and placed the state, in many matters purely secular, under the control of the Roman Catholic Church. It is not surprising, that statesmen and tourists visiting Austria and Piedmont should have contrasted the intellectual torpor of the one with the intellectual activity of the other, and should have made known their views to western Europe.

But the transformation from the old to the new system was not accomplished without uneasiness, discontent, and even distress. The new economic policy imposed heavy financial burdens upon the people, often ran counter to old ideas and methods of industry, and brought about temporary panics. During the years 1853 and 1854, a great scarcity of grain and wine, and a general insufficiency of the harvests aggravated the situation. The government was accused by the reactionary papers of leading the country to schism, anarchy, and destruction; and the

minister himself was charged with oppressing the artisan and the labourer, and with supporting sacrilegious measures that were bringing upon the country the vengeance of Heaven. But his confidence in the economic soundness of his measures, his belief that the distress would be only temporary, and his natural elasticity of nature, made it possible for Cavour to bear these attacks with equanimity. And time alone was needed to prove the justness of his conclusions. By degrees, Piedmont responded to his efforts; and as she began to feel the benefits of a system that was increasing her wealth and enlarging the scope of her economic activity, she quickened with new life and energy. Her commercial ventures, her public works, and her reorganised army gave her new dignity and stability; while her regard for peace and order, and her rigorous suppression of all revolutionary movements, increased the confidence of the European governments, and gave her an honourable name among European statesmen. "The Piedmontese government has given many proofs of its devotion to social order," wrote Drouyn de Lhuys in 1854; and to Cavour redounded the glory. Success at home inspired him with confidence and self-reliance, and raised him in the esteem of his own people; while his ability to strengthen the relations between Piedmont and the Powers of Europe, and to make his own state the most prominent of all the governments of second rank, raised him in the esteem of foreign statesmen, and caused him to be regarded as a diplomat of no mean parts. The time had come when, with safety, he might apply his foreign policy, when he might step beyond the bounds of his little state and enter the field of European diplomacy; he meant to take his part in the settlement of the vexatious Eastern Question.

The importance of the Eastern Question for Italy had already been appreciated by political writers in Piedmont; and when, in 1853, war actually broke out between Turkey and Russia, Count Balbo, who had written the *Hopes of Italy* in the decade

before, believed that the time had come when Austria would exchange the crown of Lombardy for possessions on the Danube. But Balbo died the same year, and his speculations found little place in the plans of the greater statesman, who had no faith that Austria would voluntarily withdraw from her possessions on the Po. As early as January, 1854, Cavour had formulated a different scheme, whereby the Eastern Question might become of advantage to Piedmont. "Does not your Majesty think," he said one day to Victor Emmanuel, "that we ought to find a way of participating in any war that the Powers may wage against Russia?" "If I am not able to go," said the king, "I will send my brother." From this time the idea of co-operating with the western governments became fixed in Cavour's mind. But his opponents took another view of the matter; for they saw in his plan for securing the support of France and England nothing but a mad enterprise and a piece of folly that would merely impose new sacrifices on the country, without any adequate compensation. What, they asked, has Piedmont to gain from a war in the east; and how would co-operation in a struggle with Russia, further the cause of Italian independence and unity? But Cavour was encouraged by a new incident. In 1853 the relations with Austria had been strained to the breaking point by an uprising in Milan, which had led the imperial government, notwithstanding the protests of the court of Turin, to sequestrate the lands of the Lombard *émigrés* residing in Piedmont. The western governments had been troubled by this event, because it was rumoured, that Austria's unwillingness to join in the Crimean war was due to the fact that she could not employ her military forces against Russia, as long as there was danger of a war with Italy. These rumours had led to some diplomatic correspondence with Piedmont, in course of which both Drouyn de Lhuys and Sir James Hudson, minister of England at Turin, encouraged Cavour in his plan of joining the western alliance. "The Eastern Question is without doubt,"

said the former, "of importance to all Europe; and that is why Piedmont, in whom the French government and especially the French Emperor has a great interest, would find it worth her while to take an active part in the war." A little later Hudson said: "Why do you not yourselves put a corps of troops at the service of the allies? That will be the best way of depriving Austria of all opportunity for tergiversation." To this Cavour had replied, that he personally was ready to advise the king to send fifteen thousand men to the East, if only such co-operation would not injure Piedmont's interests.

This decision, which represented at the time only Cavour's personal opinion, was not concurred in by the other councillors of the king. If Austria was using her fear of Piedmont as a pretext for refusing or postponing indefinitely the alliance with the western Powers against Russia, the Piedmontese ministers, especially Dabormida, minister of foreign affairs, were equally afraid that Austria would take advantage of the absence of the best of their troops in the East to injure Piedmont; and refused, for that reason, to accept Cavour's plans of an alliance without conditions. Therefore, during the summer and autumn of 1854, Cavour was obliged to await the issue in patience; but early in December, 1854, a proposition from England to employ Piedmontese troops in her service in the Crimea, followed by a formal demand on the part of both England and France, that Sardinia should join the alliance that these Powers had made on April 10th, brought the matter officially before the Piedmontese council. The first of the proposals the ministers rejected without hesitation, as humiliating to the state, adding that Piedmont's pride would not allow her to send soldiers to the Crimea as mercenaries of England; that she desired no subsidy; that her general must be in no way subordinate to the generals of the allied armies; and that all she would accept of England was a loan of two million of livres, to be paid under certain specified conditions. As to the second part of the pro-

posal, the ministers were equally decided; they could not enter into the alliance with England and France, unless the Powers would give written guarantees, first, that Piedmont should be admitted to the congress or to the conferences at which a treaty of peace should be signed; second, that England and France, at the close of the war, should promise to take into consideration the bad condition of Italy; and third, that the Powers should use their good offices to persuade Austria to restore the sequestrated lands of the Lombard refugees.

But Cavour, who had mastered the diplomatic situation, knew that the Powers would accept no such conditions, and for the excellent reason, that the guarantees would be an affront to Austria, whose army of 200,000 men was of far greater importance to them at this moment, than was Piedmont's small contingent, especially now that the alliance of December 2, 1854, had been signed, and the Powers had every reason to believe that Austria would actually join in the war. The situation was very perplexing to Cavour. The Powers would not agree to an alliance with the guarantees; while Rattazzi, La Marmora, and especially Dabormida, would not consent to a treaty without them. To reject these proposals was to retire into obscurity, to lose all that had been gained since Novara; and to such a course Cavour could not, for a moment, consent. But he did not hesitate. By his masterful will he practically forced Dabormida to resign from the cabinet, and persuaded the king to appoint him in Dabormida's place as minister of foreign affairs. Then hastening to the ambassadors of France and England, he accepted the alliance without guarantees, and promised to dispatch fifteen thousand men to the Crimea. This act of Cavour's, which, in the ordinary course of political events, would have been without apology, seemed to belie the good statesmanship that had thus far guided the affairs of Piedmont. Conservatives and radicals alike condemned it, the former, as a bold revolutionary manœuvre, the latter, as a piece of criminal im-

becility. "This is not a war of principles, of civilisation, of progress," cried Brofferio; "I see in it nothing but covetousness and ambition, and unbridled longing for riches and power"; and Mazzini wrote to Cavour: "You have taken a step toward an alliance with Austria; the moral degradation of the only principality upon which Italy's hopes have rested, is monstrous." But Cavour, fully aware, as he wrote to the Countess Oldofredi on the morning after the signing of the treaty, that he had assumed "a tremendous responsibility," never showed greater statesmanship than when he sought, by an unconditional acceptance of the invitation of the allies, to outwit Austria, and to gain the good will of the western Powers. Looking into the future, and seeing in the treaty but the first step in a long course of diplomatic manœuvring that would, in the end, serve Italy better than would revolutions and conspiracies, he felt convinced that the sacrifices of 1855 would be recompensed a hundred-fold, when the united kingdom for which he was working should become an assured fact. And as he was unable at this time to disclose his larger plans, it is to the honour of Piedmont that her representatives in Parliament bravely supported him. In the Chamber of Deputies he was able to carry his proposal by a majority of fifty; and aided by d'Azeglio, who spoke for him loyally in the Senate, he secured in that body a favourable majority of thirty-six.

The policy, which after many discouraging attempts Cavour had made to prevail, received its first test on April 31st, when Piedmont's troops set out for the Crimea. Yet the crisis was by no means over; for before any results were to be obtained, there was to intervene a long period of anxious waiting, during which new incidents were to rouse his further uneasiness, and to increase the scepticism and coldness of his political opponents. Austria was bitterly angry; an unfortunate dispute between La Marmora and Lord Raglan regarding the rank of the Sardinian general threatened to make trouble with England;

heavy losses by cholera among the Sardinian soldiers in the Crimea added to the griefs of the people; while the inactivity of the troops for three months without share in the glory of the siege, roused uncertainty and disappointment at Turin.

But the long delay finally had its reward. In August a dispatch from La Marmora announced the victory of the Tchernaya, in which the Piedmontese soldiers received their first baptism of fire. "We have repulsed the Russians," said the dispatch, "to the cries of '*Vive le roi*' and '*Vive la patrie*,' and the Piedmontese displayed great bravery." "This news," wrote Cavour, "has raised the public pride, and has reconciled the world to the policy of the treaty"; and a few weeks later, when he heard of the capture of the Malakof, he added: "The fall of Sebastopol is a complete justification of our policy, against which all eloquence is now powerless." Greatly encouraged, he urged Victor Emmanuel to visit Paris and London to take advantage of his new prestige in an act of courtesy, and to increase the number of the friends of Sardinia. The visit lasted from November 23d to the end of the year, and showed Victor Emmanuel to the people of the west as a loyal ally and a constitutional king. To Cavour it offered an opportunity of seeking the aid of either England or France in a war against Austria. In the former country he received little encouragement: "You have acquired enough glory," said Clarendon. But from France he expected more; for Napoleon III. had already expressed deep personal sympathy for Italy, and in 1849, in 1852, and again in 1853, had spoken significant words regarding the part that France might play in Italian affairs. Nor was Cavour disappointed. At a dinner at the Tuileries on December 7th the Emperor said to him, "Write confidentially to Walewski whatever you believe I can do for Italy." Immediately Cavour, following this suggestion, drew up a statement containing the minimum of Italy's grievances and demands. For the moment nothing more was said or done; but the gain, though slight,

was to Cavour a promise of better things to come, for the time being, an adequate return for all his labours.

The Powers, who in the meantime had been discussing the question as to whether or not to continue the war, were deciding in favour of peace. But peace Cavour did not desire. In the prolongation of the war, for which Sardinia was now eager, he saw Italy's only chance of actual gain. He could discover no advantages in a peace congress held at this stage of the struggle, before the war had really been fought out, and before the Piedmontese troops had been able to win for their country the military prominence that he desired. As Piedmont had not been admitted to the peace conferences the spring before at Vienna, there was no reason to suppose that the grievances of Italy would be noticed, if the final congress were held before further conquests had been made. In fact, there was every reason to think otherwise ; for the part that Austria was taking in furthering the cause of peace, would make it impossible for the Powers, however much they disliked the Austrian policy, to affront that Power, by going out of their way to discuss the Italian question. And if this question were not considered, how, asked Cavour, could the congress aid the cause that he held so dear? When, therefore, he heard that Russia had accepted the ultimatum, and that a congress was to be summoned on February 25th, he wrote to La Marmora, "Under the present circumstances we can hope for little" ; but, at the same time, he made every effort to gain a place for Piedmont on an equal footing with the other Powers, and to strengthen his influence over Napoleon III., from whom he expected some expression of interest in Italy. In both particulars he was successful. Piedmont took her place at the council board at Paris the diplomatic equal of the other allies ; and at the famous sitting of April 8th, at the instigation of the Emperor, the subject of Italy was introduced.

At that session, immediately after a few preliminary words

by Walewski, Lord Clarendon discussed, in detail, the condition of Italy. He declared that the presence of foreign troops upon Italian soil was a menace to the European equilibrium, and that the government of the Pope was the worst in Europe; and he denounced the king of Naples for his cruelty, and the petty Italian princes for their uselessness and inefficiency. "No Italian statesman," said Cavour in his dispatch to Cibrario, "could have formulated a more energetic or true act of accusation, than did the minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain." Buol, greatly offended, replied that the subject was foreign to the object of the congress, and one upon which he had no instructions; and Russia and Prussia upheld him, though in no way thereby committing themselves to the support of Austria. Then Cavour spoke, with moderation indeed, because, as he wrote to d'Azeglio, it seemed to him that he ought to be as calm in speaking as he meant to be bold in acting, when the opportunity should offer. He repeated the grievances of Italy, and after enumerating the evils of the Austrian occupation, showed that it was contrary to the treaties, destructive of the political equilibrium of the peninsula, and dangerous to Sardinia. No action was taken by the congress, for Buol opposed the drafting of a protocol upon the subject, and Cavour willingly acquiesced, knowing that a half-way measure at this time would tie his hand for the future.

He had gained his point, for Austria, who had entered the congress as the mediator, would now go forth accused and discomfited. Buol's obstinacy had annoyed the Emperor of the French, and made him the more amenable to the arguments of Cavour; while France and England had openly admitted that Italy's wretched condition was a matter of European interest, even though England was by no means convinced that the situation would be improved by enlarging Piedmont. Furthermore, Russia and Prussia were more in sympathy with the policy of Cavour than their official declarations seemed to indicate; and

the people of the west were strong in their loyalty to the Italian cause, not only because they admired Piedmont for her devotion to constitutional government in the midst of the reactionary influences that surrounded her; but also because they hated Austria, even more than they had hated Russia, as the enemy of political and religious liberty. Thus after April 8, 1856, Italy was a reality to Europe, a factor to be reckoned with in the diplomatic arrangements of the future; and the world knew that she had as her leader a statesman of tried ability, a diplomat without his peer, and a daring intriguer and adventurer in the field of international politics, who was ready to break the peace, or to violate any rule or tradition of European diplomacy, if only Italy might be united and free.

And Austria recognised the gravity of the situation. Although enraged by the humiliating treatment to which she had been subjected at Paris, she resolved to change for the moment her policy toward Italy, and to try the effect of moderation and concessions. Acting upon English advice, she modified the rigour of her police system in Lombardo-Venetia, pardoned political criminals, and promised a speedy amnesty; in 1856-57, Francis Joseph visited Milan, granted the promised amnesty, restored the sequestrated lands of the Lombard refugees, conceded unusual privileges to the towns, the churches, and public institutions; and, that this policy might have a guarantee for the future, appointed his own brother, Archduke Maximilian, the kindest and most lovable of the Habsburgs, viceroy of the kingdom. But to Cavour this policy was even a greater menace to the freedom of Italy than would have been a lukewarm protocol from the congress of Paris. He had returned to Turin convinced that war with Austria must come; and with this one end in view, had taken up the burden of government. In his determination that war should come, he made use of every means to thwart Austria's peace projects, and to encourage whatever would provoke her wrath. He not only built a naval

arsenal at Spezzia, urged the completion of the Mt. Cenis tunnel; but that his enemy might be induced to lose her temper, he opened in Austrian territory at Milan and Venice subscriptions to the cannon fund for the fortress of Alessandria, and accepted the Milanese proposal to erect a monument to the Sardinian army of the Crimea, "as the symbol of a common faith and a gauge for a better future." Piedmontese journalists revelled unrestrained in their attacks upon despotism and their caricatures of the Austrian policy, and, unchecked, flaunted their journals in the face of Francis Joseph when he visited Milan. Not even the royal compliments customary on such an occasion were exchanged; and when finally in Parliament, Cavour, in definite and even menacing language, threw down the gauntlet of war, crying: "Italy has been considered as a beautiful woman, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical husband, made for eternal subjection because inapt to govern herself. But this is no longer so; Italy is now marching toward independence and liberty;"—Austria's patience gave way, and on February 10th, Count Buol issued a note denouncing Piedmont and demanding satisfaction. This Cavour refused, and the Austrian envoy was recalled.

All was now to Cavour's liking. Buol had made a serious blunder, and by playing directly into Cavour's hands, had shown himself to be the diplomatic inferior of his Italian adversary. The national movement, which had been momentarily checked, took on new strength, and henceforth the policy of toleration grew more than ever unpopular, and all the good intentions of the Archduke Maximilian counted for nothing. The sympathy of the foreign Powers, for an instant with Austria, was once more with Piedmont; and Cavour hastened to profit from his successes. He sought to rally the old revolutionary elements to the Sardinian cause, to gather the most moderate of Mazzini's followers into an organisation that would work for the cause of Piedmont, and of Italy; to ally with the

Left, as he had done in 1852 with the Left Centre, for the purpose of checking fruitless insurrection and of strengthening his own policy. Through the efforts of La Farina, a National Italian Society was formed in 1857, which working openly in Piedmont, but secretly throughout the rest of Italy, had for its object the development of the idea of unity among the people, and the preparing of the way for the consolidation of the states of Italy when the time should come.

But Cavour's path was by no means without its obstacles and its terrors. Mazzini and his associates were enraged at the attempt to tamper with their organisation; the clergy and reactionists were opposing, by every effort in their power, the national liberal policy; while the people, suffering from a succession of bad harvests, were grumbling at the heavy taxation that the recent military expenses had imposed upon them. It is little wonder, therefore, that the elections of 1857 showed important gains for the aristocracy and the clergy. But this was not all: the open quarrel with Austria made assistance from without imperative. Russia, won over by Cavour's diplomacy, was ready to take the position of a sympathetic neutral, but could not be counted on to furnish military aid; while England, from whom Cavour had at first hoped for much, and for whose co-operation he had laboured long, was wholly unwilling to break her traditional policy, and to endanger the European equilibrium by aiding Piedmont to extend her territory at the expense of Austria, however willing she might have been, in the interests of that same public law, to aid Piedmont if attacked. Only France remained, a state whose organisation and policy were the reverse of those of Piedmont; whose government was absolute, not parliamentary; whose troops were already in Rome upholding the papacy; whose empress and clergy were opposed to the Italian policy on the ground that it was a menace to the Holy See; whose ministers wished to avoid all entanglement with Italy; and whose legislative

bodies had pointed out in unmistakable terms the dangers to France of a strong power on the south-eastern frontier. Was France to be counted on for aid in this crisis?

Italy's hope centred in Napoleon alone, whose authority, practically unchecked by constitutional limitation, gave to his personal wishes extraordinary weight. For a year Napoleon had been dreaming of a revision of the treaties of 1815 in the interests of the smaller nationalities. He had hoped to gain for France her natural boundaries, the Rhine and the Alps, by aiding Prussia on one hand and Sardinia on the other against Austria. His wish to deprive Austria of her mastery in Italy did not spring entirely from his interest in Italy's independence; at heart he desired to strengthen the smaller states that he might humiliate the larger, aggrandise France, and finally dominate Europe. But he dreamed of greater things. Gioberti's plans, as set forth in his work *On the Civil Redemption of Italy*, published in Paris in 1851, appealed to the imagination of the Emperor. He liked the idea suggested in this work of placing Italy under the double protection of France and the Pope, and by means of an alliance of France and Italy, of bringing about a union of all the Latin races with Norman England, in opposition to the Baltic league of the Slavo-Germanic peoples of the north. But for the consummation of this irrational scheme there was necessary the establishment of an Italian state and an Italian nationality, for which he had so strong a predilection.

But this was not all that led him to act in this instance; he was influenced by his early associations, by the solicitations of his Italian friends, by the advice of Prince Napoleon, who wished to be king of a reorganised Tuscany, and by his conscience, which told him that because of his sending the expedition to Rome, he was considered a traitor by his old allies, a person worthy of death, if one were to judge from the attacks of Pianori, who, to avenge the fall of the Roman Republic, tried

on April 28, 1855, to assassinate him. Above all, he was influenced by Cavour, who played upon every sensibility, appealed to his ambitions, his memories, his sympathies, and his fears, encouraged his dreams, flattered him with the promised gratitude of a nation, and, at times, even subtly alluded to the dangers that might ensue from conspirators, if he did not repair the wrong that he had done to Italy. Furthermore, Europe seemed favourably disposed to his intervention in Italian affairs. Frederic William of Prussia had been in a measure appeased by Napoleon's mediation in a controversy with Switzerland over the king's hereditary rights in Neufchâtel; Bismarck, already announcing that the duel between Prussia and Austria was inevitable, was encouraging Napoleon's schemes for the reconstruction of Europe, and was so successful in persuading Frederic William to exchange courtesies with the Emperor, as to lead the latter to believe that Prussia and the Confederation would remain aloof in case of war with Austria; and the Czar, who since the congress of Paris had been on excellent terms with France, was further pleased by Napoleon's consent to the proposal made in 1858 to unite Wallachia and Moldavia, which Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia supported, and Austria and Turkey opposed. At this time, Austria stood practically isolated among the great Powers, save for the advice that England might see fit to give her.

But the hopes thus aroused by Napoleon's evident sympathy for Italy, were for the moment dashed by an event, which seemed to destroy all prospects of military aid from France. On January 14, 1858, an Italian refugee, Orsini, made a frightful attempt upon the life of the Emperor; but this, strangely enough, instead of alienating Napoleon, only convinced him the more of the need of supporting the Italian cause. The exact character of Orsini's influence has never been satisfactorily explained; but the appeal which, as an Italian patriot, he made from the prisons of Mazas and La Roquette, begging the

Emperor to make Italy free and the Italians united, had the desired effect. Napoleon showed himself to be more than ever devoted to the cause of Italy. In March, 1858, Orsini expiated his crime upon the scaffold; and in May of the same year Dr. Conneau appeared at Turin to inform Victor Emmanuel and Cavour of the Emperor's intention of visiting Plombières in the Vosges. "The drama approaches solution," wrote Cavour to La Marmora; "pray Heaven that I do not blunder at that supreme moment": and on July 21st Cavour entered the imperial presence.

Without preliminary or preface, Napoleon broached the subject for which they had come together. He promised to aid Sardinia in the war against Austria, if only a justifiable pretext could be discovered; declaring that his object was to drive Austria from Italy, to make upper Italy a kingdom under the house of Savoy, and to reorganise the peninsula as a confederation of four states, the kingdom of Upper Italy, Tuscany, the Papal States, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In return, he demanded the cession of Savoy and Nice, and during a drive in the afternoon, proposed a marriage between Clotilde, daughter of Victor Emmanuel, and his cousin, Prince Napoleon. To all this Cavour agreed, saving the grant of Nice and the marriage, which were put off for further consideration. After a brief discussion regarding certain other matters, military and financial, Cavour took his leave, returning to Turin by way of Baden, where a conference with Prince William of Prussia satisfied him that Prussia would not compromise herself for Austria. Thus ended an interview famous in history; an interview not between an emperor and a minister, with the usual diplomatic form, but between two conspirators, mutually distrustful of each other, even when they were most confidential, who were secretly planning an audacious scheme of attack upon a neighbouring Power. The meeting at Plombières initiated a series of events that under Cavour's guidance made possible the

unity of Italy, and encouraged Napoleon to pursue that visionary and ill-fated plan of revising the map of Europe according to the principle of nationalities, which haunted him to the end of his career.

No sooner had Cavour returned to Piedmont than with feverish haste he began to make all necessary preparations for the coming struggle. He won over Italian notables, Pasolini, Minghetti, and others; sent Piedmontese agents to prepare the people of the peninsula for a spontaneous uprising, when war should be declared; urged La Farina to extend the National Society, and to win recruits not in the north only, but in the centre and south as well. With Garibaldi he discussed the advisability of recruiting volunteers to aid the regular army. To conciliate the conservatives, he proposed a monument to his father, Charles Albert, and to win over the revolutionary party, he offered another in honour of Daniele Manin, who, during the latter days of his life, had supported the policy of Cavour. His energy was boundless: he made suggestions and received advice; he was indefatigable in forming plans and persistent in carrying them through; he missed no opportunity of disciplining his troops, encouraging his followers, and assigning to each the part he was to play; and while closely scrutinising the course of diplomatic affairs in Europe at large, let nothing within his own country escape his attention. Judging from his actions, one would have said that war was to open on an assigned date; and so he believed that it would. "We will force Austria to begin hostilities," he said to Odo Russell, the English ambassador, "and that, too, in April or May, 1859." With this supreme confidence, born not of intuition but of keen diplomatic observation, he continued his intrigues and his warlike preparations. Yet he was not without his anxious moments. "Dear Marquis," he wrote December 30th to Villamarina, "I augur well for the new year; may it crown the efforts of our king and our country to establish an Italy grand, independent,

and happy, such as we dreamed of in our youth. Let us accomplish that great undertaking, then truly we can rest."

The year 1859 opened upon a diplomatic world expectant, and troubled with rumours of war. The interview at Plombières was no longer a secret, for in his negotiations with Prussia, Napoleon had mentioned the probability of a war beyond the Alps; and in a conference between Prince Napoleon and the Czar at Warsaw, the war had been freely discussed. Furthermore, the war agitation in Italy, the incessant intrigues of Cavour, and the unconcealed efforts of the Piedmontese press and Parliament to provoke the wrath of Austria, all pointed in one direction. It is not surprising that with Europe in a state of expectancy, the Emperor's words to Baron Hubner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, spoken in the presence of the other diplomats on January 1, 1859, should have received an interpretation not intended by their author. "I regret," said Napoleon, "that our relations are no longer as good as in the past, but I beg you to assure the Emperor that my personal esteem for him remains unaltered." The remark was probably a thoughtless, unpremeditated one, but the market felt the shock: stocks fell and credit shrank. And scarcely had Europe recovered from this blow, when there came a second in the form of an address made by Victor Emmanuel to the Piedmontese Parliament on January 10th. "Strong in the experiences of the past," he said, "we will march resolutely forward to meet the events of the future. That future will be happy, for our policy rests upon justice, upon love of liberty and country. Our state, though small in territory, has increased in credit in the councils of Europe, because it is great in the idea which it represents, in the sympathy which it inspires." And he closed his address with these significant words: "Our situation is not free from peril, for while we respect treaties we are not insensible to the cry of grief that comes to us from every part of Italy. Strong in union, trusting in our good judgment, let us await

with prudence the decrees of Divine Providence." Indescribable was the enthusiasm that followed this speech so full of promise and hope; and intense was the excitement and joy among the Italian *émigrés* gathered at this time in Turin, when a few days later Rattazzi, by repeating the same words, showed that the opinion of the king was that of his ministers also.

Events marking the inevitable approach of war now followed in rapid succession. Piedmont negotiated a war loan of fifty millions of livres, ostensibly for the defence of Piedmont; Prince Napoleon, in company with General Niel, visited Turin on January 13th for the purpose, so it was said, of inspecting arsenals, reviewing troops, and examining strategic points; though the real object of the visit was disclosed when, on the 30th, the marriage of the prince with Princess Clothilde was solemnised, and immediately afterward, the verbal agreement of Plombières was embodied in the form of a treaty, which was, however, kept a secret. On February 4th appeared the brochure *L'Empereur Napoléon III. et l'Italie*, written by de la Guéronnière after notes furnished by the Emperor, and containing, besides a restatement of the relations existing between Italy and each of the Powers, and an arraignment of the reactionary governments of Italy, the assertion, that Italian independence would not disturb the equilibrium of Europe. These indications of hostility toward Austria on the part of France and Sardinia, following each other thus rapidly in the presence of a general peace, seemed to be foreshadowing a war which had no cause, one which was threatening to destroy treaties and to disturb the existing social order. Would not Europe intervene to prevent such a war? Would she not seek to settle the difficulty by resorting to the arts of diplomacy?

Of all the Powers, England only was ready to intervene. The Derby government was out of sympathy with France and on friendly terms with Austria; and now that Austria was about to be attacked, and France was in a fair way to disturb the

European repose and perhaps extend her own territory at the expense of the lesser states, England offered her mediation. Turning to Piedmont, she sought by the memories of the past, by the friendship of England for Italy, by her love for liberty, to dissuade that state from war. She urged Napoleon to remember his pacific promises of 1852, and the fact that the governments of Europe were committed to maintain the peace; and having pictured to him the perils that a war would bring upon Europe, she begged him not to let himself be dragged into it by a state of secondary rank. To Austria she recommended moderation and prudence, and with a well-feigned care for her welfare, besought her to be patient, to consent to light sacrifices, and above all to avoid furnishing her enemies the desired pretext for war. For the moment it seemed reasonable to believe that her efforts might prove successful. Many in the Piedmontese Parliament were bitterly opposed to the war, and such men as Solaro della Marghereta and Costa de Beauregard spoke strongly against it; many in the country were fearful lest the experiences of 1848 should be repeated; while, with Savoyards particularly, the war was unpopular, because of the report regarding the separation of Piedmont and Savoy. In France the financial panic consequent upon the rumours of war, the complaints of manufacturers, the state of unrest in the provinces, the objections raised by the bishops and the clergy, and, what was of the greatest importance, the opposition of the legislative bodies to Napoleon's plan of aiding Italy, all these manifestations showed how vigorous was the protest against war, how strong the wish for peace. And for the moment Napoleon seemed to yield to this general desire. With his consent Lord Cowley was sent by the Derby ministry to Vienna to treat on a new basis: he was to ask for the withdrawal of the troops from Rome, the abrogation of the special treaties with Modena and Parma, and the reform of the government of central and southern Italy. The outlook was hopeful;

Austria consented to treat; on March 5th Napoleon declared in the *Moniteur* that he would assist Sardinia only if she were attacked, and that he believed the peace negotiations would end favourably; and on the 17th Cowley brought word to Paris that Austria repudiated any intention of becoming the aggressor, but asked that inasmuch as Sardinia's warlike preparations were annoying, the Emperor would show the sincerity of his professions of peace by requesting Sardinia to disarm.

But the English plan for mediation was thwarted in the very act of its consummation. Just at the time that Cowley was completing his mission, the Czar proposed that a congress of the Powers should be called to settle the question, a proposal that undoubtedly originated with Napoleon and was probably aimed at Austria. If Austria should reject it, she would range against her the other Powers; if she should accept it, the revision of the treaties would be undertaken with Russia, France, and Prussia against her. When on March 19th England and Prussia accepted the proposal, Austria announced that she, too, agreed to it, but on the condition that Sardinia should disarm. Though evidently piqued, she decided to temporise, thinking that by forcing Sardinia's troops to disperse, she should be able to bring about the fall of Cavour.

But for a month Cavour had been working night and day to defeat the plans for peace. His speeches had been more aggressive than ever; he had reorganised the national guard; established committees to recruit, equip, and arm the volunteers; given his support to decrees authorising the formation of free corps of revolutionary forces under Garibaldi; drawn the republicans and the followers of Mazzini more closely to the cause of Piedmont; and, in general, had made ready, not only his own state, but all Italy, for the coming struggle. Meanwhile, his confidence in Napoleon had been increased by the Emperor's remarks to Villamarina apropos of the peace negotiations, "Do not be alarmed; all this will come to nothing"; yet now Russia

was proposing to call a congress. Filled with the thought of a free Italy, and convinced that if the congress were held, Piedmont would have no place in it, Cavour made another rapid journey to Paris, March 29th. The nature of the March interviews has ever remained a secret, but their character can be inferred; for it is not likely that Cavour's eloquence deserted him on this occasion, or that his sagacity failed to suggest to him powerful weapons at hand. Had not Napoleon given many indications of loyalty to the national party of Italy? Was it not to his advantage to save Piedmont, and have Italy for a friend instead of a mortal enemy? Had not Victor Emmanuel held rigidly to the conditions agreed on at Plombières, and might not he, Cavour, in case Napoleon deserted Italy at this important crisis, disclose these conditions and incriminate the Emperor? But whatever arguments he may have used, and whatever promises he got from Napoleon, he returned to Turin, continued his preparations for war, and informed England that Sardinia would not disarm, and that she would not appear at the congress at all, unless admitted on an equal footing with the others. There was a general impression in Italy that Cavour's mission had been successful.

England having been baffled in her first attempt at mediating, now tried another plan. In consequence of a conversation with Count Buol, the idea of a general disarmament occurred to Lord A. Loftus, the English ambassador at Vienna. England welcomed his suggestion and at once communicated it to St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Paris. On April 18th, Napoleon telegraphed to Lord Malmsbury to know if England, in case of disarmament, would support the admission of the Italian princes to the congress; and on receiving a reply in the affirmative, immediately sent a telegram to Turin practically commanding Piedmont to acquiesce in England's plan, and to put her army on a peace footing. The effect was most pitiable. Already worn out by his labours, Cavour was now brought face to face with failure.

He saw his plans, dependent as they were on war with Austria, shattered at a blow; saw all hope of a united Italian kingdom vanish like a mirage. Yet he did not dare disobey the summons, and on the 19th notified France and England of his acceptance of their proposals. Peace now seemed to be assured, for Italy had again been prevented from throwing off the Austrian yoke, and Italian unity seemed to be as far off as ever. For Cavour the moment was the darkest of his life. But quite unknown to him, and on the very day when he notified the European Powers of his submission, the Austrian government was drafting the ultimatum that brought on the war Cavour so ardently desired.

This act of Austria's was no mere accident, no mere stroke of luck for Cavour. During these months devoted to negotiations, but one statesman in Europe had any definite ideas regarding the solution of the Italian question, but one was advancing a policy possessed of any real vitality. While European diplomacy, blundering and inconsistent, was trying to arrive at some settlement of the question; while European diplomats were vaguely trying to counteract the influence of the mind that was dominating them; Cavour, unswerving and determined, with but one end in view, was using every available means of forcing Austria into war. The efforts of the Powers to preserve peace were but trifling when compared with those of Piedmont's minister to break it. And in this crisis Austria was no match for her small, but clever, adversary. Without a moment's hesitation she fell into the trap so well prepared, and at one stroke undid all that England had been able to accomplish. Weary of the intolerable position in which the strategy of Cavour and the political vacillation of France had placed her, financially embarrassed because of the excessive armaments she was forced to maintain, confident that if the issue were raised, Prussia and the Confederation would not desert her, and burning with the desire to crush Sardinia before

France could complete her arrangements for war,—Austria at this supreme moment allowed herself to be mastered by the ecclesiastical and military parties at Vienna. For the second time she blundered in dealing with Italy, for the second time, lost the sympathy of Europe at a critical juncture. On April 19th, even against the advice of Count Buol, the Austrian cabinet drafted an ultimatum, declaring that inasmuch as Sardinia had refused to conform to the peace proposals of France and England, she must put her army on a peace footing and disperse the volunteers in three days, or war would follow. That the war party and the Emperor of Austria were ignorant of Sardinia's submission is evident; but Buol, when informed of it, made clear that the reason assigned in the ultimatum was a pretext, by saying, regretfully indeed, that the decision was irrevocable, as Austria was weary of Sardinia's insults. When the ultimatum reached Turin, Cavour's joy was as excessive, as had been his dejection a few days before. At once he rejected Austria's demands and applied to France for the promised support. On April 26th, Napoleon informed Europe that he would not desert his ally, that he was obliged to respect an appeal from a nation to whom he was bound by common interests and sympathies, by the alliance of 1855, and by the matrimonial union of 1859. On the 29th, Victor Emmanuel issued an appeal to the people of the kingdom and of Italy; and on May 3d, Napoleon, in a proclamation to the French, declared that he was entering upon the war, not to make conquests, but to maintain his national and traditional policy; not to threaten the territory and rights of a neutral power, or to disturb the authority of the Holy Father, but to remove the foreigner from the peninsula, and to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic.

In the war thus begun the advantages were all on the side of Austria, for with 200,000 men in the plains of Lombardy, she had only to cross the Ticino, disperse the Sardinians, and capture Turin. Had she done so, she would have been able to

intercept the French communications between Susa and Alessandria, and to prevent the junction of the allies. But Austria supplemented the diplomatic error of the ultimatum by putting the command of her forces into the hands of an inefficient general, Giulay, who seemed to be hampered by timidity, and by a fear of the name Napoleon. He permitted the allies to make their junction in good order, and then, convinced that their plan was to invade Lombardy by way of Piacenza, remained inactive between the Lesia and the Ticino in the Lomelline. The struggle at Montebello, May 20th, between reconnoitring bodies only confirmed him in this belief; while an attack by Victor Emmanuel on an Austrian corps at Palestro on May 30th and 31st, which was undertaken to facilitate the movement of the allies northward, did not arouse his suspicions that the entrance to Lombardy was to be made by way of Novara, and not by way of Piacenza. It was not until June 1st that he discerned the plans of the enemy. Then, in feverish haste, he hurried northward, only to suffer a complete defeat at Magenta on June 4th. The road was now open to Milan, and on June 8th, amid the rejoicing of the inhabitants, Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel entered the Lombard capital. The Austrians first withdrew to the Adda, and finally evacuated Lombardy altogether.

But Napoleon found the difficulties of his position increasing, for the rôle of liberator involved not a few disquieting consequences. Cavour's intrigues were beginning to tell. The Romagnols refused to submit longer to the papal government; the Tuscans, under Boncompagni, after a successful revolt against the grand duke, made Victor Emmanuel dictator, a position the king was willing to accept with Boncompagni as extraordinary commissioner; the Duke of Modena thought it wise to withdraw to Vienna; and though the Duchess of Parma remained, it was only to see Piedmont encroach upon her soil at Pontremoli, and her authority over her subjects entirely

gone. Propitious as these events were for Italian unity, they displeased the Emperor. What would the Roman Catholics of France say? Was not Cavour passing beyond the stipulations of Plombières? Disturbing news came of discontent in France, of hostility in Germany, of Prussia's indecision and England's displeasure. All these rumours influenced the irresolute Emperor, and began to awaken a doubt as to the feasibility of the task he had undertaken. But the outlook seemed bright and encouraging, when on July 11th the allied armies set out from Milan to complete the conquest of northern Italy, and to drive the Austrians out of Venetia. By the 23d they had crossed the Chiese, and were drawn in a line from Lake Garda to Carpenedolo with the Sardinians on the left. In the meantime Giulay had been relieved of his post, and the troops placed under the command of Emperor Francis Joseph; but the young monarch, wholly unskilled in the affairs of war, had been unable to decide whether to defend the Chiese or to await the attack behind the Mincio. At first the former plan was tried; later the troops were recalled and sent into Venetia; but on June 23d, at the very time when the allied armies were advancing from the west, the old plan was revived, and the Austrians, having crossed the Mincio, advanced toward Solferino. The armies were ignorant each of the approach of the other, so that when on the 24th an advance movement was begun, a meeting was inevitable. Then ensued a battle, which beginning quite by accident as a skirmish between two reconnoitring parties, soon engaged 250,000 men and lasted without intermission from eight o'clock in the morning till the setting of the sun. The French made the attack at Solferino, the Sardinians at San Martino, and all fought bravely and well; but to the successes of the French the victory was in the main due. Before midnight the Austrians had retired within the Quadrilateral; but a lack of provisions prevented the allies from making a rapid advance to take advantage of the victory. However, by the

6th of July, all preparations had been made for a decisive battle at Verona. All were ready for the attack, when suddenly, on July 7th, came the astounding news that an armistice had been concluded between Napoleon and Francis Joseph at Villafranca. And the news was true.

The causes which led the Emperor of the French to take this decisive and very unexpected step are not difficult to discover. Ever since the victory of Magenta his fears had increased, and certain indications, unnoticed at the time, disclose to us his disquietude. He disapproved of the growth of the revolutionary spirit in central Italy, which foreshadowed consequences foreign to his designs; he viewed the battle-field of Magenta with feelings of revulsion, for he possessed little of the cruel insensibility of the first Napoleon; he shrank from the demands of war, for he was neither young nor active, nor possessed of military genius; and the news from Germany greatly disturbed him, for as he advanced into Lombardy the tone of the Confederation became more warlike, and that of Prussia, glad enough to see Austria defeated but fearful that continuous French victory along the line of the Alps might be but the prelude to a campaign along the Rhine, was anything but cordial. Already had Napoleon asked England to take the part of mediator between himself and the Emperor of Austria; but Palmerston, once more in office after the fall of the Derby government on June 10th, did not like the terms proposed as falling "far short of the wishes and expectations of the Italians," and rejected the offer. After the battle of Solferino, these objections to continuing the war were made more cogent by others arising from recent events. The spirit of nationality in Italy, which had been still further aroused by his own imprudent manifesto from Milan, was passing beyond his control; the reports from France showed increasing discontent, and Walewski and the empress were picturing to him with the most vivid detail the hostile feeling of Europe; and Prussia,

deeming that the time had come for an armed mediation, was directing her troops toward the Rhine quite as much, it must be said, to win for herself the military leadership of the Confederation, as to attack France. The Emperor was face to face with difficulties. Before him was the Quadrilateral, demanding, as he afterward told Cavour, a besieging army of 300,000 men. And where were these to come from? Not from France, for he was unwilling to weaken further the military forces at home; not from Italy, for he had already roused Italy too far, and dared not embroil himself with the Pope; not from Hungary, though he had negotiated with Kossuth to that end, for that would rouse against him the Czar. Then, too, the extreme heat of the July days, together with the sight of the bloody battle-field of Solferino and his anxiety over the epidemic of cholera and typhus which was attacking the soldiers, told on his nerves, and made him all the more eager to conclude a peace with the Emperor of Austria and to bring the war to a close. The downfall of Buol some weeks before had simplified the problem, and on July 11th the armistice of Villafranca was signed. By it, Lombardy was ceded to France to be handed over to Sardinia, but Venetia was retained subject to the Crown of the Emperor of Austria. Italy was to be made into a confederation, that should consist of all the Italian states including Venetia under the honorary presidency of the Pope; the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to return to their thrones and to grant a general amnesty; while the Pope was to be requested to introduce certain indispensable reforms.

The withdrawal of Napoleon from the war, leaving Venetia still in the hands of Austria, roused against him the bitter feelings of the Italians, and led Cavour, who was unable to conceal his wrath, to resign his post. But Victor Emmanuel with greater insight and political sagacity, discerning the real gains of the war, accepted the situation, and signed the preliminaries of peace, saving the rights of all except himself, the rights of

the people of Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and the Romagna. Then having formed a new ministry with Rattazzi in the place of Cavour, he accepted the consequences of the half-victory, and prepared to carry out the terms of the agreement. He recalled the Piedmontese commissioners from the central states, Farini from Modena, d'Azeglio from the Romagna, and Parelli from Parma, confident that in the end the conditions of the Villafranca armistice would be but a slight obstacle in the way of the national movement in Italy. And he was right. Even while arrangements were being made for a meeting of the diplomats at Zürich, and while the terms of the armistice were being embodied in a treaty, the people of Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Romagna were rendering its provisions null and void. In Tuscany, Ricasoli, who had been chosen head of the provisional government after the withdrawal of Boncampagni, summoned a parliament, which decreed the deposition of the house of Lorraine and voted for annexation to Piedmont; in September, a month later, Farini, who when recalled by Victor Emmanuel had resigned his commissionership and remained at his post, effected the same result in Modena. Parma followed in the footsteps of Tuscany and Modena, and the Romagna, though not a separate state, but the province of a still reigning sovereign, declared through a constituent assembly summoned for the purpose, that it desired to throw in its lot with Victor Emmanuel.

By November an extraordinary state of things existed. Even before the treaty of Zürich was signed, its provisions were already abrogated. Three Italian states had deposed their legitimate sovereigns, formed provisional governments, elected constituent assemblies, and, by decrees of annexation, thrown themselves upon the protection of Piedmont. Here was a grievous violation of the old law of treaties, which bit by bit was falling into disuse. The right of people to dispose of themselves had not been recognised at Vienna, yet here were three

members of the European system, sovereign states, whose independence Europe was bound to respect, acting independently of treaties and congresses, deciding for themselves, and declaring it to be their desire to merge their sovereignties, to tear away their boundaries, and form one united state. So far as the principle was concerned, it did not matter that the states were small; the fact remained that three sovereign states had already ceased to exist, and that a fourth was already rapidly becoming dismembered.

For the moment Europe was astounded, and looked to Zürich for a reconstruction of the old law. But events had moved rapidly while the diplomats, in their usual deliberate way, had been discussing the terms of peace. How to check the Italian movement was a perplexing problem. It was suggested that a confederation be established, but no one desired it; that the Italian states be reformed, but four of them were reforming themselves; that the dispossessed princes be restored, but that was now impossible. Even while the representatives of Austria and France were agreeing to make every effort to organise the confederation mentioned in the terms of Villafranca, the states in whose interests they were so zealously labouring were taking matters still further into their own hands. When their delegates who came to Victor Emmanuel to propose annexation learned that he could only promise to present their case at the approaching European congress, they formed themselves into a defensive league with an army of thirty thousand men, for the purpose of resisting any attempt of the princes to recover their thrones. At first Garibaldi was elected as their head, but this choice savoured too much of revolution; then the Prince of Carignan, of the house of Savoy, but this was too suggestive of a Piedmontese protectorate. Finally Boncompagni was chosen as governor-general, and at the very time when he set out to take the headship of the league, the plenipotentiaries returned from Zürich. As between the two, where lay the real strength?

The plenipotentiaries, supporting the old law of treaties, of legitimacy, of the preservation of the *status quo*, had agreed upon the restoration of the princes and the establishment of a confederation. But the princes could not be restored, and in place of the confederation, which was already dead, was a league, founded upon the will of the people, tingling with life, the forerunner of a national Italy.

But Europe had yet to be consulted before so violent an affront to the old system of equilibrium could be officially sanctioned. Of intervention in Italian affairs there was no danger; for already had Napoleon declared that he would not suffer the dispossessed princes to be restored by force, and Austria, in January, 1860, had announced officially that she would not interfere. This was a great triumph for the doctrine of non-intervention. Russia, though certainly unwilling to commit herself to this doctrine, was not unwilling to declare herself disinterested, and to remain outside the affairs of western Europe. Prussia, as yet, hardly realised the importance for her own future of the events in Italy, and her prince regent was too much attached to the doctrine of legitimacy to sanction the overthrow of sovereign princes or to recognise non-intervention as a principle; but even had she wished to act without Austria, she would not have dared, for the recent mobilisation of her troops had disclosed so many weaknesses and defects that she found it necessary to retire for the moment from any active co-operation in European affairs. And the English government was again in sympathy with the cause of Piedmont, and strongly in favour of annexation; for owing to its friendly attitude toward Austria, the Derby ministry had been overthrown the June before, and Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon were again in power, and ready to defend Italy against Austria in any congress that might be called to settle the Italian question.

But with Russia standing aloof, Prussia not disposed to support Austria's cause, and England prepared to counterbalance

Austria's influence, it was evident that a congress if called could accomplish little; and besides, the calling of the congress depended on Napoleon III., whose attitude at this time was most uncertain. Having but just signed the treaty of Zürich, he had committed himself to peace with Austria and to the plan of an Italian confederation; and at the same time, he was desirous of making Tuscany a separate kingdom for his cousin Prince Napoleon, and of maintaining the integrity of the papal dominion, that he might not alienate the ecclesiastical party of France. It seemed hardly probable that under such circumstances he would support the cause of Italy in a congress. It is possible that the clear expression of popular feeling shown by the vote of the central states for annexation had influenced him, and recalled to mind his own doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; but whatever the cause, he made a decision toward the close of December which showed that his sympathies had been all the time with Italy. Through a brochure *Le Pape et le Congrès*, written by de la Guéronnière, Napoleon informed Europe that he had determined to break with the Catholic party, and to accept the new public law that the Italian movement had forced upon Europe; that he approved of the sovereign power of the Pope, but convinced as he was that the smaller the territory under papal control the greater would be that power, he would suggest leaving to the Pope merely the city of Rome, and making his power dependent, not upon the extent of his territory, but upon the protection and devotion of the Roman Catholic states. In a letter of December 31st he counselled the Pope to accept the facts, and consent to the loss of the Romagna; and on January 4th, in order to give official expression to his decision, he removed Walewski, who was inimical to Italy, and placed in his stead Thouvenel, whose sympathetic interest in her was well known. There was now no need of a congress; for though the Pope refused positively to give up any part of his patrimony, England and France had decided to

accept the situation that the Italians had created; and Italy, having nothing to fear from the Powers, had only to make complete her victory at home.

On the 20th of January Cavour was recalled to power, and it soon became evident to Italians and French alike that his aggressive policy was to be pursued. "The first ministry of Cavour," said the *Opinione*, "signified independence; the second signified annexation." Though confident that Europe would not interfere, the Sardinian minister entered upon his work with great caution. Having announced in his first despatch that the restoration of the Italian princes was now no longer possible, he declared that the right of the people to establish a government to their liking was incontestable, and proposed that the states should be called upon to vote a second time on the subject. If this vote should favour annexation to Piedmont, the last obstacle would be removed, he declared, and Europe would have nothing else to do than to sanction what the Italian people decreed. He sent Nigra and Arese to France to get the consent of the Emperor to this plan; for with sixty thousand troops in Lombardy, Napoleon had the power to throw all his plans into hopeless confusion. But it was difficult for Napoleon to violate so openly a treaty signed only three months before, and he interposed many objections, and suggested many compromises, only to concede in the end all the points except that regarding the annexation of Tuscany; and this he positively refused to consider. Here, in February, 1860, the negotiations rested; but Cavour, knowing his own power, answered the imperial ultimatum on March 1st by saying that Sardinia would make no exceptions in the matter of the annexations. Cavour, having at once communicated with Farini in Emilia (Parma and Modena), and Ricasoli in Tuscany, hurried the people to the polls; and when by the middle of March the vote was known to be overwhelmingly in favour of annexation, Victor Emmanuel accepted the proposal which he had been obliged to reject the

September before, and on March 23d took formal recognition of the new union. Immediately the polls of Piedmont, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, were again opened for the election of parliamentary deputies, and on April 2d, the members of the first legislative body of an enlarged Piedmont convened at Turin.

Napoleon, having been unable to check the progress of the national movement, now claimed his reward, the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had been agreed to in the discussion at Plombières, and later embodied in the treaty of January, 1859. But the failure of the Emperor to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, as he had agreed to do, would seem to have made this condition null and void; and there is no doubt that for the moment Cavour hoped that Napoleon would not press his claim, although he had no real reason for thinking it would be passed by or forgotten. After Tuscany had been annexed contrary to his wishes, Napoleon in a letter of February, 1860, had declared that if a kingdom of central and northern Italy were formed under the house of Savoy, he should consider it a matter of simple prudence to demand a rectification of his south-eastern frontier for the security of France. When this news got abroad England was indignant. "We have been made regular dupes," wrote Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell: and in the minds of the English ministers, the war for an idea had simply cloaked the policy of spoliation. But England expostulated in vain: from the other European Powers she got neither sympathy nor satisfaction. Prussia contented herself with virtuous protestations, though she saw that the natural boundaries of France included the Rhine as well as the Alps; Russia remained indifferent; and Austria, feeling that the annexation of Savoy was no different from that of Tuscany, was rather pleased than otherwise by England's discomfiture. Switzerland alone supported England. But in spite of protestations Napoleon persisted, knowing how popular the cession was in France; and

Cavour, though he hoped to the last to save Nice, finally yielded, and on March 24th signed the treaty of cession. The popular vote in the provinces was by a large majority favourable to annexation to France; and while it is undoubtedly true that pressure was used to obtain so favourable a result, there is no evidence to show that the annexation was forced upon the provinces. For the future of Italy the loss of Savoy and Nice was undoubtedly beneficial; for Savoy was strongly legitimist and sacerdotal; she had taken exception to the innovations of her king in his rôle of constitutional sovereign; and through her deputies in the Piedmontese parliament, had persistently opposed the policy of Cavour. Unable to accommodate herself to the new *régime*, and foreign in interests and language to the new Italy that was in process of formation, it is wholly reasonable to suppose that her inclusion in the new Italian state would have been a source of constant trouble and irritation, and, as Cavour said, might have forced Italy to employ a policy of repression as rigorous as that used by Austria in her government of Venetia.

If Napoleon and the European diplomats flattered themselves that the Italian problem was now happily solved, they had reckoned without a true appreciation of Cavour's ambition. The cession of Savoy was not only a reward for the past; it was also a pledge for the future. Demanded by the Emperor to please the people of France and to strengthen his position at home, it bound him to follow, even against his better judgment, the course that Cavour was already mapping out for the further extension of the power of the house of Savoy. "Now we are accomplices," Cavour is reported to have said to Baron Talleyrand after the treaty of March 24th had been signed; and he felt that henceforth Napoleon must follow where Italy led. For Napoleon nothing could have been more disastrous. Drawn on step by step to at least a tacit acquiescence in the new schemes of aggression, he seemed to have become, as

Cavour said, an accomplice in the task of establishing that very Italian unity which he did not desire, and that, too, by measures which alienated his people from him and weakened his influence in Europe. Up to this time, the old law based upon the inviolability of treaties and the sanctity of sovereign states had been broken only by the force of popular uprisings, as in Greece, Belgium, and the states of central Italy; but now it was to be attacked and overthrown, on one hand by a revolutionary expedition, which was to effect the downfall of a legitimate government, the kingdom of Naples; on the other, by a violent invasion and dismemberment of a second legitimate government, that of the Pope, the integrity of which Europe, by its doctrine of equilibrium, was bound to defend. Such a violation of European tradition was possible only because good government and the rights of peoples were becoming of greater moment than the legitimacy of kings or the integrity of states.

During the period of the Crimean war and the annexations, the governments of Naples and Rome had shown themselves uncompromisingly hostile to Piedmont's policy, and deaf to all persuasion from England and France in behalf of reform and reorganisation. In 1856, the western Powers had withdrawn their representatives from Naples; but, after the succession in 1859 of Francis II., had resumed diplomatic relations, hoping to effect a change in the character of the government. But despite Napoleon's efforts, England's warnings, and Sardinia's threats, Francis II. declared that he meant to adhere to his father's methods for assuring the safety of the monarchy. And in Rome the situation was no better. Ever since 1848 Napoleon had been urging the Pope to consider the needs of his subjects, offering in return the support of the Catholic Powers; but under the astute and diplomatic Antonelli, every suggestion had met delays, counter-suggestions, and sarcastic references to the liberties of France. In 1860, the policy of

Antonelli, who had been in power since 1849, gave way to the more warlike program of de Merode, and Rome prepared to resist attack. Money, under the name of Peter's Pence, poured in from outside, and General Lamoricière, an old opponent of the *Coup d'état*, undertook the task of forming a papal army and of introducing a better discipline. Napoleon, thoroughly annoyed by the obstinacy and blindness of the papal authorities, now proposed through Gramont, his minister at Rome, to withdraw the French troops, and on May 11, 1860, the arrangements to this end were completed. But just at this time came the report that the expedition of the Thousand under Garibaldi had already set out from Genoa southward, and Napoleon, fearing that the dreaded revolution was at last set loose, not only retained his troops in Rome, but increased their number.

The new agent that had come to the aid of the Italian cause was as old as Young Italy itself, and was, in a sense, its representative. For two years the followers of Mazzini had been planning to rouse an insurrection at some point on the western coast of Italy, and in 1859 had invited Crispi, a Sicilian refugee, to co-operate with them. But the undertaking had been postponed, and it was not until October of the same year that the plan had been revived. Then Crispi and Farini, the ex-Piedmontese commissioner in Emilia, proposed to Rattazzi, prime minister of Sardinia after the armistice of Villafranca, that such an expedition should be sanctioned by the government; but the latter answered that the time was too perilous and the position of Piedmont too insecure to justify any such action. In the meantime Garibaldi, with nothing to do after the close of the Austro-Sardinian war, was being dissuaded with difficulty from invading the Roman states; and when in April, 1860, news came of an uprising in Palermo, and Crispi urged upon him the importance of going to the aid of the Sicilians, Garibaldi, after some hesitation, consented, and hurried to Genoa to make the necessary preparations. But Cavour,

who had been recalled to office in January, 1860, realised that the revolutionary party, though useful as an ally, might be dangerous if given too loose a rein, and feared lest the Italian cause should be injured by an enterprise as rash and impolitic as this of Garibaldi's. The king, however, whose friendly advances had been recently rejected at Naples, had more confidence in the expedition, and at this crisis stood firm, and forced his minister to yield. Cavour consoled himself with the thought that Garibaldi's attack could be disavowed if it failed, and when, on the night of May 5th, Garibaldi with 1085 men started in two steamers from Genoa, Cavour, as minister of marine, forbade the expedition, but in such terms that the Piedmontese admiral, Persano, at Cagliari, understood that he was not to be too obedient. Unchecked, therefore, the steamers touched Sicily at Marsala on the 11th, and landed the men in safety; and by the 15th, Garibaldi had won a victory at Castelfimi, and was pushing on to Palermo. Protests now poured in from Russia, Prussia, and Austria; but Cavour denied that Piedmont had anything to do with the movement. With the entrance of Garibaldi into Palermo on May 30th, Sicily was all but conquered; and the Neapolitan government, which had been stunned by the suddenness of the blow, sent its envoys first to Paris, where Napoleon, greeting them with the word, "Why have you not listened to my advice?" offered them counsel, but declared that he would adhere to a policy of non-intervention: then to London with no better results, for Palmerston was pitiless; and finally, in humiliation, to Turin, but Cavour said that it was too late. On July 20th the Neapolitan troops met Garibaldi at Milazzo, and the defeat here lost Sicily to Francis II.

Cavour was now in a perilous position: he was in danger of losing his control over the new revolutionary forces, of seeing them commit indiscretions that would alienate Napoleon, rouse the Roman Catholics of Europe, turn from Piedmont the sym-

pathies of those who disliked revolution, and perhaps endanger the whole future of Italy. He feared that if the movement were not checked, it would reach Naples, then the Roman States, and, in so doing, excite against Piedmont the wrath of France and Austria. Furthermore, Garibaldi was neither an organiser nor an administrator: he could destroy, but he could not reconstruct; and he would accept no advice. He even refused to obey when Victor Emmanuel, alarmed by the excesses of the Sicilian revolutionists, forbade him to cross the straits. At this point Thouvenel, the French minister of foreign affairs, proposed that French and English fleets intervene, and when England refused, saying that the affair was an Italian one only, Cavour himself planned a counterplot to forestall Garibaldi at Naples. Notwithstanding the fact, that a project for an alliance between the kingdoms of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies was already under consideration, he sent Admiral Persano with a part of his fleet to the bay of Naples to conspire with Villamarina, the Piedmontese representative, for the purpose of winning over the Neapolitan cabinet and fleet, and of forcing the king to withdraw from the city. This outrageous scheme of gaining control of the administration of an independent kingdom, with which Piedmont was on terms of diplomatic amity, failed, because Persano was unable to influence the king to leave his capital. Cavour, baffled in this attempt, commanded Persano to make sure of the Neapolitan fleet and force, and awaited the coming of Garibaldi's army, which was triumphantly advancing towards Naples. The confusion in the city increased; and Francis II., unmourned by his people, deserted by his ministers and soldiers, and abandoned by his fleet, left Naples for Gaëta on September 6th, the day before Garibaldi entered the city.

If Cavour's position had been perilous in August, in September it was doubly so. The revolution, which had met with success in Sicily, was now successful in Naples also; and Garibaldi, hating Cavour and all the diplomats of Piedmont,

was planning to push on to Rome, then to Venetia, and with all these provinces liberated, to lay his sword at the feet of Victor Emmanuel. But his obstinacy and his vigorous opposition to annexing any state to Piedmont until Rome and Venice should be free, made it inevitable that if he failed, he would in his fall drag down the young kingdom of Victor Emmanuel; or if he succeeded, would rouse again the reactionists by his administrative follies and his inability to govern. Having failed to anticipate him at Naples, and satisfied that the only way to save Italy was to be beforehand at Rome and seize in Italy's name the eastern provinces of the Pope, Cavour determined to take the initiative, and to crown his many audacities with one final audacity by invading the pontifical territory.

Public opinion was in his favour, for in the eyes of the Italians the provinces of Umbria and the Marches had become already national territory, not papal, and to seize them was restitution, not robbery. One Power alone could frustrate this plan, and that Power was France, whose clergy, nobility, parliamentary leaders, and government were exasperated by Cavour's "impudent sophistries." But final authority lay not in the hands of Gramont, Thouvenel, or Persigny; it lay in the hands of Napoleon, who at this time was in Savoy away from the influence of his advisers. "Act and act quickly," he is reported to have said to the Piedmontese envoys who met him at Chambéry, August 28th; and having spoken, he left Savoy for Marseilles. The papal authorities grew alarmed; for it seemed that France, who had her troops in Rome to defend the Pope, was about to allow his territory to be invaded. Antonelli questioned Gramont, but Gramont knew nothing and asked Thouvenel. Thouvenel was no wiser, and communicated with the Emperor at Marseilles. "Tell Piedmont," replied Napoleon, "that if without cause her troops enter Roman territory, I shall be obliged to withdraw my envoy from Turin." Thouvenel begged the Emperor to send this statement to Turin in the form of an

ultimatum ; but Napoleon was unwilling to do so, and toned down Thouvenel's draft until it became such a humble request that it was hardly likely to turn Cavour from his course. With his army and navy Cavour advanced to the papal frontier ; and as a pretext was wanting, sent an ultimatum to the Pope on September 7th bidding him disarm the pontifical corps, on the ground that, inasmuch as it was composed of recruits from all nations, it was "an offence to the public conscience of Italy and of Europe." On the 11th, Antonelli rejected the ultimatum ; on the same day the Piedmontese entered the provinces, and the fleet a few days later appeared before Ancona. Notwithstanding Lamoricière's preparations the defence was weak. Beaten at Castelfidardo, the papal forces made a stand at Ancona, but after a ten days' siege, this fortress fell before the combined attack of Admiral Persano and Captain Fanti. Now that the way was open to Naples and Garibaldi was powerless, Cavour had no longer anything to fear from the revolutionary forces.

But this last of the long series of affronts to the diplomatic conscience of Europe, of infringements upon the treaty of 1815, touched the religious feeling of the Catholic Powers. France was stirred to the depths ; Austria and Spain seriously thought of intervening ; Prussia protested, but without breaking off her diplomatic relations ; and Russia, doubly aggrieved by the unjustifiable violence to pontifical territory and the disgrace of her old ally, the king of Naples, recalled her envoy from Turin. A meeting of the Czar, the Emperor of Austria, and the Prince Regent of Prussia at Warsaw, October 22d–26th, seemed to portend a revival of the Holy Alliance against France ; but nothing came of it, and England, who was ready to take the lead in sanctioning the new law of nations, sent to Turin, on October 27th, a message of cordial sympathy. Thus Cavour, supported by Napoleon, though not by the French nation, by England, and by Prussia though not openly, felt justified in giving his adventurous policy one more trial by

taking advantage of all that Garibaldi and the revolutionists had accomplished. On October 21st, a vote of the people of the Two Sicilies was taken, but under such close surveillance of the official representatives as to make negative voting almost impossible. As might have been expected, the result was entirely in favour of annexation.

It now remained for the Piedmontese army to complete the work of conquest begun by Garibaldi. On November 2d, Capua fell, and on the 7th, Victor Emmanuel met Garibaldi in Naples. The meeting was a memorable one. Garibaldi, emboldened by success, and believing himself to be the master of the destinies of Italy, asked that he be appointed lieutenant of the Two Sicilies for a year, a request that Victor Emmanuel, because of his wish to bring order at once into the new provinces, positively refused to grant. Thereupon the great revolutionist showed the real nobility of his character. Declining the honours and gifts that the king would gladly have bestowed upon him and his companions, he resigned the dictatorship, only regretting that he was obliged to give it over into the hands of Cavour and his friends, and withdrew to his island home, Caprera. The place of lieutenant general was given to Farini. There now remained to be taken only Gaëta, where the young king, Francis II., surrounded by the last of his soldiers and his friends, had taken refuge. But at this point Napoleon interfered, and blocking the port with a French fleet, saved the king from capture by the Piedmontese, though a successful attack from the land side reduced the town to submission, and forced Francis II. to flee to Rome. With the exceptions of Venice and Rome, Italy was now conquered, and the establishment of a united Italian kingdom was assured.

When on February 18, 1861, there met at Turin representatives from all Italy constituting the first Italian Parliament, and when these representatives by their vote changed the title of the King of Sardinia into that of the King of Italy, a mo-

mentous period in the history of Europe came to an end, and a new nationality, young indeed and unskilled, but none the less vigorous, took its place among the other nationalities of Europe. But Cavour, who had been chiefly instrumental in winning this place for Italy, who had wrought into one the discordant elements of which it had been composed, was not destined to reap the real benefits of his labours. Scarcely had he been relieved of the burden of old anxieties when he was confronted with problems more difficult of solution than any he had yet met, problems of national rather than provincial importance, requiring a master mind. From one point of view his work was done, and well done; yet never were his boldness, his clear insight, and his sound judgment more needed than in the decade from 1860 to 1870, when the young state was called upon to complete her unity by the acquirement of Venice and Rome, and to steer her way past the dangers to which the policy of Bismarck and the struggle for the unity of Germany gave rise. And Cavour would gladly have been at the helm in this crisis; but worn out by his emotions, his labours, and his cares, the great statesman, at the crowning point of his career, passed away. On June 5, 1861, a date memorable in Italian history, Cavour died.

Italy's attainment of national independence and unity is the mightiest event that the student of European history has to reckon with between 1815 and 1861; mightier even than the revolution of 1848, and more far-reaching in its results than the Crimean war in 1855. For the first time in the history of Europe the principles of the inviolability of treaties and of hereditary sovereign rights were forced to give way to the doctrine of the rights of a nation; for the first time, those supporting the narrow and illiberal theories of the old system were forced to acknowledge themselves conquered by those who were putting into practice the more enlightened methods of government and administration that characterised the modern or new

régime. In its character and results the struggle in Italy was essentially different from the movements that had established the independence of Greece and Belgium. The Italians had won a victory over Europe, whose traditions, maxims, and prejudices, were all against them; over Austria and the petty princes, who had sought by every means in their power to oppose them; over the Roman Catholic Church, whose fundamental doctrines regarding the temporal power of the Pope were hostile to the cause they had at heart; over the revolutionary leaders, who in 1860, as in 1849, would gladly have snatched the fruits of success from those whom they had called the moderates, and have fought on to eventual defeat for an idea; and, finally, over Napoleon himself, who though he had aided the Italian cause, had no intention, as is evident from his brochure *Napoléon III. et l'Italie*, and from the terms of the treaty of Zürich, of allowing Italy to become anything but a *union fédératif*. But the victory was also that of their king, who had conquered himself, his traditions, and his prejudices, and had sacrificed his daughter and his birthland for Italy; and of Cavour, who by the sheer force of his genius had compelled Europe to recognise a new international principle based on the affinities of peoples, and had inaugurated, not only a new *régime* for Italy, but also a new public law for Europe.

CHAPTER IV.

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III.

THE elevation of Louis Napoleon to the headship of the French nation brought to an abrupt close the political progress that France, notwithstanding many governmental changes, had experienced for thirty-eight years. The people, weary of the struggles of parties, and frightened by the spectre of a "horrible Jacquerie," cleverly conjured up for the crisis of 1852, consented to the overthrow of parliamentary government; and in the interest of peace and material prosperity, allowed themselves to be mastered by a ruler whose doctrines were those of an intelligent despot, whose model was the government of the Consulate and of the Empire, and whose self-appointed mission was to complete the work of the first Napoleon. This act of France, committed in a moment of fear and excitement, and involving a complete change in her system of government, postponed the solution of all the political problems that for seventy years had been before the French people; for the new government, though intensely active in promoting the social and industrial welfare of the people, ignored, by virtue of the very principles upon which it was founded, the great question of 1793 and 1848, the question of the republic.

When, in January, 1853, Louis Napoleon stood as the crowned emperor of the French and made his opening address to the assembled deputies of the nation, he had reached, after much disappointment and labour, the goal toward which his eyes had long been turned. He had not come to power without de-

liberation, nor had he grasped the sovereignty for the mere purpose of satisfying base desires and personal ambitions. To understand the Emperor's career, one must look beyond those inconsistencies of character and action that seem to mark him as a charlatan and an adventurer, and try to get a true appreciation of the system of government which he conceived, not on the spur of the moment, but after years of brooding in exile and in prison, and which he sincerely believed would be best for France.

Napoleon III. was by nature a fatalist; his every act was performed in the firm belief that he was predestined by Providence to bring the people of France out of a state of chaos into one of order and security; to rescue them from economic distress and bestow upon them happiness and prosperity; to bring into the disordered world of European nations, national symmetry and political harmony. "Above the efforts of science and reason," he said in 1852, "there exists a Supreme Will which rules the destinies of individuals as well as of nations"; and ten years later in his *Vie de Jules César*, he set forth most pertinently his doctrine of the providential elevation of men for the performance of a definite work. Sensible of an obligation to the name he bore, and confident that he should reach the foreordained end in spite of all obstacles that circumstances might throw in his path, he never hesitated or despaired. And this persistent catering to one idea made him, who was by nature timid and irresolute, appear bold and audacious, rash, and fond of that which was sensational. In spite of himself he became a conspirator; for having conspired to gain power, he was compelled to conspire to preserve it; and dreamer, as well as practical politician, he often appeared to be deceiving others intentionally, whereas, in fact, he was himself deceived. But all his acts cannot be excused on these grounds; for possessed of no scruples of conscience, devoid of moral principles in political affairs, and convinced that his mission required that he master

events rather than be mastered by them, he would frequently act with total disregard of every code of political ethics, speak of his devotion to the republic and the constitution even while plotting against them, and present matters in a manner always favourable to his own purpose and program. The government of the Empire was one which in no way represented an historical progress; which owed its being to a clever manipulation of circumstances, and its maintenance to a persistent concealment of its weaknesses; and which was dominated by a man of mediocre ability, whose ideas were a strange medley of the philanthropic, the despotic, and the revolutionary. It is not a cause for wonder that such a government should have shown signs of decay before it had run half its course, and, in the end, should have fallen an easy victim to the attack of an outside power.

Napoleon's political opinions, as first formulated, were expressed in the *Idées Napoléoniennes* in 1839, and afterward were fully worked out in his various speeches and manifestoes dating from 1849 to 1870. Convinced that parliamentary rule as a principle of government was injurious to the welfare of the French, and as a social guarantee, a lasting cause of disorder, he declared that unity, peace, and the security of the country could be obtained only by the revival of the governmental system of 1799, 1802, and 1804; that the concentration of the executive power was necessary, if the happiness of the people and the prosperity of the state were to be increased, and if the state were to be established upon firm foundations. He believed that after so many revolutions, France needed, not a constitution, but a system; and above all the firm hand and the firm will of an absolute prince, who, rising superior to the passions of party, would work for a single end—the prosperity of France. To this thought he gave expression in 1839, and repeated it in the well-known message of October 31, 1849. "An entire system triumphed on the 10th of December," so the message ran;

"for the name Napoleon is a complete program in itself; it wishes to say: within, order, authority, religion, the welfare of the people; without, national dignity." But he had no desire to wield tyrannical or arbitrary power, he was not a reactionist in the sense in which that term applied to the Bourbons of the Restoration; for he recognised progress and gloried in it, and believed that a government to be successful must be progressive, that one based on immutable forms could not last. Convinced that national conglomerations of people were the divinely appointed form that all states were destined to take, he made nationality the basis of his empire. He constantly spoke of himself as a democratic chief, the chosen of December 10th, upon whom the people might impose new burdens. "Faithful to my origin," he wrote in 1861, "I do not consider the prerogatives of my Crown either as a sacred trust which no one can touch, or as a heritage of my ancestors which it is necsesary to leave intact to my son. Chosen by the people, and representing their interests, I will always abandon without regret every prerogative useless to the public weal, just as I will preserve unshaken in my hands all power indispensable to the tranquillity and prosperity of the country." Of his sincerity in this statement later events were to give the proof.

But liberty he refused to place among the foundation stones of the imperial edifice, because, as he said in 1853, he was convinced that the exercise of political liberty had weakened every French government since the fall of the first Napoleon; in fact, that liberty had never helped to form any durable political system. He deemed it necessary first to establish order, to organise and consolidate all departments of government, and after placing the empire on a firm foundation, to crown it with liberty,—as the first Napoleon would have done, so said his nephew, had not "the statesmen of Europe in the name of liberty—but rather of licence—roused the nations of Europe, and defeated the Emperor, first at Leipzig, and then at Water-

loo." It was the mission of the great Emperor's heir, Louis Napoleon believed, to finish the work so well begun, first by re-establishing a Napoleonic system without liberty, and gradually, by voluntarily limiting his own prerogatives, to give the people a share in the government, and so to identify his *régime* with principles of liberty and progress. And he was given courage for his work by a firm belief that France wished to see put into practice the plans of the first Napoleon, and that upon himself, as the bearer of the Napoleonic name, devolved the sacred duty of restoring, in all its efficiency, the Napoleonic system.

But Napoleon III. interpreted the *idée Napoléonienne* in terms, not of war, but of peace. His was to be an Augustan, not a Cesarian, era, an era of peace and happiness following one of military activity. "It is not an idea of war," he wrote in 1839, "but a social, industrial, and commercial idea—an idea of humanity." On October 9, 1852, he expressed this thought at Bordeaux in a more elaborate form, in what has not been inaptly called the manifesto of the empire. "Some say, in a spirit of defiance, 'the empire is war'; but I say, 'the empire is peace.' It is peace, for France desires it; and when France is satisfied the world is tranquil. . . . I have, however, like the Emperor, conquests to make. Like him, I wish to draw into the stream of the great popular river those hostile side-currents which tend to lose themselves without profit to anyone. I wish to conquer to religion, to morality, to prosperity, that still numerous part of the population which, in the midst of the country of faith and belief, knows little of the precepts of Christ; which, in the midst of a land the most fertile in the world, can scarcely enjoy the chief necessities it produces. We have immense uncultivated territories to clear, routes to open, harbours to excavate, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, our network of railroads to complete. We have opposite Marseilles a vast kingdom to assimilate to France; we have to

bring all our great ports of the west nearer to the American continent by the more rapid communications, which have hitherto failed us. Finally, we have everywhere ruins to reconstruct, false gods to overthrow, truths to make triumphant. This is how I understand the empire, if the empire ought to be re-established. Such are the conquests that I meditate, and you who surround me, you are my soldiers."

This was the imperial program, this the policy outlined in fullest sincerity, that Napoleon III. placed before himself at the beginning of his reign; and to it he faithfully adhered in all but one particular. He made economic conquests; he crowned the edifice with liberty; but he did not avoid the issue of war, and that destroyed him. Naturally irresolute, accustomed to pursue a tortuous and secret path in diplomacy, and wanting in directness of purpose, he was never master of events either at home or abroad. In internal affairs, he was controlled to no inconsiderable extent by Persigny during the earlier years, by Rouher, Prince Napoleon, and Drouyn de Lhuys during the later; and in foreign affairs he became an instrument in the hands, first of Cavour and then of Bismarck, the sport of national forces which he had helped to create but which he was powerless to control.

To comprehend Napoleon's influence, and to understand what made it possible for him to carry out, without hindrance, his ambitious plans, one must turn to the constitution which he himself had drafted, and which he had promulgated by virtue of the authority given him in the *plébiscite* of December 20, 1851. Intentionally modelled after the constitution of the Consulate, and, as revised in 1852, after that of the Empire, it gave first place to the chief of the executive power. Louis Napoleon, first as "president for ten years," and afterward as Emperor, was vested with the command of the army and the navy; and had the right to declare war, to arrange political and commercial alliances, to conclude treaties of peace, and to issue

rules and decrees for the execution of the law. In his name justice was to be rendered, and he held in his own hands the pardoning power ; he could declare any department in a state of siege after referring the matter to the Senate ; and upon him the ministers depended absolutely. He alone could initiate legislation, sanction and promulgate the laws ; he alone could assemble, adjourn, prorogue, and dissolve the *Corps législatif*, as the popular body was called, and he need not summon another for six months ; he alone could convene the High Court of Justice ; and, furthermore, he could name those members of the Senate who were raised to that dignity from the rank of ordinary citizens. He could appoint and remove all members of the Council of State, was himself the president of the latter body, and could name the president and vice-president of both the Senate and the *Corps législatif*. And finally all employees of the government were required to take an oath of obedience to the constitution and of fidelity to the chief executive. In the exercise of all these important functions, the executive was responsible to no one save to the people, and to them his responsibility was a mere name. As president for ten years or Emperor for life, his tenure was secure against any attack through popular suffrage. He could be brought to trial by the High Court of Justice for plots against the internal and external safety of the state; but inasmuch as that body could be convened only when the executive so decreed, he could neither be dismissed nor brought to trial without his own consent.

The legislative functions were in the hands of the executive, the Senate, and the *Corps législatif*, while the Council of State performed certain supplemental and deliberative duties. But none of these bodies was able, in reality, to offer any serious resistance to the executive will. The *Corps législatif*, though elected for six years by universal suffrage, was for the first decade a practically powerless body. Deprived of all means of protest, as the address to the throne was abolished, and all in-

terpellations and petitions were forbidden; with no opportunity of introducing a new policy by overthrowing or censuring the ministry, as the members of the cabinet were not allowed to be deputies, and were prohibited from appearing on the floor of the Chamber; and with no means of influencing public opinion, or of making their eloquence known to the people, as the minutes of the proceedings were issued through the president, an appointee of the executive, in but one, and that the official, form; —under all these circumstances, it was inevitable that the deputies should lose their interest in the government, and should make scarcely any attempt to emancipate themselves from the control of the Emperor. Usually they voted all laws submitted to them without murmuring, and during the greater part of the reign were merely a deliberative body, expressing the will, not of the people, but of the executive. Such were the essential characteristics of the constitution of 1852, a consitution which was founded, not on tradition and experience, but on theory; which never worked in entire harmony with the theory according to which it had been constructed; which bore trace of the handiwork of the Abbé Siéyès, that arch constitution-maker of the Revolution; which, though simple in conception, was cumbersome and complicated in its workings; and which, though intended to give sovereignty to the people, in reality wrested it from them, destroyed for the time being all popular interest in political affairs, did nothing to strengthen the principles of democracy upon which it was supposed to be based, created a *régime* that had all the marks of a despotism; and in the name of the people of France, granted enormous powers to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

The chief characteristic of the internal history of France from 1852 to 1857 is a steady development in the strength of the Empire. The opposition to the new *régime* was slight, for so effectual had been the *coup d'état* that few voices were raised, few acts committed, against the Napoleonic supremacy. The

republicans who remained at home were held firmly in check, and denied liberty of the press, of reunion, and of association; and the republicans who had fled abroad, and were living in Nice, the Pyrenees, Geneva, the cities of Germany, and especially those in Belgium and England, vented their wrath to no purpose at meetings in cafés and private houses, through pamphlets, which were with difficulty smuggled into France, and through societies, which made vain efforts to stir up insurrection in that country. Toward the other parties the government acted with characteristic adroitness. Though Louis Philippe was dead, and the Orléanists had made but few attempts to support the cause of his grandson, yet between them and the Empire there was perpetual war; for Napoleon, never for an instant forgetting their scornful epigrams and speeches, and the intensity with which they had warred against him in the National Assembly, did not rest until he had driven every Orléanist or Orléanist sympathiser from political office, and even from political life. With the Legitimists, however, it was different; for the Count of Chambord, though immovable in his convictions, was not the man to fight for a throne that he thought should be his by prescriptive right. Napoleon, knowing this, and believing the Legitimists to be useful allies, because of their connection with the church, and ornaments, by virtue of their rank and relation to the old *régime*, pardoned their indiscretions, and contented himself with reproving their most zealous sympathisers. They, in turn, accepted the situation, almost ceased to exist as an active party, and sank year by year into a deeper oblivion.

Over against this policy of threats, punishments, and intimidations for the republicans and Orléanists, and of tolerance for the Legitimists, Napoleon placed another of kind acts, favours, and rewards for the nation at large, which had condoned his crime and accepted his leadership. Repression and progress, the one necessary in order to make the other possible, became

the catchwords of the Empire : first to establish the Empire and then to reform it, was the plan ever uppermost in the imperial mind. To raise France socially and materially, to make use of all that modern science and invention could furnish for improving the condition of the people, was the aim of the Emperor, and in 1852 he began to put into execution this plan, which took but little account of the ethical and intellectual needs of France. Bodily comfort and material gain were given by Napoleon as a solace for the loss of liberty; and, for the time being, a promising economic activity concealed the serious want of moral and religious strength.

The Emperor, first of all, turned his attention to works of charity and philanthropy. Asylums and maternity hospitals were opened, and at Vincennes and Le Vésinet, hospitals for injured labourers ; the number of mutual relief societies, the first of which had been founded in 1850, was increased, and their influence extended ; and public assistance was given for the improvement of the houses of workingmen, both in the cities and in the country. These excellent undertakings were supported in part from the sale of the Orléanist estates, in part, from the private purse of the Emperor. But Napoleon had larger projects in mind, and in carrying them out he showed profound sagacity ; for he made the economic forces, which were bringing about an industrial revolution in other parts of Europe, work, not only to the advantage of France, but especially to that of his government and himself. With full allowance for the many evils his scheme entailed, and notwithstanding the fact that in operation it lacked unity and completeness, it was most beneficial to the country, and did more to ameliorate social conditions than had all the reform measures of the two preceding governments.

For the benefit of landed proprietors who desired to increase their working capital or improve their land, there were established in 1852 credit banks, whence could be obtained loans

upon first mortgages, bearing five per cent. interest, and payable in easy, yearly instalments. This *crédit foncier* for the improvement of agriculture favoured, on the whole, the larger proprietors, but was less advantageous to the small farmers, for whom originally it had been intended ; it benefited the proprietary interests of the cities, but did little to hasten the actual improvement of the country lands. This effort to stimulate agricultural pursuits in France was supplemented, in the same year, by the establishment of the *crédit mobilier*, which was designed to increase the public wealth by the encouragement and promotion of great undertakings. The railway system, which had been left in a very incomplete condition by the July Monarchy, was extended until, in 1856, the number of miles of constructed railways had increased from two to nearly six thousand. Steamboat lines were established, and the extension of the telegraph was begun. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the period was the opening of telegraphic communication between the Tuileries and the French camp in the Crimea, by means of a cable, which was sunk in the Black Sea on April 25, 1855. The Emperor, relying on the support of public opinion, encouraged all enterprises that promised to be successful and beneficial, in the hope that many of them would come to be associated with the Napoleonic name ; and in this he was not disappointed. The people, welcoming the new inventions that doubled their exchanges and increased their profits, paid homage to the imperial name, praised the Emperor for his good works, and gave signs of satisfaction that seemed to guarantee to the Empire a security that it probably never possessed.

But side by side with these evidences of economic activity, there existed, during these early years of the Empire, conditions productive of great want and misery to the people. Insufficient harvests in 1853 and 1854 raised the price of wheat at home, while the war with Russia cut off an important source of

supply from without. Cholera appeared, and destroyed, it is said, 150,000 people ; and the miserable condition of the people was still further aggravated by inundations, which were due to the rising of the rivers, notably of the Rhone and of the Garonne. Yet, to all seeming, money was never more plenty, the life of the court never more magnificent. Speculation became the business of the day. Capitalists, who had been timid during the disturbed period of the war, were eager to invest money in the new enterprises, and business was made even more brisk by the rumours of newly discovered gold in California and Australia. Rapid gains were expected, money easily made was quickly spent, and luxury increased. All the nation was at the Bourse. Rich and poor, men and women, those in official circles,—even those in the antechambers of the ministry, —were engaged in the fascinating pursuit of buying and selling. The opportunities for amassing wealth were numberless. The stocks and securities of railway lines, gas companies, mining companies, and various agricultural organisations, and government, municipal, and departmental bonds, due to the many loans made necessary by the extensive public works and, above all, by the Crimean war, were sold, bought back, and sold again. The excitement, naturally aroused by such conditions, was increased by the rumours, true and false, from the seat of war ; while the telegraph enlarged the field of speculation, by carrying these reports from Paris to the provinces. The condition of France was becoming unhealthy both financially and morally, and the illusion of wealth thus created was increased by the policy of the court. The Tuileries set an example of luxury that was alluring to those of lower rank. Fêtes, receptions, entertainments of all kinds, which were given to the empress at the time of her marriage in 1853, and continued by her afterward, gave to the life in Paris the appearance of a perpetual carnival. Even while the people were in want, while cholera and the war in the Crimea were claiming new victims,

the splendours of Paris were maintained, defended by the specious argument that "a fête was a rain of gold that watered all industries." In consequence, even as early as 1856, the people, attracted by the luxury of the court life, and seeing it copied by all those who came within the area of its magnetic influence, drew false conclusions, and forgetting misery and want, forgetting the evils of war and the losses by flood, began to believe in sources of wealth that did not exist.

Nor is it surprising that the nation should have come to believe that a period of prosperity was at hand: Baron Haussmann's grand scheme for rebuilding Paris in 1853, and the great exhibition of Paris in 1855, in themselves would have warranted such a belief. According to Haussmann's plan, Paris was to be remodelled first, by the destruction of many dingy quarters and streets, that the space about the greater buildings might be increased, and the sanitary conditions of the city improved; and then, by the construction of great boulevards, in order to admit light and air, to make easier the movement of troops, to allow freer circulation to the crowds of Paris, and to make more accessible the railway stations that communicated with the provinces. Though the original plans were never carried out in all their detail, the work accomplished was of lasting benefit to France: the "great cross of Paris," with its arms intersecting at the tower of St. Jacques, will ever stand as a monument to the ability and perseverance of the famous ædile. And the work was of immediate, as well as ultimate, value. Like the promotion of railway building, the speculations of the Bourse, the fêtes of the Tuileries, the splendours of the exhibition, and the war in the Crimea, it diverted the mind of the people, it drew their attention from the *coup d'état* and the loss of political liberty, and it added to the glory of Napoleon and the Empire.

In the year 1856 Louis Napoleon had reached the zenith of his career. For four years the internal condition of France

had been one of peace ; revolution and disturbance had been checked ; happiness and content had again come to the nation ; good works had been undertaken, and public improvements made ;—on all sides were signs of material prosperity. The people, though suffering, seemed appeased in their discontent as they saw the Emperor concerned for their welfare, founding hospitals for those stricken with the epidemic, visiting the inundated districts, giving of his bounty to the homeless, and relieving the misery caused by bad harvests. Those who were in office, with increased salaries and numberless opportunities of making money, recognised the value of attachment to the government, and lauded the imperial name ; the moneyed classes paid homage to the man who had increased their opportunities of gaining wealth, and had quieted disorder, that capital might be productive; the army, after winning glory in the east, returned to France proud of the distinction that it had won under the banner of the Emperor ; and the clergy, little recking of the clouds that were soon to gather, eulogised Napoleon as the defender of the Pope, the benefactor of the church, and the protector of the state. Only the intellectual class was silent : in the salons and the Academy the opposition to the Empire found refuge.

In foreign relations good fortune had with equal persistence favoured the Emperor. In less than two years and a half after the *coup d'état*, his government had been recognised by all the European Powers ; as an ally of England he had engaged in war against Russia ; in less than four years, because of the victories of his troops in the Crimea and especially of the taking of Sebastopol, he had gained the reputation of having the finest army in Europe ; and he had received the highest honours that diplomacy could bestow, in having his capital selected as the meeting place of the peace congress. In his beautiful city of Paris he entertained his guests with that lavish hospitality for which the Tuileries had already become famous ;

and acting as the head of the European concert, courted by Russia on one hand and by Piedmont on the other, and on friendly terms with England and Prussia, he seemed to hold in his grasp the power to shape the future of Europe. And then, that Providence might not seem to have exhausted its gifts, he was gladdened at this, the crowning point of his career, by the birth of a son, heir to the destinies of the Empire.

Yet even during these first happy years there appeared signs full of bad omen for the future. Increasing expenses required frequent loans ; while to the casual observer Paris seemed all life and happiness and prosperity, for him who cared to listen there was a low murmur of discontent among the people, wrung from them by their want and misery ; popular support, which had been granted the Emperor, not because of any real devotion to his *régime*, but rather because of his generous interest and gifts, could be retained only by continued interest and benefactions ; the forcing of the material development of France, too often at the expense of the religious and intellectual development, was encouraging an unsymmetrical growth ; while the Emperor's secret diplomatic methods, and his want of decision and a fixed plan, displayed his fatal defects as a ruler, and made it questionable whether, in the presence of greater diplomatic crises, than those which had thus far arisen, he could preserve the reputation for statesmanship that his clever management of the *coup d'état* had won for him. All these indications, however, were too far below the surface to attract any general attention, in the midst of the many excitements and diversions that attended the new reign.

But in 1857, when were held the first general elections since 1851, a slight re-awakening of public opinion was noticeable. The time had come for a renewal of the members of the *Corps législatif*, and preparations for that event were made throughout the country. In consequence of interference on the part of prefects, of the manipulation of election districts, of the in-

difference of the public, and of the prestige acquired by five years of successful rule, the candidates of the government were, in nearly every case, returned by considerable majorities, and the new legislature was, therefore, little different from the old, was little more than a willing tool in the hands of the Emperor. Yet there was one notable difference between the Chamber that had assembled in the summer of 1852 and this which met in December, 1857. The former, to a man, had supported the imperial policy; but in the latter there existed an extreme Left, composed, at first, of three men, Hénon, Darimon, and Ollivier, and, after the election of Picard and Jules Favre in April, 1858, of five, *Les Cinq*, as they were called, who became the advance guard of a true constitutional opposition. The number, at first insignificant, increased with each new election, until finally the party of opposition, aided by the press, and by those who were desirous of restoring to France some measure of parliamentary government, was able to make the first break in the solid Empire.

At this point, when political life in France was as yet but little disturbed, an event occurred that carried in train consequences most disastrous to the Empire. On the 14th of January, 1858, four days before the members of the new *Corps législatif* assembled, an Italian, Orsini, and two accomplices attempted to assassinate the Emperor as, at half after eight in the evening, he was about to enter the opera house with the empress. As if by a miracle, both escaped injury; but eight persons were killed outright, or died afterwards, and about one hundred and forty were wounded. Immediately a great outcry arose against all revolutionists and revolutionary projects. Piedmont, Belgium, and England were accused of harbouring exiles, and were called hatchers of plots, because, as the French government claimed, these countries had not only offered asylum to conspirators but had allowed them to form there their plans of assassination. On January 20th, Walewski sent a vehement despatch

to the French ambassador in London, stating that Pianori, Tibaldi, and now Orsini had prepared their schemes in that city, and declaring that England had no right "to protect that class, which, by its flagrant acts, placed itself outside of common justice and under the ban of humanity." Having made this protest, the government prepared repressive laws for France. On January 27th a decree was issued dividing the state into military districts, and the "law of general security," which was put before the Chamber on February 1st, was, on the 11th of the same month, adopted by a vote of 217 to 24.

Thus a law was passed that conferred upon the government the right to proscribe without judgment those whom it suspected to be its enemies, to forbid them the country, to confine them in France, or to deport them to Algeria. It was a vaguely expressed measure, granting arbitrary and dictatorial powers out of all proportion to the crime committed, a measure confusing executive and judicial functions, capable of ready extension in the hands of the Emperor, of application to any movement, small or great, that seemed dangerous to the imperial policy. While it is true that only Ollivier and a few others in the *Corps législatif* opposed the law, and that in the Senate General MacMahon alone spoke against it, it is equally true that the people in general condemned it. A feeling of dismay spread throughout France, of wonder that the imperial power should feel so insecure as to need this military protection, this instrument of proscription; that the government which could boast of having maintained order for six years, should now admit that such legislation was needed to preserve it. But the ministry, recovering a little from its fright, and fearing that the new law was rousing discontent instead of stilling it, weakening confidence instead of strengthening it, and exasperating friends and foes alike instead of winning supporters to the government, tried to mend matters by restricting the operation of the law to seven years, and by making its application, in any given case,

depend upon the combined consent of a prefect, a general, and a procureur-general. Notwithstanding this effort, "the law of general security," known among the people as "the law of suspects," weakened greatly the loyalty of France and strengthened the cause of the opposition, proof of which fact was given at the time of the supplemental elections in April, when Paris, to show its disapproval of the obnoxious law, elected, by a good majority, Jules Favre, the defender of Orsini.

And the attempt to assassinate the Emperor not only affected the internal political condition of France; it also led to trouble with England, with whom the relations had been none too good since the signing of the treaty of Paris. The English people were enraged at the too outspoken expressions of the French press, and of certain French generals and colonels who seemed to be charging England with complicity in the attack; and on the other hand, the French were equally indignant, when on February 19, 1858, Parliament, as an answer to the "addresses of the colonels," overthrew Palmerston, who had just brought in a conspiracy bill; and when an English jury acquitted an accomplice of Orsini, Bernhard, of whose guilt, so the French believed, there was ample proof. Fortunately, the sovereigns of the two countries did not share the popular ill-will, and in a meeting at Cherbourg the August following, made every effort to efface all traces of the unpleasant episode.

It would seem that Napoleon had already suffered enough at the hands of Orsini; but like a sinister fate, the spirit of the Italian pursued him, and drove him to his ruin. Orsini paid for his crime with his life; but his testament, in which he appealed to the Emperor to make Italy free, worked upon Napoleon's mind, and caused him to adopt a policy that in the end destroyed him. We have noted how Napoleon, instead of abandoning Cavour, as he might have done with reason after this attempt upon his life by an Italian patriot, only prosecuted more diligently his plan of going to war with Austria for the

cause of Italy ; and how, in July, 1858, he summoned Cavour to meet him at Plombières, and before a third of the year 1859 had run its course, was at the head of his troops helping Italy to drive the Austrian white coats from Lombardy. And there is no need of our mentioning again the incidents of the war, the terms of Villafranca, or the events leading to the annexation of the various states to Piedmont. What we are here chiefly interested in discovering is, why the Italian policy was so injurious to the imperial cause ; why, in Italy, the fate of the Second Empire was decided.

Until the year 1858 Napoleon had pursued his course with due regard to the interests of the nation of which he was the head ; but with his entrance into the Italian war, he adopted a policy, in forming which he had consulted, not the needs and traditions of the nation, as sound statesmanship should have prompted him to do, but his own personal sympathies, his own sentimental and humanitarian views. At Plombières, he for the first time committed himself to a policy based upon his theory regarding nationalities and races, which, though never very clearly formed even in his own mind, he persistently tried to carry out, and in so doing used all the forces that France by the constitution of 1852 had placed at his disposal. Little did he dream that the consequences of this act would work nothing but harm for him : he did not foresee that the Italian war, while winning freedom for Italy, would weaken his own position both in France and Europe ; that the expedition to Mexico would ruin him financially and morally ; that his attitude toward Prussia would bring about the destruction of his Empire. Standing at the congress of Paris as the most influential man in Europe, he overestimated his own power to manage and hold in check the national movements, both in Italy and Germany, which he honestly desired to aid. But once embarked upon the Italian adventure, he found himself borne along on the current far beyond the point that he had set

for himself. At first desiring only a north Italian kingdom as one member of an Italian confederation, of which the Pope should be the head, he was led on, at one time resisting, at another consenting, to sanction the overthrow of the sovereign state of Naples, the seizure of the lands of the Pope, and the establishment of a single greater Italy composed of all the states of the peninsula. It was inevitable that under these circumstances he should appear vacillating and inconsistent. To sign the treaty of Zürich and then to sanction acts that rendered its provisions null and void, was a policy that roused the distrust of Europe ; to agree to the overthrow of Naples and the attack on Rome, was enough to rouse the enmity of the eastern Powers, and to bring against France a new coalition; to annex Savoy and Nice, after disclaiming all idea of conquest, was sufficient to destroy England's confidence in him, and to endanger their friendly relations. From the close of the Italian war his influence declined, and by 1863, in consequence of his wavering policy, he had forever lost his dominant place in European politics, and had forfeited the trust of the Powers. Even Italy, whose cause he had supported, began to mistrust the man who had signed the armistice of Villafranca, had protected Francis II. at Gaëta, and was upholding the Pope in Rome.

Nor was the Emperor's Italian policy of any advantage to him at home. It so thoroughly annoyed Legitimists, Orléanists, liberal Catholics, and constitutionalists of all grades of opinion, that the good results of the early attempts at reconciliation were undone, and the country was once more divided into parties. The Legitimists were thrice wounded : as upholders of the doctrine of legitimacy, they resented the overthrow and despoliation of legitimate sovereigns ; as Bourbons they keenly felt the downfall of the Bourbon king of Naples ; as Roman Catholics who made their religious creed a part of their political creed, they were outraged by Napoleon's views regarding the temporal power of the Pope as expressed in his pamphlet *Le*

Pape et le Congrès. The old alliance with the clergy was at an end, and war between the clerical party and the government almost at once broke out. When, through episcopal mandates and the press, the clerical party sustained vigorously the rights of the Pope, and violently condemned the conduct of the government, the latter, in reply, suppressed the clerical paper *L'Univers* and confiscated the ecclesiastical pamphlets, returning war for war. The constitutionalist leaders, who had never ceased to oppose the imperial policy, because they considered the erection of a strong state on the south-eastern border harmful to the welfare of France, strongly disapproved of the manner in which the Emperor conducted his diplomatic business, deeming him forgetful of the interests of his advisers as well as of France. The democrats,—such as Jules Favre,—who favoured the cause of Italian unity, were aggrieved that the armistice of Villafranca had stopped the movement half way, and had driven the Emperor over to the side of Austria ; in short, the imperial policy satisfied no one except the Emperor's immediate supporters. Then, too, the Italian campaign and the events that followed betrayed, as nothing had done hitherto, the real inability and weakness of the Emperor himself, his underhand methods, and his powers of intrigue. Many began to say, as did Lord Palmerston, that the "Emperor's mind seemed to be as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits," and to doubt whether, after all, there lay under that taciturn and sphinx-like exterior, the genius that had been ascribed to him.

Such were the results of this unfortunate Italian policy. Napoleon himself appreciated the changed situation, and in 1860 made many attempts to counteract its bad effects. In order to increase the prosperity of France, he gave his support to certain measures touching the economic relations with other countries. The negotiations that had been under way with England since 1852 for a treaty of commerce on the basis of a reduction of duties, were, after considerable delay, due in part to

the Emperor's entanglement in Italian affairs, in part to a great deal of opposition at home, finally brought to an end by a treaty signed on January 23, 1860. This treaty fixed for ten years the commercial relations between France and England, suppressed old tariffs, and introduced a system of moderate duties. A great outcry at once arose : protectionists declared that French interests were being sacrificed for English, just as in the war with Italy they had said that French interests were being sacrificed for Italian ; constitutionalists were amazed at the secrecy with which the negotiations had been conducted ; and the whole country was stirred by the debate that arose upon the subject in the *Corps législatif.* That body confirmed the treaty, but the controversy regarding it was ominous for a long continuance of the personal government of the Emperor. A little later, in August, 1860, an expedition was undertaken in conjunction with England, for the purpose of compelling China to adhere to the treaty of Tien-Tsin of June 27, 1858. After defeating the Chinese at Palikao, the allies obtained a renewal of the treaty and of certain important articles whereby eleven Chinese ports were thrown open to the western Powers. This notable step in the history of international commerce, which brought China and Japan into touch with the western world and added an important colonial territory to France, was not without its evil consequences for the Emperor. Not only was it an exceedingly expensive expedition calling for new loans, but it led to no little unpleasant and unjust comment in France to the effect, that the privileges conceded by the Chinese were less to the advantage of France than to that of England, who was almost exclusively mistress of commerce in the east.

A new incident now disclosed even more clearly the difficult position in which the Emperor was placed. In the spring of 1860, the Druses, Mussulman agriculturists of the Lebanon, attacked and massacred many of the Maronites or Syrian Christians ; and in July, a mob of fanatical Mussulmans

assaulted the Christian quarters in Damascus, murdered two thousand Christians, and destroyed the consulates of France, Austria, Russia, Holland, Belgium, and Greece. Napoleon at once proposed to the Powers that they should interfere for the purpose of restoring order, and on August 3d, a convention to discuss the matter was held. On September 5th, a treaty with the Porte was signed, according to which France was to send 6,000 men to Syria, and England was to co-operate with the fleet for the purpose of stopping the massacres in Syria, and of establishing order and peace in the Turkish territory. The French occupation proved to be entirely successful ; but as six months, the term set by the Powers, was found to be too short a time in which to restore order satisfactorily, France kept her troops in Syria beyond the date agreed upon. The distrust of England was at once aroused : English statesmen, mindful of the annexations of Savoy and Nice, and fearing the loss of British influence in the east, maintained that the French Emperor was planning to obtain a protectorate over Syria, and on this ground, demanded that the troops be recalled. This eagerness of England to discover an unworthy motive for Napoleon's conduct was partly justified by the Emperor's change of attitude toward Turkey since the Crimean war ; but it was due, in the main, to a selfish determination to prevent France from gaining a foothold in the east. It is wholly probable that the Emperor had advocated the cause of the Syrians, partly from instincts of humanity, partly from a desire to win again the favour of the clerical party in France, for the Jesuits and Lazarists had already established schools among the Maronites. This England would not believe, however, and although the occupation was prolonged by the common consent of the Powers to June 5, 1861, it was brought to an end because of England's insistence, before its object had been fully attained. Ever on the alert for something to criticise, the people of France now condemned the Emperor for yielding too easily to the wishes of England.

Thus with the year 1861 the straight path, which, in his manifesto of 1850, the Emperor had promised to follow, had become a winding and devious course, turning sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, sometimes passing underground only to appear again in an unexpected quarter. Yet, meanwhile, he had not forgotten his original promises. In July, 1860, he had written to Persigny: "I said at Bordeaux—and I am still of the same mind—that I have great conquests to make; but they are to be made in France. I have still to organise this country morally and socially; I have still to develop her internal resources, which even yet are in a languishing condition; and those objects present fields for my ambition vast enough to more than satisfy it." That he might prove his sincerity, he had negotiated commercial treaties first with England, and later with Belgium, Prussia and the Zollverein, Holland, Spain, and Austria, which inaugurated a new era in the commercial history of Europe; he had increased the number of commercial privileges of the French colonies, opened three lines of steamers to America and Africa, established steamship service in the Mediterranean, and encouraged de Lesseps to carry through the work on the Suez Canal.

Nor was he unmindful of the fact that he had promised to resign some of his own prerogatives that the people might have a share in the government of France. Forced by the events of the Italian war and by the breach with the clerical party to turn toward the constitutional liberals, he made his first attempt to draw the latter to his support by issuing on September 24, 1860, a decree that restored the address to the throne and allowed the deputies in the Chamber to interrogate freely the commissioners of the government on all matters pertaining to the internal and external policy of the state. The immediate effect of this act was almost startling: the sessions of the *Corps législatif* increased enormously in interest; the public again crowded to hear parliamentary debates; and when, in March,

1861, the first address under the new decree was presented in the Chamber, oratory of a high order was heard once more in France. But of greater importance was it that some of the ablest orators were in the opposition, criticising freely the imperial policy, denouncing the law of general security, the law limiting the press, and the various financial measures which had been passed up to this time; and that when the address was finally voted, it was found, to the consternation of the imperialists, that ninety members of the Right—the clerical and monarchical party—had voted against the government, as an emphatic reply of the advocates of the temporal power of the Pope to the Emperor's policy in Italy.

From this time the constitutional opposition steadily increased. Notwithstanding the fact that Ollivier, influenced by the concession of the address, was beginning to favour the cause of the liberal Empire, *Les Cinq*, becoming bolder, proposed in 1862 a number of amendments to the address of a most audacious character. They demanded liberty of the press, freedom of elections, right of reunion, and direct nomination of the mayors by the citizens; and the next year, 1863, on the eve of the elections, embodied these demands and others in the form of a program for the liberal party. This party was rapidly taking on an organised form, and its cause was strengthened by the growing hostility to the Emperor on the part of the bishops and many of the men of letters in France. In celebrating with pomp the services of the martyrs of Castelfidardo, the bishops did not hesitate to liken the Emperor to Pontius Pilate, and to echo the Pope's charge that Napoleon III. had persecuted the church while pretending to protect it. And again, when the minister of public instruction transformed the old chair of Hebrew in the College of France into one of comparative philology and appointed Renan to fill it, a veritable battle raged between the Roman Catholics and the government, in which the latter was finally worsted. In the conflict with the men of letters, Victor

de Leprade was removed from his professorship at Lyons for verses full of unpleasant allusions to the Emperor ; the editor who published the letter of the Duke of Aumale " upon the history of France," defending the Bourbons and attacking the Bonapartists, was sentenced to fine and imprisonment ; and certain conferences and courses of lectures that were organised in Paris for a more liberal study of history, literature, and geography, were suspended or forbidden, because it was known that the promoters of them were hostile to the government. So the war went on, while the country was awakening to a new political life.

The test of the situation was soon made; for on May 31, 1863, were held the general elections for the renewal of the *Corps législatif*. Both sides were determined to win, and neither left anything undone that might seem to promise success. Persigny acted with an ardour worthy of a better cause. Administrative pressure was applied by every functionary from minister to mayor : prefects intimidated voters, promised, favoured, and arrested ; electoral districts were changed, opposition placards mutilated, opposition manifestoes confiscated in the post. This was a disgraceful display of governmental interference ; and though it may not be just to hold the Emperor responsible for the doings of Persigny and the prefects, nevertheless he was blamed at the time, and their methods were a damning commentary upon his pretensions of liberal government. Democrats and clericals alike voted with the opposition, and it early became evident that important results would be obtained. Thanks to its policy of favouritism and intimidation, the government was victorious in the provinces ; but in Paris and the larger cities, where liberal ideas had spread with greater rapidity, it was defeated ; in all, thirty-five deputies opposed to the government were returned. The meaning of this was significant : the spirit of revolt stirring in the labouring people in the cities, had tended to separate them from the peasants of the

country ; in other words, the Napoleonic legend and name had lost their influence, and Paris had broken with the Emperor. And Napoleon at once appreciated the importance of the lesson. Dismissing Persigny from office, he reorganised the ministry, and gave the minister of state the power to defend the acts of the entire cabinet before the Chamber ; and in so doing, made not only an important concession to the constitutional liberals, but also a distinct advance in the direction of parliamentary government.

While these acts of Napoleon's, which seemed to be a pledge of greater constitutional changes to come, were winning for him some measure of praise and support at home, the foreign relations of France were becoming more complicated and unsatisfactory. Every new political and diplomatic crisis showed the Emperor's lamentable inability to master the situation ; and his position was steadily becoming worse instead of better, largely because of his failure to hold to any fixed purpose. Annoyed and disturbed by certain threatening statements made by the Italian Parliament in 1861 regarding Italy's right to Rome, and by Garibaldi's attempt in August, 1862, to seize that city, he turned from the alliance with Italy, dismissed Thouvenel from the ministry on October 15, 1862, and summoned Drouyn de Lhuys as an indication that he had determined to adopt a conservative policy and one friendly to Austria. This attempt to conciliate the ecclesiastical party in France resulted in utter failure. The Pope resisted every attempt of the Emperor's to effect a reconciliation between him and the Italian government, and indignant that in the convention of September, 1864, Italy should have agreed to become the protector of Rome if Napoleon would consent to the removal of her capital to Florence, issued the encyclical *Quanta cura* and the Syllabus or catalogue of the errors of the age which Napoleon would not allow to be published in France, on the ground that it contained propositions contrary to the

principles upon which the imperial constitution rested. Just at this time, when the Italians were disturbed by the Emperor's change of attitude; when the relations between Napoleon and the Pope were on the worst possible footing; and when the bishops in France taking up the papal cause were protesting against the interdiction of the Syllabus and making bitter attacks upon Duruy, the minister of public instruction, as the promoter of infidelity and materialism, the relations with Russia and England were changing for the worse. The uprising of the Poles in 1863 against the authority of the Czar effected a veritable diplomatic revolution in Europe. Napoleon, who had been on excellent terms with Russia since 1856, influenced by his own doctrine of nationality, and by his minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, who hated Russia's ally, Prussia, and carried off his feet by a wave of popular feeling in France, took up the cause of the Poles, and by so doing forever lost the friendship of Alexander. Furthermore, in his effort to form an alliance for the defence of the Poles, he was so enraged by England's refusal to co-operate, that when, the following year, Palmerston asked for his assistance in upholding the integrity of Denmark, he refused, and by so doing, completed his estrangement from England, and abandoned Denmark to the aggressions of Germany. But the most disastrous of all Napoleon's foreign undertakings, the most illegitimate, fatuous, and ruinous, was the ill-fated expedition to Mexico.

In 1859 the Mexican congress had voted, and the president approved, a law suspending for a few years the payment of all foreign debts. In consequence of this act, England, France, and Spain, the three Powers chiefly concerned, broke off diplomatic relations with Mexico, and on October 31, 1861, signed a treaty at London, whereby they agreed to act together for the purpose of enforcing the claims of Mexico's European creditors; but at the same time they expressly renounced all plans of conquest, and all designs against the existing Mexican govern-

ment. On December 8th, the Spanish fleet appeared before Vera Cruz, and a month afterward, the French and English fleets followed. In a joint note to President Juarez, the Powers again declared that they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of Mexico, and in a convention, held at Soledad, February 19, 1862, they recognised Juarez, and agreed to open negotiations with him on April 15th. But already it had become evident that the French had other views in mind than the settlement of the indebtedness, and these became known officially when, in February, General Almonte, a bitter enemy of Juarez, arrived with new instructions from Napoleon to the effect that he disapproved of the convention of Soledad as "contrary to the dignity of France." Almonte, asserting that he was in the full confidence of the Emperor, announced that he purposed transforming the republic of Mexico into an empire, and placing Maximilian of Austria upon the throne. England and Spain, claiming that France was distinctly breaking the terms of the treaty of October, withdrew from the alliance, and began to treat separately with the Mexican government. By the end of April they had entirely withdrawn from Mexico, and that which had begun as intervention for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt, ended as a war for the overthrow of the Mexican Republic. So successful had been the French troops under General Forey that, by the middle of the year 1863, a provisional government of notables had been established, and an invitation sent to Maximilian to take the Mexican throne. The young prince hesitated long; but urged by Napoleon, and by his wife Carlotta, daughter of the king of Belgium, he decided to accept, if the necessary guarantees could be secured. These were given by Napoleon and the Pope; the former promised to leave 25,000 men in Mexico, and to furnish 270,000,000 of francs, of which 66,000,000 were to be paid on account, and 25,000,000 yearly until the whole was paid; the latter blessed the new enterprise, and promised to

send a special nuncio with full powers to reconcile the religious parties in Mexico. Thus equipped, Maximilian set sail for Mexico on April 16, 1864.

There is much that is still obscure in the history of this sad, but famous, expedition ; but it is not difficult to discover, in part at least, the motives that prompted Napoleon III. to originate it and give it his support. For years he had been interested in the internal affairs of Mexico and the countries of South America, but his knowledge of the former state, derived largely from the reports of Mexican aristocratic and clerical *émigrés*, was necessarily incomplete. In his desire to rescue Mexico from a state of civil war, he overestimated the strength of the conservatives and monarchists, and, in consequence, concluded that he could restore order to the country and peace to the nation by erecting there, as he had done in France, a strong imperial government. But besides wishing to bring peace to Mexico, he also desired to further the interests of the commercial classes in France, by opening in the west a new field for their activities and their profits ; and hoped to appease the ecclesiastical party at home, if only he could overthrow the existing anti-clerical government in Mexico, which had established freedom of worship, had taken away the privileges of the clergy, and had confiscated the ecclesiastical lands. In this plan he was encouraged by the empress, the Mexican refugees, and the clergy in France ; but also the very grandeur of the scheme attracted him, for in the event of success, the flag of France would float victorious over the walls of Mexico as it had just done over the walls of Pekin. How far he was influenced by his desire to give unity to the Latin race, may be inferred from his letter to General Forey, dated July 3, 1863. " In the actual state of civilisation of the world, the prosperity of America cannot be a matter of indifference to Europe. . . . We are desirous that the republic of the United States be powerful and prosperous, but we are not desirous that she

should make herself mistress of the Gulf of Mexico, dominate the Antilles and South America, and so be the sole dispenser of the products of the New World. . . . If, on the contrary, Mexico preserve her independence and maintain the integrity of her territory, if a government be established there with the assistance of France, we shall have rendered to the *Latin race* on the other side of the ocean its strength and its prestige ; we shall have guaranteed security to our colonies and those of Spain ; we shall have established our beneficent influence in the centre of America ; and that influence, in creating immense outlets to our commerce, will procure for us the materials indispensable to our industry. To-day, our military honour, the exigencies of our politics, the interests of our industry and our commerce, demand that we march upon Mexico, plant boldly our flag, and establish there even a monarchy, if that be not incompatible with the national sentiment of the country, or at least a government that promises some stability."

This expedition, which in 1865 Napoleon declared would form one of the most beautiful pages in the history of his reign, and which Rouher called "a grand thing, by which France would conquer a great country to civilisation," was destined to do more than any other of Napoleon's ventures to drag the Second Empire down to ruin. Not only did it involve an attack upon a sovereign state, which even in the midst of war and political chaos was showing itself competent to solve, without foreign aid, the problem of its national unity ; but it also required that such attack be made in the face of the determined opposition of the United States, who, victorious in the war with the Confederacy, was ready in 1865 to forbid the further intervention on the part of the French Emperor, and to drive out his troops by force of arms, if necessary. Then, too, it was ruinous in that it increased the French debt, weakened the French army and military resources, strengthened the opposition of the liberals in France to the government, and

further alienated from their sovereign the people of France, who though ready to fight for the honour of their country, had no sympathy with the Emperor's dream of a Neo-Latin league. Such an aggression on the part of France imperilled her old friendship with the United States, which was already impaired by the unconcealed sympathy of the Emperor for the cause of the Confederacy, and by the equally unconcealed sympathy of the United States for the cause of the Mexican republicans; and besides, the repulse of the French army before Puebla in 1862, as the first defeat that the troops of the Emperor had suffered, injured his military prestige; the character of the undertaking damaged his moral influence; and the failure, which eventually came, destroyed men's faith in his political judgment and foresight. But the expedition worked its greatest harm to Napoleon in the part it played in compelling him to remain neutral at a time when the political opposition to him in France, his isolation among the Powers, and the uncertainty of affairs in Mexico, placed him at a disadvantage, and enabled Bismarck, already victorious in the struggle with Denmark, and looking forward to the conflict with Austria, more easily to carry on those negotiations so fatal to Napoleon that occupied the attention of Europe in the year 1866. Entanglement in Mexico and the danger of war with the United States were not the only causes that led the Emperor to be neutral during the Austro-Prussian war; but they must always be considered as contributing, to a very considerable degree, to that result.

At the same time the internal condition of France was daily growing worse. The management of the finances, which had been the subject of the severest criticism since 1861, had brought matters to a crisis in 1865, when the *Corps législatif* positively refused to vote a request for further loans and for a sale of state forests. The minister of finance found it impossible to get any appropriation from the deputies for large expendi-

tures, especially for the army. With each session the constitutional opposition became more exacting. In 1866 forty-five members of the majority signed a petition for an amendment to the address, asking that the privileges of December 24, 1860, should be extended. Though the amendment was rejected, it obtained sixty-one votes, and when the next year a second amendment of the same character was offered, it received sixty-six votes. These gains, though small, were significant; for they showed that the old majority, under the pressure of public opinion, was breaking down, and that a new party was in process of formation. This, the *tiers parti*, to which Ollivier, as the advocate of the liberal Empire, attached himself, stood opposed on one side to the conservatives, who wished to maintain intact the constitution of 1852, and on the other, to the Left, who wished to destroy the constitution entirely. So violent did the debates become that in 1867 the address was abolished, and there was substituted the interpellation, or right of a deputy to question from the tribune the ministers of the government regarding the affairs of state. This important concession broke down the opposition of the *tiers parti*, and was the cause of Ollivier's separating entirely from his old comrades of the Left, and becoming a loyal supporter of the government.

At this juncture a moment of peace came to Europe, due to the Universal Exposition which was opened April 1, 1867, at Paris. Crowds flocked to the capital and exhibits to the number of sixty thousand revealed the discoveries of art and science, the progress of invention and industry. The splendours of the city were never more dazzling, the fêtes never more elaborate, the amusements never more numerous and alluring. King William of Prussia with Bismarck and Moltke, Alexander of Russia, Francis Joseph of Austria, the King of Portugal, the Sultan of Turkey, and hosts of minor princes, laid aside political cares, and gave themselves up to the enjoyment of the pleasures that Paris furnished. And Napoleon, by nature

tactful and courteous, proved a delightful host. Nothing was left undone that might add to the enjoyment of his guests and make more cordial the relations of France with the other Powers. To all appearance there was nothing in France but content and prosperity, nothing but harmony and good will; yet how specious it all was! In fact, the strength of the Empire was already decaying: its debt was enormous, its army was half demoralised from neglect, its administration was without vitality, its standards were sensual, and its morals a byword and a reproach. And in the midst of all the gaiety, just when the official fêtes at the Tuileries were at their height, there came that ominous report, a veritable death's-head at the feast, the sign and token of a criminal foreign policy, that the ill-fated Maximilian had been executed in Mexico.

From the beginning of his reign Maximilian had shown a spirit of conciliation. He had summoned liberals to the ministry, had abolished the censorship of the press, had created a *landwehr*, and had promised religious freedom. Nevertheless, he had estranged from himself the ecclesiastical party by refusing to restore the confiscated church lands, and had maddened the Mexicans by executing, on October 16, 1864, two officers of Juarez, under a decree which provided that whoever continued to fight under the name of Juarez should be treated, not as a soldier, but as a brigand. His government had never been anything else than bankrupt, its constitution anything else than a paper document, and its local administration had no efficiency whatever. At last, with the victory of Appomattox, April, 1865, which closed the civil war in the United States, the Union government had taken decided action. At first unofficially, through private intermediaries, Schofield and Morton, afterward by act of Congress, December 16th, the United States had demanded of Napoleon the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico. The Emperor, unable to refuse, had endeavoured to save the imperial government by offering to withdraw if the

United States would recognise Maximilian ; and even as late as October 16th, he had hoped that this course would be followed. But Secretary Seward had positively refused, saying that the erection of an empire upon Mexican soil was the very thing to which the people of the United States objected. Then in March, 1866, Maximilian had persuaded his brother, Francis Joseph, to send 4,000 Austrian soldiers to Mexico, but Seward had checkmated this move before the troops left Trieste. In desperation Carlotta had immediately hastened to Europe, and besought Napoleon to fulfil his promises, but had received only sympathy and the advice that her husband would better leave Mexico ; and finally, when her last hope had failed her, when the Pope had refused her either encouragement or help, the unfortunate empress, worn out with the fearful strain, had become hopelessly insane. But even after this last blow, Maximilian had refused to desert his followers, and had made strenuous efforts to maintain his position, until the gradual departure of the French troops from January to March, 1867, had deprived him of the main strength upon which he had depended. The liberals, who had been steadily gaining ground, had then driven from the northern and southern provinces the followers of Maximilian, and had forced the Emperor to Queretaro, where on May 15th he had been captured, and four weeks later on June 19th had been shot, because he had brought war and desolation to Mexico and had shed Mexican blood. This was the news that came to Europe during the festivities of the exposition.

Thus despite the outward evidences of prosperity and peace, the condition of the French Empire was pitiable. The Mexican expedition had cost thousands of lives, immense quantities of ammunition and stores of all sorts, had sunk enormous amounts of money without the slightest return, and had ruined scores of capitalists, large and small, who, trusting in the government, had subscribed to the Mexican loans. Nor was this all. It added a new humiliation to the many that France had already

suffered, and resulting, as it had, in the insanity of Carlotta and the death of Maximilian, it struck Europe with horror, and branded the French government with a stain of dishonour. Aware of his precarious position, and confronted as he well knew, and as the most intelligent men in France well knew, with the greater crisis created by the defeat of Austria by Prussia at Königgrätz, Napoleon now began to consider those military and political reforms for which preparations had already been made. In 1868 three measures were presented to the *Corps législatif*. The first of these concerned the reorganisation of the army, which, owing to the untimely economising on the part of Fould, the minister of finance, and the expedition to Mexico, found itself wanting in both men and equipment. The law, passed on January 14, 1868, increased the time of service and provided for the establishment of a reserve and a *garde mobile* that was to be employed in France only. But even this poor plan of substituting mere numbers for those improvements in arms and service that enlightened military leaders declared indispensable, failed because of the bankruptcy of the government; for not only could no money be obtained for cannon and repeating rifles, but when, after Marshal Niel's death, General Lebœuf tried to obtain an appropriation for the *garde mobile*, the *Corps législatif* refused to grant it. The situation was still further aggravated by a special provision of the law which gave to the Emperor the right to name the officers, and resulted in the introduction of incapable men into the army, who proved inefficient when the great crisis came. The second law, which was passed on March 9th, made possible the establishment of new journals without the authorisation of the government, and had the effect of furnishing to the enemies of the Emperor weapons against him, in that it increased the number of journals opposed to him. The third law, which granted the right of re-union under certain conditions, was passed on March 25th.

Partly in consequence of these liberal measures, which undoubtedly helped to undermine the strength of the Empire, the opposition became more outspoken and violent. The Left now numbered more than a hundred, and though many of its members had followed Ollivier into the ranks of the supporters of the liberal Empire, there still remained an implacable minority, which, led by Jules Favre, Jules Simon, Picard, Lajuinais, had carried on the war in the Chamber during the years 1867 and 1868, not only against the Emperor, but against the imperial *régime*. And in the latter year a new ally appeared. Socialism, silenced but not destroyed by the brutal measures of 1852, revived once more in France when the doctrines of Lassalle and Karl Marx, which had already become influential in Germany, were introduced through the members of the International Association of Workmen. This society, which had been organised in England in 1864 as a mutual assistance society, had taken on a socialistic and revolutionary form at the meeting in Lausanne, when, with Garibaldi as its president and Karl Marx as its guiding spirit, it had proclaimed war on the papacy and on monarchy, and had declared in favour of the nationalisation of lands, mines, quarries, forests, and telegraphs. From 1868 to 1870 it became in France the agent of a new socialism, more precise than that of 1848, more logical, pitiless, and revolutionary. Its French members, few in number, but actuated by intense hatred for the imperial government, passionately took up the cause against the imperial institutions, and in the name of liberty and social reform, aided the republicans in the war against the government.

And many indications testified to the strength of the radical cause. In 1868, Grévy, one of those who in 1848 had objected to the Roman expedition, and had declared himself a democrat and the representative of the revolutionary principle, was elected to the Assembly by a considerable majority. In the same year, Henri Rochefort started a new journal, the *Lanterne*,

with the express purpose of combating the Empire; and so brilliant, witty, and scurrilous was it, so interesting to the general public because of its scathing personalities, the scandals, the disgraces, and official misdemeanours in which it dealt, that fifty thousand copies of the first number were sold in a few hours. But it was seized by the government, and in August, 1868, Rochefort was sentenced to fine and imprisonment. Shortly after this episode, another incident showed the tendency of events. In November, certain democrats met at the cemetery Montmartre to celebrate the death of Baudin, who had been killed in 1851, and to open a subscription for the purpose of erecting a monument to this, the first victim of the *coup d'état.* Again the government interfered, and brought the promoters of the undertaking to trial; but the *procès Baudin* gave an opportunity for the enemies of the Empire to rally to the cause of the accused, and the courtroom, which was crowded with spectators, became a battle-ground for the defenders and the opponents of the *coup d'état.* Gambetta, one of the advocates for the defence, in a speech full of passion and eloquence, likened the attempts of the government to apologise for the crime of December 2d to Lady Macbeth's efforts to efface the stain of murder. "Every act has its consequences," he cried; "December 2d will be avenged." And a few weeks later he was returned from Marseilles to take the seat of the illustrious Berryer. But even more significant than this expression of public approval were the results of the election of 1869. In addition to the methods that the government usually employed, it tried to conjure up again the red spectre of socialism, and to revive the Napoleonic legend by announcing the celebration of the centenary of the birth of the first Napoleon. But the Napoleonic name had lost its magic; and notwithstanding the fact that the government had made extensive preparations for these elections, and that the liberals and the uncompromising radicals were unable to agree upon candidates and so scattered

their votes; the government suffered heavy losses in the provinces, and its candidates were signally defeated in Paris. Equally disquieting were the results of the supplementary elections of October; for Rochefort was returned from Belleville as the representative of the Irreconcilables, a party organised by Gambetta for the purpose of reviving the political ideas of 1793 and 1848.

The events of the year 1869 furnished unmistakable evidence of the decay of the imperial institutions, of the crumbling away of all the supports of the imperial structure. The Emperor, who was suffering from a disease with which he had for some years been afflicted, began to lose heart. No longer confident of his power to control the course of events, and dominated by the old spirit of fatalism, he was acting according to the impulses of the moment, and allowing the ship of state to drift almost without guidance. This was the more serious in that the men upon whom he depended for advice, Drouyn de Lhuys, Gramont, Prince Napoleon, Lavalette, Ollivier, and others, could not agree upon a common policy, some favouring an Austrian alliance and war, others a Prussian alliance and compromise, while a third party demanded peace, on the ground that it was indispensable for France at this juncture. Furthermore, the empress and the Ultramontanes were daily increasing in influence, and were controlling nominations in the army as well as in the cabinet; and, what was most significant of all, the majority that had so long sustained the Empire was gone. In place of a body of deputies voting solidly in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, party groups appeared, royalists, voting with the republicans, imperialists or *Arcadiens*, hating liberal concessions and desiring war with Prussia, constitutional liberals or the *tiers parti*, desiring peace and the liberal Empire, republicans, opposed to the whole imperial *régime*, and a few Irreconcilables, advocating a radical republic. The mere presence of these parties not only augured ill for the existing

régime, but was suggestive of conflicts to come, should the Empire be overthrown. It was a strange time for the government, already in decay, to select for the crowning of the political edifice with liberty. When the International was extending the area of its activity, and was stirring up dissension between workmen and their employers; when the people of Paris were roused to the white heat of excitement by the fiery speeches of Gambetta, by the sentencing of Rochefort to six months in prison, and by the shooting by Pierre Bonaparte of Victor Noir, a young journalist, in consequence of a wretched newspaper controversy; when the religious and intellectual world, and the government as well, were distracted by the debates in the Vatican Council over the question of papal infallibility;—then it was that Napoleon, influenced by the results of the elections of 1869, decided to lay aside his absolute authority, and to inaugurate a new and liberal *régime*.

In the summer of 1869, one hundred and sixteen deputies of the *tiers parti* and the old majority had agreed to a plan, which became the basis of an interpellation demanding a responsible ministry and a share for the *Corps législatif* in the management of public affairs. In response to this interpellation the government submitted to the Senate a measure providing for the revision of the constitution. It proposed to establish a responsible ministry, which, though still depending on the Emperor, was to be subject to impeachment by the Senate; to give to the *Corps législatif* a share in the initiation of laws, a larger right of interpellation, the right to pass the order of the day, to vote the budget, to discuss amendments by sections, and to name its own president and secretary; and to transform the Senate into a deliberative body with the right of interpellation, of voting the order of the day, of making its own regulations, and of making its sessions public. These changes did not establish a complete parliamentary system; but as representing true political reform, and as guaranteeing other measures which, in time,

would complete the transformation of the absolute into the liberal Empire they gave satisfaction to all those who were not declared enemies of the existing government. On January 2, 1870, Émile Ollivier, now leader of the *tiers parti*, was entrusted with the responsibility of forming a ministry ; and in face of distrust, agitation, and hostility, in a France already weary of the Empire, yet fearing revolution more, he undertook the difficult task of reconciling, by means of further reforms at home and a policy of peace abroad, the nation and the imperial government. And Napoleon, true to his principles, and wishing to strengthen the remodelled structure, and to bind the nation once more to him and to his dynasty, decided to appeal to the people, and on May 8th summoned them to the polls to cast their votes for or against the changes that had been made in the constitution since 1860. "The Empire," so read the circular of the ministers, "addresses a solemn appeal to the nation. In 1852 it asked for power to assure order ; with order assured, it now asks in 1870 for power to establish liberty." The mass of the people, comprehending very imperfectly the meaning of the forty-five constitutional articles presented to them, and fearing socialism and revolution, voted in favour of the amendments by a majority of nearly six millions. This would seem to signify that they desired the continuance of the imperial *régime ;* and yet, when four months after the *plébiscite* of 1870, the Emperor and the imperial army were captured at Sedan by the victorious Prussians, scarcely a hand was raised in defence of the Napoleonic dynasty. With the loss of its army, the Empire fell without resistance, and on its ruins there arose the government of the republic.

Thus an outside war, which in no way was organically connected with the history of the Second Empire, checked the course of events in France, and at one blow destroyed an institution that was slowly, though unmistakably, destroying itself. That the Empire could have long continued to exist is in-

credible, if for no other reason than that a reaction cannot be permanent. It had been founded on violence, and accepted by the French people as a safeguard against anarchy. Its fundamental principle, the personal supremacy of one man, was contrary to the doctrines for which the people of Europe had been struggling since 1789 ; its policy of repression, its control of the press, its denial of public liberty, were at variance with those rights for which France herself had fought in 1830, and again in 1848. Therefore the Empire in no way stood for the forces that make for progress, that are inseparably bound up with the development of human society. It had been able to establish and maintain itself in no other way than by chaining, by military force, that republican and socialistic element which in 1848 had driven the nation, caring more for prosperity than for political liberty, to confer upon Louis Napoleon despotic powers. But the republicans and socialists who had been suppressed in 1852 and were only awaiting the time to revenge themselves for the *coup d'état*, arose with a new strength and greater numbers in 1870. The serious illness of the Emperor foreshadowed a regency during the minority of the prince imperial which was sure to bring a reactionary and ultramontane element into power, and so to hasten the inevitable conflict. Even a long reign, while it might have postponed the issue, could not have prevented it ; for the causes of decay were too organic for a recovery to have been effected by constitutional changes and liberal measures. The Emperor, irresolute when he should have had the will of a Cæsar, had been unable during his eighteen years of supremacy to establish an imperial system, or to create a body of imperial institutions, strong enough to resist revolution. Even his social and economic reforms, which have left a deep impress on France, added nothing to the strength of his Empire, because they were initiated and carried out by him alone, and were not an expression of the popular will, or an indication of the power of the nation to rely on, and to help, itself.

The Empire was, therefore, nothing but an adventure out of accord with modern highly developed civilisation, and one which not only exhausted the resources of France, but checked for eighteen years the education of the people in matters of government and in habits of self-reliance. This defect the Emperor recognised and strove to remedy by increasing the powers of self-government in the departments and communes, and by admitting the people to a share in the government and the initiation of laws. But such reforms, carried to their logical conclusion, in the end would have destroyed the Empire itself, not because an imperial form of government is inconsistent with popular privileges, but because the power of Napoleon III. depended on the maintenance of his absolute supremacy. Had this been broken down, the forces of revolution, which were only waiting for an opportunity to re-establish the republic, would certainly have overthrown him, and destroyed his Empire.

CHAPTER V.

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA.

THE Germany of 1851 gave little promise of its brilliant future, for in every part lay the shadow of reaction. Austria had established a thoroughly centralised and military system, exceeding in its disregard of provincial and racial distinctions the worst phases of the absolutism of Metternich. Prussia, following her example as closely as possible, was restoring to the nobility their proprietary and police privileges, granting more extensive liberties to the priest and the Jesuit, and conceding to the clergy, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, greater control over matters of a purely secular character. Under the guidance of the two Powers, the Federal Diet was removing all such evidences of liberalism as electoral laws, right of publication, freedom of association, and the like, which they deemed contrary to "the common safety," "the highest welfare" of the Confederation. To all outward appearance the three years of earnest striving and hopeful enthusiasm, of popular commotion beyond anything that had been known in the recent history of Germany, had resulted in a further curtailment of constitutional and political privileges than had been the case before the revolution began.

But such a condition could not be lasting. The individual states were not likely to accept without protest a further increase in the power of the Diet; Prussia and Austria, upon whose co-operation the whole system depended, were not likely to remain on terms of cordiality, inasmuch as the events of forty

years had been tending to increase their rivalry. Changes in the government of either Austria or Prussia might, at any time, impel one to adopt a policy of which the other would not approve ; events in Europe, leading to a rearrangement in the relations of all the Powers, might make it necessary for one of these German states to act without the other ; while the pressure of public opinion and of economic interests, ineffectual though it had been during the revolution, was destined to become greater, rather than less, in the years that were to follow.

During the period from 1851 to 1856 appeared significant indications of the future. In August, 1851, Bismarck took his place in the Diet at Frankfort, prepared to defend the honour and rights of Prussia, even if so doing should cause a rupture in the Federal system. In 1852, when Schwarzenberg demanded the admission of Austria into the Zollverein, the Prussian government, influenced to no small degree by Bismarck's representations, made a counter-proposal for a renewal of the Zollverein without Austria, and refused to grant her request. The death of Schwarzenberg, the desire of Francis Joseph to be on friendly terms with Prussia in case Louis Napoleon should threaten the peace of Europe, and the urgent request of the Czar for a reconciliation, prevented Austria from resisting Prussia's demand. In 1853, a commercial treaty was negotiated between Austria and the Zollverein ; and although it was agreed, as a kind of compromise, that the question of Austria's admission should be taken up again in six years, yet to have postponed the issue for so long a time, was a victory for Prussia.

Still more significant was the influence of the Crimean war, for it not only lost to Austria her leadership in Europe, and so ruined her diplomatic standing ; but it provoked a situation which disclosed very plainly the fact that Austria was not in reality a German state, that because of her proximity to the Danubian principalities and the Ottoman Empire she was pos-

sessed of interests which concerned, only to a very slight degree, the welfare of the other states of the Confederation. Had Louis Napoleon threatened the balance of power, Austria, Prussia, and the lesser states would have stood shoulder to shoulder in resisting him ; but that the disturber of the peace was the Czar, and the territory threatened the region of the Danube and not the Rhineland, entirely altered the situation. Frederic William IV. and Bismarck decided to remain neutral, and refused to follow Austria ; and the lesser states did the same ; for though they were willing to join Austria in defending the Confederation, they would not send a soldier to aid her in a war against Russia. For the first time on a question of first importance, Austria found herself outvoted in the Diet. But of even greater importance was it that the Crimean war injured the prestige of the Confederation in Europe. Not only had Austria's vacillating and time-serving policy thrown the first place among the Powers into the hands of Napoleon III., but Prussia's neutrality, necessary as it was, angered the western Powers, and almost led to her exclusion from the congress of Paris. The insinuation that Germany had ceased to be of importance in the regulation of the affairs of Europe ; that the proud state, which for so many years had been the head of the European system, had sunk to insignificance as a factor in European diplomacy, and was looked upon with scorn by the statesmen of the west, was enough to rouse popular indignation in Germany to a high pitch. Why, it was asked, was Germany in disgrace ? If because of her inefficient federal system, then it was high time that this system were reformed, that a national government were established which should show itself strong in the presence of Europe ; that a consistent policy were adopted that should make impossible the bickering and quarrelling of states. After five years of political inactivity, the people of Germany began to awake to the evils of the existing *régime*. The various parliaments and newspapers discussed, and un-

sparingly condemned, the reactionary movement in general, and Austria's diplomatic policy in particular. Buol's attempt to reply to these attacks only hurt Austria the more; for they showed how narrow was his view of that which was best for Germany, how determined he was to carry out his own selfish schemes, and to further the interests of Austria rather than those of Germany as a whole. Consequently, Austria's position at the close of the Crimean war was not an enviable one: the war had cost her 160,000,000 of florins without a single compensating advantage; her Oriental policy had been checkmated by Prussia and the lesser states; her ideas on government had been condemned by the German people and statesmen alike as injurious to Germany; she had been defeated once in the Diet; and her leading statesman and chancellor, by his inability to conceal his anger, was rapidly losing influence among the princes of Germany. Certainly the policy of Schwarzenberg in the hands of Count Buol-Schauenstein was costing Austria dear. Prussia, on the other hand, had come through the war with comparatively little expense; she had kept the friendship of Russia; had gained, for the moment at least, the friendship of the South German states, and had become the real leader in the Federal Diet.

But as long as Frederic William IV. remained her king and Manteuffel her leading minister, there was no assurance that these successes would be permanent. The king was too strongly committed to the Habsburg house to be willing to break completely with Austria; and Manteuffel, who made it a cardinal principle never to oppose the king's will, was not the man to turn the existing situation to the advantage of Prussia. When, however, in October, 1857, it became evident that the illness of the king, which had already affected his earlier acts, had reached a stage that warranted the appointment of a deputy, his brother, Prince William, assumed that office, first for three months and then for ten; and in Septem-

ber, 1858, after considerable opposition on the part of the feudal, or Kreuzzeitung party, both within and without the ministry, was summoned to take the regency. As deputy, he had been obliged to adhere to the policy of his brother; but as regent, he was able to formulate a policy of his own: and when one realises the importance of this change, and takes into consideration the attitude of the prince in the years preceding his regency, one can readily understand the opposition to him on the part of the conservatives. Since the reaction of 1849, he had shown himself out of sympathy with the government: he had supported the war policy in the controversy regarding Hesse Cassel in 1850; he had resented the humiliation that Prussia had suffered at Olmütz; he had opposed the restoration of the feudal party to power in 1851; in 1853 he had favoured the project of alliance between Prussia and the western Powers, because he considered Russia the aggressor in the attack upon Turkey, and desired her humiliation; and so outspoken had become his opposition to the king's plan of an alliance with Austria, consummated April 20, 1854, that he was given leave of absence from Prussia, and was even threatened with confinement in a Prussian fortress.

But it must not be inferred that Prussia had at her head a man in any way identified with the liberal or progressive party of his time. On the contrary, Prince William was a thorough conservative in politics and in religion, and an admirer of the house of Habsburg; but he was preserved from the faults of his predecessors by a strong attachment to Prussia and the Fatherland. His devotion never showed itself to better advantage than when he consented to assume, at an advanced age, the burdens of a kingly rule, which he would gladly have resigned in favour of his son, had he not felt that Prussia needed him in this crisis; and when, in the years to come, he showed his unwillingness to follow any tradition or accept any political dogma that threatened Prussia's independence or honour. He

did not believe that the unity of Germany was to be attained by parliamentary decrees; and though fully aware that popular representation and constitutional government were essential to the life of modern states, was inclined to be conservative in his estimate of the part that the people should play in politics. Above all, was he a vehement opponent of all revolutionary measures; and was always ready to take the field, as he had done in the case of the Baden republicans in 1849, to put down by force of arms radical uprisings. He believed that Prussia was destined to be the future leader of Germany, and was prepared to await the occasion when should be fought the inevitable war that alone could overcome Austria's opposition and the jealousies of the lesser states. He did not anticipate that the victory would be won in his day. "I did not say," he wrote at a later time to Sir Andrew Buchanan, "that neither I nor my son nor my grandson would see a united Germany; I said that probably I should not live long enough to behold such a thing, but that I surely hoped the unity would be realised in the time of my son or my grandson." He was not a great statesman, nor was he a man without political blemish; but he had strength and moderation, faith in Prussia, trust in her people, an unlimited capacity for work, and those qualities much needed in Prussia, decision, firmness of will, a regard for prompt obedience, and an appreciation of the importance of an efficient army in winning respect for the Hohenzollern dynasty.

On becoming regent, Prince William at once dismissed Baron Manteuffel, and all those of the feudal party who had hitherto been responsible for the policy of Prussia, and summoned a new cabinet under the leadership of Anthony von Hohenzollern and Rudolph von Auerswald, statesmen who, though opposed to reaction, were devoted to Prussia and in no way inclined to advocate the inauguration of an extremely liberal policy. The people, however, greeted with joy this "ministry of a new era," when they saw it begin the elimination of old abuses, particu-

larly in ecclesiastical and police affairs, stop the reactionary interpretation of the constitution, and endeavour to raise the moral tone of the Prussian administration. So much enthusiasm did this policy arouse in Prussia, that even though many of the liberals still remained suspicious of the new ministry and the prince regent was not at all confident that the popular joy would be lasting, the elections of 1858 in Prussia resulted in the defeat of the feudal party as well as the radicals, and the return of a majority favourable to the government.

At the very outset of the regency, the government was confronted with the prospect of Austria's going to war with Italy and France ; and the question arose as to what attitude Prussia would take. Would she support Austria in this emergency ? Would she permit the old enemy, France, the inspirer of revolutionary doctrines, who had won the victory at Austerlitz and Jena and had dismembered German territory, to threaten once more, under a new Napoleon, the integrity of the Confederation ? The southern states made clear their determination to aid Austria in this patriotic war ; but Prussia was actuated by different motives. Not only had her people never forgotten the arrogance of Austria after 1849 and were sincerely and strongly in sympathy with the cause of Italy ; but the government also meant to avoid war if possible, partly because it desired peace, and partly because it wished to reorganise its army before putting it to an actual test. Prussia, therefore, set sentiment aside, and at first declared that neither she nor the Confederation had anything to do with the matter ; and even after war had been declared, deeming Austria to be in the wrong in sending her ultimatum to Sardinia, stated that she would put her troops in readiness for the defence of the Confederation, but would otherwise remain neutral. When, however, the news came of Napoleon's promise to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic and of Parma's revolt against her sovereign ruler, Prince William's attitude changed ; for he had no sym-

pathy with the war which gave loose rein to the forces of revolution, which threatened the independence of princes and the integrity of states, and which put in danger the treaties of 1815. Without a moment's hesitation, he decided to assume the position of armed mediator as soon as the French army should have advanced sufficiently far into Lombardy to make a French attack by way of the Rhine impossible; and in order to effect this mediation, he demanded of Austria the entire command of the Confederate troops. The court of Vienna, which had three times before scornfully refused a similar demand, again refused, except on terms that Prussia could not possibly accept. But the defeats at Montebello, Magenta, and Solferino, caused her to moderate her tone, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that Prussia would have gained her point had not the peace of Villafranca removed all necessity for her mediation. Certain it is, that in this crisis Prussia was the controlling influence in bringing about that famous armistice; for her proposal to throw 400,000 men upon the Rhine, in case Napoleon continued his advance, was one of the causes that sent the Emperor of the French to Villafranca; while her motion in the Diet that all the Confederate troops be placed under her command, made Francis Joseph more ready to accept the terms of peace. Prussia's importance was steadily increasing in Germany, and the relations with Austria were becoming decidedly less friendly.

The national character of the Italian movement stirred again in the German people the spirit of 1817 and 1848: popular enthusiasm revived; demands for the reform of the Confederation increased in number; and following the example of the National Association in Italy, a National Association of Germany was organised at Frankfort in September, 1859, after preliminary meetings had been held at Eisenach and Hanover for the purpose of arousing public interest in a stronger central authority, a national assembly, an imperial constitution, and

an empire under Prussia's leadership. Although the association was strongly condemned by many of the German governments, and persecuted by parliamentary decrees and stringent police regulations; and although the people of the South German states compelled it to drop from its program the clause providing for Prussian leadership; nevertheless, it gained sympathy under oppression, and the ideas for which it stood spread rapidly through Germany. Supported by the liberal press, and encouraged by a series of national festivals, the most important of which was that held in honour of the one hundredth anniversary of Schiller's birth, it made the poet's words, "we will be a nation of brothers," once more the battle-cry for German unity. By taking part in the elections held in the various states, by winning seats in parliaments, and by influencing the policy of ministries, the association, though never numbering more than twenty thousand members, became, after 1860, a political power of importance. Once more Germany rang with the cries of 1848, once more the German liberals boldly supported the rights of the people in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein, where the old quarrel had again broken out, and demanded the erection of a German national state with a strong executive and a national parliament, that prosperity and power might come again to the divided and disordered country.

But Prussia was not to have a part in furthering the work of the National Association; for not only was Prince William convinced that with Napoleon at the height of his power, annexing Savoy and Nice, possibly threatening Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, permitting Piedmont to overthrow the kingdom of Naples and forcibly seize the lands of the Pope, it was no time to press the demand for German unity, and to weaken further the Confederation by sowing dissension among its members. But also he strongly disapproved of the method employed by Bennigsen and his associates. He had no faith

in the attempts to attain unity through the formation of associations of any kind; and though he admitted that such might be of service in preaching the gospel of unity, he contended that they were utterly powerless to solve that most momentous of all problems, of who should stand at the head of the newly united state and wield the authority of the central government. In his own mind there was no doubt that in Prussia alone the solution of this problem was to be found. As early as 1849 he had written to General Natzmer, "God alone knows when German unity will be attained, but that Prussia is one day to be the head of Germany is borne out by the course of her entire history"; and he was quick to see that if Prussia were to be successful in the work planned for her, she would be obliged, not only to make secure her relation with the Powers abroad, but also to raise from its low estate, and entirely remodel, the army, her instrument of power.

Therefore, while Germany was ringing with the enthusiasm of the many German associations that had recently come into existence, Prince William and his coadjutors were turning their attention to the military system of Prussia. For many years it had been evident that this system, as well as that of the Confederation, was unsatisfactory, and unsuited to the needs of Germany; but it was the attempt to mobilise the army in 1859 that had brought out its many weaknesses and defects. Prince William, who had been for forty years a soldier, was convinced that it would be necessary to reorganise each of the divisions into which the Confederation was divided, to revise the soldier lists, to improve the equipment, to make more thorough and frequent inspection, and to effect sweeping changes in tactics, before the Confederation should be able to act in its own defence. Unable, however, to carry out the larger plan, because Austria vehemently opposed any act looking to Prussia's leadership in military affairs, he turned his attention especially to Prussia, and by means of two laws, proposed in the House of

Deputies, February 10, 1860, tried to effect the desired reform.

The difficulty was as follows. The law of 1814, upon which the Prussian military system was based, had established the principle of universal obligation to serve for three years in regiments of the line, two years in the reserves, and fourteen years in the *landwehr*. In other words, a young man entering the army at twenty, served with the colours until he was twenty-three, and with the reserves until he was twenty-five. He was then discharged from active service, but became a member of the militia or *landwehr* until he was forty. During the first seven years of this period, he was liable, in case of war, to be called out to serve at the front as part of the actual army ; but during the second seven years, he was liable to nothing more than garrison work in the fortresses. Two forms of abuse had arisen. In the first place, in consequence of the long period of peace, the term of service with the colours had fallen from three to two years ; and in the second, the recruiting system had not kept pace with the growth of population in Prussia, for although the latter had increased from ten to eighteen millions, the number of recruits received into the regiments remained the same as it had been in 1815, namely, forty thousand. The result was, that as no increase had been made in the number of regiments, some twenty-five thousand young men were owing service to the state who each year escaped this obligation, while the married men and men with families were bearing the burden of military duty. This state of affairs was injurious, because it tended to disturb business and home life during a period of war, and to make the *landwehr* practically useless, in that its rank and file were out of military training, its officers unacquainted both with their men and their duties, and its energy, activity, discipline, and knowledge of tactics far inferior to those of the regiments of the line.

These were the defects that the prince regent endeavoured to remedy ; and that he might have advice upon which he could

rely, he called to be war minister, in 1860, General Lieutenant von Roon, a man of thorough knowledge, a writer on geographical matters, a soldier of extraordinary boldness and iron will, and an organiser of pre-eminent ability. At his suggestion the prince regent proposed to restore the three-year term of service, to increase the number of yearly recruits from forty to sixty-three thousand, to increase the regiments of the line by forty-nine, and to call to active service at the front only the younger men of the *landwehr*, that is, those from twenty-five to twenty-seven years of age. When these proposals were made to the House of Deputies, a great outcry at once arose throughout the country, particularly against those portions of the plan that provided for a removal of part of the *landwehr* from war duty and increased the term of service. Von Patow, minister of finance, assured the deputies, however, that any measures now passed would be only provisional, and asked for a grant of supplies. The deputies, thinking that another year they could control any military arrangement not to their liking by refusing to appropriate funds, granted 9,000,000 thalers for the increase of the army. The reorganisation of the army was at once effected according to the plan of the prince regent and General von Roon, and the thoroughness of the work showed clearly that in the minds of the military leaders, there was no thought of its being temporary. When in January, 1861, Prince William, now king of Prussia through the death of Frederic William IV., consecrated the colours and standards of the newly formed regiments, the new military organisation was complete.

When it was clearly understood that the new arrangement was intended by the government to be permanent, and not provisional, the wrath of Parliament and the country broke forth. The opposition, feeling that it had been basely deceived, and that the promise of a temporary army increase had been but a trap to inveigle the deputies into a grant of supplies, girded themselves for the encounter, and, in the election of the follow-

ing December, returned enough of its members to insure a bitter struggle in the next Parliament. With the sitting of 1862 the conflict came : the deputies refused to vote a second appropriation bill, asserting that Prussia should not talk about increasing the military burdens of the state, but should come out boldly for German unity. An inevitable deadlock ensued, the Parliament exercising its right to refuse the necessary supplies, and the government declaring that what it had done was authorised by the law of 1814. To put an end to this unprofitable discussion, the king dissolved the Parliament on March 11th, and when a few days afterward the Hohenzollern ministry resigned, summoned a conservative ministry under Count Hohenlohe to take the management of affairs. This act made the issue definite ; for it showed that the struggle in Prussia was but part of that larger conflict everywhere present in Germany between the governments and the people, in which the former were endeavouring by diplomacy, compromise, or force to reform the federal system without regard to the wishes of the people ; and the latter, reviving the methods of 1817, 1832, and 1848, were seeking to bring about unity by means of speeches, associations, and parliamentary resolutions. When in January, 1862, the new Parliament came together, the liberal element was in the majority, thoroughly convinced that the end of the "new era" had come, and that the government, which had already lost its popularity, would never decide upon any bold or warlike policy. Therefore, for seven months the deadlock continued, the deputies refusing to vote supplies, and declaring that any attempt to raise money without their consent would be unconstitutional. The king, placed in a difficult position by his oath to the constitution and by his conviction as to the military needs of Prussia, turned to the only man who could help him in this emergency ; and on the resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, called Bismarck to be president of the ministry. The new era for Germany had in reality begun.

Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen was at this time forty-seven years old, a Junker of the narrowest type, a representative of the statesmen of the reactionary party. He had first come into prominence in 1849 as a member of the second United Diet of Prussia, and had shown himself to be in all matters rigidly conservative, devoted to Prussia, opposed to liberal movements, and a relentless enemy of all who attacked the Prussian policy. In debate he was bold and pitiless, striking down opponents without mercy, yet withal a man attached to no tradition, no party, no policy of the past, a man of clear understanding, definite views, acute powers of observation, and great decision of character, combining, as Maurenbrecher says, the qualities of the lion and the fox. Since 1849 he had been frequently consulted by the king, and after his entrance into the Frankfort Diet in 1851, had begun to formulate his own political views. While there he learned to know the organic weakness of the Confederation, and the selfishness of Austria, the lukewarmness of the lesser states, and had become convinced that the future of Germany depended, not so much upon her relations with foreign Powers as upon the ability and determination of Prussia alone. "Austria is not a German state," he said at Frankfort, "she is cosmopolitan; Prussia is entirely German, the only great German Power." He believed that Prussia was destined, both by the events of her history and by the geographical location of her territory, to take the first place in Germany; and he had himself seen a favourable opportunity for her doing so, first at the time of the Crimean war, and again at the time of the war in Italy. Then he had not been listened to at court; but now, in 1862, with the example of Cavour and of the policy that had made a united Italy before him, and with power in his hands as the head of the ministry, he was prepared to shape the Prussian policy in the mould of his own thoughts.

The appointment of Bismarck increased the hatred of the parliamentary opposition, or party of progress, as it was called,

and made the parliamentary struggle tenfold more bitter. In the mind of the liberals the fight was no longer for the defeat of the military bill, but for the defence of the constitution against the attack of an absolutist and autocrat. What Bismarck was going to do was unknown; for before he entered into high office he had made no public announcement of his discontent with Prussian conditions, his hatred of Austria, or his desire for German unity, and his speeches in the Federal Diet had never reached the public ear. His famous answer to a resolution of Parliament a week after his entrance into the ministry did not mend matters; for though it disclosed the innermost secret of his thoughts, it impressed his opponents with its brutality rather than with its wisdom. "Our blood is too hot," he said in reply to Forckenbeck's resolution, September 30, 1862; "we are too fond of wearing an armour too large for our small body. . . . Prussia must consolidate her might, and hold it together for the favourable moment, which has been allowed to pass unheeded several times. Prussia's boundaries, as determined by the congress of Vienna, are not conducive to her wholesome existence as a sovereign state. Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities the mighty problems of the age are solved,—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849,—but by blood and iron." To those of the opposition who advocated a cosmopolitan liberalism this language was so objectionable that their leaders, Simson, Vincke, and others, refused to co-operate with Bismarck, when, in his desire to effect a compromise, he tried to persuade them to enter his cabinet. The conflict was resumed. The Lower House passed an appropriation bill without a clause providing for the reorganisation of the army; the Upper House amended the bill to include such a clause; and the next day, October 12, 1862, the Lower House declared the act of the Chamber of Peers unconstitutional, and consequently null and void. In this quarrel between the two houses the government saw its way of escape.

Declaring that under the Prussian constitution a money bill was binding only when both houses concurred in its passage, and that in case of disagreement, for which there was no provision in the constitution, it fell to the government to provide for the necessary expenses, it made known its intention of conducting the administration without a parliamentary grant. For three years the bitter controversy continued; but meanwhile the army in the hands of Roon, Moltke, and their military associates, was undergoing the transformation that in the end made it the model of all the armies of Europe. The world saw only the parliamentary war; but few saw the forging of the new weapon, or knew of the policy that had already shaped itself in Bismarck's mind.

While all this was taking place in Prussia, a wholly inconclusive controversy was going on among the princes, as well as among the people of Germany, regarding the reform of the worn-out federal system. All concurred in the opinion that the existing system was as bad as possible; but no two of those interested could agree as to what remedy to apply. Austria was refusing to accept any proposal that did not provide for her leadership in the Confederation; Prussia was stipulating for her old plan of a restricted Germany, and the smaller states were supporting her; while the lesser states, jealous of Prussia, and in a sense of Austria also, would do no more than increase the strength and popularity of the Diet by extending its power and authority. But all arguments ended where they had begun, and this controversy was little more than an eddy in the great current of German history.

Other incidents of the time were, however, more suggestive of the future. When the quarrel between the elector and the people of Hesse Cassel broke out in 1862, and the former issued a decree making the right to vote dependent upon taking the oath to the hated constitution of 1860, Prussia sent General Willisen to Cassel to demand the withdrawal of the order. The

elector, confident of the support of the Diet, refused the demand in a manner easily construed as insulting; and immediately King William ordered that two army corps be prepared for action, whether with the intent of war or merely as a threat is uncertain. This vigorous and unexpected act had its effect. Instead of supporting the elector, the Diet passed a motion to abolish the existing constitution and to re-establish that of 1831, which was a distinctly liberal document. Thus Prussia won her first important political victory in defending the rights of the Hessians against an arbitrary elector and a hesitating Diet; and no sooner had she gained this advantage, than she again showed her determination to act without regard to Austria. After Napoleon III. had made his famous treaty of commerce with England, he proposed to Prussia and the Zollverein to enter into similar commercial relations with them; but as any alliance of this character had, of necessity, to be on a more or less free-trade basis, Austria, who was bound by her economic conditions to maintain a protective policy, vigorously protested, alleging that such an alliance would make impossible her entrance into the Zollverein. The new question as to whether the commercial interests of Prussia and the Zollverein were to be sacrificed for those of Austria, divided Germany, and it was significant that in the course of this controversy, Saxony and Bavaria, enemies of Prussia in political affairs, should have declared themselves in favour of the treaty with France. In the crisis that followed, Prussia did not hesitate an instant: on March 29, 1862, the treaty was drafted, Austria's demand of July for admission into the Zollverein was positively refused, and on August 2d the treaty was signed. And Prussia not only supplemented her political victory in Hesse by this economic victory in the matter of the commercial treaty with France, but she went further, and in the name of the Zollverein, even in the face of Austria's displeasure, signed a similar treaty with Belgium. In the meantime, as if to make

all the more clear her disregard of Austria's opinion, she took official recognition of the young kingdom of Italy, partly that she might keep in close touch with Russia, who had already done the same, and partly to gain a new ally, in case of a struggle with Austria.

The policy thus inaugurated contained no trace of the old vacillation, no indication of deference to Austria's superior position or historical claims, no regard for the old doctrines of the divinity of kings and the integrity of states. On the contrary, it betrayed a sympathy for popular rights, an appreciation of the growing economic needs of the nation, and a willingness to ally with that which the reactionists called the revolution, if doing so would only strengthen Prussia ; it revealed the existence of a master mind which was to shape Prussia's career ; it guaranteed firmness and audacity, which Prussia had not known since the days of Frederic the Great ; and it gave promise of a future from which the men of the old *régime* would have shrunk with horror.

But of the new policy, now definitely under the control of Bismarck, no part is more deserving of praise for its shrewdness, political foresight, and statesmanship, than that which concerned the foreign relations of Prussia. In 1862 Napoleon III., driven by the obstinacy of the Pope and of Cardinal Antonelli to give further evidence of his sympathy with the cause of Italy, prevailed upon Russia to recognise the new kingdom, and Prussia soon after followed Russia's example. The relations between France, Russia, and Prussia, were, therefore, eminently friendly. England, on the other hand, in consequence of the Crimean war and the events that followed, was not on good terms with Russia nor yet with the Prussian government, inasmuch as she favoured the cause of the Prussian parliamentary liberals. Thus, in 1862, the Powers of Europe were divided into two groups : on one side were France, Russia, Prussia, and Italy ; on the other, England and Austria ; while

Napoleon III. was still considered the most powerful and most ambitious of the sovereigns of Europe. But in 1862–63 two events occurred which disturbed this arrangement. In 1862 Garibaldi made an attempt to seize Rome, which resulted in his defeat at Aspromonte and the dispersion of his followers by the Italian government; and this was followed by the issue of a circular from Turin which declared, that though the government would oppose any attempt to take Rome by force, nevertheless, as that city was the natural capital of Italy, it would support any demand of the whole nation to obtain it by diplomatic means. The effect of this statement upon Napoleon's variable temperament was important. Fearing that this action on the part of Italy would involve him more deeply in Italian affairs, and wishing to gain again the support of the ecclesiastical party in France, he changed his policy toward Italy, dismissed Thouvenel, and called Drouyn de Lhuys to be minister of foreign affairs. The relations with Italy at once ceased to be friendly; for Drouyn de Lhuys, following his customary policy, sought close relations with Austria, even at the risk of breaking with Russia. The second event completed the diplomatic re-arrangement. In January, 1863, the Poles, maddened by the brutal policy of Nicholas I., and deeming the conciliatory acts of his successor, Alexander II., insufficient to compensate them for the loss of their national independence, rose in revolt, and for the moment braved the authority and might of Russia.

This last struggle of the Poles for the independence of their fatherland roused the enthusiasm of Europe for their bravery and their heroic resistance, and created a situation of pre-eminent importance in the diplomatic history of the Powers. When the uprising began, England expressed her sympathy for the Poles; and even Austria, allowing her hatred of Russia to overcome her inherent dislike of all revolutions, adopted a policy that seemed to favour Poland, not for the purpose of en-

couraging national feeling, but in order to avenge herself on Russia, to give support to England, to preserve amicable relations with the Pope, and to gain the good will of Napoleon. The latter found himself in an embarrassing position, for he was unwilling to offend the Czar, and determined not to entangle himself with another national movement after his recent experience with Italy ; yet his own scheme for the reconstruction of the map of Europe included an independent Poland. Besides, in France the democrats, the press, and even the clergy, were shouting "*Vive la Pologne*"; and as the elections of 1863 were approaching, he felt that he must do something to win popular favour. Therefore, early in the year, he addressed a letter to the Czar urging him to re-establish the kingdom of Poland in favour of his brother Constantine. The answer of the Czar, a rather haughtily worded refusal, chilled the friendship of the Emperor for Russia, and drove him over to the side of his minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, who was ever urging an alliance with Austria.

Napoleon, now having broken with Russia in committing himself to an aggressive policy in favour of Poland, strove to build up a new alliance, and made every effort to persuade England and Austria to join him in sending a note of protest to the Czar. The three Powers at first despatched separate notes in which they protested in strong language against Russia's actions in Poland, with the sole effect of arousing the indignation of the Russian people, and of bringing upon the Poles, who were considerably encouraged by the sympathy of the Powers, most brutal punishment. The harsh methods now used by Russia to suppress the revolution called out another protest, this time in the form of a common note, sent June 17, 1863, which demanded for the Poles a general amnesty, national representation, nomination to public office, liberty of conscience, the use of the Polish language in official business, and a regular system of recruiting. Three days after this note had been

despatched, Drouyn de Lhuys disclosed the real designs of the French government by inviting the two Powers to enter into a closer agreement with France, in order to make good the six points in case the Czar objected to them, as it was evident that he would. But this they refused to do: and all that the Emperor could obtain, was a second series of notes, issued in August, in which the western Powers declared that they would hold Russia responsible for the consequences, in case she prolonged the struggle with Poland.

Thus though the Polish revolution had cemented more firmly the friendly union between Russia and Prussia, and alienated Russia from France, it was not sufficiently influential to cause England and Austria to lay aside their distrust of Napoleon and to form with him a strong western alliance. Both the Powers, deeming Napoleon the most ambitious of European kings, feared that any alliance with France would be followed by a demand for Belgium or for the Rhine as a boundary. England had not forgotten the seizure of Savoy and Nice, and the treacherous management of the Mexican question was still fresh in her mind. Austria had been on bad terms with the French Emperor since 1856, but at this time, thinking to frighten Prussia, who he feared would not agree to his plans for reforming the Confederation, Francis Joseph had entered into negotiations with Drouyn de Lhuys. How far the matter went is not yet known; but Bismarck failed to be moved by the threat of an Austro-French alliance, and persuaded his king to refuse to attend a meeting of the princes at Frankfort, which was called by Austria in August, 1863, to consider the reform of the Confederate system. This refusal, followed by an earnest entreaty from England that Austria should break off negotiations with France, caused that Power to reject an alliance that inevitably would have involved her in war with Russia. Napoleon now felt that he had been trifled with and tricked; but he made one more effort, and proposed to Europe the November

following that a general congress should be called to settle difficulties pending between the Powers. Bismarck, who was doing all in his power to avoid alarming France, declared that he had no objection to the congress; but England refused to have anything to do with it. The counter-alliance had failed.

Meanwhile, Prussia with almost all the peoples and the governments of Europe against her, had the audacity to turn from an alliance with the western Powers, and to take the side of Russia against the Poles.

At the outbreak of the insurrection, King William had expressed to the Czar his conviction that both governments should combine against the Poles as a common enemy, and should consider the revolution as inimical to the interests of both Russia and Prussia. On February 8, 1863, a compact was signed: Prussian regiments were at once put in readiness, and Bismarck made known his intention of interfering, if necessary, to put down the revolt. This act, to all appearances a fling in the face of the liberals of Europe, was interpreted as a further exhibition of the Prussian government's defiance of the wishes of the Prussian people, as an indication that the Prussian government had made an alliance with absolutism, and approved of beating down an enslaved nationality that was struggling to free itself from its oppressor, and as an act contrary to the spirit of European civilisation in the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding this, in entire disregard of public opinion, Bismarck adhered to the alliance, and took no part in the protests of the other Powers, which were arousing the indignation of the Czar. The contrast is a striking one. Napoleon, by his Polish policy, had lost forever the friendship of Russia, and at the same time had failed to gain new allies in the west; by his Austrian policy he had angered Italy, and he could not count on England, who twice had refused to cooperate with him; in fact at the close of 1863, he found himself

without an ally in Europe: his prestige was impaired, he was himself fallen from the high state of 1856. Prussia, on the other hand, issued from the conflict diplomatically strengthened; for she had gained Russia's good will, which was destined to be of the utmost value to her in the events of the years that were to follow, while she had in no way made impossible the establishment of closer relations with the other Powers. Above all else, Bismarck had seen demonstrated for the second time the impotence of the western Powers to prevent encroachments upon the treaty arrangements of 1815; and he realised that if Cavour and Alexander II. had with impunity trampled under foot the so-called binding pledges, there was no reason why he could not do the same.

The situation in 1863 was an extremely interesting one. To the world at large it seemed that if Germany were ever to succeed in gaining unity, she must look for help to the liberal party, and not to the Prussian government, which with its army, its rigid administration, and its Junker minister, was to all appearances aping the methods that Austria had so often used in the interest of absolutism. A reorganised army, a defiance of parliamentary majorities, and a disregard of the rights of the nation, seemed sufficient to warrant the belief, that Prussia in her desire to supplant Austria in Germany was to be as brutal in her methods, as reactionary in her policy, as had been the house of Habsburg. It is little wonder that to the people of Prussia the "new era" seemed to have come to an inglorious end, and that they should have felt that their only help lay in obstinately adhering to the letter, as well as to the spirit, of their constitution. Not even the statesmen of Europe understood the policy of Bismarck; and never in the history of recent events has prophecy gone so wide of its mark, never have political writers and thinkers been so baffled and misled. Yet every important act from the beginning of King William's reign had been one of a series leading to the unity of Germany,

an inseparable part of a plan, which though simple in its leading idea, demanded for its successful accomplishment the genius of a far-sighted statesman. A weaker man would have failed; but the Prussian statesman knew his strength. Firm in his convictions, fertile in his resources, matchless in his diplomacy, he met every obstacle, won over his enemies wherever he could, struck them down with brute force when logic and persuasion failed, and by dint of threatening to resign, prevented the king from making concessions that would have endangered all his minister's calculations. During the excitement of these three months one mind led all the rest, one policy was fixed, one purpose was unchanging, one scheme was practical. The measures proposed by the Prussian parliamentary leaders might have furthered the progress of parliamentary government in Prussia, but they would never have won for that state the headship of Germany, or have solved the problem of German unity; reforming the federal system in accordance with the ideas of the German princes would never have effected the transformation of the Confederation into a national state; the National Association and all the popular societies, though invaluable in promoting unity of thought and interest, would never have overcome the centrifugal tendencies, the rivalries, and the jealousies present in Germany. Like Cavour, whose success had been an inspiration to the German statesman, Bismarck was convinced that a spontaneous popular uprising, such as had been that of 1848, could be of no permanent value. He based his hopes upon the strength of an established monarchy which should wield a weapon of tried efficiency at a time when, a legitimate pretext having been given, and fear of interference from the Powers abroad having been removed, the problem could be settled, as Clausewitz had said fifty years before, by the sword. The monarchy existed, Prussia; the weapon was already forged, the army; the time was favourable, for Prussia was diplomatically strong; and there had already arisen the

quarrel over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which was to furnish Bismarck with the desired pretext.

At the treaty of London, in 1852, the Powers, by establishing as a part of the public law of Europe the integrity of Denmark and making Christian of Glücksburg heir to the throne, had recognised the full independence of the duchies, except that the Danish king was to be, as he had been for centuries, the hereditary lord. As a gauge for the future, the Powers had accepted a manifesto issued by Frederic VII. on January 20, 1852, in which he agreed to grant independent assemblies to the three provinces. But the promise had been badly kept; for wishing to break the spirit of nationality that had been growing among the inhabitants since 1848, and to destroy their German institutions and affiliations, the Danish government had adopted from 1852 to 1855 a policy of petty tyranny, and in the latter year had issued a constitution that was so distinctly contrary to the spirit of the earlier agreement, so unmistakably intended to effect the eventual abolition of all self-government, and so thoroughly pro-Danish in its essential features, as to arouse great wrath in Germany. But the time had been well selected, for Europe was occupied with the Crimean war, Prussia and Austria were at enmity with each other, and the Confederation was fearing an attack from France; and it was not until 1857 that any action could be taken. But on February 11th of that year, the Diet had passed a decree declaring that it would prevent, by force if necessary, any attempt that should be made to enforce this constitution in the duchies that were members of the Confederation, that is, in Holstein and Lauenburg. This decree, intended as a reply to King Frederic's constitution, had been, at best, but a half-way measure; for it had left Schleswig wholly out of account; but the Diet, unable to make the treaty of 1852 the basis of its action, because the Confederation had not been a party to it, had been powerless to do more. To the letter of this decree Denmark had promised to conform; but

at the same time she had taken advantage of the Diet's failure to mention Schleswig, and had made preparations that seemed to indicate a determination to incorporate that province into the Danish kingdom. But as such an act would have been contrary to the London treaty, not only had the people of Schleswig protested against being separated from their Holstein brothers, but Prussia and Austria, and finally England, who had just begun to learn from Prussia the true inwardness of the Danish policy since 1852, had entered objections. On September 11, 1862, England had presented a scheme for the granting of complete autonomy to Schleswig, but this had only aroused the more the wrath of the ultra-patriots, (the Eider-Danes, as they were called, who were determined to carry the boundary of the consolidated states to the Eider, the river between Schleswig and Holstein,) and led to the indignant rejection of England's plan. In the winter of 1862–63, in order to remove all doubt on the subject, the Danish Parliament, in the heat of excitement, had proposed to the king to issue a new constitution legalising the incorporation of Schleswig, and to draft a charter for Holstein to be imposed upon her without her consent, both of which acts were a direct defiance of the London treaty. In the March Patent, or royal proclamation, of 1863, which had brought the whole matter prominently before Europe, Frederic VII. had declared that the agreement of 1852 was no longer binding, and promised to comply with the wishes of his Parliament and his people.

This was the situation in the summer of 1863. The Danes on one side and the Germans on the other were roused by the royal proclamation to the highest pitch of excitement. There is no doubt, that while the former were willing to fight, they confidently expected that their threats to incorporate Schleswig would result in nothing worse than notes and protests, with the harmlessness of which they were already familiar; and it is equally certain that they looked with contempt upon the in-

efficient and inactive Federal Diet in Germany, and trusted that the controversy over the Polish question would divert from them the attention of those who had signed the treaty of 1852, by leading to war between Prussia, Russia, and the western Powers. If such a war should break out, they thought that Denmark, by joining England and France, could get what she wished as a reward for her co-operation. But the Danes had reckoned without Bismarck, who, with definite plans of his own regarding the settlement of the Danish question, had no idea of engaging in a European war. He did not believe, as he had stated in 1862, that the difficulty could be finally settled by the mere interference of the Confederation, inasmuch as that body could concern itself only with Holstein ; and he saw no way to prevent the incorporation of Schleswig, save by a national war between Germany and Denmark. But for such a war, a very different thing from a federal chastisement, he was not ready in the summer of 1863; therefore, partly to gain time, partly to let the zeal of the people of Germany expend itself in a martial effort, he persuaded the Diet, July 9, 1863, to demand of Denmark the revocation of the March Patent, and in case of refusal, to follow up that request with a military occupation of Holstein. As Bismarck expected, this demand only made matters worse. Denmark, replying most arrogantly, not only refused to withdraw the patent, but, relying on support from England, where Lord Palmerston was declaring that if the Confederation attacked Denmark, England would take the side of the Danes, and on aid from Sweden, whose king had recently visited Copenhagen, on September 28th proclaimed a new constitution for Denmark-Schleswig, which definitely incorporated the latter province. In November the constitution, having passed the two Houses of Parliament, was ready for the king's signature.

Just at this time that event took place which Europe had so long awaited with apprehension, and for which the Powers had made careful preparation, the death of Frederic VII. without

an heir. The news caused a profound sensation in Europe, and in the minds of the many diplomats, who had long been drifting about in the troubled diplomatic waters, aroused grave fears as to the outcome. At once Christian of Glücksburg ascended the throne. Would the new king observe the treaty of 1852 and refuse to accept the constitution, which had been left unsigned by his predecessor? Would the duchies accept the new king as their duke, or would they turn to Frederic, Duke of Augustenburg, who had already refused to acknowledge his father's renunciation of the family claim, and was ready to call on the Germanic Confederation to aid him in winning his hereditary rights? Such were the questions that were naturally asked. When the news of the king's death got abroad, the Holsteiners, who had been long awaiting this event, rose *en masse* demanding separation from Denmark under the Duke of Augustenburg; but the Schleswigers waited, hoping that Christian IX. would recognise their right to constitutional autonomy, and would withhold his signature from the constitution. With the latter rested the final decision, and he was fully aware of the position in which he was placed; but in Copenhagen, away from the German influence, he was unable to resist the pressure of the Danish ministry and people, who must always bear the responsibility for the fatal consequences that followed. Christian IX. signed the constitution. At once the Schleswigers joined with the people of Holstein in demanding entire separation from Denmark under the Duke of Augustenburg. On Germany the effect was even more startling. The feeling of exasperation at this act of the Danish king was greater than at any time since the March days of 1848: princes and people, conservatives and liberals, joined in one common resolve to recognise the duke, and support the duchies against Danish tyranny, even if this should require the dismemberment of the Danish kingdom, and the incorporation of the duchies as a separate state in the Germanic Confederation.

To Bismarck the excitement and passion that attended the discussion of this question were eminently satisfactory, because they were creating a situation of which he could make use; but to Austria the course of events was exceedingly disquieting. She could not share with the rest of Germany, *i. e.*, Third Germany, its enthusiasm for the cause of the duchies, and was, therefore, forced to hold herself in readiness to see what Prussia would do. Bismarck had already formulated his plan, though he was able to disclose but part of it at a time as circumstances made its execution possible. He could not accept the recent Danish constitution, for it was contrary to the London treaty, by which it was convenient for him to stand for the present; neither could he adopt the plan of Third Germany, for that would result in adding another federal prince to the thirty-six already in the Confederation, who would be sure to side with Austria, and to vote against Prussia in the Diet. The goal he had set for himself was not to be reached without difficulty and deliberation, and upon the outcome of the first step depended eventual success or failure. It was necessary to entangle Austria in the Prussian policy without frightening her; and as she was determined to stand by the terms of the treaty of 1852, that is, to support Christian IX. as the hereditary lord of the duchies, and to maintain the integrity of Denmark, it became necessary for Prussia to propose a common act of which Austria could approve. Therefore, rejecting the proposals of Third Germany by telling the Duke of Augustenburg that he could do nothing for him as Prussia was bound by the London treaty, Bismarck made known to Austria that if Christian IX. would not adhere to the agreement of 1852, he was prepared to begin an armed chastisement of Denmark in Holstein, as a federal act for the protection of the rights of that duchy. This proposal Austria accepted, because it seemed to accord far more closely with her own views than did the wishes of the lesser states, most of whom had recognised the Duke of Augusten-

burg, or than those of the Diet, which, never having accepted the terms of the London treaty, was unwilling to recognise Christian IX. as Duke of Holstein. Through the combined efforts of the two Powers, a favorable vote was at last obtained in the Diet, authorising the immediate occupation of Holstein, in order to compel Denmark to withdraw the charter that she had imposed upon the inhabitants of Holstein without their consent. The military execution of this decree was entrusted to Prussia, Austria, Saxony, and Hanover; and before the close of the year 1863 Holstein was in the possession of the Confederate troops.

Having accomplished successfully the first part of his plan, Bismarck was ready to carry out the second and more difficult part, to transform the armed chastisement into a national war; that is, to demand of Denmark the withdrawal of the November constitution, which, it will be remembered, concerned Schleswig only, and if this were refused to cross the Eider,—the river dividing Denmark from the Confederation,—for the purpose of upholding the European agreement of 1852. But the Diet indignantly refused to aid in any such undertaking, because, in the first place, it had no right to chastise Schleswig, which was non-Confederate territory, and because, in the second place, it would do nothing to uphold the London treaty, which it had never sanctioned and would never support. Bismarck had anticipated this refusal, and had arranged for it by inviting Austria, in case the Confederation refused to co-operate, to join with Prussia, not as a German state, but as a European Power, in carrying on the war. As soon as the vote in the Diet had been announced, without a moment's hesitation he called upon Austria to join him in demanding the withdrawal of the Danish constitution, and, if necessary, in invading Schleswig. Austria could not refuse; for Prussia was asking nothing revolutionary; she was, so far as Austria could see, demanding nothing but an adherence to a treaty to which Austria herself had given her

consent. Besides, Austria was as eager as Prussia to silence all demonstrations in favour of Augustenburg and to maintain the rights of Christian IX. in the duchies; and when she saw France threatening to aid Third Germany, which was enthusiastically supporting Augustenburg, the Prussian Parliament itself refusing a grant of supplies for the undertaking, and the Diet rejecting the motion that she had introduced jointly with Prussia, she yielded to Bismarck's skilful diplomacy, and accepted the Prussian proposal to demand of Denmark the withdrawal of the constitution. It was the beginning of the end for Austria.

But the new undertaking was entirely different from a federal chastisement; it was a European, not a German matter; it involved an attack by two European Powers upon another European state. Had Bismarck intended to do no more than did Austria, that is, to uphold the terms of the London treaty, then he might not have considered it necessary to wait for a favourable situation in Europe before acting. But Bismarck anticipated a stubborn war that would annul existing obligations, that would make it necessary to free the duchies entirely from Danish control, and so to break the very treaty that Prussia and Austria were going to war to defend. That such a war would endanger the peace and disturb the equilibrium of Europe he was aware; and he had undoubtedly considered the possibility of Austria's withdrawing at the supreme moment, and of the other signers of the treaty uniting to oppose Prussia's plan. Why, then, did Bismarck believe that the relations of the Powers at this time favoured the audacious and masterful design that he had in mind; and why was he confident that he should be able to carry out his scheme without serious interference?

That England would be hostile was the one fact upon which Bismarck could count with certainty; for though Lord John Russell in 1862 had proposed to act in concert with the German

Powers in settling the Danish problem, when, as all supposed, there existed a Franco-Russian alliance; nevertheless, a year later, when the friendship between Russia and France had been broken and Prussia had taken the side of the Czar on the Polish question, the English government returned to its traditional defence of Denmark, and threatened to support the Danes in case Germany became aggressive. "We have taken a deep interest in favour of Denmark," wrote Palmerston to Lord John Russell, May 1, 1864, "because we have thought from the beginning that Denmark has been unjustly treated, and because we deem the integrity and independence of the state which commands the entrance to the Baltic objects of interest to England." The English government would, therefore, certainly oppose Bismarck's scheme. But would the other Powers support her? Russia certainly would not, for she was still engaged in suppressing the Polish revolt, which the interference of the western Powers had only served to prolong, and grateful to Prussia for her promise of co-operation, was ready not only to remain neutral, but, if necessary, to hold back Sweden by a threat that if Sweden armed, she would mass an army on the coast of Finland. Certainly not Austria, who by her acceptance of Prussia's plan for the attack upon Denmark, had made herself participator in the very act that England desired to prevent. There remained, therefore, only France, whose Emperor, angered by England's abandonment of the Poles the year before and by her rejection of his proposal for a European congress, was not only ready to avenge himself by refusing to join her in defending Denmark, but was even inclined to throw over the treaty of 1852 altogether, and to aid Third Germany in supporting the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg. Thus England was isolated in Europe, and was wholly unable to go single-handed to the defence of the Danish kingdom. The tangled diplomacy of the period and the complete want of accord between the members of the London conference who had

signed the treaty of 1852, gave a royal opportunity to Bismarck, who knew that the solution of the Schleswig-Holstein problem depended, less upon the German people, than upon a favourable European situation. In tracing back the complicated course of events of this memorable year of diplomacy, we see that it was the uprising of the Poles that made possible the attack upon Denmark, and enabled Bismarck to score the first of that series of victories which ended, seven years afterward, in the establishment of a united Germany.

Confident that Europe would not interfere, Bismarck completed his arrangements with Austria ; and that he might not be prevented from carrying his plan to completion, proposed as an amendment to the agreement which he had already made with Austria, that " in case hostilities in Schleswig ensue and the existing obligations between the German Powers and Denmark are consequently annulled, the courts of Austria and Prussia reserve the right to decide in concert with each other upon the future relations of the duchies. To promote such harmonious action they will then agree upon further measures. They will in no case determine the question of the succession without mutual consent." As this amendment provided that the disposal of the two duchies should be left entirely to the decision of the two Powers, and as Count Rechberg, the Austrian chancellor, was confident that he could easily check in time any aggressive or unscrupulous action that Bismarck might be inclined to commit, Austria signed the contract on January 16, 1864. On the same day the allies sent a despatch to the Danish government demanding the withdrawal of the constitution within forty-eight hours. On the 18th the reply was received that the Danish government would not comply ; and before a week had passed, Austrian and Prussian troops had entered Holstein, and were prepared to begin hostilities on the other side of the Eider.

The effect of this action upon Third Germany was immediate :

Bavaria and Saxony were indignant at what they chose to call an infringement of the rights of the Confederation ; the popular chambers and liberal associations expressed their abhorrence of such disloyalty to the German cause ; the Prussian Parliament rejected the government loan ; and some of the minor states thought for the moment of refusing to allow the allied troops to pass through Holstein. But to all this stir and play of anger Bismarck was entirely indifferent ; his only concern was for the influence that his action would have on the Powers abroad, and he awaited anxiously to see tested a situation that he was convinced was favourable. Nor had he miscalculated. Everything stood firm. Lord John Russell, though thoroughly aroused by the aggressive attitude of the German Powers, found himself unable to act ; and his proposal that Denmark be given six weeks in which to repeal the constitution in a legal manner, was rejected not only by Prussia, but by Denmark as well, for Monrad, the Danish minister, declared that the constitution would not be repealed at all. Then Lord John, declaring that the war was the most outrageous act in history, turned to France and solicited her aid. But Napoleon III. was only too ready to take his revenge on England ; and, besides, he was hoping that the war would result in a quarrel between the allies that might force Prussia to turn to France for aid against Austria, and so make reasonably sure some concession of territory on the left bank of the Rhine. It is at least reasonable to suppose that some such thought was passing through the Emperor's mind ; for on January 28, 1864, he replied to England that he could not think of undertaking this war, which was sure to lead to a conflict with Prussia, unless England would guarantee him, not only her military support, but also suitable indemnity in case they succeeded. England saw at once that she was meant to help France win the Rhine as a boundary, and rejected this impossible proposal, as Napoleon, who did not wish to engage in a war, had known that she

would. Unopposed, therefore, the German Powers continued their attack upon Denmark.

In the war thus undertaken, the allies, notwithstanding the courage and determination of the Danish troops, were almost continuously victorious. Crossing the Eider on February 1st, they advanced with little opposition to the first real line of defence, the Dannewerke, where they had expected to meet with a vigorous resistance. But to their surprise, after two days of not very severe fighting, the Danes abandoned their works, and withdrew to the entrenchments of Düppel and to the fortified town of Fredericia. In spite of the most inclement weather, the allies followed their enemy through a country little adapted to rapid progress, and for three weeks, while waiting for their siege artillery, faced the Danes in their defences. Finally, on April 18th, the attack was made on the redoubts by the Prussians under Prince Frederic Charles, and before three o'clock in the afternoon of that day the works were captured, and the Danes forced to take refuge in the island of Alsen. Prussia had won her first victory since the reorganisation of her army, and almost since the battle of Waterloo; and naturally the news of it was received with great joy at Berlin. Whatever the people may have thought of the means whereby the remodelling and strengthening of the army had been effected, or however angry they might still be with the government for its administration without a budget, they were proud of this victory, and were ready to acknowledge that any reduction of the strength of the army was not to be thought of.

But the capture of Düppel and the occupation of Jutland that followed meant more than this. It meant that the treaty of 1852 had been proved useless and inefficient, that it had become a dead letter; and what was of greater importance, it meant that two of the members of the European concert had been able to overthrow a treaty that had been incorporated as part of the public law of Europe, and that, too, without the consent of

those Powers who had signed it and promised to maintain it. And Austria was guilty equally with Prussia. The Power that for fifty years had made the sanctity of treaties one of its cardinal principles, was now to agree to the dismemberment of the very kingdom that it had entered the war to defend. It is true that Austria did not depart from her traditional course willingly; but what could she do, and where could she turn for support, now that Prussia, who had made the treaty of 1852 merely a convenient pretext, was ready to declare that the war had destroyed all previous obligations? She was forced to acquiesce in Prussia's plans or lose her influence in Germany: for England was her only ally in Europe, and the verdict of France and of Third Germany was overwhelmingly against the retention of the old treaty. Napoleon, who was every day drawing near to Prussia and separating himself from Austria, now plainly stated that the people of the duchies should decide for themselves whether to form an independent state under the Duke of Augustenburg, or to vote for annexation to Prussia; and even more strongly than he did the people of Germany favour the plan for separation. Petitions and addresses circulated widely and received thousands of signatures from the people in their clubs and associations, from the deputies in the chambers, and from even the princes and the nobility. Austria did not dare to stand alone against Prussia and the Confederation; and at last, against her will, with a sense of being drawn into engagements, the issue of which she could not foresee, and sadly aware that the old standards were breaking down, gave her consent, and entered the lists of those who were opposing a treaty that not a year before she had wished to defend.

The European Powers, hoping to prevent further hostilities, now made an effort to settle amicably the difficulty between Germany and Denmark. On April 25th, England, France, Austria, Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and the Confederation, came together at London to arrange an armistice between

the combatants and to discuss the question of the duchies. For Bismarck it was an important moment; for even if the new congress should not insist on the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark, it might impose conditions that would seriously hamper him in the carrying out of his plans. Having with some difficulty arranged for a truce from May 12th to June 12th, the representatives took up the larger questions. In the discussion that ensued, Russia and England were at first inclined to adhere to the old agreement; but when the Danish representative declared that his government would not go back to the terms of 1852, but would stand out to the end for the complete incorporation of Schleswig, all the Powers went over to the side of Prussia, and tacitly dropped the question of the integrity of Denmark and with it the treaty of 1852.

But if the duchies were not to be a part of Denmark, what was to be done with them? Two proposals were made: the first by Prussia, to the effect that Schleswig-Holstein should be established as an independent state under the Duke of Augustenburg; the second by England, who suggested that Schleswig should be divided, and the portion above the Schley be given to Denmark. These propositions aroused great excitement in the conference. Russia, who was supporting the claim of the Duke of Oldenburg, declared against the German proposal; Sweden, Denmark, France, and England supported Russia, and, to Bismarck's satisfaction, the claims of Augustenburg were rejected by the conference. This proposal in reality had not been part of Bismarck's plan; but as Third Germany had ardently supported it, and Austria had accepted it as better than to allow the duchies to be annexed to Prussia, he had recognised it as a possibility, and had presented it to the conference with the hope that the representatives would refuse to accept it. The discussion over the division of Schleswig was more bitter; for the German powers positively refused to consider so large an accession of territory as would have been made

by drawing a line at so southerly a point as Flensburg on the Schley; and demanded a northern line from Appenrade to Tondern. Every sort of pressure was brought to bear on Denmark to induce her to accept the latter boundary; but she would not even grant that the people of the disputed district should have a voice in the matter, an opinion in which she was seconded by Russia, Austria, and Sweden. Even when England proposed to submit the matter to the arbitration of Napoleon, Denmark refused; and so persistently obstinate was the Danish government, probably because it was expecting aid from England, that the conference was not able to reach any conclusion. On June 25th the meetings were brought to an end, and the representatives dispersed. Two things had been accomplished: the treaty of 1852 had been tacitly, though not officially, declared null and void; and the principle had been laid down, to which Europe still adheres, that in determining the boundary between two states, the inhabitants of the territory in dispute shall have no voice. All other questions were left undecided. Nothing was done to solve the problem of the disposal of the duchies or of the succession to the ducal throne, and no conditions were proposed to govern the action of the German Powers. To Bismarck this result was a great relief, for now he had his hands freed. He had won the battle with Palmerston, not only because of the dogged pertinacity of the Danes, and the refusal of Napoleon to support England, but also because of his moderation, and the consummate skill with which he had controlled the diplomacy of the conference.

Inasmuch as the conference had failed to effect an amicable settlement of the questions at issue, the allies renewed the war. On June 22d they put their forces in motion, and crossing the channel which separates the island of Alsen from the mainland, began an attack upon the strongly entrenched Danes. For four days the manœuvres continued, and when on the 28th the island was captured, not a Dane remained to hold what had been con-

sidered at Copenhagen an impregnable stronghold. The way now lay open to Fünen and even to Zealand and Copenhagen. At this critical moment, when all were looking for the expected aid from England, the news came that Lord Palmerston had, by a small majority only, escaped a vote of censure in the House of Commons; that the Queen disapproved of his course; and that the other members of the cabinet were resolved to follow a policy of peace. This confession that Lord Palmerston's war policy had conspicuously failed, coupled with Napoleon's final refusal to aid the Danes, broke the spirit of the Danish nationality. The Eider-Dane ministry was dismissed, and on July 12th proposals for a truce were sent to Berlin and Vienna. On August 1st the preliminaries of peace were arranged, and about two months later, October 30th, the treaty of Vienna was signed. By this treaty, Christian IX. renounced all his rights to the three duchies, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, in favour of the king of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and pledged himself to recognise whatever disposition they should make of them.

No sooner had the preliminaries been arranged than Prussia demanded the withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Holstein, on the ground that as the sovereignty of the provinces was vested in Prussia and Austria, the Confederation had no right longer to occupy the territory. Austria concurred, and though Saxony was inclined to be obstinate, the motion to withdraw the troops was carried in the Diet, and the duchies were soon free from Confederate troops. The two Powers then assumed full control, and by the end of the year a joint commission government was organised and set in motion. But this could not be permanent, and what of the future? The allies were now able to dispose of the provinces as they pleased, unrestrained by any previous conditions made either by themselves in their agreement of January 16th, or by the London conference, or by Denmark in the treaty of Vienna. Yet were those

governments that for fifty years had faced each other as rivals in Germany, had come into conflict over numberless difficulties, and had been two or three times on the verge of war, to be able to agree as to the best manner of dealing with this territory in the present, and of disposing of it in the future? And if they could not agree, would it be possible for them to preserve harmony by a compromise, or if that too failed, would either submit to the other without a resort to arms?

The attitudes that these Powers assumed at this juncture presented striking contrasts. Austria found the situation troublesome and perplexing: as a non-German state, with interests in the centre and east of Europe rather than in the north, she would gladly have rid herself of the whole affair, if she could have done so without injury to her dignity; she would have accepted even the annexation of the provinces to Prussia, if the latter would have given her territorial compensation in return. She had, in fact, no fixed purpose, no definite plan, except that of preserving peace and retaining her preeminence in Germany. Before the war she had loyally supported the claims of the king of Denmark, and had approved of maintaining the integrity of his kingdom; but now that this position was no longer tenable, she saw nothing else to do than to sanction the entire independence of the duchies, and to uphold the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg as the legitimate sovereign. That this policy was in no way consistent with her former one she was aware; but forced to take the defensive, she had done so with the hope that she would be able to make impossible any aggressive action on the part of Bismarck. In truth, she was distinctly annoyed that she had the matter on her hands at all, for it was taking her attention from her plan for the internal reorganisation of which the Austrian state stood greatly in need.

To Bismarck, on the other hand, the struggle for the duchies was an integral part of his scheme for the humiliation of Austria

and the overthrow of the Confederation. He was not disposed to insist upon the annexation of the duchies to Prussia, if he could obtain his end in any other way. He was willing to accept even the sovereignty of Augustenburg, though neither he nor King William had any confidence in the duke, if the latter would accept Prussia's conditions. What these conditions were he made known to the German world on February 22, 1865. He demanded that the duchies should enter the Zollverein, and adopt the Prussian tariff system; that they should place in Prussia's hands the entire control of their postal and telegraph service, their army and navy; that they should accept the Prussian military law and recruiting system; and that their troops should take the oath to the king of Prussia as their commander-in-chief. He also demanded that Prussia should be given such control over the harbour of Kiel and the proposed canal from the Baltic to the North seas, as to enable her to guard these strategic points in the interest of Germany as a whole. These demands were made on the ground that Schleswig-Holstein was not prepared for independent existence; that her finances were in a deplorable condition; that her position as an outpost open to attack by sea made it dangerous to Germany to leave such an important coast-line dependent upon the uncertainty of an independent government; that only the acceptance of the Prussian system and a Prussian protectorate, or, if these were refused, entire incorporation into the Prussian state, could give the strength that was needed by the frontier land that guarded the Baltic.

Bismarck was looking forward to the day when there should be a common German interest, a national welfare; and he saw in such a future an answer to all the arguments based on the rights of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. From his point of view to uphold these rights would have been to sanction the reaction; to recognise the obligations of the inhabitants to the duke, whom for months they had saluted as sovereign, to accept all

their claims to an independent existence, and to admit them as a separate state into the Confederation, would have been to encourage particularism ; to have made concessions to their dislike of the Prussian military system and Prussian taxes, to their dread of the economic changes that would follow their admission to the Zollverein, would have been to sanction the existence, in this remote corner of the new Germany, of institutions that were of the past, not of the future. Bismarck's remedy was a stern one, and little wonder is it that to the critics of the period it appeared to be brutal, reactionary, and anti-liberal, hostile to constitutional rights, indifferent to national distinctions, uncompromising and unyielding, and dependent for its strength, not on the willingness of the German people, but upon the power of the Prussian army.

Yet after thirty years this policy stands in another light. It was one of force, but of force applied for the attainment of a nobler end than the mere aggrandisement of Prussia ; it had in view the construction of a state that was to be grander and more powerful than the Hohenzollern kingdom. It is true that the new system was to circle about Berlin ; but that was better than the old system circling about Vienna. It is true that the undue attention given to the army was to affect seriously the new national life ; but even with its militarism, the inevitable penalty of a policy of war, the modern Germany has rid itself of the weaknesses of the Confederation, of the denationalising influence of an all-dominant Austria, of the rivalries and jealousies of the particularistic states. To remove these obstacles from her path, to increase her influence and her prestige, to gain for her a constitutional government on a national foundation, to bring her into touch with the best that modern civilisation has had to offer, this was Bismarck's work. Yet even he would have found his task infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, had he not been supported, as had Cavour, by a sovereign, heart and soul interested in the construction of a

new state. "One would seek in vain in history," says Rothan, "for a minister and a sovereign complementing each other so marvellously; one would find it difficult to determine the exact share due to William I. and Bismarck in the work which they accomplished together."

CHAPTER VI.

THE UNITY OF GERMANY.

IN tracing Bismarck's policy and the history of Prussia we have seen that Austria, forced to follow a course to which she was distinctly opposed, had been led into a situation that was both disquieting and perplexing. She had warred against Denmark in defence of the treaty of London and the constitutional rights of the duchies, but had issued from the war compelled to sanction the dismemberment of the Danish kingdom, and to accept, jointly with Prussia, rights of administration in the duchies which she certainly did not desire. Up to this time she had supported Prussia and opposed Third Germany, Holstein, and the Duke of Augustenburg ; but now, aroused by Prussia's proposal to annex the duchies, or, in case the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg were sustained, to place them under a Prussian protectorate, she was driven to join the German liberals in supporting the complete separation of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark. Thus she had entirely reversed her policy : was opposing Prussia instead of supporting her, was supporting Augustenburg instead of opposing him, and was once more in full accord with Third Germany and the Diet.

Such a course must soon have led to a conflict with Prussia, for Austria not only rejected the February conditions, but allowed her commissioner to countenance the cause of Augustenburg in Holstein, and even went so far as to put a vote through the Diet demanding the immediate recognition and coronation

of the duke. But neither party was ready for the rupture. Bismarck wanted Italy's co-operation and Napoleon's neutrality, and had still to overcome King William's dislike of the revolution so far as to induce him to consider an alliance with Italy against Austria. The latter Power was even more ready for a compromise ; for she was afraid of Italy, was in the midst of her struggle with Hungary, and was uncertain of Napoleon. Furthermore, her financial condition was deplorable ; she had been obliged to reduce her army and to curtail expenses, and was suffering from discord in the government, not only between the cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies, but even between the ministers in the cabinet itself.

Both Powers were, therefore, ready for a compromise, and at Gastein, on August 14, 1865, came to an agreement on the Schleswig-Holstein question. In principle, the common government of the duchies was to be retained; but as far as matters of actual administration were concerned, Holstein was to be placed under the control of Austria, Schleswig under that of Prussia. Prussia was also to receive Lauenburg in full sovereignty in return for two and a half million Danish thalers ; she was to control two military roads through Holstein, to have the right to establish troops at Rendsburg, to have men-of-war in the harbour of Kiel, to construct a canal from the Baltic to the North seas, and to receive both duchies into the Zollverein. Great though these material advantages were to be for Prussia in the future, it was a matter of greater moment to Bismarck that by the treaty of Gastein he had forced Austria to a decision on one of the most important questions in the controversy, as to whether Christian IX. or the Duke of Augustenburg was the rightful lord of the duchies. In selling Lauenburg to Prussia, Austria had tacitly denied the rights of the duke ; for where did she get her title to Lauenburg, Bismarck asked, if not from Christian IX. in the treaty of Vienna ? And if Christian IX. had had rights in Lauenburg before he conveyed them

away, had he not had rights in the other duchies also? How, then, he argued, could Austria continue to support the claims of Augustenburg without violating the very principle upon which the treaty of Gastein was based? Clearly this treaty was in all particulars a victory for Prussia.

Having thus bound Austria to an agreement that was in every way to her disadvantage, Bismarck turned his attention to France and Italy. He needed Napoleon's neutrality; and knowing that the Austrian party in Paris was ever urging upon the Emperor an alliance of Austria, Italy, and France against Prussia, and that an envoy had already been sent to Vienna to discuss such an alliance, he sought an interview with Napoleon at Biarritz in October, 1865. The time was favourable; for not only was the French Emperor ill and discouraged, but his government was isolated in Europe, his expedition to Mexico had proved a costly failure, the Algerian revolt of 1864 had been a heavy burden, and in parliament and the country the opposition to him was daily increasing. The Napoleon at Biarritz was, however, the same who had met Cavour at Plombières, and the second meeting was but a complement of the first. What was said in this famous interview has never been satisfactorily made known, for Bismarck's report to King William is not so detailed as is Cavour's letter to Victor Emmanuel: but it is probable that Bismarck asked for Napoleon's consent to Prussia's plan of aggrandisement and alliance with Italy, and watched for expressions from the Emperor regarding neutrality; and that Napoleon, after making clear his intention of remaining neutral, threw out hints regarding the possibilities of the occasion for France. That any definite agreement was reached regarding compensation in return for neutrality, is wholly unlikely; although it is reasonable to suppose, that Bismarck did nothing to disturb any impressions that the Emperor may have received regarding what Prussia might do for France in the future; and that Napoleon, knowing that war was out

of the question, and a military undertaking on the eastern frontier impossible, did not think it necessary to explain to Bismarck that he was making a virtue of necessity. The two conspirators separated mutually satisfied ; for Napoleon saw in Prussia's friendship a possible means of obtaining new territory for France, and Bismarck felt sure that Napoleon would not only not oppose an alliance of Prussia with Italy, but would remain neutral in the forthcoming war.

Bismarck now returned to Berlin to watch the working of the treaty of Gastein. He felt confident that Austria would not adhere to the interpretation which he himself believed was the only legitimate one, and from which he was resolved that she should not depart by one jot or tittle. On the ground that the vesting of the sovereignty of the provinces in the two Powers made necessary the suppression of all Danish and provincial uprisings, all demonstrations in favour of Augustenburg, Prussia governed Schleswig as a subject province, checked all movements for independence, and enforced strict obedience to her authority. Austria, on the other hand, granted Holstein the privileges of an independent state ; and in her endeavour to be conciliatory, won great popularity by giving the Holsteiners a share in the government and suppressing only the most violent of the demonstrations. Austria's laxity in controlling popular speech and movements that favoured Augustenburg, resulted in an increase in the number of Augustenburg associations and a greater boldness on the part of the Augustenburg press ; and by January, 1866, so intense had become the anti-Prussian feeling in Holstein that Manteuffel, governor of Schleswig, entered complaints against the license of the press. But this protest from Prussia was met by evasions in Holstein, and by the comment in Vienna that Prussia had no business to interfere in Holstein affairs ; and so bold had the followers of Augustenburg become, that on January 23d they went so far as to hold a huge mass meeting in Altona, at which they made

speeches hostile to Prussia and cheered vociferously for the hereditary duke.

These events convinced Bismarck that nothing was to be gained by temporising, and that it would be necessary to settle the question, not by compromise, but by war. Having waited three months for Austria to show a willingness to govern Holstein as Manteuffel was governing Schleswig, he had no intention of giving her any further opportunity of disregarding the Gastein agreement; and in his determination that war should come in the spring of 1866, he was ready to ride roughshod over every sentimental consideration and to do anything that would compel Austria to lose her temper, and to fight in defence of her dignity and her honour. It is hard to justify many of the acts that followed this decision, and easy to understand why Europe considered Prussia the aggressor; and only when one appreciates the fact, that war between the two states was sooner or later bound to come, and that Bismarck's policy, though Prussian, was German also, can one defend the methods of the Prussian statesman. The issue took definite form about the middle of January, 1866, when Bismarck demanded that Austria should show her allegiance to the treaty of Gastein by banishing the Duke of Augustenburg from Holstein. In reply, Count Mensdorff declared that no cause could be assigned for banishing the duke, and that any interference on the part of Prussia in the administration of Holstein would not be permitted. This interchange of hostile notes, the first act in the drama which, six months later, terminated in actual war, brought abruptly to an end the alliance that the two Powers had made in January, 1864.

Before receiving the reply of the Austrian minister, Bismarck had applied himself to the difficult task of completing the alliance with Italy. The Italian statesmen, particularly La Marmora, the head of the cabinet, were suspicious of Prussia, and fearing that at any time a new peace agreement, similar to

that of Gastein, might leave Italy to the mercy of Austria, had been up to this time by no means ready to accept unreservedly Bismarck's proposal to join an alliance against her. On the contrary La Marmora had been inclined to treat with Austria for Venetia on a peace basis, and, in November, 1865, when the treaty of Gastein had seemed to release Italy from all obligation to Prussia, he offered to buy Venetia for a thousand million lire. But however welcome the purchase-money would have been to the Austrian minister of finance, who was already wondering how he was going to pay Austria's debts, Francis Joseph had refused to barter one of the jewels of his crown for money. Further discussion regarding the matter during the early months of 1866 had made it evident that Italy and Austria could not come to any agreement, inasmuch as Austria refused to recognise the Italian kingdom, and Italy would not renew the diplomatic relations with Austria unless Venetia were restored. The failure of these friendly negotiations had induced La Marmora to consider the Prussian proposal more seriously; but he was still greatly perplexed. He dared not act without Napoleon's consent, yet he could not discover what Napoleon's wishes were; and unable to get definite news from Berlin, he became more than ever uncertain as to the best course to follow. It is not surprising that the moment was one of doubt for the Italian minister, for Bismarck himself was embarrassed by the indecision of King William, who found it hard to enter into an alliance with Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel against his kinsman and brother monarch, Francis Joseph.

But already an event had taken place that made easier the final settlement of the difficulty. In November, 1865, when the question of a commercial alliance with Italy came before the members of the Zollverein, the lesser States, enraged at Austria for having in the treaty of Gastein deserted the Duke of Augustenburg, had lent themselves the more willingly to the persuasions of Bismarck; and in December had not only rati-

fied the commercial treaty, but had consented to recognise officially the sub-Alpine kingdom. This act won for Prussia a popularity among the Italian people which stood her in good stead later. And the commercial alliance prepared the way for the political alliance. When, in March, 1866, after further negotiations with Napoleon had elicited from him a satisfactory response, La Marmora, feeling that all the arguments were in favour of an alliance with Prussia, despatched Govone to Berlin with instructions to make definite proposals for a treaty. After a long discussion, which was not always amiable, inasmuch as the Italians were still suspicious of Prussia, the treaty was signed, April 8th, the Italian representative expressly stipulating that it was to last but three months. By this compact, Italy bound herself to declare war against Austria, when once Prussia had taken the initiative.

But strangely enough this treaty contained not a word referring to the Schleswig-Holstein question; for Bismarck had already realised, that if Prussia could furnish no better reason for declaring war than a dispute concerning administration merely or a desire to annex certain provinces, his policy, which had already aroused the indignation of the people of Germany and the western countries, would be condemned for all time. He determined, therefore, to lay bare the most far-reaching and revolutionary of all his plans, to justify his conduct by declaring at once, that the question of the duchies was but part of the larger question which concerned, not merely the leadership, but also the reform, of the entire Confederation. The text of the treaty, therefore, bound Italy to declare war only when the king of Prussia should have failed to get the approval of the other German governments to certain plans, relating to such reforms of the Confederate constitution as were necessary to the welfare of the German nation.

This scheme for remodelling the Confederation was no new one, conceived on the spur of the moment for political purposes

for four years it had been an integral part of the larger policy of the Prussian government. As early as January 22, 1863, the Prussian representative in the Diet had advised the establishment of a national parliament that should be dependent on the suffrages of the people; in August, 1863, at the very time when Austria was bringing together the princes at Frankfort to consider the needs of the Confederation, Prussia, in a despatch sent from Berlin to Vienna, had declared that she approved of an increase of federal authority, but only on condition that the Diet's decrees received the consent of a parliament chosen by the people; and again, on September 15th of the same year, when the constitution outlined by the princes at Frankfort was submitted to Prussia, the Berlin government had restated this principle in still more emphatic language. On the day, therefore, after that on which the treaty with Italy had been signed, Bismarck introduced into the Diet his famous motion providing for the establishment of a national assembly, that should be chosen by direct and universal suffrage in the proportion of one deputy to every hundred thousand inhabitants, convene periodically, and have a share in Confederate legislation, that is, in all matters of common interest as specified in the Vienna Final-Act, and in certain particular matters relating to citizenship, commerce, navigation, war, the navy, and the like. This motion, which contained some of the most essential features of the imperial constitution of 1848 and 1849, disclosed the nobler part of Bismarck's scheme, and revealed the fact that he was providing, not only for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the supplanting of the house of Habsburg by the house of Hohenzollern, but also for the recasting of the political organisation of Germany with its many feudal inconsistencies in a modern mould, and for the destruction of those particularistic elements which, as a legacy from the past had hindered the development of German strength and German unity. In a word, Bismarck desired to bring about a political

revolution which should substitute within reasonable and proper limits the rights of individuals for the rights, hitherto practically unlimited, of sovereign states.

But this proposal was received almost with derision by Europe. How, it was asked, could this narrow-minded, unsympathetic Junker, who had disregarded the constitutional rights of the Prussians, had treated Schleswig like a conquered province, and denied to the Holsteiners the privileges of self-government, be in earnest in advocating a national parliament, direct and universal suffrage, and a secret ballot? Many considered the motion but a cloak for further autocratic measures, an expedient learned from Napoleon for gaining support from popular votes for a policy of blood and iron; others thought that in proposing it Bismarck was but making a desperate attempt to win popularity for a hopeless cause. That he hoped by this motion to strengthen the alliance with Italy, to gain the sympathy of Bavaria, turn public sentiment in his favour, and above all else to furnish a pretext of war which the king would approve there can be no doubt, but at the same time, as the future was to show, he was sincere in his desire that the new Germany should be constituted, as nearly as was practicable, according to the principles laid down by the National Assembly of 1848. The motion did not, however, serve the immediate purpose for which it was introduced; it did not provoke the war; for before the committee appointed by the Diet to consider the motion could act other events brought to a climax the wearisome contention between the two great Powers.

Since the breaking of the alliance between Prussia and Austria, due to Mensdorff's refusal to banish the Duke of Augustenburg from Holstein, preparations for war had gone steadily on. Early in March Austria had begun to put her troops in readiness, to increase the number of those already under arms, and to make all necessary arrangements for placing the army in the field in the shortest possible time.

Toward the end of the month Prussia had bestirred herself; fortresses on the Hanoverian and Silesian frontiers had been manned, the regiments put on a partial war-footing, horses purchased, and on March 29th orders had been issued for mobilising the army. During the month Prussia, cool and confident, willing to postpone complete mobilisation for the sake of peace, yet certain that war was inevitable, stood in striking contrast with Austria, whose army was not ready, whose cabinet and military leaders unable to agree were equally unable to withstand the vehement war feeling every day growing more intense in Vienna. A proposal to disarm, which Prussia agreed to on April 21st, seemed about to be generally accepted, when reports came to Vienna of the mobilisation of Italy's forces. Suspecting Prussia of favouring a general disarmament that Italy might have a free hand to attack Austria, the Austrian government, without stopping to find out whether or not the reports were well founded, decided, in a great council of war held April 21st, to set in motion instantly the greater part of her forces; and convinced that the finances of the state could not long endure the strain of heavy expenditures for military purposes, declared, under great excitement, that if Prussia refused to agree to Austria's proposal for the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, it would refer the whole matter to the Federal Diet, and would summon the Holstein estates to get an expression of opinion from the Holstein people.

By this act Austria was distinctly challenging Prussia to war, and so Bismarck interpreted it. In a note of May 7th he declared that Austria was deliberately violating the treaty of Gastein, to which the Confederation had not been a party and regarding which it could have nothing to say; that in fact she was making that agreement null and void, and placing matters once more on the footing of the treaty of Vienna, according to which the two Powers were to govern the provinces, not sepa-

rately, but jointly. Having made this explanation, he claimed the right to interfere in the administration of Holstein; although he well knew that Austria would consider such interference as equivalent to a declaration of war. Italy mobilised her troops at once; by May 3d the Prussian government had issued commands for the execution of the order of March 29th, and as one after another of the hostile states began to make preparations for war, placed on a war-footing her entire army, including the corps of the Rhine, Westphalia, Prussia, and Pomerania. By the middle of May, Germany presented the appearance of a huge armed camp; trade and commerce came to a standstill; credit was unobtainable; traffic and intercommunication ceased; and the western world daily expected an outbreak of hostilities. In Germany, the lesser states were outspoken in their defence of Austria, while the minor principalities, the moderate liberals, and the members of the National Association showed clearly their sympathy for Prussia.

While Germany and Europe were in a state of intense expectancy, Napoleon communicated with the Prussian ambassador, Goltz, regarding what France was to receive for her neutrality to counterbalance the gains that the other states might make in case of war. The reply was entirely non-committal: and in the course of further negotiations, Bismarck, refusing to answer "yes" or "no," talked rather of the difficulty, than of the impossibility, of giving compensation, and grew more and more reserved upon the subject. The discussions between Napoleon and Goltz, as well as those between Bismarck and Benedetti, came to nothing; and from this time, Napoleon seems to have abandoned the idea of obtaining territorial guarantees. Then he turned to Austria. Honestly desirous of winning Venetia for Italy, convinced that it was the part of wisdom for him to be on terms of close friendship with Austria inasmuch as he was confident that she would win in the coming struggle, and influenced by his minister, Drouyn

de Lhuys and the clerical party, who desired to prevent an alliance between Prussia and Italy, he renewed negotiations with the government at Vienna. As the result of his intervention he was able to announce on May 5th that Austria had consented to give Venetia to Italy in return for her neutrality. This unexpected proposal stunned, for the moment, the Italian government, whose suspicions of Prussia had been aroused only a few days before by Bismarck's statement that there was nothing in the treaty binding Prussia to take up arms for Italy. But when Bismarck obtained from King William the promise that Prussia would declare war on Austria if Italy were attacked, La Marmora rejected the Emperor's offer, not merely, it must be said, because of King William's promise, or because Italy was bound by treaty with Prussia, but also because he knew that an indignant people, loyal to Prussia and hating Austria, would resent in the highest degree such a disgraceful piece of treachery, and drive him from his place in the state. Bismarck had won his reward for having obtained for Victor Emmanuel the recognition of the states of the Zollverein the December before.

Unable to settle the Venetian question in this way, Napoleon, resorting to his old plan of calling a European congress, proposed to England and Russia that they should send representatives to Paris to discuss the best manner of settling all disputes peaceably. At first, the Powers addressed would consent to act only on the basis of the *status quo;* but in the end they formulated their program more definitely, and on May 24th invited Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the Germanic Confederation to join in a congress with a view to the preservation of the peace of Europe, proposing for discussion the cession of Venetia to Italy, the disposal of the duchies, and the reform of the Confederation. Prussia at once accepted the invitation, and a few days later Italy and the Confederation did the same. But on May 28th Austria made it known that she would accept the

invitation on two conditions only: she demanded that the Pope be invited, thus introducing a subject of fatal significance for Italy, that of the temporal power of the Pope; and that no question of cession of territory should be presented. These conditions rendered futile the summoning of the congress, and on June 24th the project was formally abandoned. Again the Austrian government had yielded to the influence of the war and clerical parties in Vienna, and exasperated by the coolness and implacability of its enemy, had allowed to pass this last opportunity of preserving peace. "Long live the king," Bismarck is reported to have cried on hearing this news: "it is war."

In this emergency Napoleon, who had been not a little annoyed by the failure of all his negotiations with Prussia, accepted again the plan of the Austrian party in Paris and made a final effort to save Venetia for Italy and to gain concessions from Austria in return for the neutrality of France. A convention was arranged, June 9th and 12th, whereby the Emperor Francis Joseph agreed in case of Austria's success in the war to give up Venetia, to recognise the kingdom of Italy, provided no attempt were made to annex Rome, and to make no change, without the consent of France, in the organisation of Germany of such a kind as to bring it under a single administrative head. This treaty was negotiated in such a secret and mysterious manner that its details are still obscure. The statement, made at the time, that Austria promised Napoleon the left bank of the Rhine in exchange for three hundred thousand men, is certainly not true; nor can we rely on the conclusion, based on remarks made in 1869 and on a paragraph in Persigny's not very reliable memoirs, to the effect that Austria promised Rhenish territory if Napoleon would abstain from the war. Napoleon himself had given up all hope of gaining territorial compensation by any system of negotiation, and had fallen back on his plan of interfering at the proper moment and so dictat-

ing the terms of peace. For this reason he rejected altogether the proposal that Prince Napoleon made to Bismarck a few days later to form an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia in return for either Luxemburg, the French boundary of 1814, French Switzerland, or Piedmont. This proposal has become famous beyond its deserts largely because it was made public by Bismarck at the outbreak of the war of 1870 for the purpose of turning the sympathies of Europe from France. Though Napoleon was often capricious and inconsistent and yielded too readily to his advisers it does not appear that he intentionally behaved in a deceitful or disloyal manner: his was a position that made straightforward dealing impossible. Personally he would have preferred peace, and a congress in which a fair distribution of territory might have been agreed upon; he would have given Venetia to Italy, Silesia to Austria, Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, and have received as his share the left bank of the Rhine. But the congress was never called, and now war confronted him: one set of advisers urged a triple alliance of Austria, France, and Italy against Prussia; another one of Prussia, France, and Italy against Austria. That he would gladly have agreed definitely with either Austria or Prussia regarding compensation for France is evident; but equally evident is it that he was unwilling to exact, by threatening to throw an army on the Rhenish frontier, those guarantees from Prussia, which, had they been given, would have altered the course of European history. This decision, though fatal to France, was creditable to Napoleon; for although the financial and military condition of the country made actual war impossible, there can be little doubt that a threat to interfere would have altered the situation materially. The real cause of the disaster of 1870 was not Napoleon's failure to enter into an alliance with Austria, or to gain positive guarantees from Prussia in 1866; it is the fact, that he had already so exhausted the vitality of the Empire that a warlike policy was

impossible at the very time when his own waning prestige made brilliant deeds necessary. The fault lay partly in the Emperor's lack of ability as a ruler and a diplomat, but still more in the unnatural and adventurous character of his entire *régime*.

After May 28th, when Austria by her conditional acceptance had rendered useless the calling of a congress, war was inevitable between the two German Powers. On June 1st Austria carried out her threat of referring the question of the duchies to the Diet, and at the same time instructed General Gablenz in Holstein to call the estates on the 11th. Thereupon, Manteuffel in Schleswig, having declared the agreement of Gastein broken, prepared to invade Holstein as common administrator, and conceded to Gablenz the right of occupying Schleswig in the same capacity. But the latter, knowing that a Prussian invasion of Holstein meant war, withdrew to Altona, and soon crossed the border into Hanover. Then followed several important and exciting events. On June 9th, Bismarck confirmed Manteuffel's occupation of Holstein ; and on the next day sent a circular letter to all the German courts to prepare them for the overthrow of the old Confederation, and the erection of a new one that should provide for the exclusion of Austria and for a national parliament elected by the people on a basis of universal suffrage. The Austrian government, deeming the occupation of Holstein a violation of the treaty of Gastein and an infringement upon federal law, proposed in the Diet on June 11th a new motion which, if passed, would bind the Diet to decree the mobilisation of the Confederate army in order to punish Prussia for her arbitrary conduct. This act was equivalent to a declaration of war, and on the next day diplomatic relations between the two Powers were broken off. Prussia waited impatiently for the vote of the Diet that should seal the destruction of the old federal system, before testing the strength of her army and taking revenge for the humiliation she had suffered at Austria's hands at Olmütz.

Three days were to elapse before the decision could be reached, and Bismarck used the opportunity to announce to the various German governments that Prussia would consider every vote in favour of Austria's motion as equivalent to a declaration of war. On June 14th the vote was taken : Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Würtemberg, Hesse Cassel, and Hesse Darmstadt, voted with Austria ; Luxemburg, the Mecklenburg curia, the Oldenburg curia, the Saxe Weimar curia, except Meiningen, and the free cities, except Frankfort, voted with Prussia. As Baden, though favouring Prussia, withheld her vote, the decision devolved upon the thirteenth and sixteenth curiæ : in the first of these, which was composed of Brunswick and Nassau, the vote was divided, Brunswick agreeing with Prussia, Nassau with Austria ; in the second, which was composed of six minor principalities, the vote stood three to three. In each case, however, the vote was counted for Austria, and the motion was declared carried by a vote of nine to six. Immediately, the Prussian representative declared the Confederation dissolved in the name of the king of Prussia, presented the outline of the new national system, and stating that his official duties were at an end, withdrew from the Diet ; and on the same day the Prussian government informed the courts of Hanover, Hesse Cassel, and Saxony, that in case they did not at once lay down their arms and accept Prussia's plan for a new confederation, the Prussian troops would advance against them. Each government refused to obey. On the 16th a circular note proclaiming the unity of Germany was sent to all the minor states of North Germany, requesting them to withdraw from the Confederation and join Prussia in establishing a new government that should represent the national and progressive spirit of Germany. On the same day the Prussian troops crossed the boundaries of the hostile states.

Thus was begun a war which was not merely a duel between two great Powers, but a *bruderkrieg*, a civil war in which nearly

all the members of the old Confederation were ranged on opposite sides. This terrifying prospect of a great internecine conflict naturally carried the thoughts of many Germans back to that time, two hundred and fifty years before, when a similar struggle, lasting for thirty years, had decimated the people of Germany, devastated the country, and given to France her grand opportunity for wresting from the house of Habsburg the leadership of Europe. But little realisation were these thoughts to find in the events that followed. The struggle, instead of lasting thirty years, was over in seven weeks ; instead of bringing ruin to Germany, it brought her no injury other than that due to the momentary cessation of business and disarrangement of the economic machinery ; instead of redounding to the glory of France, it prepared the way for her greatest humiliation. The Thirty Years' War had forced the old imperial Germany to withdraw from the position of supremacy in Europe, which as the heir to the realm of the Cæsars, she had held for eight hundred years ; the seven weeks' war prepared the way for a new imperial Germany, which under a new dynasty, newly organised on the basis of nationality, was to become the leader among the Powers of Europe.

Prussia's first attack was made on those hostile North German neighbours who had refused her command to disarm, and between June 16th and June 26th Hesse Cassel, Hanover, and Saxony were occupied by the Prussian troops, after but little resistance on the part of their inhabitants. For the attack on Austria three armies were in readiness : one in Lusatia under Prince Frederic Charles ; a second in Silesia under the crown prince ; and the third near Torgau under General von Bittenfeld. King William was commander-in-chief and General von Moltke chief-of-staff. Opposed to Prussia was the Austrian army of the North under General Benedek in Bohemia. On June 22d began the march southward, which carried the Prussian flag into the very heart of Bohemia. After a series of

minor victories for Prussia and her defeat at Trautenau, she fought the decisive battle on July 3d near Königgrätz and Sadowa, and such was her victory that Austria, in her crippled financial condition, could not recover from the blow. "Your Majesty has won, not only the battle, but the entire campaign," said Moltke to the king; and Bismarck is reported to have added, "Then the question at stake is decided; now we must endeavour to establish the old friendship with Austria," a remark indicative of his desire to defeat Austria, not to injure her.

But the victory at Königgrätz did not end the war: the Confederate army and the South German states had still to be reckoned with. But the reckoning was not to be a long one. Nothing could have shown better the utter inefficiency of the Confederate military system than the wretched mismanagement of this campaign. The leading generals, Prince Charles of Bavaria and Prince Alexander of Hesse, could not agree; there was no general-in-chief; and the Confederate military committee that acted in this capacity prevented, by its arbitrary interference, the carrying out of any definite plan of campaign. Bavaria was beaten at Kissingen, July 10th, at Aschaffenburg, July 14th, and Frankfort, the meeting-place of the Diet, fell into the hands of Prussia two days later. This war, the first and last that the Diet had to wage, was brought to an inglorious end by the signing of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg. But Italy was far less successful in the south than Prussia; for La Marmora, refusing to act on Prussia's advice that he cross over to Dalmatia and strike a blow at the heart of Austria, showed his inability as a commander by crossing the Mincio to Custozza, where on June 25th he suffered a defeat that cost him his command and his reputation. His overthrow, together with the defeat of Admiral Persano at Lissa in the Adriatic on July 20th, gratified Austria, but increased the wrath of the Italians, and made them less willing to consider proposals of peace.

Stunning and bewildering as was the news of Austria's unexpected defeat upon Europe in general, and upon the Viennese, the Pope, and the ultramontanes in particular, it nowhere aroused greater wrath and perplexity than at Paris. For Napoleon the situation was full of peril; for no sooner were the losses of Austria at Königgrätz seen to be irretrievable, than Francis Joseph made known at Paris his willingness to cede Venetia to Italy, and his desire that Napoleon should interfere as mediator. Thus the Emperor, who had anticipated either an Austrian victory, or a protracted campaign that would enable him to interfere and dictate the terms of peace, was suddenly confronted with the task of mediating with Prussia in behalf of a defeated Austria. What would he do? Immediately he caused to be published in the *Moniteur* of July 4th a note in which he accepted the position of mediator; and then, listening to the persuasions of the party of action, as those led by Drouyn de Lhuys, Gramont, and the Empress Eugénie may be called, thought for the moment of holding to his former plan of imposing his own terms upon the victor. But when Bismarck announced that although he was willing to accept the Emperor as mediator, he would never consent, except after defeat in battle, to permit him to dictate the conditions of peace, Napoleon broke with the Austrian party, and withdrawing from the aggressive position to which that party would have committed him, returned to the policy of peace with Prussia. The negotiations that followed took the form of a compromise between Bismarck and Napoleon. Before an armistice could be arranged, the terms were drafted by Bismarck and transmitted to Paris, where Napoleon, as mediator, accepted them. Austria was at first inclined to object to them; but to what end? She could not but see that in resisting she should only be courting further defeat and, perhaps, a heavier punishment, for Prussia, stopped half way in her victorious career, was far from exhausted, while she herself could command no money and

scarcely any credit, and could get no aid either from Hungary or from her own home provinces. Therefore, on July 20th, she accepted without reserve the terms agreed upon, and the armistice was at once proclaimed.

Negotiations for peace were begun at Nikolsburg on July 22d. Napoleon, knowing from Bismarck's preliminary draft that the unity of all Germany under Prussia's leadership was not to be effected by the victor of Königgrätz, but that the South German states were to remain outside the new confederation, showed himself indifferent to all minor matters, made no objection to Bismarck's plan for annexing Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort to Prussia, and said nothing about compensation to France. Bismarck, in his turn, was willing to compromise. He was extremely desirous of completing the negotiations quickly, because he had heard that Russia was about to propose a general congress, and also because he feared that the leaders at Paris, who were not at all satisfied with the Emperor's indifference to the interests of France, might at any time cause Napoleon to change his mind. He accordingly agreed not to annex Saxony on condition that she enter the North German Confederation ; and thus simplified, the work advanced rapidly.

The preliminaries were signed at Nikolsburg on July 26th and on August 23d were embodied in a treaty at Prague. This treaty provided for the dissolution of the old Confederation, and for the erection of a new organisation in Germany of which the Emperor of Austria should not be a member ; it declared that Austria should remain intact with the exception of Venetia, which should be ceded to Italy, and that Schleswig-Holstein should be transferred to Prussia, with the exception of the northernmost district of Schleswig, which should be united to Denmark, if the inhabitants should so desire. The latter provision, which was introduced at the special request of Napoleon, was never carried out ; for Prussia did not ask the con-

sent of the people of any of the provinces annexed to her, as had Italy and France; and when the following October she took possession of Hanover, Nassau, Hesse Cassel, and Frankfort, she did so by virtue of the vote of the Prussian Parliament and not by virtue of any *plébiscite* held in the provinces themselves. Inasmuch as Austria persistently refused to give Venetia directly to Italy, claiming that it was already in possession of Napoleon, and as Italy with equal persistence refused to receive the province from the Emperor of the French, the treaty was so worded as to become, in this particular instance, a masterpiece of ambiguity.

For Austria, the treaty of Prague marked the close of a great career, and inaugurated a new era in the life of the state which had played a pre-eminently important part in the past history of Europe. It brought to an end the dominance of the house of Habsburg in Germany, and destroyed the methods of government based upon the principle of legitimacy of princes and the inviolable rights of sovereign states of which that house had been so long a representative. For Prussia, however, it marked the beginning of a larger work, which because of its greatness demanded a longer time and a second victory for its completion. It was no part of the plan of Bismarck to stop when Prussia's destiny was but half fulfilled, to establish a national government for but half of the German people, to leave the South German states outside of the Confederation, although he knew that in continuing the task he was bound to raise an issue with France, which only a trial of arms could settle. In driving Austria from Germany, and in destroying the political system that had been established in 1815, Bismarck had threatened, even more than had Cavour, the political equilibrium of Europe; and should he succeed in erecting upon the soil of Germany a state, which because of its unity and military strength, would take the leadership among the Powers, he would disturb the balance of the whole European system. This Napoleon III.

knew, and, like his great predecessor, saw in the establishment of a powerful state on the other side of the Rhine a menace to the supremacy of France. The treaty of Prague was but a truce in the greater struggle that was bound to come not for the leadership in Germany but for the leadership in Europe.

The war of 1866, in effecting a great change in the political organisation of central Europe and increasing enormously Prussia's territory, population, and prestige, called forth two acts of interference, one from Russia, who demanded a congress, the other from France, who demanded compensation, for both of which Bismarck had prepared himself by hastening the signing of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg. Russia's request, which was officially presented the very day after that on which the preliminaries had been signed, was rejected by King William ; and Russia was induced to remain neutral by the promise that Prussia would assist her in recovering her control in the Black Sea. But France was more difficult to manage, for Prussia's victory at Königgrätz had created a public feeling that Napoleon could not resist. Although the Emperor himself had no wish to withdraw from the position he had taken at Nikolsburg, he was seemingly powerless before the persuasions of Drouyn de Lhuys, the pleadings of the empress, and the oratory of Thiers, and in a moment of suffering and weariness, consented that Bendetti should be instructed to ask for the cession of the Rhenish Palatinate and Rhenish Hesse, including the city of Maintz. This demand was made on August 5th, but King William positively rejected it ; and a few days afterward the Emperor, in a better state of health and mind, declared that the request had been the result of a misunderstanding, and on August 11th removed Drouyn de Lhuys from the ministry.

But the negotiations were not at an end. With the retirement of Drouyn de Lhuys, the men friendly to Prussia came into control of affairs ; and Rouher and Prince Napoleon urged the Emperor to consider a plan, which was none other than

that suggested by them the June before, namely, that of a Franco-Prussian treaty. On August 20th the proposal was made to Bismarck, that in return for an alliance with France, Prussia should cede Landau and Saarlouis, permit France to annex Luxemburg, and promise to aid her in acquiring Belgium. To the first two conditions Prussia again answered in the negative, declaring that before an inch of German territory should be ceded, she would resort to arms. But regarding Belgium, Bismarck hesitated, and even allowed Benedetti to draft the articles of the treaty which, in justice it must be said, Benedetti vigorously maintains was written by himself at Bismarck's dictation. As to Bismarck's connection with this treaty, there is yet much to be learned; for though it has not been proved that he definitely encouraged France to believe that she should have Prussia's aid in acquiring Belgium, yet there is no doubt that here, as at Biarritz, he did nothing to destroy the hopes of France as to what Prussia might do. Wishing to keep matters in abeyance until the preliminaries of Nikolsburg should be embodied in a definite treaty, Bismarck temporised, and after August 23d, when the treaty of Prague was signed, quietly dropped the question of a Franco-Prussian treaty, and forgot to give Benedetti an answer. In the famous Lavalette circular, which was issued September 16th, Napoleon, expressing his personal opinion, showed that he cared little about the issue, and could remain on good terms with Prussia without territorial gains.

Once more the sky was clear, and Bismarck was able to turn his attention to the completion of his task at home, to the arranging of terms of peace with the South German states, and the erection of a new confederation. That he might do nothing to prevent the union of all the German states in a common confederation in the future, he demanded from the defeated governments only trifling cessions of territory and the payment of reasonable war indemnities. The treaty with Würtemberg was

signed on August 13th, and that with Baden on the 17th. Each of these states renewed its connection with the Zollverein, and made important agreements regarding railway communications; and at the same time signed with Prussia secret treaties of alliance, in accordance with which each state placed its army at the disposal of the king of Prussia and accepted the Prussian military system. Because of King William's desire to annex certain portions of the territory of Bavaria and Hesse Darmstadt, the negotiations with those states were complicated and long drawn out; but when Bismarck succeeded in modifying the king's demands, and informed the representatives of Bavaria and Hesse Darmstadt that their protector Napoleon, upon whom they were depending for help in maintaining their integrity, had already asked for the Rhenish Palatinate and Rhenish Hesse, all opposition ceased, and these states allied themselves to Prussia on the same terms as had Baden and Würtemberg. On October 21st peace was made with Saxony and she entered the North German Confederation as an independent state. And in Prussia Bismarck's success was even more worthy of remark. The Parliament, which had formerly been hostile, came loyally to the support of the king and the minister, whose purposes it had so little understood; and with few dissenting voices passed a bill of indemnity, making legal the irregular financial policy of the administration.

Bismarck had now reached the end of one great period in his career. He had driven Austria from Germany, had warded off the danger of European intervention in the affairs of Germany, had silenced, for the moment at least, the demands of the French for compensation, had entered into alliances with the states of South Germany, and had gained the support, not only of the liberals of Prussia, but of those of Germany as well. Thus the ground was prepared for the new federal structure, the general plan of which had been submitted in Bismarck's note of June 10th. This outline, which may well be considered

the first draft of the constitution of the North German Confederation, arranged to include all states, except Luxemburg and those owing allegiance to the Emperor of Austria, together with the non-German provinces of Prussia in a confederation, which should have a confederate diet, a parliament chosen by universal suffrage and by secret ballot, and carefully defined functions relating to the army and navy, to diplomacy, and to matters of trade, tariff, and commerce. At first sixteen states, afterward twenty-two, entered into treaty relations with Prussia to last for one year; and at the expiration of this time, each state was to send plenipotentiaries to Berlin to model, after the plan described above, a constitution, in its turn to be submitted to a parliament made up of representatives of the people.

This plan was systematically carried out. The plenipotentiaries met, December, 1866; and in February, 1867, the final draft was submitted to a popular body which convened at Berlin, and which was made up of representatives of the people of the twenty-two states, elected according to the law of the National Assembly of April 12, 1849. By this body, the draft of the constitution was somewhat amended and returned to the council of plenipotentiaries, who accepted it on the day on which it was presented. This constitution when ratified and promulgated by the governments of the various states became law, and on July 1, 1867, the North German Confederation was legally founded. This new state with an old name included all the lands north of the Main that had been in the old Confederation, with the single exception of Luxemburg, and in addition, the eastern possessions of Prussia, together with Schleswig, which with Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, Frankfort, and Holstein had been annexed to Prussia in October, 1866. The king of Prussia was the president of the Confederation, named the chancellor, and possessed supreme military and diplomatic functions as had the king in Frederic William's plan for a Federal Union; the princes were represented by their

envoys in the Federal Council, the organisation of which closely resembled that of the Plenum of the old Federal Diet, and cast forty-three votes, of which Prussia had seventeen; and the people were represented in the Reichstag, which in no way stood for the states, but which, like its forerunner, the National Assembly, of 1848, represented the entire nation. Yet notwithstanding its retention of traditions and forms of the past, the new organisation thus established had no legal connection with the old Confederation, and differed from it in one very important particular. The old states no longer existed as sovereign governments, for they had become subordinate to a higher federal power, which drew its authority from the nation as a whole. Thus particularism had been legally destroyed; for the North German Confederation was not a league, but a state; not a federation of states, but a federal state; not a reorganised Germanic Confederation, but a new and higher form of federal government, born of a political revolution and the creature of a national will. But as a national state, it was neither democratic nor parliamentary: Prussia had won her victory not only over the other governments, but over the democrats and parliamentarians as well. Bismarck, who was willing to concede universal suffrage and a constitution, was as determined as his king that monarchy should never be curtailed by the vesting of sovereignty in the people, or that authority should be weakened by making the chancellor or ministers dependent upon a shifting majority in the lower house of the legislature.

The constitution of the North German Confederation was so framed as to admit without amendment, the states of South Germany into the larger federation, whenever they should desire to become part of it. But for the present this was not to be thought of. Any extension of the Confederation to include the states above the Main, could have been effected only in the face of the opposition of Austria, who already considered the treaties

of alliance between these states and Prussia as contrary to the treaty of Prague, and in the face of the bitter hostility of the people and the political leaders of France, who were vehemently opposed to the erection of any strong German state on the other side of the Rhine. Furthermore, though the grand duke and the popular assembly in Baden favoured Prussia's plan, there was but slight evidence that the people of the South German states wished to enter the larger organisation. Apparently content with the advantages they derived from their connection with the Zollverein and from the secret treaties of alliance with Prussia, they seemed unwilling to assume the burdens that a closer relationship with the north would impose upon them, and during the three years from 1867 to 1870 held aloof, showing little inclination to make use of even the privilege offered in the treaty of Prague of forming a South German confederation. In 1867 Bismarck, hoping that a closer relationship in matters of trade and industry might familiarise the states of Germany with the thought of a common government and a common administration, adopted a new plan for the Zollverein, and entirely remodelled its organisation. To take the place of treaties between the states, he succeeded in establishing a tariff parliament, consisting of members of the Reichstag of the North German Confederation and of deputies from the South German states chosen by universal suffrage. On April 27, 1868, the first meeting of this body was held and its very existence seemed to foreshadow the larger union to come. But the particularistic forces were still powerful in the south, and at this first meeting a strong anti-Prussian delegation appeared which prevented the congress from passing any vote in favour of union. In the meetings held in 1869 and 1870, the question of politics was left untouched, and the debate was restricted to technical questions of taxes and tariffs. The tendencies in South Germany were not encouraging. Bavaria was in the hands of Roman Catholics, calling them-

selves "patriots," who opposed Prussia from political, as well as religious motives; Würtemberg was controlled by democrats, who wished to introduce the Swiss military system, and reduce the military expenses; while it seemed as if the national liberal party in Baden, which favoured union, was losing strength each year. In truth, Prussia's policy had not roused confidence among the South German people, who hated her harsh methods and were averse to her military system; and it was evident that unity, sought through the ordinary course of development, would be long delayed. A series of events second in importance only to those of 1866 was to take place before the German nation should become a unit.

It will be remembered that all negotiations between Prussia and France had come to an end in the summer of 1866, when Bismarck positively refused the demand for Rhenish territory, and allowed the draft of the treaty, which Benedetti had drawn up, to remain unsigned. These rebuffs, following the victory of Königgrätz, had roused public opinion in France as voiced by the Parisian press and the parliamentary leaders, and had given rise to the fear, well grounded indeed, that Prussia was becoming too prominent in the affairs of Europe for the dignity of France. Napoleon, though himself desirous of peace, and fully aware of the impossibility of obtaining a single inch of German territory, was becoming convinced that he could win the favour of the French nation only by adopting the aggrandising policy of the Bourbons and extending the French frontier. Therefore in 1867, when the grand duchy of Luxemburg, which had separated from Germany at the time of the dissolution of the old Confederation, came, so to speak, into the market, Napoleon offered to buy it of the king of Holland, who was its hereditary sovereign. Secret negotiations were begun in March, and through the influence of the queen of Holland, who was violently anti-Prussian in feeling, the matter was successfully arranged. But Luxemburg, as a triangle of territory

bounded by France, Belgium, and Prussia, was of far too much importance from a military standpoint to be allowed to go in this way as compensation to France ; and when the news of the transaction got abroad, a great outcry arose among the German people, and Bismarck was interpellated in the parliament that was discussing the constitution of the North German Confederation at Berlin, regarding this sale of a former Confederate state. His answer was conciliatory, though, as a warning to France, he took this occasion to make public the treaties of alliance with the South German states.

Notwithstanding the fact that Bismarck himself was willing to consider a compromise, a conflict seemed imminent ; for the people, thoroughly irritated, were loudly expressing their hostility to the " hereditary enemy," and the military staff, which had been busy remedying the defects in the army organisation that the campaign of 1866 had disclosed, was talking of war. Napoleon, though desirous of settling the matter peacefully, feared an outburst of fury in Paris if the occasion were allowed to slip, and was even consulting with his generals regarding the military forces of France. He soon became convinced, however, in conversation with General Lebrun, that France could mobilise scarcely more than 200,000 men, and was wanting in marshals and generals competent to take the command of the army. Therefore, when King William, of Holland, in alarm withdrew his consent to the purchase of Luxemburg, Napoleon accepted Russia's proposal to refer the matter to the Powers, inasmuch as the position of the grand duchy rested upon the general treaties of 1815 and 1839. At London, on May 11, 1867, a peaceful settlement was made : Napoleon resigned all his claims to Luxemburg ; Prussia consented to withdraw from the old federal fortress of Luxemburg the garrison which the French deemed a constant menace to them at one of the most vulnerable points of their frontier ; and that no further disputes regarding this territory might arise in the future, the Powers

guaranteed the neutrality of the grand duchy. But the controversy and the fact that Prussia issued from this diplomatic contest clearly the victor, only made more intense the feeling of hostility in Paris for Germany.

Prussia now went directly forward in the course she had been pursuing for seven years. Under the management of Roon, she continued to improve the military system of the north and made the army of the Confederation an instrument of the highest precision. For notwithstanding the splendid tactics of the Prussian infantry, and the superiority of its needle guns and its breech-loading cannon, which had won the campaign of 1866, the authorities were of the opinion that the army was not entirely ready for the task that lay before it. The year 1867, therefore, was devoted to dividing the territory and reorganising the system of recruiting in such a way as to insure a more rapid mobilisation of the troops. The army corps were increased from nine to twelve; the military arrangements of the South German states were brought to perfection; and that the Prussian staff might have a more accurate knowledge of the French frontier, the chief-of-staff himself in 1868 examined on foot every mile of territory from Luxemburg to the Rhenish Palatinate. So definite was the information possessed by the Germans, not only of the topography of the country, but also of the condition of the French army and of the number of men France could place on the frontier in case of war, that in 1868 Moltke was able to outline accurately a complete campaign against France. When one bears in mind these facts, and remembers that Bismarck could count with certainty on the neutrality of Russia, and with reason on the friendship of Italy and the helplessness of Austria, one understands why Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon prophesied success for Prussia in case of war with France. The definiteness of purpose and the ability of these Prussian leaders contrast strangely with the vacillation and inefficiency of those who were ruling France during these same eventful years.

The condition in France had not come about from ignorance. As early as 1868, Benedetti had reported to the French court that the cabinet at Berlin was preparing at the same time for the unity of all Germany and for war with France; and stated it as his opinion that the German people would regard the war as an act of aggression by France against the Fatherland, and would take the side of Prussia against her whom they considered an hereditary enemy. During the same year General Ducrot had kept the military authorities at Paris fully informed of Prussia's preparations; and after the settlement of the dispute regarding Luxemburg, General Lebrun had made a careful examination of the Prussian military system, and indicated its superiority, both in tactics and equipment, to that of France. Furthermore, in 1867, General Trochu in *L'Armée française en 1867*, a work published anonymously, had pointed out the defects of the army organisation and had endeavoured to determine the best remedies therefor. Since 1866 Napoleon had been fully aware of the need of far-reaching reforms in the French army, and for two years a commission had been busy drafting a military law. But the work of this body amounted to little, largely because the recommendations of its military members were opposed by the ministerial members, who were influenced less by the needs of the occasion, than by the fact that they should be obliged to defend their recommendations before the *Corps législatif*. The half-way measure, known as the military law of 1868, was passed; but it was not carried out, because the Chamber refused to grant the appropriation asked for by General Lebœuf, who after the untimely death of Marshal Niel became commander-in-chief of the army. For the same reason the motion to equip the army with repeating rifles failed to pass, as did also that to increase the number of batteries, and to introduce a cannon as precise and portable as that used by the Prussians.

All these changes and improvements were ardently desired

by Napoleon, who in 1868 drew up a plan for a thorough reorganisation of the army; but of this plan little or no account was taken. Where lay the blame? Certainly not with the Emperor, who was fully aware of the importance of reorganising the army; not with Marshal Niel, who was in full sympathy with the Emperor, as his praiseworthy efforts in the year 1868 to hasten the manufacture of chassepots, to strengthen the artillery, and to organise the *garde mobile* bear witness; not even with General Lebœuf, who cannot be censured for failing to make bricks without straw. The blame must fall, partly, no doubt, upon the departmental bureaus, whose devotion to routine was often destructive of progressive reform; partly on the *Corps législatif*, which absolutely refused to vote the necessary credit; and partly upon those party leaders and military braggarts who refused to heed the warnings of those better informed than themselves, overestimated the strength and efficiency of the French army, and in a frenzy of false patriotism cried out, somewhat as did Marshal Randon in 1866: "What! will not a nation like France, which is able to gather under its flag 600,000 men in a few weeks, has 8,000 field guns in its arsenal, possesses 1,800,000 rifles and powder to last ten years, be always ready to maintain by force of arms its honour and right?" But when all else is said the conclusion remains, that the greatest blame must fall upon the Napoleonic *régime*, which had destroyed all spirit and enthusiasm in the departments of administration, had roused the suspicions, as well as the hostility, of that growing party in the *Corps législatif* which opposed on principle any project supported by the Emperor, had destroyed the confidence of many of its own followers by an inconsistent foreign policy that had brought only ill to France, and, lastly, had so increased the national debt by its heavy expenses for internal improvements and fruitless foreign expeditions, that the representatives of the people were more concerned to guard the nation's treasury than to take steps to

maintain the nation's honour. Thiers struck at the root of the matter when in 1870, in reply to the constitutionalists, he said: "I beg of you do not speak of our institutions, which, in my conviction at least, are the principal cause, more than the men themselves, of the evils that have come upon France."

The Emperor himself was unable to decide whether to adopt a policy of peace or a policy of war, whether to seek alliance with other Powers with a view to aggressive action, or to advocate a plan of disarmament, which at one time strongly attracted him: his mood changed as one influence or another affected him. Returning to France in August, 1867, after an interview with the Emperor of Austria at Salzburg, he excited grave apprehension by referring, in a speech delivered at Lille, to certain "black clouds" upon the horizon. But as during the year 1868 both the Emperor and the king of Prussia frequently expressed their determination to preserve the peace, all fears were calmed, capitalists were reassured, and credit rose. When, however, in 1869, France learned that Prussia at last positively refused to allow her to annex Belgium, and that Napoleon, whose idea was to form a Franco-Belgian Zollverein, had been prevented, by Bismarck, as the French government believed, from gaining possession of certain Belgian railways, the desire for war grew so strong in Paris that Napoleon communicated with Austria regarding the possibility of a triple alliance of France, Austria, and Italy.

In March, 1870, Archduke Albert, the victor of Custozza, came to France, ostensibly to study the French army, arsenals, and harbours, but actually to consider the project of an alliance; and so satisfactory was this visit that in May General Lebrun was sent to Vienna to plan a campaign with the archduke. The draft of this plan, which has been recently published, contains the proposal that the war be undertaken in the spring of 1871 with the entire forces of the three Powers; that France, who according to Lebœuf's estimates was able to mobilise her

troops in fifteen days, take the initiative and cross at once the Palatinate frontier; that the other Powers who, as Archduke Albert frankly acknowledged, could not mobilise their troops in less than six weeks, preserve neutrality until the expiration of this period, when Austria, having concentrated her army in Bohemia, should move westward to unite with the French, perhaps at Nuremburg, in order to detach South Germany from Prussia, and the Italian army stationed at Verona should advance by way of the Tyrol to attack Munich. The forces of the allies were estimated at 1,300,000 men, and the movement of the troops was worked out with considerable detail; but at the same time, Francis Joseph told General Lebrun plainly that Austria did not desire war, and in any case would not declare war at the same time with France, inasmuch as doing so might lead, in the new excitement regarding German nationality, to an uprising of the German population in Austria. "But," he added, "if the Emperor Napoleon, forced to accept or declare war, presents himself with his armies in the centre of Germany, not as an enemy, but as a liberator, then I shall be compelled to declare that I am going to make common cause with him."

The negotiations went no further, and there is no proof that any definite agreement was reached; but the fact of chief interest is that Napoleon should have considered such an alliance at all, inasmuch as only the January before he had openly advocated a reduction of armaments and peace with Prussia, and a month later, acquiesced in the proposal of the Gladstone government that England become an intermediary to induce the two Powers to disarm. There can be little doubt that this project of a war alliance with Austria originated with Gramont, the empress, and the other leaders of the war party, who so often before had endeavoured to draw the Emperor to the side of Austria, and had been responsible for the convention of June 12, 1866, and for Napoleon's decision to dictate the terms of peace after the battle of Königgrätz. But in the end the peace

party triumphed, the negotiations with Austria were given up, and all immediate difficulties seemed to have disappeared, when a new diplomatic incident again threw the European world into a state of excitement.

In 1868 a revolution broke out in Spain : the queen, Isabella II., was driven from the throne ; a provisional government was established ; and the Cortes of that year, in spite of the opposition of a strong republican element, voted for a monarchy with a liberal constitution. Then came the search for a king. Several candidates were proposed, among them the Duke of Montpensier, who had been one of the chief actors in the "Spanish Marriages" in 1846; but Napoleon would not suffer an Orléanist to mount the throne of Spain. Finally in February, 1869, Salazar, a Spanish unionist deputy, proposed Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a brother of Prince Charles, who had been elected only three years before prince of Roumania. But when this proposal was first made in the spring of 1869, the father of the prince rejected it, as he also did a second time in November, even though Salazar came secretly to his chateau in Switzerland and offered the crown to each of the sons in turn. Discouraged by these failures, General Prim turned to Berlin for support, and sent Salazar with letters to King William and Bismarck. The king preferred to leave the decision to the prince himself, and when the prince refused, the matter seemed to have ended. But Bismarck, even at that time, desired the election of Prince Leopold "for dynastic and political reasons." It is clear from the letters of Prince Anthony to his son, the present king of Roumania, that Bismarck and his counsellors had already foreseen the importance of this candidature as furnishing, in case of need, a possible pretext for war, inasmuch as Napoleon had informed the Berlin government, as early as 1869, that he would look on the acceptance of the Spanish throne by a Hohenzollern prince as an act directed against France. And such a view of the matter was not with-

out reason ; for though the prince was closely connected with the house of Napoleon, yet inasmuch as Prince Anthony, the father, had been the head of the Prussian cabinet in 1859, the interests of the family were closely identified with those of Prussia.

With the beginning of the summer of 1870, Bismarck seems to have found excellent reasons why another experiment with the candidature should be made. That he knew of the negotiations which General Lebrun was conducting at Vienna, is not to be doubted; and it is quite likely, that either from Florence or Pesth he had received information regarding the plan that the two generals had drafted of waging war against Prussia in 1871. He knew, furthermore, that the king of Prussia could control the military forces of the North German Confederation until December, 1870, only, for after this time its numbers and expenses were to be controlled by federal legislation ; he knew that the army was ready, for when requested to disarm by the Gladstone government, he had refused on the ground that the Prussian system rendered disarmament impossible ; and he also knew that Prussia had nothing to fear from foreign Powers, for Russia had recently renewed her promises of neutrality, Italy was certainly friendly to Prussia, and Austria would be deterred from openly co-operating with France by her fear of her German population, Hungary, and Russia.

In view of these facts, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Bismarck had much to do in reviving the question of the election of Prince Leopold in June, 1870. On the 14th of the month, the Spanish government for the fourth time offered the throne to the prince, and on the 28th, Leopold, with the approval of the king of Prussia, gave his consent. Bismarck had carried his first point. But even now war need not have followed ; for although Napoleon had twice declared that he would not suffer a Hohenzollern to ascend the throne of Spain, nevertheless, had the French government acted wisely and with

dignity, the whole Prussian scheme might have miscarried. A telegram of protest and inquiry was sent from Paris to Berlin on July 4th; but as the king was at Ems, Bismarck at his country-seat at Varzin in Pomerania, no information could be obtained, and on July 7th Benedetti was despatched to Ems to obtain from the king his consent that Prince Leopold renounce the Spanish throne. Between that time and the 12th the earlier interviews took place, with the result that Benedetti was able to telegraph to Paris that the king had consented "to give his entire and unreserved approbation to the desistence of the prince of Hohenzollern." The prudence of sending the ambassador to Ems may be questioned, and the dogmatic tone of his instructions, which he wisely concealed, may be strongly condemned; still up to this time the French government had acted, on the whole, with justice and reason. The answer of King William was entirely satisfactory to the Emperor, to Ollivier, and to the peace party; and had the matter stopped here, it is fair to suppose that peace might have been preserved.

But the control of the situation lay not with the Emperor, but with Gramont, Lebœuf, the empress, and the party leaders in Paris, who were doing all in their power, both in the *Corps législatif* and in the city, to bring on the war. Through their persistence the government at this juncture made an unfortunate blunder. To Baron Werther, Prussian envoy at Paris, Gramont suggested that King William be asked to send Napoleon a personal letter, "letter of apology," the Germans called it, in which he should state that "in authorising Leopold of Hohenzollern to accept the Spanish throne, he had desired to injure in no way the interest or to offend the dignity of the French nation; and that in urging the renunciation of the prince, he had desired to terminate henceforth all misunderstandings between his government and that of the Emperor." About the same time, influenced by certain members of the Right in the Chamber, Gramont instructed

Benedetti to ask the king for guarantees for the future. Why this demand should have been made at this time it is difficult to understand, for it had been refused once before, and of course would be refused again. The instructions to Benedetti, which were sent by telegraph, reached Ems before the communication from Werther, which was despatched by courier. Therefore, on the morning of the 13th Benedetti approached the king, and after a few moments' conversation regarding the message which the king was expecting from Prince Anthony, announced that he was instructed to demand guarantees for the future. "You ask of me a promise for all time and for all cases," the king answered; "I cannot give it"; and though Benedetti renewed his request, the king refused to consider it, adding, however, that he would summon the ambassador later to hear the contents of the telegram from Prince Anthony. Nor is there any doubt that the king intended to see Benedetti again; but Werther's report containing the request for a personal letter which arrived meanwhile, appears to have irritated the king and exhausted his patience. Up to this time he had controlled the affair himself, had received Benedetti freely, and had treated the question of the candidature more or less as a personal matter; but he now took a different attitude. He sent his aide-de-camp to make his last communication to Benedetti, refused to receive him again, and despatched an account of the events of the 13th to Bismarck at Berlin with the permission that the chancellor might communicate it to the press, if he so desired. Thus the chances which had favoured peace as long as King William had managed the negotiations, now greatly favoured war, for the control of affairs was in the hands of Bismarck.

The telegram from Ems, a confidential despatch to the chancellor, was prepared for the press by Bismarck in the presence of Moltke and Roon; and though the actual facts were in no way falsified, they were abridged in such a way as to make possible a great many interpretations of the king's treatment of

Benedetti. The condensed account sinned greatly in the matter of omissions, and it is not surprising that immediately the most exaggerated and contradictory reports should have spread through Europe. That Bismarck hoped to provoke war, there can be no doubt: Gramont by his insistence had thrown the game entirely into the chancellor's hands.

Bismarck's telegram to the press had the desired effect. A *furor teutonicus* seized upon the Germans, who deeming Bendetti's demand "outrageous arrogance," interpreted the press notice as an expression of the will of the nation. In France it was received as an insult. Making no allowance for the fact that this notice was not intended to be a diplomatic communication, and without waiting for any official announcement from Berlin, the war party in the French ministry and the Chamber placed upon it the worst possible interpretation, and demanded war. The decision in favour of peace, which had been approved by the cabinet even as late as the morning of the 14th of July, was reversed later in the same day, under circumstances that are still obscure, and may always remain so. On the day following, the Duke of Gramont announced to the *Corps législatif* the decision of the government, and such was the enthusiasm it created, that his request for a vote of credit for the mobilisation of the army was granted by the Chamber with but ten dissenting voices, and by the Senate, unanimously. Paris gave way to a furor for war, though it is claimed that some of the war manifestations were paid for. There is no doubt that from the 14th to the 19th of July a comparatively small band of men, composed of excited officials, swaggering army officers, members of the clerical party, deputies ready to accuse the Emperor and the whole peace party of cowardice, imperialists loyal to the empress and her son, and journalists who carried at their pen points a defence of the honour of France, were able to force France into war at a time when the country was wholly unprepared, both in allies and home forces, to carry on such a strug-

gle as this promised to be. In thus rushing headlong into war, France was guilty of a folly for which neither the Emperor, who up to the last moment counselled peace, nor the people in general, who, so far as the reports of the prefects go to show, were averse to the war, can be held accountable. Just as in 1830, 1848, and 1851 France had allowed herself to be controlled by a comparatively small body of men in Paris; so now she allowed her future to be shaped by the wrathful, revengeful and passionate members of the war and clerical parties, who committed an act which the more sober members of the cabinet condemned, and which it is doubtful whether the country, or even the legislative bodies, in calmer moments would have sanctioned by their votes. Jules Favre undoubtedly spoke the truth when, on September 17, 1870, he said: "There is not a sincere man in Europe who can affirm that had she been consulted, France would have made war upon Prussia." Yet on July 19th war was officially declared.

The war of 1870 was ostensibly between France and Prussia, two Powers equally matched; but in reality the two combatants were not equal in strength and position. France had not an ally in Europe. Russia, eager to regain control of the Black Sea and offended by the anti-Slavic policy adopted by Austria from 1866 to 1870, not only remained friendly to Prussia and threatened to arm when Austria did, but joining with England, who at once declared for neutrality, she persuaded Denmark to do the same. Even Austria and Italy, with whom negotiations were still pending, and upon whom Gramont had counted so confidently when he made his speeches to the *Corps législatif*, refused to co-operate: Austria, because of Hungary's determination to remain neutral, and because she feared her German population and Russia; Italy, because she believed that a French victory would prevent her from acquiring Rome. Prussia, on the other hand, could rely, not only on the neutrality of these Powers, but upon the support of the entire German nation.

No sooner had war been declared than Louis of Bavaria, faithful to the treaty of alliance, put his forces at the disposal of King William, and Würtemberg, Hesse, and Baden did the same. The new Germany was awakening, and in the cry and shock of war the dream of a common Fatherland was at last realised.

But greater even than the contrast which Europe saw between the unity and latent power of the new Germany and the discord and inefficiency everywhere discoverable in France, was that between the military organisations of the two states. In Prussia, existed a system of great armies, scientifically organised, perfect in equipment, unequalled in tactics, and recruited according to an entirely new principle of universal military service. In France, on the other hand, still existed the system of 1854 and 1859, that of small armies, badly equipped, unaccustomed to rapid marching, composed of men long in the service, and commanded by officers ignorant of topography and the science of war, of both of which subjects the Prussians were masters. Furthermore, the French system, at best inferior to that of the Prussians, had been made infinitely worse by the vices of the Empire, which had sapped the strength of the army as they had that of the state. In the final issue the conflict lay, not between France and Prussia, but between two military systems, one of the old, the other of the new *régime*.

The war that followed falls naturally into two parts: for during August and September, 1870, Napoleon was defending the frontier to check the advance of the invaders and to save his dynasty and the Empire; while from October, 1870, to January, 1871, France was attempting to drive the Germans from her soil and save her capital from capture. It had been the intention of the Emperor to take the offensive, to cross the Rhine somewhere on the Baden frontier, to separate South Germany from the north, and to unite with the forces which, to the last, he hoped to receive from Austria and from Italy. But

the attacking army, which moved slowly, lacked order, plan, and efficient leaders, and was numerically never greater than 250,000 men, was caught in the trap of its own preparation. By the defeat of MacMahon and the army of Alsace at Wörth, August 6th, and by the equally crushing defeat of Frossard and the army of the Rhine at Forbach on the same day, the whole course of the war was decided, and the fate of the Empire practically sealed. In consequence of this disastrous opening of the campaign, one army was completely demoralised, the other, which had been forced back to Metz, could not decide whether to fight or retreat; the Emperor, who was utterly incompetent to perform his responsible duties, was obliged to resign the command to Marshal Bazaine; and in Paris the Ollivier ministry was replaced by one under Palikao from the reactionary and warlike Right, and the radicals and revolutionists became more confident and aggressive.

All hope of aid from Austria or Italy was now out of the question; and the opinion, general in Europe, that the complete defeat of the imperial troops was only a matter of time, was confirmed by the events of the second and third weeks of the war. While attempting to retreat to Châlons the army of the Rhine, the only one capable of presenting an efficient front to the enemy, and containing the very flower of the imperial troops, lost heavily in the fearfully bloody battles of Borny, on August 14th, Mars la Tour, on August 16th, and Gravelotte, on August 18th, and was finally forced to take refuge in Metz. The end of the tragedy soon came. MacMahon and the Emperor, with an army hastily gathered together at Châlons, not daring for political reasons to turn to the defence of Paris, attempted by a northerly movement to extricate the army in Metz. But indecision again prevented the execution of the plan. This last imperial force was met by the German army of the Meuse, driven farther north, and having been surrounded at Sedan, was compelled to surrender as prisoner of war on

September 2, 1870. At the end of one short month the imperial structure had fallen, the Emperor was a prisoner, and France was left without an army.

The second great period of the war began when the Germans, leaving the army of Prince Frederic Charles before Metz, advanced rapidly toward Paris. In that city the revolutionists had repeated the scenes of 1848. The irreconcilable republicans, aided by the mob, which had broken into the chamber and dispersed the *Corps législatif*, had proclaimed the republic on September 4th at the Hôtel de Ville, and placed the defence of France in the hands of a provisional government. This body made every effort to provide for the protection of the city. Armies were formed from the regulars, from the *garde mobile*, and from all the peasantry between twenty-one and forty years of age gathered in a *levée en masse*. The government endeavoured to get aid from Europe, and made proposals to Bismarck, first for an armistice, and, afterward, for a peace ; but all without success. Thereupon the campaign began in earnest with the siege of Paris, which, during four memorable months of cold and distress, the troops within the city and those in the provinces vainly endeavoured to raise. Though a million men were under arms, they were untrained and inexperienced, and proved no match for the tried German soldiers ; from the beginning there was never a moment's doubt as to what the result would be. The siege began on September 19th, and by October 5th, when King William took up his headquarters at Versailles, the investment was complete. The Germans were strengthened by the fall of Toul, on September 23d, of Strassburg, on the 28th, and more than all else by the capitulation of Metz on October 27th, which added more than two hundred thousand men to the besieging army. On October 8th Gambetta, leaving Paris for Tours in a balloon, organised, with amazing rapidity, the military forces of the provinces, and, as some think, unnecessarily prolonged the contest and increased the sufferings in Paris.

From November to January the contest was fierce, but with scarcely a gleam of hope for France. The army in Paris failed in a series of attempts, lasting from November 30th to December 2d, to break through the German lines in order to co-operate with the army of the Loire ; and after a battle, fought long and brilliantly between December 1st and 3d, the latter army was driven back, and at Le Mans, on December 16th, was thoroughly beaten. An ill-advised effort, made during the early weeks of January, to cut off the German communications with the rear by a movement on Belfort, was frustrated, and the troops were driven into Switzerland and disarmed. Finally, on January 24th, Paris, starved and in despair, and threatened with the Communists within as well as by the Germans without, gave up the struggle and surrendered. An armistice was concluded that a national assembly might be elected to ratify the terms of peace ; and Bismarck and Thiers, having agreed upon the preliminaries at Versailles, signed the definitive peace at Frankfort, May 10, 1871. Its terms were simple : France gave up Alsace and a part of Lorraine, retaining, however, the fortress and environs of Belfort, and agreed to pay five thousand millions of francs within three years, and support a German army of occupation until the final payment should be made.

The year 1871 marked the close of an important period of German history. The Prussian victory at Königgrätz, the treaties of alliance with the South German states, the adoption of a common military system in 1866, the common tariff parliament of 1868, and the military unity of 1870, were but parts of the larger movement that culminated in this year in the erection of the Empire. When, under the leadership of the crown prince of Prussia, the soldiers of Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg marched side by side with those from Posen, Silesia, and Hesse, the truth dawned upon Germany, as upon Europe, that in the throes of conflict all distinctions and differences were vanishing, and that the common Fatherland for which all were

fighting was already become a reality. No sooner had the Sedan campaign been won, than the princes of the South German states, actuated in part no doubt by a fear of Prussia's might, but still more by a genuine enthusiasm for the common country, took that step which for four years they had strenuously refused to take. In September they entered into negotiations, which were continued during the early days of the siege of Paris, looking to their entrance into the North German Confederation; and on the 15th of November Baden and Hesse Darmstadt, on the 23d, Bavaria, and on the 25th, Würtemberg, joined the northern body. Though considerable opposition was made by the national liberals in the Reichstag of the North German Confederation to concessions granted to Bavaria, such as the control of the army in time of peace and a separate postal administration, nevertheless, by December 10th, the treaties were duly ratified, and a German Confederation with King William as president came into existence. But this title was but a temporary one. Through the initiative of Louis of Bavaria, and with the consent of all the other princes, the proposal was made to change the name of the Confederation to that of Empire and to offer to the king of Prussia the title of Emperor. To this the Reichstag of the North German Confederation and the Landtags of the South German states agreed, and on the 30th of December the constitution of the new Empire was promulgated. On January 18, 1871, at Versailles, in the palace of the Bourbons and in the presence of one of the most august assemblies ever gathered, the coronation of the new Emperor took place; and on the battle-field, in the presence of the army and amid the thundering of cannon, the German Empire was born.

But the creation of a united Germany was only the greatest among the results of the war of 1870. That war is of pre-eminent importance, not only because it overthrew one empire and established another, and inaugurated a new military era by

compelling every important nation in Europe to recast its army; but chiefly because it brought to an end that political revolution which, in one form or another, had concerned the states of western and central Europe since the downfall of Napoleon I. It raised Prussia to the headship of the new Germany; it enabled the republicans of France to take up the work ignored by the imperial government and to establish once more the republic; it enabled Italy to invade the territory of the Pope and to complete her unity; and finally, by diverting the attention of the western Powers, it enabled Russia to set aside one of the most important of the terms of the treaty of Paris, and to recover her control in the Black Sea. When all this had been accomplished, scarcely a vestige remained of those conditions of the congress of Vienna which, for so many years, had been the anxious care of the European concert. An era in the historical development of Europe, during which the problems at issue had been to a preponderating degree political and constitutional, had come to an end; and, save for the Eastern Question, scarcely one of the difficulties that since 1815 had vexed the statesmen of the different countries remained to be surmounted. In the new era the very atmosphere was to change; peace was to reign; the interests of peoples and governments were to be social, industrial, and commercial, rather than political, and in consequence, movements making for progress were to lie more deeply hidden, and the tendencies of events were to be more difficult to discover. In thus closing one era and inaugurating another, the war of 1870 stands as the great dividing line between the Europe of yesterday and the Europe of to-day.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL MONARCHY.

IN turning our attention from the war of 1870 and its consequences to consider the movement that brought Austria into the ranks of the enlightened and liberal states of Europe, we pass back at one step from the era of to-day to that of the eighteenth century; for until 1848, Austria preserved intact her antiquated methods of government, and resisted successfully all the attempts that were made to alter her unprogressive political system.

As the bearer of an imperial title that was, in theory, not Austrian, but European, the house of Habsburg had played a more or less cosmopolitan part in the history of Europe, asserting its authority in lands outside its own borders, and often exhausting its energies in efforts to maintain its supremacy abroad. It had never identified its interests with those of any nationality, had never depended for strength upon the resources of any people or of any well-defined territory. And this is not surprising; for the people within the borders of the Austrian Empire, not only did not compose a single nation, but were possessed in common of neither race, historical antecedents, language, customs, nor religion. The hereditary lands of the archduke of Austria contained principally Germans, with Slovenes, a Slavic people, in the lower provinces, and Italians in the cities of the southern border. The kingdom of Bohemia, including Moravia and Silesia, was occupied largely by Czechs, who were Slavs, and by Germans, who resided chiefly in the

cities and in the territory of the north-west. The kingdom of Galicia possessed a mixed population of Slavs of different groups, Poles in the west, Ruthenians in the east, and Roumanians in the Bukovina. The kingdom of Hungary contained Germans in the west, Magyars in the centre, and Slovaks, or Slavs, in the north ; in the east Germans, that is Saxons, and Magyars together with a large Roumanian peasant population ; while in the south, Croats and Serbs, also Slavs, predominated. In some quarters existed a bewildering mixture of Slavs, Germans, and Magyars mingled and superimposed. These were not true nationalities ; the only test in the least degree certain was language ; and even those who spoke the same tongue did not always live in contiguous territories. Over such a group of races and peoples the house of Habsburg ruled, and so neglectful of all that concerned the local life of these people had it been, that in the various provinces local peculiarities and historical claims had become so pronounced as to admit of no common interest other than that in the common dynastic head.

Previous to 1848 the government of Austria, like that of the eighteenth-century monarchies, had been administered by an absolute Emperor, who, though caring little for government, was expected to concern himself with many of the most trivial details of administration ; by a chief minister, who, though subject to immediate dismissal by the Emperor, was really the head of the Empire and the director of its policy ; by sundry subordinate ministers and heads of departments, who with powers badly defined and often conflicting, very inefficiently performed their duties; and by a medley of boards and councils, which, given over to formalism and routine, acted with extraordinary slowness. The methods of the government were crude, unsystematic, and complicated, those in authority acting secretly and arbitrarily, neglecting the more important needs of the state in order to hasten their own advancement or to estab-

lish the absolute authority of the crown. Local government was in the hands of the nobles and the clergy. The former, preserving in full their feudal privileges, were exempt from military service, and they alone were permitted to hold large properties and important offices. They administered local justice, controlled the local assemblies and local police, and, in general, regulated the condition of the peasantry. And in this work of preventing all local interest in matters of administration, so well conducted by the officials of Vienna and the nobles in the provinces, the government itself had aided by its policy of repression and its total disregard of public opinion. It had suppressed all uprisings and discussion ; had confiscated books, plays, pamphlets, and journals ; had excluded from the country foreign works containing liberal sentiments ; had scrutinised the words and acts of professors and students ; had prohibited the organisation of societies and unions ; and had opened suspected letters, demanded passports, and viewed every stranger with suspicion. At the same time it had made worship compulsory, and though tolerating all creeds, had admitted to public office no one of other than the Roman Catholic faith. This was the way in which Metternich had compelled obedience at home ; and this was the form of government against which the revolution of 1848 had been undertaken.

But the administration in Austria was not a system, it was a condition ; it was based on neither plan nor principle, but on tradition and habit. The dominant influence was essentially feudal, and humanity began, as Windischgrätz said, with the baron. Over feudalism, though not over the house of Habsburg, the revolution of 1848 had been successful. When the moderates in the Hungarian Diet succeeded in March, 1848, in embodying in their address to the Emperor requests for the equalisation of taxes and the abolition of feudal privileges and seignorial rights, they had won a victory over the aristocratic elements in Hungary. When the deputies to the Constituent

Assembly in Vienna, summoned after the uprising in May, 1848, voted to abolish the *corvées*, quit-rents, and seignorial justice, and to do away with all distinctions between noble and non-noble, they performed, as had the Constituent Assembly in France in 1789, the most important work of the revolution. And the feudal privileges thus abolished were not restored after the revolution was over. The government, established by Schwarzenberg in the years from 1849 to 1851, was wholly different from that of Metternich and the old *régime*. The army had won the victory over the revolution, and the new administration, recognising neither national peculiarities nor feudal rights, took on a military character—that is, became absolute and centralised. On one hand it ignored the historical claims of Hungary and Bohemia; on the other it refused to restore the privileges of the aristocracy, the old seignorial rights over the peasantry, and the old control of provincial justice and administration : feudal and popular claims were alike passed over, that the absolute authority of the Emperor might be restored.

The constitution of March 4, 1849, which inaugurated this new policy, was directed chiefly against Hungary ; and by abolishing her constitution, her diet, and her county assemblies, and by placing her dependencies under the government at Vienna, it reduced her to the level of the other provinces. But that part of the constitution which provided for the representation of all the members of the Austrian state in a parliament at Vienna, and for extensive powers of self-government in the provinces themselves, was liberal enough in conception, though it proved to be too difficult of execution for a man of Schwarzenberg's indolent nature. After order had been restored, he found it simpler to ignore entirely the differences of nationality, and by abrogating the constitution, to place absolute authority in the hands of the Emperor. Therefore, by letters patent in 1851, the constitution of March 4th was withdrawn in the name

" of the unity of the Empire and of the monarchial principle "; the parliament was deprived of its functions, and became merely a council of the Empire ; the ministers were made responsible to the Crown alone ; and the various kingdoms and duchies were transformed into administrative or military divisions, and were governed, not by feudal intermediaries, as in the paternal system of Metternich, but directly by officials appointed from Vienna. All offices were held by Germans, the language of the courts, the schools, and official circles were German, and in general the influence of the German element everywhere predominated. Centralisation was complete ; and for ten years, while this " provisional system," as it was called, lasted, a harsh and rigorous police administration was everywhere maintained.

And in carrying on this work of centralisation, the government could find no better ally than the church, which in 1849 had condemned political liberty as " impious," and had declared all national movements to be but " a remnant of paganism," and the differences of language, to be " the consequences of sin and the fall of man, traceable to the tower of Babel." On August 15, 1855, a concordat was signed with the Holy See, which granted all the demands that the Roman curia dared to make, and bound the state to carry out such regulations as the clergy desired. " The Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion," so the concordat reads, " will henceforth exercise in the entire Empire those rights and prerogatives which it ought to enjoy according to the divine institutions and the canon law,"—a clause which freed the church absolutely from the authority of the state. In addition, the concordat declared that the bishops were to direct the youth in all departments of education, both public and private ; to see that in all branches of instruction there existed nothing contrary to the Catholic religion and morality; to censure freely all books dangerous to religion and morals, and to call upon the state for aid in main-

taining such censorship ; to inflict punishments upon the disobedient clergy and laity with the aid of the government ; to control marriages ; and to acquire property in inalienable right. In 1856 the bishops were given complete control over the religious interests and lives of non-Catholics, and over the property of all the clergy and churches. In fact, by this agreement, Austria subjected herself to the control of the Roman Church as completely as if there were in the state no interests save those of the bishops and the clergy.

Under Alexander Bach, minister of the interior, this system was applied in all its severity ; and from 1849 until 1859 Austria and all her dependencies lay in an intellectual and political torpor. Saved from the revolution by the army, she was now forced to submit to its authority, as well as to that of the police, and the clergy. Not an agitator could raise his voice, not a journal utter a protest ; at the same time intellectual and economic activity ceased, the latent powers and great resources of the state remained undeveloped, and Austria could only wait for the new policy that should release her from the iron grasp of her rescuer. And during this period the influence of the government at Vienna began to decline. The financial condition of the state was far worse than it had been even in the days of Metternich, when the government had seen each year a deficit, and had sought to conceal it from public notice by loans for extraordinary expenses. This disordered bookkeeping, relic of the days when states did not consider themselves responsible for their expenditures, had been thrown into hopeless confusion by the revolution of 1848, which, in bringing misery and want to the people, had cut off receipts, and, in calling for unusual military expenditures, had increased the amount of the public debt. Every year since that time the expenses had exceeded the revenues, and it was estimated that before 1859 the debt had risen to nearly three hundred millions of florins. Such a policy in itself need not have been a cause of anxiety, for all European

states after 1848 had begun to contract enormous debts ; but in Austria, this was not accompanied with any orderly or systematic method of financiering, or with any effort to improve the economic condition of the state as a whole, in such a way as to give it a reputation for solvency as a guarantee against repudiation.

At the same time the political influence of the government was suffering, in Germany, at the hands of Prussia, in Europe at large, at the hands of Napoleon and France. During the years when her autocratic methods of suppressing liberal ideas were losing for Austria the respect of the west, her policy in the Crimean war was costing her her reputation for good statesmanship. To the liberals of Europe, she seemed no better than the reactionary states of Italy. When Lord Clarendon, at the congress of Paris, condemned in unsparing language the bad government and despotic measures in Rome and Naples, and held up to scorn the policy that sought to repress agitations by armed force rather than by remedying the causes of the discontent, it was well understood that he was attacking, not only the states of the Italian peninsula, but Austria as well.

The Italian war brought matters to a crisis, and roused the Emperor to a full realisation of the evils of Schwarzenberg's methods. Had Austria been solvent, or had she been free from the dictation of the army and the church, it is unlikely that the ultimatum which brought about the war would have been sent. But the Emperor, knowing that Austria could not long support the equipment made necessary by Cavour's military preparations, and urged by the generals and bishops, sanctioned the prosecution of this war that was to cost him one of the fairest of his provinces and the reputation of his soldiers. But this was not all. The military and autocratic methods of the court of Vienna had already aroused a spirit of disaffection among the Magyars and Slavs, many of whom openly rejoiced in the defeat of Austria's forces at Magenta and Solferino ; and was

leading Magyars, Croats, and Serbs to consider a plan of joining with Napoleon in a general uprising against the Austrian government. Still another incident was significant of public opinion both within and without the Empire. After the war, when the government called for a loan of two hundred millions of florins, to be used in reorganising the army, it found itself unable to raise more than seventy-six millions, and was obliged to admit that the credit of the state was exhausted. Francis Joseph could no longer be blind to the weaknesses and defects of the system that had injured the prestige of the house of Habsburg in Europe, and provoked a war, which not only had resulted in dismembering the Empire, but had so far destroyed the loyalty of the people and their interest in the affairs of the state, as to make them either afraid to take up the bonds of the government, or indifferent to the measures which the government desired to adopt.

No sooner, therefore, had the armistice of Villafranca been agreed upon, than Francis Joseph turned his attention to the needs of his Empire, and with the earnestness and wonderful patience that characterised him and won for him in later years the love of his people, took up the task of remodelling the government. The problem which faced him was one which might well have appalled the most able of the enlightened statesmen of Europe; for it demanded that he who solved it should satisfy the claims, not only of classes, but of races, and make harmonious the many interests that for generations had been opposed to one another. But the Emperor did not flinch. Having dismissed Alexander Bach, he issued a manifesto in August, 1859, in which he declared that it was his intention to correct the old-time abuses of the Empire and to introduce reforms of a liberal character; and six months afterward, by the March Patent of 1860, he summoned some thirty-eight leading men from the different provinces to meet with the council of state of the Empire, for the purpose of considering the question

of the finances, and of expressing an opinion as to the manner in which the new reforms should be carried out.

The committee appointed by this enlarged council to report upon the subject, presented two views: one held by the centralist minority, whose leader was the advocate Hein; the other supported by the federalist majority under the leadership of Clam-Martinitz, the Czech. It was the wish of the minority to establish a central power which should have authority over the diets of the various provinces, without regard to the historical claims of the various nationalities; or, in other words, it advised that the diets be given important powers, but at the same time be made subordinate to the central government at Vienna. This, the German view, was supported by the burgesses in the cities and the industrial regions of the west, who desired a strong government for the protection both of trade and industry, and of the middle classes against the aristocracy and clergy; and also by the members of the smaller races, who looked to Vienna for defence against the larger nationalities. On the other hand, the federalist majority preferred the establishment of a federal state, in which all the nations should be equal, in which each should preserve and exercise in full autonomy the powers that it claimed by virtue of its traditions and its national unity. Owing largely to the influence and eloquence of the Magyar representatives, the federalists secured a majority in the committee, and their plan was accepted by the Emperor as the basis of his reforms. On October 20th he issued for the Empire a new law, known as the October Diploma, which showed clearly that the tendencies were in the direction of federalism and states' rights. The Diploma restored the national assemblies, granted to the Magyars the use of their old constitution, and to the other nationalities privileges determined by their old territorial regulations; it established for the common government an imperial council composed of delegates from the national assemblies, with power to legislate in

all common affairs relating to finance, the post-office, and the army ; and it abolished the common ministries of the interior, justice, public worship and instruction.

But unfortunately the experiment was to have but a short life of four months, for neither the government nor the Magyars were willing to interpret the October Diploma in the spirit in which it had been framed. Goluchowski, who had taken the place of Bach, shared with the aristocracy sympathies which made it difficult for him to play the reformer. The decrees that he issued interpreting the Diploma were centralist in their character, and made clear the government's intention of regulating the national assemblies in the interest of uniformity, and of granting them, not the right to select their deputies to the imperial council, but merely the privilege of naming certain persons from among whom the Crown would make its selection. In their turn, the Hungarian comitats or county assemblies, passing far beyond the intent of the Diploma in their exercise of the newly restored privileges, not only acted as if the March Laws of 1848 were once more in force, and as if Hungary were connected with Austria merely by the person of the Emperor ; but strove to sweep away all traces of Austrian authority, and boldly denounced the whole imperial system.

The Emperor, greatly displeased by the violent words and acts of these ultra-nationalists of Hungary, and by their attempts to force his hand in this hostile and illegal manner, withdrew from the position he had taken in October ; and in February, 1861, issued a patent, ostensibly to complete the previous arrangement, but in reality to inaugurate a new system. The February Patent set the current running in the opposite direction, and showed the determination of the Emperor to abandon his former federalist policy in favour of one that should be centralising. Goluchowski was dismissed, and Schmerling became the minister of the new policy. The February Patent, while preserving intact the national assemblies,

minimised their powers of self-government by strengthening the imperial council, and destroyed their national peculiarities by organising them after a common model. The imperial council was divided into two chambers, after the English fashion, and its functions were vastly increased. When the Magyar deputies were absent, it became a parliament with limited powers; but when they were present, it became a parliament with full powers, competent to discuss and to regulate the affairs of the entire country. The ministries of the interior and of public instruction were restored; and by dividing the electors into classes, and granting special privileges to the great landowners and to the inhabitants of the towns, the electoral system was so altered as to give the control of the elections, for the greater part, to the landed aristocracy and the German *bourgeois* classes. By this octroyed constitution, Austria was treated very much as if she were a homogeneous state, consisting of a single nationality; for but little attention was paid to the historical and national rights of her various members. It is true that the constitution was in many respects liberal; but it was unsuited to the condition of things in Austria, it pleased only the Germans and centralists, and it deeply offended the Magyars and Czechs, the aristocracies of the various nationalities, and all who supported the old *régime*. Such a doctrinaire constitution could not be permanent.

But the constitution was to be given a fair trial. Hungary, Croatia, and Venetia at once refused to send deputies to the imperial council, and at first Istria and Transylvania did the same; but after a new electoral system had been forced upon these provinces, they became obedient to the law. Though the Saxons did not get their representatives to Vienna until 1863, enough members were sent from the other provinces to constitute a limited parliament with power to legislate upon matters which were not Hungarian, and which did not fall within the province of the local legislatures. As the majority of this

council was German, the acts of the members and the policy of the ministry favoured naturally the interests of Vienna rather than those of Pesth, and during the period from 1861 to 1863 the council was more concerned to reform the German federal system than to effect a reconciliation between the government and the eastern nationalities. It is a striking fact that instead of showing any interest in the affairs of her non-Germanic peoples who were afterward to become her greatest support, Austria should have expended her energy during these very years in trying to reform a worn-out federal system that three years later had ceased to exist.

But in the meantime what was the attitude of Hungary? In that country were two parties, one composed of ultra-nationalists, who were bitterly opposed to making the slightest concession to Austria, and were ready at any time to resort to violent and aggressive measures; the other that of Deák, Eötvös, and the moderate liberals, who though ready to do battle for the legal rights of Hungary, were also willing to compromise with Austria. Deák outlined his position in the famous addresses of 1861, in which he had declared that Hungary's rights dated far back in the past, but that inasmuch as the March Laws of 1848 defined these rights in a form better adapted to the requirements of the times, it would be necessary for these laws to become the basis of all agreements with Vienna. Owing to his influence, the Hungarian Diet refused to accept the February Patent, which as he declared "transformed Hungary into an Austrian province, and placed the nation under the control of a foreign majority"; and after stating that it would never sacrifice its constitutional independence, it asserted with vehemence that Francis Joseph was not the legal king of Hungary, because he had never been crowned, and that he could not be crowned until he had consented to recognise the unity of Croatia, Transylvania, and Hungary, and had restored the fundamental law of the land. The ministry at Vienna refused to negotiate with

the Magyars unless the latter would recognise the February Patent, while the Magyars, with equal persistence, refused to accept the patent unless the Emperor would recognise their historical rights: and here in 1861 the matter rested. "We can wait," said Schmerling, when he heard that the Magyars had refused to send delegates to Vienna; and for four years the deadlock continued.

But Schmerling soon found himself in an awkward position. Though he had boasted that by a liberal constitution and a common parliament he could preserve the unity of the Empire, he soon found himself powerless to overcome the resistance of the Magyars and Croats, and was forced to apply a hated policy of repression in order to control them; and so deeply did he offend the other Slav nationalities by his disregard of their interests, that gradually the Poles and Czechs grew to dislike the common parliament, and finally gained courage to withdraw from it altogether. Furthermore, the lesser nationalities, who had favoured a centralised government, were annoyed by his devotion to the Germans, the nobility by his regard for the burgher classes, and the clergy by his religious toleration. Nor was this all: in mismanaging the finances, he lost the favour of the burgher and capitalist classes upon whose support in parliament he had, up to this time, depended. The expenses of the year 1864 far exceeded the appropriations, which in their turn exceeded the revenue; and the government found itself unable to pay its debts. When, therefore, a reduction of expenses was ordered, especially in the army, the wrath of the military leaders broke forth, and the nobles sent petitions to the Emperor asking for the dismissal of Schmerling, and for the abrogation of the constitution that had reduced the defences of the country and had aroused a feeling of insecurity and discontent throughout the Empire. In 1865 the situation was only worse. The minister of finance asked for a loan of one hundred and seventeen millions of florins for arrearages and

extra expenses, but the parliament granted him only thirteen millions, for the purpose of paying interest on the public debt.

The experiment of 1861 had proved a lamentable failure. Half the subjects of the Emperor were estranged from him, and the other half were already refusing to grant the supplies necessary for carrying on the business of the state. Schmerling had not been a successful minister: his plan which was to enable Austria to maintain her position as the leading state in the Germanic Confederation, and for which many sacrifices had been made, was not prospering; his attempt to reform the federal system had failed, owing to Prussia's positive rejection of the constitution drafted by the princes at Frankfort; and the alliance between Austria and Prussia in the war against Denmark threatened to disarrange all his plans by causing disaffection among the South German states, close alliance with whom was the very keystone of his German policy. The situation at last became so unbearable that the Emperor determined to act for himself. In June, 1865, he left Vienna for Pesth to begin the task of reconciliation with the Magyars, who, roused to enthusiasm by this unexpected mark of confidence from the Emperor, received him as a thrice-welcome guest. On July 27th, the parliament having dissolved, he dismissed the Schmerling ministry; and, on September 20th, issued a manifesto to the people of the Empire declaring that the constitution was suspended until it could be revised in the interests of the eastern nationalities, and calling on Magyars and Croats to state frankly the conditions on which they would renew their connection with Austria.

This act of the Emperor's struck a final blow at the old policy of centralisation, and left the government face to face with the task of solving the problem with due regard to the rights of the nationalities. It was now called upon to choose between two systems, federalism and dualism, the latter of which was the older, dating back to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723. It

was evident that the acceptance of either system would be attended with many difficulties: for the federalists would oppose dualism, which would divide the Empire between the two dominant nationalities, German and Magyar, instead of parcelling it out among an indefinite number of states united by a federal tie; and the Germans, who were fearful of becoming a helpless minority in the presence of so many Slavs and Magyars, would certainly prevent, if possible, the establishment of a federal system in the Empire. During the winter of 1865 and 1866 the Emperor entered into negotiations with the Hungarian Diet regarding the acceptance of their terms, which had been drafted with care and moderation by Deák. The ultra-nationalists of Pesth wished to stand out for absolute independence, saving only the right of the Emperor to be elected king of Hungary; but Deák, with truer insight and statesmanship, willingly admitted the existence of interests common to Hungary and Austria, and while insisting on the constitutional independence of Hungary, conceded the need of a common government to regulate those interests. During the spring of 1866 the matter was under discussion in the Diet on the basis of Deák's concessions; though even at that time it had become evident, that however much the Emperor might desire reconciliation with Hungary, the aristocratic Belcredi ministry and the political leaders in Vienna were opposed to granting Hungary's demands, and were ready to advise the Emperor to dissolve the Hungarian Diet in the hope of obtaining another that would be more compliant.

But even while the Magyar committee was drafting its terms of compromise, war broke out between Austria and Prussia, and the attention of the entire Empire was concentrated upon the result. Many of the Magyars were considering the advisability of revolting, and even Deák, loyal as he was to the Emperor, would not consent that the Hungarian Diet should raise a single soldier for the purpose of prolonging the war. But the

issue was soon decided by the battle of Königgrätz, which destroyed forever any hopes that the house of Habsburg may have cherished of holding the leadership in Germany, and blotted out the last traces of those old imperial traditions that, for so many years, had served only to draw the attention of Austria away from the needs and interests of the people within her own borders. No longer entangled in the affairs of Italy and Germany, the house of Habsburg was now free to turn to Hungary, the nation which for seventeen years it had ignored, and on a new foundation to construct a state, more solid and enduring than any of the past, and more in sympathy with those newer political ideas which, as yet, had found but little place in the Austrian system of government. No sooner had the peace been signed than Count Mensdorff, minister of foreign affairs, resigned, and was succeeded by the former prime minister of Saxony, the old opponent of Bismarck, Count Ferdinand Beust, who entered Austria's service as minister of foreign affairs in October, 1866.

With the entrance of Beust into the cabinet, the conflict began between federalism, supported by Count Belcredi, minister of the interior, and dualism, which Beust believed to be the only system practicable under the circumstances. During the ensuing months the matter was vigorously debated, and when a decree was issued in January, 1867, summoning an extraordinary parliament, it seemed as if the federalists had won the victory, for the majority of the deputies proved to be committed to the federalist cause. But inasmuch as the parliament had not members enough to take definite action, because the deputies from the German provinces refused to take their seats, it was dissolved; and the Emperor, abandoning the idea of a federal government, determined to try dualism. At the same time a conflict of equal importance had taken place in the Hungarian Diet, where Deák and those advocating a compromise had won the victory from the ultra-nationalists under the

leadership of Tisza. By February, 1867, all controversy was over: at Pesth the Diet had agreed to accept the compromise that had been drafted the spring before by its committee; and at Vienna, Belcredi had withdrawn from the cabinet, and Beust had become chancellor of the Empire. On February 8th the compromise was accepted by the Emperor, and the Hungarian constitution restored; on March 15th Francis Joseph was crowned king of Hungary; and before the end of the year the new system had been legally accepted by the Hungarian Diet and the parliament in Vienna. The Dual Monarchy was established.

The new system, which was founded on the *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867, divided the Empire into two parts: Cisleithania, made up of the seventeen provinces of Austria, in which Germans predominated; and Transleithania, made up of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Transylvania, Servia, and certain military frontiers, the population of which was, for the most part, Magyar and Slav. It was intended that these two parts should form separate independent states, each of which should have its own constitution and powers of self-government: but that the two states should be under one sovereign, who should be Emperor in Austria and apostolic king in Hungary, and should form a single monarchy under the title of Austria-Hungary. The essential feature of this compromise was a common government, which was to consist of three joint ministers, who were to be appointed by the Emperor and to control foreign affairs, war, and finance, and of two deliberative or regulative bodies of sixty members each, to be known as the Delegations, which were to be chosen annually from the legislative bodies of Austria and Hungary, and to have control of other affairs such as commerce, tariffs, money, coinage, the military system, and the industrial legislation. The Delegations were to sit alternately at Vienna and Pesth, to deliberate and vote apart, and never to come into joint session except in

case of a deadlock. Each was to employ its own language; all communications between them were to be made in both German and Magyar; and when they sat in joint session, the presidency was to be held alternately by each, and two journals were to be kept. Thus the Delegations were to form in no way a common parliament.

The relation thus established between the two parts of the Empire was without precedent in the history of government; and certain features of the arrangement that disclose its temporary character are interesting in view of Austria's future. According to the *Ausgleich*, Austria and Hungary, though remaining two states, absolutely separate in everything that concerned the individual life of each, were joined together in one monarchy, Austria-Hungary, but by bonds that might be broken at any time. In all affairs that touched the military and economic life of Austria and Hungary, harmony and unity were to depend on the willingness of the delegates to legislate according to certain common principles; should they fail to agree, and the harmony be broken, neither the state nor the Emperor was to have the power of coercion. All matters of commerce were to be regulated as between sovereign states, by treaties lasting for ten years, at the end of which time either state was to be free to withdraw, if it so desired. The most permanent bond, the common ministries, might be loosed at any time should the house of Habsburg come to an end; for the *Ausgleich* was not a compact between two states, but between each state and the dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine. There was to be, in reality, no permanent bond between Austria and Hungary.

Such was the remarkable political expedient conceived by Deák, and adopted by the Emperor and Count Beust. It took no account of other than the German and Magyar nationalities, and ignored entirely the whole federal question; but it established a government, which was the result, not merely of political ingenuity, but of experience, and one that on the whole was

to be successful. Hungary became a constitutional state with power to guarantee to her people full liberty, a responsible ministry, and a legislature of two houses, one aristocratic, the other elected under a liberal franchise. Toward Croatia, the only country of importance within their borders, the Magyars were in turn generous. In 1868 a compromise was arranged which, in reserving to the Diet at Pesth only affairs of interest common to both Hungary and Croatia, gave the Croats considerable power of self-government. In the Delegations the Croats were to have always five members, and were to enjoy within their own country the use of their own language in official circles. And the constitution of Austria was scarcely less liberal: in accordance with the five statutes of December 21, 1867, citizens were to be equal before the law, all races of the state were declared equal in language and nationality, and, although she did not adopt the parliamentary methods and the broad franchise of the western governments, Austria became after 1867 a liberal constitutional monarchy. When during the year 1868 the Austrian government quietly set aside, in a manner as little offensive as possible, the conditions of the concordat of 1855, and established freedom of religion, civil marriages, and secular instruction, it completed the work of reorganisation, and Austria took her place among the enlightened governments of Europe.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

WITH the year 1871 came the settlement of those great political questions that had been troubling central and western Europe since 1815, and the Powers entered upon a period of diplomatic inactivity that contrasted strangely with the bustle and concern of the preceding twenty years. Italy was a united state with Rome as her capital; the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were a part of Prussia; and Germany was an Empire under the house of Hohenzollern. France having rid herself of the last Bonaparte was taking up the problems of 1848 with the determination to solve them in the interests of the republic. Austria had withdrawn from Germany, had lifted her hand from Italy, and was at last turning her eyes away from Frankfort, Venetia, and the west to Pesth and the east. The political boundaries of the European states were fixed and except for the question of Alsace and Lorraine no further changes, save in Turkey, were likely to be made in the territorial arrangements of the states that composed the European system. In constitutional matters the end of a long struggle had been reached and parliamentary government in the west and constitutional government in the centre of Europe had become the permanent form of political life. Few traces of the old absolutism anywhere remained, for national unity and political liberty, inseparable parts of the higher intellectual and industrial life upon which Europe had already entered, marked

the close of the struggle, and became integral features of a new era.

During the five years that followed the close of the Franco-Prussian war, European diplomacy spent its strength in endeavouring to adapt itself to the new situation. But it was difficult for Europe to believe that the future was to be one of peace. Inasmuch as three great wars had destroyed the illusions of the earlier period, and for more than twenty years, war and the rumour of war had kept the diplomatic world in a state of constant unrest, it seemed reasonable to suppose that the new leader, with his seat at Berlin, might continue the aggrandising policy of the recent past, invade the adjacent German-speaking countries, and annex them to the new Empire in order to make complete the unity of the German nationality; or that Germany, anticipating the French desire for revenge, and seeing in the rapid recovery of that country a menace to her own integrity, might undertake a new war for the protection of the new Reichsland, and for the purpose of obtaining new milliards of indemnity. That such thoughts were in the minds of political writers and thinkers of this period, there is abundant evidence to prove. In 1873, alarmists predicted that Germany would interfere in the civil war in Carthagena; in 1875, that a conflict would break out between Germany and Belgium; and most important of all, they felt certain of the approach of war with France, when in 1875, after the French Assembly had passed a military law reorganising the army, certain diplomatic queries gave rise to exaggerated newspaper reports regarding the relations between the two countries. But a renewal of the war of 1870 was in the highest degree improbable; for Germany was the head and arbiter of the new European system, and her Emperor and chancellor, having accomplished the purpose for which they had entered into war, had no further desire to disturb the peace. In his speech of January 18, 1871, Emperor William had struck the keynote of the new policy: "I wish to

be the champion of the German Empire," he had said, "not in martial conquests, but in works of peace, in the sphere of national prosperity, freedom, and civilisation"; and in his speech from the throne March 21st, he had given expression to the same feeling, in saying that Germany was to become a sure protector of the new peace of Europe.

But Bismarck, though in full accord with the sentiments expressed by his Emperor, was also alive to the importance of maintaining friendly foreign relations; and wishing to prevent any union of the two defeated countries, which had so nearly formed an alliance against Germany in 1870, and to isolate France, that she might be unable to take revenge, he strove to make, not Germany only, but all central Europe, the guardian of the peace. With Russia the friendly relations were easily maintained; for in March, 1871, Alexander II. expressed his desire for friendship with Germany and the preservation of the peace; but with Austria, to whom Bismarck at once made friendly advances in the hope of drawing her entirely away from France, an understanding was not so easily reached. It is true that the meeting of Bismarck and Beust at Gastein, in August of 1871, and that of the Emperors of Germany and Austria at Ischl and Salzburg in September of the same year, suggested the probability of an *entente* between Austria and Germany; but this was not accomplished until important changes had taken place at Vienna. In 1871, under the Hohenwart ministry, Austria had been experimenting with a federal, that is a pro-Slavic, policy, which was naturally looked upon with disfavour by Germany. In November, however, Francis Joseph, acting under the influence of Beust, rejected the demands of the Czechs, and held to dualism. But the triumph of Beust was a short one; as the enemy of Bismarck and the friend of France he was dismissed in November, and Count Andrássy, a Magyar, hostile to the Slavs and friendly to Bismarck, was appointed minister of foreign affairs. In his

first proclamation, Andrássy expressed Austria's desire to establish friendly relations with Germany, and to support a European peace that should be "sincere, binding, and constant." In September, 1872, the Emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria met at Berlin, and agreed to aid one another in upholding the new European treaties; to settle by peaceful means the Eastern Question; and by a dual policy of repression and reform, to destroy socialistic movements, and to benefit the condition of the working classes.

But the new arrangement, based as it was upon the personal friendship of the monarchs for one another, and not upon any natural sympathy between Germans and Slavs, was not likely to be of long duration. The Russian minister, Gortchakoff, did not share his master's sentiments of good will for Germany, nor was the Russian nation especially friendly to the Germans and the Magyars; and consequently the "alliance of the three Emperors," although ostensibly lasting until the death of Alexander II. in 1881, as early as 1874 showed signs of weakness. The marriage of his daughter to the Duke of Edinburgh in 1874 brought the Czar into friendly relations with England, and the good feeling thus produced continued until the rise of Disraeli and the war of 1877. Still more disturbing was Russia's support of the Count of Paris in France, where Bismarck favoured the republic, and of Alfonso XII. in Spain, whose cause Bismarck had distinctly opposed the year before by officially recognising the Spanish Republic, with Serrano as chief executive. In the new grouping of the Powers, Russia's place was taken by Italy, whose king, Victor Emmanuel, though at first inclined to seek closer relations with France, found himself on the side of Bismarck in the struggle against the papacy. In 1872 Prince Humbert visited Berlin, the next year Victor Emmanuel journeyed to Vienna, and afterward to Berlin also, and in 1874 the two Emperors returned the visit. The friendly feeling thus engendered united central Europe and prepared

the way for the triple alliance of 1882. Thus, in 1875, Germany, Austria, and Italy stood together, with Russia wavering, France isolated, and England, under the bellicose Disraeli, ready, if the occasion should offer, to enter once more the arena of European politics. In 1876 rumours came from the east that promised to revive the Eastern Question, and diplomacy, which had languished for five years, once more bestirred itself.

It will be remembered that by the treaty of Paris of 1856 the Powers not only had admitted the Ottoman Empire to all the advantages of the public law and system of Europe, but had bound themselves not to interfere in its internal affairs; and that they had justified this act by the *hatti humayoun* issued by the Sultan February 18th of the same year. This edict was a very liberal document, and had its provisions been carried out, would have transformed the Ottoman Empire into a European state. It confirmed all the old privileges of the Christians, placed Christian and Mussulman communities on a common level in religious matters, admitted Christians to all public employments, to the civil and military schools of the Empire, to seats in the council of public instruction, and in provincial boards of administration; it promised to establish mixed tribunals, the procedure of which should be public and according to law, to draw up a code of laws, to lighten corporal punishment, and to abolish torture; it decreed the abolition of tax-farming, guaranteed equality of taxes, and granted to foreigners the right to hold landed property in the Empire; it declared that steps should be taken to improve the financial condition of the country, to facilitate communication by the building of roads and canals, and to benefit the people in general by the introduction into the Empire of the art, the science, and the funds of Europe.

But grave difficulties stood in the way of any adequate execution of this decree. The Sultan, Abdul Medjid, was as inactive and vacillating as ever; the Mussulmans refused to be

associated with the despised infidels in administration, to obey them in places of authority, either in the state or in the army, and to accept their verdicts when they served on the tribunals; the Christians preferred to pay an army tax rather than serve in the army, were afraid to take their places on the tribunals, or to hold positions of prominence, and though pleased by the religious freedom that the edict conferred upon them, objected to other of its conditions that seemed to trench upon their historic rights; and the Powers, having pledged themselves not to interfere, could do nothing except issue protests, or propose that committees of inquiry be appointed to examine into the condition of the Christians. Under such circumstances it was impossible that equality between Christian and Mussulman should exist. The administration became Mussulman, because Christians occupied, at best, only subordinate positions; the army remained Mussulman, because the Christians refused to serve in it; the tribunals remained Mussulman, because Christians feared to sit on them; law was interpreted in favour of the faithful, and Christian evidence was not accepted. Furthermore, the situation was made worse by outbreaks of religious fanaticism: in the spring of 1860 an uprising of the Druses against the Maronites in the Lebanon resulted in frightful massacres at Deir-el-Kamar and Damascus, which led to the occupation of Syria by French troops, and to vigorous protests from the west against Turkey's disregard of her promises. With customary dissimulation, the Turkish authorities expressed surprise and promised reparation; but there the matter ended.

In 1861 Abdul Medjid died. Having no fixed policy during his long reign of twenty-two years, he had wavered between reaction and reform, at one time seeking to appease the wrath of the old Turkish party, who saw in his subservience to outside influence the cause of all Turkey's woes; at another trying to aid the reformers, who, encouraged by England and

Russia, were endeavouring to introduce the political ideas of the west. Abdul Aziz, his successor, was no more competent than he to govern, and like him was controlled by advisers, the old Turks, the reformers, Fuad and Ali, and the ambassadors of Russia and France. A few half-hearted experiments were tried, but the most important of them, which was made in 1864 to improve justice by establishing separate tribunals for each Turkish administrative district, failed because the Christians not only could not be persuaded to co-operate, but almost refused to make known their grievances. While justice thus remained unreformed, the finances grew steadily worse. Not only was no attempt made to introduce a budget and to square the yearly accounts, but the wastefulness and extravagance of the new Sultan increased enormously the public debt. By the end of the decade, the latter had increased more than tenfold in amount, and the taxes, farmed as before, became heavier and more burdensome. So unbearable had become the Turkish administration in 1867, that the Powers instituted an investigation into the affairs of the Empire, and showed in a published memoir that scarcely one of the important provisions of the edict of 1856 had been put in force. Various methods of reform were suggested: Russia urged the Sultan to recognise the historical rights of the various nationalities; France suggested that he entirely disregard distinctions of nationality, and establish a uniform administration throughout the Empire. For the moment, it seemed as if the advice of Napoleon were to be acted on at Constantinople; but the downfall of the Second Empire put an end to the Emperor's influence, and, at the beginning of the new decade, Turkey remained as unregenerate as before.

At the same time, murmurs of discontent from the dependent races and frequent expressions of a desire for independence were foreshadowing that dismemberment from within which was to be the most characteristic feature of Ottoman history during the ensuing twenty-five years. The people of the north

and west, Roumanians, Servians, and Bulgarians, still cherished the traditions of their past greatness, and never forgot that their rulers, five centuries before, had been lords of empires, and their ancestors proud and independent peoples. The Greeks, by their revolution of 1820, had begun this war of the old nationalities against their oppressor ; and during the period following, Moldavia and Wallachia freed themselves from the control of Turkey in affairs of administration, and the Servians became independent of the Porte, save for the presence of Turkish troops and the yearly payment of tribute. The revolution of 1848 roused anew these subject peoples, and in consequence of uprisings of the Roumanians against the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Powers in 1856, at the congress of Paris, took the principalities under their own protection. They were, however, by no means agreed as to the form that the organisation of the provinces should take. France and Russia desired that they be made into a single state ; but this plan Austria, Turkey, and finally England refused to accept. Consequently, in 1858, a compromise was reached, whereby the provinces were to remain separate, but to possess a common name—the United Principalities—and to have a single commission to prepare laws touching such matters as were common to the two states. This arrangement only hastened the union which the Roumanians themselves were determined to make, and which they effected in a wholly unexpected manner. Authorized by the convention of 1858 to elect separate hospodars, the *divans* of each principality chose the same person, Colonel Alexander Couza. Such a vigorous expression of the national will broke down the opposition of the Powers who, in 1859, recognised the new state, and in 1861 the Sultan gave his consent to the union. But the troubles of the Roumanians were not yet over, for the new prince proved an unsuccessful ruler. After prince and nobles had been quarrelling for five years, the Roumanians discovered that government by one of

themselves was impossible owing to the jealousies to which it gave rise; and in 1866 they compelled Couza to abdicate, and called Prince Charles of Hohenzollern to the throne. Although still legally under the suzerainty of the Porte, the new state, with a single head, ministry, assembly, and capital, was practically independent. Its crises were passed, its future was assured; and its entire independence having been officially recognised by Russia and the Porte in 1877, and by Europe in 1878, it entered upon its career as a sovereign European state.

While Roumania was thus winning her independence, and the Ottoman Empire was undergoing dismemberment in the northeast, other movements, of no less importance, were taking place in the west and south. For some years the two branches of the great Servian race in Servia and Montenegro had been dreaming of a great Servian monarchy that should comprise Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Servia, and Montenegro. When, therefore, in 1861, the Herzegovinians, enraged by the refusal of the Sultan to grant them separate ecclesiastical privileges and a national bishop, rose in revolt, a general uprising took place, and the Montenegrins, in full sympathy with their neighbours, engaged into a mountain warfare that soon involved them in a struggle with the Porte. Servia, too, in her determination to force the Turkish soldiers from her territory, took up the cause of the Herzegovinians as well as her own, and by 1862 the Serbs of Montenegro, the Herzegovina, and Servia were at full war with the Porte. The unfortunate Herzegovinians were badly defeated; the Montenegrins, who were also defeated, were compelled to accept severe terms in the convention of Scutari; but the Servians, aided by the Powers, who met at Constantinople in 1862, were so far successful as to be able to force the Sultan to withdraw Turkish troops from all Servia except Belgrade and four fortresses. As the result of a friendly negotiation in 1867, Turkey withdrew entirely from Servian territory. Thus, before the end of the

decade, Servia, like Roumania, had gained independence in all matters military and administrative, and was ready for the entire separation from Turkey that was granted her in 1877 and 1878.

In the south, the attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire were less successful. The Christian mountaineers of Crete, in large part Grecian in sympathy and blood, maddened by the iniquities of Turkish misrule in the island, entered upon a fierce struggle in 1866 for independence and annexation to Greece. Aided by the people and the government of Greece, whose king, the recently chosen Prince George of Glücksburg, did not dare oppose the wish of the nation, they succeeded in prolonging the struggle for three years, until it was feared that war would arise between Greece and Turkey. But in 1868 the Powers intervened, and decided that Crete should remain a part of the Ottoman Empire on condition that the Sultan grant the Candiotes a constitution. This, the organic law of 1868, which affected to redress the most serious grievances, was duly issued ; but it is hardly necessary to say that, like the schemes of reform within Turkey herself, it remained a dead letter. In Egypt, where Mehemet Ali's attempt to dismember the Empire had failed, owing to the intervention of Russia in 1832, and of the Powers in 1840, a new influence was at work. By a liberal use of money in 1867, the Pasha, a grandson of the old Mehemet, gained for himself a new title, that of Khedive, and obtained independent rights in all matters relating to police, postal and transit services, and the imposition of customs duties. In Bulgaria, the patriotic party won a notable victory in 1870 in persuading the Sultan, notwithstanding the opposition of the Phanariote or Greek bishops, who had hitherto been Bulgaria's spiritual rulers, to allow them to have an exarch of their own and a national Bulgarian church. Thus, in 1870, the Ottoman Empire was showing unmistakable signs of disintegration. By its failure to carry out the reforms, which it had so osten-

tatiously promised, it had aroused the distrust of the Powers; by its concessions to European influence, it was increasing the hostility of Mussulman for Christian, and encouraging fanatical outbursts of cruelty; it was losing little by little its control of the subject peoples; while its illegal and arbitrary methods of taxation were arousing revolts, as in Crete and the Herzegovina, and its bankruptcy was making necessary the sale of privileges, as in Egypt. Turkey was fast approaching a crisis in her career, and only an increase of the discontent, a further evidence of decay in administration, a few additional instances of obstinacy in the matter of reforms were needed to effect a general uprising, and to bring down upon her, notwithstanding the conditions of the treaty of Paris, the intervention of the Powers.

During the period from 1871 to 1875 the disorders within the government steadily increased. Abdul Aziz, having lost by death his reforming ministers, Fuad in 1869 and Ali in 1871, gave himself over more and more to the pleasures of the harem, and squandered the treasure of the state in favourites and palaces. The treasury, notwithstanding frequent loans, was always empty; officials were unpaid, justice was arbitrarily dispensed; the administration was wretchedly conducted; personal security could not be obtained; and the subject peoples, burdened with *corvées*, crushed by violence and heavy exactions, were hopeless and rebellious. At last, in July, 1875, unable longer to endure the situation, and incited by Slavic sympathisers, the Herzegovinians again rose in revolt; the Bosniaks followed; and soon Montenegro, Servia, and even Austrian Dalmatia were aiding the movement with men, arms, and encouragement. It was a pan-Slavic protest against the arbitrary and violent methods of administration employed by the Sultan, in defiance of his many promises to ameliorate the condition of his subject peoples.

The news of this general revolt soon got abroad, and in

August the three Powers, Germany, Austria, and Russia, sent to Constantinople a note of warning. As a reply, the Sultan issued an *iradé*, October 2, 1875, granting abatement of taxes and extensive local privileges. But the insurgents, having no faith in the promises of the Sultan, continued their struggle. Then Austria proposed that the signers of the treaty of Paris draft a note of protest; but England, wishing to gain for the Turk a longer time in which to fulfil his promises, refused for the moment to consider the proposition. Acting on England's advice, the Sultan, on December 12, 1875, issued a firman promising further administrative, judicial, and financial reforms. But Russia had no more faith in the new promises than had the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, who did not abate their efforts in the least. Then it was that Count Andrássy submitted the terms of a note of protest to Russia, Germany, and France, by whom they were accepted, and to England, who expressed herself as willing to give them a general support, though unprepared to commit herself unreservedly. This note, demanded that the Porte establish religious liberty, abolish farming of taxes, employ the revenues of Bosnia and the Herzegovina in the interest of those provinces, institute local assemblies, and ameliorate the condition of the agricultural classes. It was sent to the Porte on January 30, 1876. On February 13th the Sultan accepted it, and in March issued a new set of promises of the most elaborate kind relating to the government of the provinces (*vilayets*).

Austria now seemed to be satisfied. Thus far she had chosen to act with Russia rather than with England in the attempt to gain from the Sultan a redress of the grievances of the subject peoples; but after the Andrássy note had been accepted and promulgated, she had no desire to go further. Well aware of the danger to her own integrity of a long-continued Slavic revolt on her borders, and quite out of sympathy with Russia's desire to encourage national movements, she endeavoured to

check the insurrection and to persuade the insurgents to put down their arms. At this point appear with unmistakable clearness the diverse interests of the various governments who were engaged in the controversy. England, jealous of Russia, and threatening war if a hand were laid upon Turkey, stood for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; Austria, caring little for the integrity of the Empire, but desirous of influence and territorial extension in the south-east, was unwilling to encourage national independence of the subject peoples; and Russia, wishing to extend her influence throughout all Turkish territory, and convinced that the doctrine of separate nationalities, which she had held before 1870, was the only one which could solve the Turkish problem, encouraged by every means in her power the pan-Slavism of the south. In consequence of Russia's support, the revolutionary movement became more menacing than ever during the early months of 1876, and the insurgents in Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina showed little inclination to disarm; and not only did Russia advise these states to draw up a list of their grievances, but she even suggested to Austria that the Powers present the new program to the Porte, and accompany it with a statement, that if it were not carried out, they would take means to enforce it. But Austria refused, and at this juncture Bismarck issued an invitation to Russia and Austria to meet at Berlin to consider a new settlement.

It did not seem likely that these Powers could come to any common agreement, so irreconcilable were the views that they held; but an event took place in May, 1876, which forced them to act in harmony. A Mussulman mob in Salonika, roused to a murderous degree of fanaticism by the interference of the Powers and the reform projects of the Sultan, attacked the consulates of France and Germany, and murdered the consuls. This act sent a thrill of horror through the west. The two Powers concerned at once advanced their fleets into Turkish

waters, and in the Berlin conference Russia, renewing her proposal that the Powers take measures to enforce reforms, drafted a memorandum, which reproduced, in the main, the terms that the insurgents had presented the April before. The Berlin Memorandum, as it is called, was accepted by the conference on May 13th. It proposed, first, that vessels be despatched to the Dardanelles and an armistice of two months be demanded ; and, secondly, that the Sultan be commanded and, if necessary, forced to rebuild all the villages that had been destroyed, to furnish food, utensils, and beasts of burden to the unfortunate peasants, and to exempt them for three years from taxation ; to establish a Christian commission to distribute aid ; to withdraw the Turkish troops, to authorise the Christians to remain armed until the reforms had been effected ; and to permit the consuls of the Powers to supervise the execution of these reforms. These conditions were sent to Rome, Paris, and London, and answers were impatiently awaited. Italy and France accepted them at once ; but England, where public opinion had not been sufficiently aroused to affect the stubborn policy of the Disraeli government, rejected them without hesitation.

For the moment events seemed to be working in England's favour. What the Powers might have done in this crisis, had not on May 29, 1876, a revolution broken out in Constantinople that destroyed the value of the memorandum and rendered futile the work of the conference, it is impossible to say. Abdul Aziz was deposed and Mourad V. established in his place, and the new government, at once adopting a vigorous policy of resistance, ordered Servia to lay down her arms. Russia, who had been foiled by England's refusal to accept the Berlin Memorandum, now worked secretly in the provinces themselves, and by encouraging the Servians in their revolt, sought to thwart the new Turkish policy. On June 30th Servia openly declared war, on July 2d Montenegro did the same, and a few days afterward the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians threw

themselves with renewed ardour into the struggle. The war thus undertaken resulted in victory for Montenegro, but in bitter defeat for Servia; and the new Turkish government, proud of its victory, was prepared to impose onerous terms upon the conquered state.

But already rumours were spreading through the west of a new massacre, more horrible than had been that in the Lebanon in 1860. The Bulgarians, who had suffered less in the past from Turkish oppression than had the people of the Adriatic, were little known to the world outside. Satisfied with the reforms of Midhat Pasha, with the ecclesiastical privileges that had been granted them in 1870, and with the general agricultural prosperity of their province, they had not joined in the insurrection of 1875; but a small uprising at Batak, in April and May, 1876, itself of little consequence, had brought upon them a body of irregulars, the Bashi-Bazouks, whose cruelty did more to aid the cause of that unhappy people than all the diplomacy of the Powers. During the month of May some twelve thousand Christians were massacred under circumstances that aroused the indignation of the civilised world. Gladstone, coming out of his retirement, roused not only the liberals, but the whole English people by his pamphlet on the atrocities and by his speeches. The liberal party took up the cry, and so mercilessly scored the government that the Disraeli ministry found itself painfully embarrassed, and deemed it wise to withdraw, for the moment at least, its support from the Ottoman Empire.

When, therefore, Servia appealed to the Powers to mediate between herself and Turkey, and the Powers referred the matter to England, as the government whose advice the Porte would be most likely to accept, Disraeli did not dare, in the existing state of public opinion, openly to refuse to act as mediator. He proposed an armistice of six weeks, the maintenance of the rights of Servia as before the war, and a certain amount of administrative independence for Bulgaria. But Midhat Pasha and the other

ministers of Young Turkey had on August 31st seized the control of the Empire, and after deposing the imbecile Mourad V., placed in his stead his brother Abdul Hamid II. They now sought to temporise, and hoping to rid themselves of the tutelage of Europe, by promising to transform Turkey into a modern constitutional state, they issued, on October 1st, an extraordinary edict of reform, one provision of which guaranteed a constitution to the Ottoman Empire; and on October 12th, proposed an armistice of six months and the disarmament of the Servians. This practical rejection of England's mediation, and the repetition of the old reform comedy, exhausted the patience of the Czar. Having made up his mind to intervene if Turkey should refuse the good offices of the Powers, he had secured a promise from Francis Joseph in an interview at Reichstadt in July, 1876, that Austria should remain neutral in case of Russia's intervention; and had himself promised, that in case of Bulgaria's liberation, Austria should receive Bosnia and the Herzegovina as her reward. Sure, too, of the neutrality of Germany, inasmuch as Bismarck was known to hold the opinion, which he expressed later, that the Eastern Question was not worth to Germany the bone of a single Pomeranian grenadier, Alexander, on October 15th, despatched General Ignatieff to Constantinople to demand an armistice of six weeks with the Serbs, and autonomy for Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. To gain time, the Porte hesitated, while its troops, conducting the war with great rapidity on Servian soil, captured Deligrad and Alexinatz, and were ready to advance to Belgrade. Then it was that Ignatieff sent in the Russian ultimatum, namely, the acceptance of the armistice in forty-eight hours or war; and the Porte, terrified, at once submitted. On November 2d the armistice began, and for the first time in a year peace existed in the Ottoman Empire.

This act of Russia's excited the suspicion and wrath of England, notwithstanding the fact that the Czar had declared in

conversation with Lord A. Loftus, the English ambassador, that he desired no conquest, aimed at no aggrandisement, and had not the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople. The "will of Peter the Great and the aims of Catharine II." became once more realities to the English people; the campaign of sentiment, which had been inaugurated by the Bulgarian horrors, began to lose ground before the fear of Russian aggression and conquest; and Disraeli, who had been losing his influence, once more became popular. On November 9th, at the Guildhall banquet, he declared that England was ready for war, and, in a righteous cause, would not end the fight until right was done. But his views were not shared by Lord Derby, minister of foreign affairs, who deeming the Czar's expressions of amity acceptable, had, on November 4th, proposed to the Powers that a conference be held at Constantinople to consider the conditions according to which the Eastern Question might be settled. The proposal was duly accepted and acted upon; and at preliminary meetings, held between the 11th and the 22d of December, the terms that were to be presented to Turkey were drafted. The Powers demanded that Turkey grant an increase of territory to Servia and Montenegro, administrative independence to Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Bulgaria; to the latter provinces Christian governors, who should be appointed by the Porte and confirmed by the Powers, the right to a national militia, and the use of the national language in official matters; and that she herself accept an international commission whose business it should be to carry the reforms into effect. On December 23d the formal meetings began, but without a representative from Turkey; and on January 15th, the demands were formally presented to the Ottoman government. All eyes were now turned toward Turkey, for with her lay the decision; should she refuse the terms offered her by the Powers, Russia, who was already massing her troops along the Bessarabian frontier, would try the effect of force.

For some time the Ottoman government had been in the hands of Midhat Pasha, the representative of Young Turkey, and the reformers, who loudly protested against this intervention of the Powers, on the ground that it was contrary to the terms of the treaty of Paris. Not to be outdone by their European antagonists, they had conceived a new device, a constitution, which a special commission had been engaged in drafting ever since the edict of October 1st. This constitution, which guaranteed to Turkey liberty, justice, and equality, a responsible ministry, an assembly of two chambers, freedom of speech, religion, the press, and association, and the like, was proclaimed in the midst of booming cannon on December 23d, even while the representatives of the Powers were sitting in solemn state within earshot of the acclamations. And it served the purpose for which it had been devised. When the conference duly presented its demands on January 15th, it was informed by the Turkish minister, Safvet Pasha, that they were not only a menace to the independence of the Sultan and contrary to the terms of the treaty of Paris, but wholly out of accord with the new constitution. The position of the Turks was impregnable: their Empire was a constitutional state and could attend to its own reforms; the treaty of Paris forbade the Powers to interfere in the internal affairs of the government, and made illegal their proposal to nominate local governments, or to establish an international commission to superintend local administration. There was but one thing for the Powers to do, and that was to withdraw: and this they did, highly displeased, leaving the victory to Turkey. And as if to make more evident the hollowness of his promises and the worthlessness of his constitutional reform, within two weeks after he had rejected the terms proposed by the conference, Abdul Hamid disgraced the man and the party that had drafted the constitution, by dismissing Midhat Pasha from his post.

On the initiative of Russia, one more attempt was made to

bring the Porte to terms. In a protocol, drafted at London on March 31st, the Powers urged the Turk to put into execution the promised reforms, and declared that they purposed watching very carefully the manner in which the Ottoman government performed its task. But Safvet answered as before, that Turkey was already undertaking her own reforms, and as an independent state, would not for a moment submit to the surveillance of the Powers. Russia had now no reason for waiting longer ; and having promised Roumania to recognise her independence in return for the privilege of unobstructed passage through her territory, the Czar on April 24, 1877, issued his declaration of war.

Thus far Turkey had justified her acts by the treaty of Paris, and over and over again had reminded the Powers of that unfortunate document, a lasting monument to their blundering diplomacy. But Turkey had no guarantee that the treaty of Paris would protect her now from the wrath of Russia, or that the Powers who had signed the treaty, and had been endeavouring for a year past to prevent war by means of their mediation, would intervene by arms to resist the Muscovite invasion. Of all the European Powers, England alone was inclined to oppose Russia. Largely through the influence of Bismarck, Germany, Austria, and Italy declared for neutrality ; France, whose foreign minister, Decazes, was friendly to Russia, did the same ; and no Power remained to aid England in defending her old ally, Turkey, and the treaty of 1856. Even if the English cabinet and Parliament had been a unit in desiring war, England could not have gone to war alone. On the contrary, Derby and Carnarvon did not support the spectacular policy of Disraeli, and Parliament needed more evidence of Russian aggression, before it would vote additional war-credit. Therefore, England, too, declared for neutrality, stipulating only that her interests in the Suez Canal, in Egypt, and in the Persian Gulf should not be imperilled, and that, above

all, Constantinople should not be occupied. To these conditions, Russia agreed, but stated that the exigencies of war might demand the temporary occupation of that city, and Lord Derby replied, that such occupation would at once necessitate England's taking measures of precaution from which she had hitherto felt justified in abstaining. Thus England left herself free to take whatever course might appear to her necessary for the protection of British interests.

The Russian army crossed the frontier in April and, making use of the railway and provisioning facilities agreed upon with Roumania, advanced slowly southward toward the Danube. Its progress was so hindered by the bad roads and high waters that not until June did it reach the river. Early in July the three divisions, into which it had been divided, crossed the river, the main division making the passage at Simnitza ; and meeting with little resistance from the Turks, pushed southward along the line of the Jantra to Tirnova. The advance guard under General Gourko continuing the forward movement, occupied the Shipka pass, and penetrated southward through southern Bulgaria, and so rapid was the movement and so slight the resistance that by July 25th, a part of the cavalry had entered Hermanli, but two days march from Adrianople. At the same time the left division turned to the east to operate in the neighbourhood of Rustchuk and Shumla, while the right wing, seizing Nicopoli, moved westward in the direction of the Osma and the Vid. In the Caucasus the campaign under General Melikoff promised equal success: Ardahan was taken on May 17th, and the way lay open to Erzeroum.

These astounding successes, which seemed to portend the immediate overthrow of Turkey, stunned Europe. England, who with each day of the war had been growing more suspicious of Russia, began to look to her warships ; the states of central Europe were troubled ; and Austria, apprehensive of what the future had in store, made preparations for defence. But the

tide of war soon turned: on June 24th a Russian division, which was advancing against Batoum in Armenia, was driven back, the siege of Kars was raised, the advance to Erzeroum checked, and the entire Russian line forced to the position that it had held before the opening of the war. And even more worthy of remark was the resistance that the Russians met in Europe. Osman Pasha, the Turkish commander at Viddin, who had been unable to save Nicopoli, established himself at Plevna, and by his genius and heroism checked absolutely the Russian advance southward. The Russian division under General Gourko was forced back gradually from Hermanli to the Balkans, the left wing near Shumla was compelled to stop operations, and all available Russian strength was brought to bear on the task of taking Plevna. Twice was the attack made, and twice were the Russians repulsed with great slaughter. General Gourko, assailed in the Shipka pass by Suleiman Pasha, narrowly escaped defeat; while the left division, driven by Mehemed Ali toward Biela, was in danger of a defeat which would have thrown open to the Turks the line of the Danube, and have made it possible for the Turkish army to attack the rear of the Russians who were fighting at Shipka and Plevna. The months of September, October, and November, 1877, were anxious ones for the Czar.

Roumania now entered the struggle, new troops were sent from Russia, and Todleben, the hero of Sebastopol, was summoned to direct the siege of Plevna. Gradually the situation altered. By November 17th, Russia had renewed her attack in the Caucasus, taken Kars, and invested Erzeroum, the latter of which fell into her hands the February following. The siege of Plevna began, and every effort was made to cut off Osman Pasha from all outside aid, that fear of starvation might force him to surrender. By Todleben's skilful management, Russia was soon in possession of all the strongholds in Bulgaria: Gourko held Shipka pass; Suleiman Pasha, who had been

transferred to the army of the east, was driven from Biela, and forced to take refuge behind the Black Lom ; and finally, on December 10th, after one of the longest and bravest defences in the history of modern warfare, Plevna surrendered. Immediately the Russians pushed across the Balkans by the Shipka, Etrepol, and Trajan passes, passed steadily southward through ice and snow and freezing weather, and by January 20th had massed their main forces at Adrianople, and established one detachment at Khorlu, and another at Rodosto on the sea of Marmora. The road to Constantinople was now open.

The wrath of England, which had been gathering ever since the fall of Kars and Plevna, now broke forth. The war party in the cabinet and the Jingoists in the streets of London had been daily growing more influential ; Lord Carnarvon had resigned from the cabinet and Lord Derby had done the same, though he afterward withdrew his resignation. False rumours that the Russians were in the suburbs of Constantinople, and even in the city itself, set London and the House of Commons in a ferment, and turned the current of popular favour toward Turkey. On February 15th the government sent the fleet through the Dardanelles, with orders to aid the Turks, if the Russians advanced nearer the Ottoman capital, and during the month of February, 1878, the tension was very great. But in reality Russia had no intention of giving England cause for war. Already an armistice and preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon with Turkey, and as the Czar wished merely time in which to arrange the terms of the final treaty, he willingly promised England that if no English troops were landed on the Asiatic or European coast, his troops should not occupy Gallipoli or enter the lines of Bulaïr. This device for delay was successful, and on March 3d Turkey and Russia signed the treaty of San Stefano.

Russia, having thus gained her point by force, was ready to see tested her plan of solving the Eastern Question by parcel-

ling out the territory of the Ottoman Empire among the various nationalities in the south-east. The treaty of San Stefano granted Bessarabia to Russia ; guaranteed the independence of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania ; decreed that the territory of Montenegro should be more than trebled in size, and that of Servia increased by extensions in the south ; and most important of all, provided for the erection of a greater Bulgaria that should consist of territory extending from the Black Sea to the Ægean, and westward to include nearly the whole of Macedonia. This greater Bulgaria was to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte, but at the same time was to be under the surveillance of a Russian commission during the drafting of a constitution and under the protection of the Russian army for five years. Had this treaty gone into effect, not only would the Bulgarians again have come into possession of land and cities that had been the homes of their emperors and have been freed from all direct interference of the Sultan, but the Ottoman Empire would have been severed into four parts, Constantinople and its environs on the east, the isthmus of Salonika on the south, Thessaly and Albania on the south-west and west, and on the north-west, Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and the Sandjak of Novibazar, territories so far separated as to be unable to communicate with one another. Such a partition would have blotted out the Ottoman Empire as a European power, and have given the very heart of its territory to Bulgaria, a state whose people had had little training in matters of administration and government, and were too little experienced as a race to be raised so suddenly to a position of such importance.

The treaty of San Stefano not only pointed to a Russian protectorate in the future, but it set aside the treaties of 1856 and 1871 ; and such a violent attack upon the integrity of Turkey could be allowed only when agreed to by all the Powers sitting in a general congress. England, who had already declared that she would not recognise any treaty made between Russia and

Turkey that might alter the conditions of 1856, no sooner heard of the treaty of San Stefano than she determined to prevent its execution. With this object in view, she announced that she would not send representatives to a general congress unless Russia would consent to submit the terms of the treaty without exception to the discussion of those governments which had signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871. And England was supported by Austria, who saw that Bosnia and the Herzegovina as independent states would prevent her territorial extension south-eastward; and by France, whose new foreign minister, Waddington, was friendly to England, and desired only that the subjects of Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places should not be discussed by the congress. Disraeli resolved, therefore, to defy Russia; and having accepted the resignation of Derby, placed Salisbury in his stead, strengthened the fleet at the isle of Princes before Constantinople, and dispatched new troops to Malta, he declared that the treaty of San Stefano was contrary to the interests of England.

Russia would gladly have accepted the defiance, but she was unprepared for another war, and, what was of greatest importance, was without an ally in Europe. Bismarck, who had been willing to serve the Czar as long as it was politic to do so, preferred at this juncture to make advances to Austria rather than to Russia; and not only refused to bind himself to support Russia, but made it clear that he favoured the plan of submitting the entire treaty to the decision of a congress. The Czar, thus isolated, consented to treat with England, and on May 30th, 1878, secretly signed with her a compact, by which he agreed to the chief modifications that were afterward made in the treaty of San Stefano. Five days after this had been done, England, having won her first point, made a secret treaty with the Porte, and in return for a promise to protect the Turks against Russian aggression in the Caucasus, gained the consent of the Sultan to occupy the island of Cyprus. This scheme of

Disraeli's to secure for England a share in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, on pretence of protecting her, could not have been unknown to Russia, for it had been hinted at in the agreement of May 30th.

The congress opened at Berlin June 13, 1878, and just a month later the final treaty was signed. There were present the plenipotentiaries of England, France, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Russia, and on special occasions the representatives of Greece, Roumania, and Persia were admitted to present their particular claims. The object of the congress was to examine line by line the terms of the treaty of San Stefano, and to modify them in the interest of peace and the European equilibrium ; and its conclusions were to form a new law for Europe in all that related to the Eastern Question. During the twenty sittings, the battle royal was between England, represented by Disraeli and Salisbury, and Russia, represented by Gortchakoff and Schuvaloff, while Prince Bismarck, as presiding officer and "honest broker," tried to calm the troubled waters. In the interest of harmony, Germany took sides with England and France, and as, in the main, the other Powers, Austria and Italy, voted against Russia, that Power on such crucial questions as the division of Bulgaria and the cession of Bessarabia, fought the battle alone. She had entered the congress in the hope, as Gortchakoff remarked in the seventh session, that the laurels of war might be converted into the olive branches of peace ; but save for the cession of Bessarabia, which Russia insisted on as a point of honour, and the independence of the Balkan states, which all the Powers desired to effect, she suffered defeat at every point, and scarcely a single important condition of the treaty of San Stefano was preserved. The diplomats with Disraeli as their leader, in their determination to reduce the Russian gains to a minimum and curtail the territory of the Slavic peoples of the Balkan peninsula, divided Bulgaria, cut down the boundaries of Montenegro, favoured an extension of

the frontier of Greece, and gave Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria. Little wonder is it that Gortchakoff should have asked with some bitterness at the fifteenth session, after most of the work had been accomplished, that the congress make known the principles and the method according to which it meant to insure the execution of its august decrees. But he got no satisfactory answer; for at England's suggestion the congress refused to consider his proposal, declaring that the signatures to the treaty were a sufficient guarantee of its intention to watch and control the execution of its decisions.

The treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13, 1878. In accordance with its terms the greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty was divided into three parts, Macedonia, which was given back without reserve to the Porte, Eastern Roumelia, which was simply a diplomatic name invented by Disraeli for southern Bulgaria, and Bulgaria proper, consisting of the territory between the Danube and the Balkans; Montenegro was cut down one third; Servia was slightly increased in size; and Turkey, though compelled by Russia to restore Khotour and its environs to Persia, received back Erzeroum, the Bajazid, and the valley of the Alachkerd. Russia received a new outlet on the Black Sea, Batoum, and retained, not only a large portion of northern Armenia, a possession which at a later time determined her attitude on the Armenian question, but, despite the bitter opposition of the Roumanian envoys at the congress, the remainder of Bessarabia also, giving in return the land of the Dobrudscha, which Roumania did not want. By other conditions of the treaty, Bosnia and the Herzegovina were placed under the military administration of Austria, and the Greek frontier was extended to include Thessaly and Epirus, though in the arrangement, as finally perfected in 1881, Epirus was left in the hands of Turkey. Furthermore, Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, were declared independent states; Bulgaria was made independent, save for the payment of annual tribute to Turkey, and

was given the right of choosing her own prince, though the appointment was to be approved by the Powers and confirmed by the Porte; Eastern Roumelia was made autonomous in matters of administration, and was allowed a Christian governor-general, nominated by the Porte for five years with the consent of the Powers, although the province still remained under the political and military authority of the Sultan. Freedom of worship and equality before the law were proclaimed for the Ottoman Empire, and in Servia and Roumania full political rights were granted to the Jews.

The treaty of Berlin seriously imperilled the friendship of Russia and the central European Powers, and made more bitter than ever the rivalry between Slav and German. The Russian minister could not forgive Bismarck for having failed him at the congress; the Russian people were enraged that the Slavic cause should have received such humiliating treatment at the hands of Bismarck and Andrássy, the representatives of the German and Magyar races. During the winter of 1878 and 1879 the Russian officials, press, and people denounced Bismarck's policy, and charged the chancellor with betraying their friends and defending their enemy; the Russian government massed troops upon the frontier; at public meetings Russian generals made warlike speeches; and in certain quarters there was talk of war. The race feeling grew more bitter when Austria attempted to carry out her part of the treaty. Bosniaks and Herzegovinians resisted the Austrian troops; the Servians, disillusioned regarding a greater Servia, thought for the moment of calling in Bulgarians and Russians to aid them in preventing Austria from occupying Bosnia and cutting off the Slavs of Servia from those of Bosnia and Montenegro; and within Austria-Hungary, Czechs and Serbs, sympathising with the Servians regarding the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, renewed with greater determination than before the struggle against dualism.

Owing to these manifestations of the hostility of the Slavs, Bismarck proposed to Austria that she and Germany bind themselves together more firmly by a formal treaty of alliance, as a protection against possible Russian aggression. Francis Joseph, meeting the German chancellor half-way, consented as an act of amity to abrogate the clause of the treaty of Prague (1866) regarding the cession of northern Schleswig to Denmark, and in October, 1879, signed a secret treaty of peace and mutual defence. By this treaty both states were bound to assist with their entire strength, in case either were attacked by Russia, and to conclude peace only in common; or if either were attacked by some other Power than Russia, by France, for instance, the other was to remain neutral, assisting only in case Russia should give aid to the attacking Power. The dual alliance thus formed became a triple alliance with the admission, in 1882, of Italy, who, disturbed by the colonial policy of the Ferry ministry in France, deemed it wise to turn to Germany and Austria for protection.

But in forming this triple alliance Bismarck had another object in view than the preservation of peace; he wished to bring about the isolation of France in Europe: and in attaining his end, he was greatly aided by those conflicting interests which made a counter-alliance of the remaining states for the time being impossible. After the congress of Berlin, while internal reforms and territorial extensions in the east were diverting the attention of Russia from the affairs of the west, the clashing interests of France, England, and Italy were tending to diminish, rather than increase the friendship of these countries for one another. The first note of discord had been struck when England accepted Cyprus as a *pourboire* for the assistance she had rendered Turkey, an act that France deemed contrary to the spirit of the alliance into which they had entered at the congress of Berlin. Ferry's scheme for the colonial expansion of France, which drove Italy over to the side of Germany and

might well have aroused alarm in England, did not disturb for the moment the harmony, largely because Gladstone, who supplanted Disraeli in 1880, turned his attention to internal affairs, and assumed a conciliatory attitude toward the Powers abroad. But in 1883, after the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the uprising of the Mahdi in the Soudan had involved England in a serious war for the defence of Egypt, France, under the ministry of Freycinet, refused to co-operate, the *entente* was broken, and, on the return of Ferry to the head of the ministry in the same year, the colonial policy was renewed more vigorously than before, and the rivalry with England began in earnest. Supported by Germany, whose interests in colonial matters were the same as those of France, France began to extend the sphere of her influence in West Africa, Indo-China, and the Upper Nile, and to provoke thereby a quarrel with England which has lasted for fifteen years.

While colonial rivalry was thus disturbing the friendly relations between France and England, the attitude of Russia was equally advantageous to Bismarck. Although the events of 1878 and 1879 had increased the hostility of the Slavs for the Germans, nevertheless the "alliance of the three Emperors" continued to exist until the death of Alexander II. in 1881, because of the personal regard which he had for the Emperors of Austria and Germany. Even then the peace was not broken, for the new Czar, though personally disliking the Germans, proclaimed on his accession that his foreign policy would be entirely pacific. In September, 1884, when the three Emperors met at Skiernevice, Alexander III., fearing the Nihilists, who since 1881 had been unusually aggressive, and anticipating complications with England, who was disturbed by Russia's seizure of Merv and Pendjeh in 1884, concluded with Germany a secret treaty, which bound each of the two Powers to remain neutral in case either of them were attacked by some outside Power.

Thus in 1885 Bismarck occupied a peculiarly strong position in Europe. He controlled the triple alliance and was the inspirer of its policy; by virtue of the recent treaty with Russia he was influential at the court of St. Petersburg; and he was on terms of friendship with France, with whom he was in close accord upon the colonial question. Furthermore, by his own colonial policy, which he had adopted only the year before, he had gained for Germany important possessions in Africa; and in 1885 at the international conference at Berlin, over which he himself had presided, had in the main carried his point in opposing England and Portugal upon the question of free commerce and navigation in the Congo. At no time in his career as a statesman had he seemed more influential than in 1885, and at no time for fifteen years had peace been so definitely assured as at this juncture. Then it was that events in the east attracted once more the attention of the European Powers.

Since 1878 the states of the Balkan peninsula had shown an extraordinary amount of independence and national enterprise, as each in its own way and under a constitutional form of government, strove to solve the vital questions of internal and external politics. In 1881 Roumania, by an act of her Parliament and with the consent of the Powers, had become a kingdom, and in 1885, when the Roumanian church was removed from the control of the Greek patriarch at Constantinople, obtained entire ecclesiastical independence. The management of her government during these years had been in the hands of the liberals, and the building of railways and the promotion of agrarian reforms testified to her progress. Servia, which had become a constitutional government in 1869 and a kingdom in 1881, had been kept in a state of disturbance by liberals, progressists, and radicals, who, jealous of one another, were at constant war among themselves and with the monarchy. In 1883, the National Assembly (*Skuptchina*) had become so radical in tone that the king, Milan I., found it necessary to effect

its overthrow by a *coup d'état* and to suppress a radical uprising among the peasantry by force of arms. He had then established a centralised administration, reorganised the army after the European model, adopted a high protective tariff, changed the system of taxation, and limited the powers of the communes. Thus, in 1885, Servia was in reality an absolute monarchy. Montenegro had little history during these seven years save that involved in the alteration of her boundary; and Greece was concerned, as were all the states to a greater or less extent, with the struggles of parties, the payment of indebtedness, and the acquisition of territory.

But Bulgaria had been the chief actor in events of greater importance. Rescued from the Turks as she had been by the military prowess of Russia, and governed, during the first year of her independence, by a people inexperienced in affairs of state, it is not strange that she should have accepted her constitution from Russia, should have admitted Russians to the most important administrative and military posts, and should have deferred to the wishes of Russia in selecting her first prince, Alexander of Battenberg. However, until the death of the Czar, Alexander II., in 1881, Russia interfered but little in the government of the new state, and the prince experienced his chief trouble with the National Assembly (*Sobranje*), which disliking Russia and desiring the annexation of Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria, strenuously opposed his pro-Russian policy. In 1881, having become convinced that the radical leaders were aiming to get control of the real authority in the state; and unwilling to become a mere puppet in the principality, Prince Alexander suspended the constitution, and demanded extraordinary powers for seven years. Having gained this point, he formed a ministry of Russian generals, and for two years continued his government as if he were the prince of a Russian protectorate. But as this *coup d'état* had brought about merely a change of masters, prince and people were no

better satisfied than before. Moreover, the national party had been working secretly in the country, rousing the loyalty of the Bulgarian peasantry and encouraging them in their hostility to the Russians; while the prince, also stirred by national enthusiasm, had been growing daily more sympathetic with the cause of the patriots. Therefore, in 1883, having wearied of the intolerable insolence of the Russian officials, who were aiming at nothing less than the establishment of a regular Russian *régime* in Bulgaria, he answered an address of the National Assembly by restoring the constitution, an act which so enraged the Russians that they withdrew at once, not only from the Assembly, but from all administrative posts as well, and left the prince free to select his advisers from the liberal party.

Meanwhile the people of Eastern Roumelia had been conspiring to rid themselves of Turkish rule; for though they had been organised according to the plan drawn up at Berlin, with a governor, directory, provincial council, and a national militia, they had remained at heart, as they were in blood, Bulgarian. Finally, people, council, and functionaries, rose in revolt against the Turkish authorities, and in September, 1885, quietly and without bloodshed arrested and imprisoned the governor and the commander of the militia, established a provisional government, and sent to Prince Alexander to ask him to annex them to Bulgaria and to send them aid. The moment was a critical one for both prince and people: to annex Roumelia was to defy Turkey, to break the terms of the treaty of Berlin, and, above all else, to court the anger of Russia and the Czar; to refuse to annex her, was to defy the whole Bulgarian nation, to leave the insurgents to be treated as rebels, and possibly to provoke in Eastern Roumelia a civil war between Christians and Mussulmans. Swayed by these reasons, Alexander chose to turn from Russia and throw in his lot with his adopted people; and on September 20th, assumed the title of Prince of North and South Bulgaria.

When the news of this event got abroad, Turkey protested, but, unable, on account of affairs in Constantinople, to spare troops for the subjugation of the province, made no effort to coerce the rebels; but the other two Balkan states, Greece and Servia, were not disposed to take the matter so lightly. Ambitious to extend their own territory at the expense of Turkey, they looked upon the annexation of Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria as an aggression on the part of Bulgaria that was unjustifiable, in that it threatened the equilibrium of the peninsula. Greece in great excitement prepared for war, and was prevented from making a formal declaration only by the timely intervention of the Powers, who sent a fleet to Suda bay. But Servia, where jealousy of Bulgaria had been increased in recent years by disputes over frontier and tariff questions, was more successful, and on November 15th declared war. Dependent entirely upon their own resources, for the Czar, Alexander III., enraged by the defiance of Prince Alexander, had withdrawn all Russian officers from Bulgaria, the people, Christians and Mussulmans alike, bound more closely than ever to their brave leader, threw themselves courageously into the struggle. On November 19, 1885, they won a decisive battle over the Servians at Slivnitza, and had it not been for the intervention of the Austrian envoy, who in the name of the Powers forbade them to advance, they would have occupied Belgrade, the Servian capital. On December 22d an armistice was arranged; and although in the peace that followed Bulgaria received from Servia neither territory nor indemnity, she was content with having won Eastern Roumelia, and having fused all of her people into one compact national whole. The "impregnable frontier" which, at the congress of Berlin, Disraeli had erected in the Balkans as a bar to Russia's advance southward, had failed to keep apart the two divisions of the Bulgarian nation.

Nor was the European concert disposed to interfere in behalf

of the violated clause of the treaty of Berlin, and in a conference that was held at Constantinople in November, 1885, Russia was alone in opposing the annexation to Bulgaria of Eastern Roumelia. Annoyed that her plan for controlling even a small Bulgaria had been thwarted by the people themselves, she did not hesitate to withraw from the position she had held at Berlin in 1878. England also changed her policy, and through her representative, Sir William White, declared that she would not support anyone who should attempt to drive out the prince from Eastern Roumelia. With Bismarck, however, who at this time controlled the diplomacy of Europe, the decision rested. Although he declared that the Eastern Question had no interest for Germany, and that if Russia managed the matter in a quiet and diplomatic way he should not deny her right to interfere in the affairs of the Balkan states, nevertheless, he made it clear that Germany would not aid Russia in recovering her influence, and implied, that if she should attempt to do this by force, or should in any way threaten in the Balkan peninsula the peace of Europe, Germany would reserve the right to interfere. Thus Russia, finding no support in the west, was obliged to accept such terms as were agreed upon by the conference. In a second meeting at Constantinople the Powers, who were unwilling to depart from the letter of the treaty of Berlin, consented to accept the compromise to which the Porte had agreed after the victory of Slivnitza, and recognised Prince Alexander as governor-general of Eastern Roumelia. Such an arrangement proved to be, however, but a diplomatic device to conceal the actual union of the two parts of the Bulgarian nation.

Russia was thoroughly angry, not only because Germany and Austria had not supported her, but chiefly because Prince Alexander, with the aid of the Bulgarians, had dared to defy the Czar. Unable longer to act openly, she now tried secret intriguing for the purpose of overthrowing the authority of the prince and of driving him from his throne. Once before, in

1883, an attempt had been made to kidnap him, but had failed. But in August, 1886, he was seized in his palace at Sofia, forced to abdicate under threat of death, and was taken first to Reni, on the Russian side of the Danube, and thence to Lemberg, in Austria-Hungary, where he was set free. During his absence, the conspirators, Clement the Metropolitan, Zankoff, and Gruieff, established a pro-Russian ministry, and declaring Bulgaria to be under the protection of the Czar, prepared to restore Russia's influence in the principality. But the Russian partisans had reckoned without the Bulgarian people and army, who, convinced that Russian rule meant only evil to Bulgaria, rose against the conspirators, and within five days after the abdication of the prince, overthrew the new ministry, and in conjunction with Stambuloff, president of the Assembly, established a provisional government. At the request of his people Alexander returned to Bulgaria, but fearing that his restoration would only increase the woes of his country because of Russia's ill-will toward himself, he threw himself, in a moment of weakness, on the mercy of the Czar, and offered to leave Bulgaria if the latter demanded it. The Czar did so demand : on September 7th the prince abdicated the throne, and on the 8th left Bulgaria forever.

Bulgaria, left for the moment without a leader, was governed by three regents, whom the prince had appointed before his departure. Immediately the Russian party made strenuous efforts to recover control, and through General Kaulbars carried on an active campaign to prevent the summoning of the Assembly, which they knew would certainly demand the election of a prince and the restoration of the constitution. But Kaulbars failed ignominiously, and in the elections of October, 1886, the patriots won an overwhelming victory. Having been prevented from making Bulgaria a Russian prefecture, the Czar tried the plan of rejecting Prince Waldemar, of Denmark, whom the Assembly elected, proposing instead a

Caucasian candidate, the Prince of Mingrelia. But the Assembly refused to accept the Czar's candidate, and chose, after some delay, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who consented to become the new prince of Bulgaria in spite of the fact that the Czar refused to recognise him. Though the European governments could not confirm the election, and so make him a legal ruler according to the treaty of Berlin, inasmuch as the Assembly that had elected him contained members from South Bulgaria, which was still legally only Eastern Roumelia, yet both England and Austria, as individual governments, were friendly to Bulgaria, and Russia did not dare to interfere openly in Bulgarian affairs.

Beaten at Sofia, Russia now vented her wrath upon Germany and Austria, who with England were opposing her everywhere in the Balkan peninsula. Caustic articles had already appeared in the Moscow press in 1886, army officers were making speeches derogatory of Austria, and army corps were massed upon the Polish frontier. These indications of hostility, taken in conjunction with others suggestive of trouble between Germany and France, such as the arrest of Schnaebelé, the efforts of Déroulède's League of the Patriots to revive the policy of "revenge," and the appearance of Boulanger as minister of war in France, gave rise to rumours of war. Bismarck, knowing that the peace would not be broken, for the Czar was still bound by the secret treaty of 1884, encouraged the war rumours in order to strengthen his own control over the Reichstag; at the same time, as a warning to the war parties of Russia and France, he made public the treaty with Austria of 1879, and in the famous speech of February 6, 1888, disclosed the policy of Germany and declared that the Germans feared God, but nothing else in the world. Alexander, ignoring the opinions of Ignatieff and the army leaders, clung to his policy of peace; and, with the defeat of Boulanger, fears of a general European conflict disappeared.

Russia's isolation among the Powers, to which Alexander referred, when in 1889 he spoke of the Prince of Montenegro as "Russia's only faithful and sincere friend," was made somewhat more complete after the dismissal of Bismarck; for Caprivi, his successor, refused to renew the treaty with Russia, and in July, 1890, entered into an agreement with England, whereby the island of Heligoland was exchanged for territory in eastern Africa. It is hardly surprising, in view of the friendly relations existing between England and Germany, and of the possible formation of a quadruple alliance, that, beginning with 1891, the two isolated Powers, Russia and France, should have drawn more closely together. A French fleet visited Cronstadt in July, 1891, and in 1893 a Russian squadron was received at Toulon with joyful demonstrations of friendship on the part of the French. The situation was a little better defined when, in the same month of 1893, England sent six warships to Tarentum, where Italy was holding a naval review, both as an expression of amity, and an indication that she meant to preserve the equilibrium of the Mediterranean. The *entente* between Russia and France took outwardly at least the appearance of an alliance when in 1896, Nicolas II. visited Paris, and the next year President Faure visited St. Petersburg.

After 1890 the Balkan states were no longer a matter of concern to the European concert. Roumania, with but little history to recount, continued her internal improvements, increasing the number of her railways, and encouraging literature and art. The marriage of the heir-apparent, Prince Ferdinand, the king's nephew, with Marie of Edinburgh, strengthened Roumania's position abroad, while the birth of a son, who was baptised in the Greek faith in 1893, strengthened the dynasty at home. The state was at last established, as King Charles said in his Jubilee address of 1891, upon indestructible foundations. In Bulgaria, from 1887 to 1894 the tendencies were distinctly anti-Russian; and Stambuloff, the prime minister, was remark-

ably successful in suppressing conspiracies against the government,—of which that of Panitza in 1890 was the most serious,—and aroused admiration for his statesmanship by obtaining from Constantinople important privileges both religious and educational for the Bulgarians of Macedonia. But his lack of tact in dealing with his sovereign led to an estrangement that ended in his dismissal from office in 1894; and from that time Prince Ferdinand followed a policy of his own. Having become more firmly established at home by his marriage in 1893 and the birth of an heir the year following, the prince deliberately adopted a policy of reconciliation with Russia, and in 1896 allowed his son, Boris, to be converted formally to the Greek faith and to be rebaptised in the presence of a special envoy of the Czar. The results of his policy were most satisfactory. On March 14, 1896, he received from the Porte a confirmation of his election, and during the month of April visited St. Petersburg and Paris, where he was received by the Czar and President Faure. On August 17, 1897, he visited Constantinople, and did homage to his suzerain for his principality, apparently with the hope of gaining advantages which would strengthen Bulgaria's hold upon Macedonia.

The history of Servia after 1885 had not been such as to increase her reputation as a constitutional state. Her unfortunate war with Bulgaria had not only ruined the standing of her army and burdened her with a heavy debt, but it had greatly weakened the authority of King Milan. In 1888, the radicals, who had been in the opposition since 1880, came into control, and the Russian party supplanted the Austrian at Belgrade. The first result of this shifting of party relations was a revision of the constitution, whereby the powers of the king were diminished and those of the Assembly increased. This act, together with quarrels in the royal family between King Milan, who opposed pan-Slavism, and Queen Natalie, who, as a Russian, encouraged it, led to the resignation of the king in 1889, and

the appointment of a regency to act during the minority of the heir-apparent, Prince Alexander. But the growing strength of the radicals, who were determined to inaugurate a full parliamentary *régime*, threatened to eclipse the royal power; and in 1893, young Alexander, acting with the advice of his father, declared himself of age, and took the government into his own hands. He arrested the regents, dissolved the Assembly, and in 1894 abolished the constitution of 1888 and re-established that of 1869. Then, breaking entirely with the radicals, he established an autocratic government. Friendly to Austria, and ambitious to promote the welfare of his country along economic and financial lines, Alexander I. made an effort to bring to an end the party conflicts, which had hitherto hindered Servia's progress, to come to an agreement with the radicals, and to terminate the provisional *régime*, and in 1897, with this object in view, appointed a committee to draft a new constitution.

Inasmuch as the problems that Roumania, Bulgaria, and Servia were called upon to solve were now no longer of a kind to disturb the peace of Europe, the Eastern Question, after 1886, was narrowed to Turkey and her remaining dependencies, Macedonia, Albania, Armenia, Syria, and Crete, where trouble had recently arisen, and was certain to arise in the future. In the affairs of Turkey herself there had been considerable improvement. After 1878 she had concerned herself with carrying out the terms of the treaty of Berlin, and had spent the next few years in negotiating with Montenegro and Greece regarding their boundaries, with Austria regarding the occupation of Bosnia, with Russia regarding the large indemnity owed her, and with her bondholders throughout Europe, whose interests had been provided for by a special arrangement in 1881. So successfully had her finances been managed that by 1893, when she paid punctually for the second time her annual instalment to Russia, her financial reputation was in a large measure re-

stored in Europe, and capitalists were willing once more to consider Turkish loans. In government, Abdul Hamid II. had shown unexpected energy. In 1881 he had broken with the liberals and had banished Midhat Pasha to southern Arabia; in 1884, after effecting important changes in his ministry, he had taken the control of affairs from the hands of vizier and *divan*, and had become the personal governor of his Empire, with the party of Young Turkey in the opposition. At the same time he had freed himself from the influence of England and France, which had been pre-eminent in Turkey from 1877 to 1883, admitted Germans to important military and financial posts, and with the aid of von der Goltz, a Prussian officer, reorganised the Turkish army after the Prussian model. In 1890 the German influence was at its height; but after that time it declined, and the Sultan listened with more favour to the advice of Russia and France. After 1893, however, France lost her control, and Turkey showed herself more and more amenable to the wishes of Russia. This change was evinced by the recognition accorded to Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria in 1896, and by the deference of Turkey to Russia in the peace negotiations with Greece in 1897.

After 1889 and 1890 interest in the Eastern Question centred in the affairs of Armenia and Crete. Although outbreaks had occurred between Christians and Mussulmans in Syria, Yemen, Albania, and Tripolis, nowhere was the situation so serious as in Armenia, where were to be seen the beginnings of a movement for autonomy, and in Crete, where a struggle took place for entire independence from the suzerainty of the Sultan. The Armenian question had first received diplomatic recognition when, in the treaty of Berlin, the Porte promised to introduce without loss of time reforms into Armenia, and to protect the people,—Gregorian Christians,—against Circassians and Kurds. As England had made this promise one of the conditions of the Cyprus convention, it behooved the English government to see

that such a promise was kept; but during the ensuing decade nothing had been done. The growing prosperity of the Armenians, which was due to the continuance of peace, roused the cupidity of the Turkish tax collectors, who by their illegal exactions stirred the anger of the people and provoked bloody conflicts in 1889 and 1890. About this time an Armenian national party was formed, partly in Turkish, partly in Russian Armenia, which began to clamour for national autonomy and the reform of the administration of the *vilayets*. Thus, to the Turkish officials, the Armenians were not only Christians, but rebels. During 1894 atrocities were committed by the mountain Kurds, which were accompanied with acts of revenge on the part of the Armenians. In November, 1894, England, France, and Russia demanded the appointment of a committee of investigation, which, sitting at Mush, near Lake Van, drew up an elaborate scheme of reform. But the interference of the Powers would seem to have aroused a feeling of religious bitterness and to have given a new character to the massacres. Abdul Hamid, who had already adopted a pan-Islam policy, evaded the demands of the Powers by changing his ministers and making promises, and either he or his officials, as is commonly believed, authorized Mussulman emissaries to instigate the massacres of 1895 and 1896, which took the form of an attempt to Islamise the Armenians or to destroy them. Roused by these atrocities, the English people demanded that the government interfere; but Russia, on the ground that it was contrary to her interest to allow the consolidation of Armenia, as part of the Armenians were her subjects, declared that she did not desire in Armenia a second Bulgaria, and would protect the Porte: and in this position she was supported by Austria, France, and Germany. England, therefore, did nothing, Lord Salisbury declaring that she had not a sufficient army to occupy Turkish territory in the face of a Turkish force of 400,000 trained men and the opposition of the other Powers. The

matter was considerably complicated by the organisation in Constantinople of an Armenian revolutionary federation for revenge, and an attack by Armenians upon the Ottoman bank in August, 1896, as a protest against being abandoned by the Powers; but though further massacres took place in March, 1897, the Powers refused to act unless they could come to a common agreement in the matter.

The Cretan struggle was of a different character. Since 1868, the island, notwithstanding the reforms of 1868 and 1877, had been in a condition of perpetual unrest, and so heavy had become the burden of Turkish misrule that outbreaks occurred between Christians and Mussulmans in 1885 which culminated in the revolt of 1889 and the conquest of the island by the Turks. The Powers, however, intervened, and compelled the Sultan to raise the state of siege, abolish the war tribunals, and declare an amnesty. But attempts to reorganise justice in 1892, unrest among the agricultural population, and national discontent in 1894 prepared the way for a long and bitter struggle lasting from 1894 to 1896, in which the Candiotes, aided by the Greeks, resisted all Turkey's efforts to suppress them. Notwithstanding the promise, finally given in July, 1896, that Crete should have partial autonomy and a Christian governor, the Candiotes were still dissatisfied, demanded independence, and renewing the struggle in July and August, 1896, defeated the Turks and established a provisional government. The Sultan in this emergency accepted the terms of the Powers, appointed a Christian governor, and promised new reforms. But during the winter of 1896 and 1897 owing to the delay in putting the reforms into execution, and to continued conflicts between Christians and Mussulmans, Greece, carried away by a pan-Hellenistic passion, though insufficiently supplied with money and with arms, entered into the struggle in defence of the freedom and annexation of Crete. During December, 1896, military preparations were begun, troops were concentrated on the

Macedonian frontier, and in February, 1897, a fleet of torpedo-boats and a detachment of men were despatched to Crete. But the Powers, who had their warships stationed at the island, refused to allow Greece to interfere ; and issued a note commanding her to withdraw, and promising to confer upon Crete autonomy under the suzerainty of the Porte. During March and April the excitement in Greece was intense, for the people had no faith in autonomy and were enraged at the intervention of the Powers. Then it was, April 18, 1897, that Turkey, angered by raids of the Greek irregulars into Macedonia, declared war against Greece. The campaign that followed lasted until the middle of May, and proved disastrous to Greece, who, badly beaten, was forced to withdraw her forces from Crete, to accept the mediation of the Powers, and agree to autonomy for Crete. The remainder of the year was spent in efforts to settle the terms of peace and to secure a governor for the Candiotes. In the first particular, the Powers compelled Turkey to moderate her demands ; they permitted only a slight rectification of the Grecian frontier, whereas Turkey had demanded all Thessaly; reduced by more than half the indemnity that Turkey claimed; and refused to allow the " capitulations " or special judicial privileges granted to the Greek inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire to be abolished. The terms were agreed upon September 18, 1897, but owing to a dispute regarding the evacuation of Thessaly by Turkish troops, the final treaty was not signed until the middle of December. In the second particular the Powers were less successful. Although the Cretan Assembly accepted the autonomy granted them, the Powers were unable to agree upon a governor. M. Droz, of Switzerland, was rejected by the Sultan, Colonel Schaeffer, of Luxemburg, by Russia, and Prince George, of Greece, proposed by the Czar and formally accepted by England and France, was opposed by Turkey and by Germany. In March, 1898, no candidate had been agreed upon.

At the close of the year 1897 two essentially different problems presented themselves in the east: one relating to the further dismemberment of European Turkey; the other to the position of the Christian subjects of the Porte, notably in Armenia and Crete, for whom the Powers had affected so large an interest. All the states of the south-east, Montenegro, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria, with their eyes upon the "promised land" of Macedonia, were ambitious to increase their territory and to wield a larger political influence in the little world of the Balkan peninsula. But Greece had ruined her chances by the unfortunate war with Turkey, which cost her some of her own frontier fortresses and rendered her financially bankrupt. Bulgaria, on the other hand, though not an independent state, was stronger than either Servia or Montenegro; and possessed of a strong and well-drilled army under the leadership of a prince who had proved himself a shrewd and sagacious ruler, she stood ready to take advantage of any opportunity to gain once more the whole or a part of that land which she had lost by the decision of the congress of Berlin. In this struggle for possession of Ottoman territory Russia and Austria were Bulgaria's dangerous rivals and were seemingly agreed that neither should act without the other. Russia, discarding her old-time solution of the Eastern Question, according to the principle of independent nationalities, desired the maintenance of Ottoman integrity, until that time should come when she might arrange a compromise with Austria regarding a partition of European Turkey; while Austria was satisfied to extend the sphere of her influence by means of her railways and her commercial treaties, and to win for herself if possible a new seaport at Salonika and a new stretch of territory in the south-east.

In all matters relating to the amelioration of the condition of his Christian subjects, the Sultan, stronger than ever by virtue of his military successes in the war with the Greeks, was determined and obstinate. That pressure from the Powers,

without which nothing of lasting advantage to the oppressed people of the Ottoman Empire could be gained, had not been applied, and it was evident, from the attitude of the European concert toward the Armenian, Cretan, and Turco-Greek questions, that other motives were determining the action of the Powers than a disinterested regard for the settlement of the Eastern Question. Of greater importance to the states of the west than the problem of Turkey's place in Europe and her relation to her subject peoples were the problems of colonial expansion and commercial supremacy. By 1895 England and Russia had exactly reversed the policies according to which they had acted in 1876; the former desiring to intervene to protect the Armenians, the Cretans, and the Greeks, the latter refusing to interfere, and insisting on the maintenance of the entire independence of the Porte. But the attitude of the other Powers in the European concert was no longer determined by the motives that had prevailed in the days when the concert had been a reality, and France and England had stood together in defence of liberal institutions against the members of the Holy Alliance. The natural alliances of the earlier period, based on a similarity of political ideas and principles, had given place to a new arrangement due to similarity of industrial and commercial interests. It is true that Austria, Germany, and Russia united to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire out of a common regard for the monarchical principle; but it is equally true that England was isolated in her defence of the Armenians and Cretans, not for any political reasons, but because of the existence of a silent commercial war in which all the other Powers were ranged against her. The fact that for two centuries England had been the great commercial Power in Europe and had in the main monopolised the carrying trade of the world made a conflict inevitable whenever the other Powers, in their desire to extend the area of their industrial activity, to open up new markets for their products, and to in-

crease their wealth, should enter the field in competition with England. Thus France, who was England's natural ally, supported the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and opposed England, not because she was especially loyal to the Ottoman cause, but rather because the settlement of the Congo and Niger questions were of greater consequence in increasing her power and extending her prestige. As in Africa the interests of Germany and France were identical, so, in China, France, Germany, and Russia stood together against England and Japan. The attitude of the European Powers toward the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire was to be determined in China, India, and Africa rather than in Europe, and in consequence the final settlement of the Eastern Question seemed to be indefinitely postponed.

CHAPTER IX.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

THOUGH for fifty years previous to 1870 the political history of France had been one of revolutions and reactions ; though, outwardly, the governments had seemed unstable, and political opinions without conviction ; nevertheless, under the surface, the progress of education, of industrial and social reform, and of political ideas had been unbroken and definite. Held firm by that mechanism of administration which she had received as an inheritance from the first Napoleon, and which had remained almost unchanged from government to government, France had suffered but little from actual disorder in the business routine of the state ; and in all that concerned the life and thought of the people, had undergone a real historical development. That this development had been in the direction of republican ideas and principles, the events of the future were to show. Notwithstanding the fact that for eighteen years France had borne the name and burden of empire, the people in 1870, particularly of those classes that had not received the imperial patronage, had no real sympathy for imperialism or an absolute form of government. The frequent appeals of Napoleon III. to the principle of universal suffrage ; the various revisions of the constitution in the interest of liberal and parliamentary institutions ; the existence in the *Corps législatif* of a strong and influential republican opposition after 1863 ; the activity of the radicals during 1868 and 1869 ; and the constitutional changes of 1870, which the Emperor had hoped would

preserve his Empire ;—all these had kept alive the republican spirit, and prepared the way for a new attempt to establish a permanent government for France.

On September 3, 1870, the news came to Paris that the army of the Empire had been defeated at Sedan, and that the Emperor was a prisoner. On the same date, at a night session of the Assembly, after General Palikao had confirmed this news, Jules Favre, representing the party of the Left, proposed to the deputies the dethronement of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his dynasty ; and though the ministry sought to preserve the throne for the empress and her son, not a voice from the floor of the Chamber was raised in her behalf. The deputies, recognising the fact that the Empire had ceased to exist, prepared to establish a provisional government to take the control of affairs ; but the legislative body of 1871, like that of 1848, was not allowed to act. After declaring that the deputies were not competent to decide the question, inasmuch as they had received their warrant from the Emperor, and were, by a considerable majority, committed to the cause of the liberal Empire, the indignant populace of Paris, long since alienated from the Empire, invaded the Chamber, and demanded that the republic be proclaimed. With the control of affairs thus wrested from them, the deputies were powerless ; and Jules Favre, Gambetta, and the representatives from Paris hurried with the mob to the Hôtel de Ville, and there, in the presence of republicans and socialists, Gambetta proclaimed the republic. This event was no isolated one ; for already the same had been done at Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, a fact which proves that this change of the government was the work, not of a Parisian mob, but of the republican party of France.

A provisional government was at once established, composed of eleven men, who were called upon in this serious crisis to negotiate with the invading Germans, to arm the country for defence, to gain from the people at large their sanction of the

republic through a national assembly chosen by universal suffrage, and to suppress the insurrection in Paris, where already the revolutionary leaders were preparing to establish the commune and to oppose the government. In September, the republicans were inclined to advocate peace ; but by October, when King William and Bismarck, who at first insisted on recognising the regency of the empress, consented to treat with the provisional government, they had changed their minds, and having postponed the elections, were making every effort to continue the war. The result was unfortunate ; for the provisional government, though unauthorised and revolutionary, was forced to continue in office to the end of the war, and to leave the impression in the country that the republicans, as a party, were committed to a warlike policy.

Therefore, when the polls were opened on February 8, 1871, for the election of deputies, after Paris had finally been starved into surrender, and the armistice of January 28th had been signed, nearly five hundred monarchists were returned to the Assembly, as a reply from the country to Gambetta's war policy. The new body, which held its first sitting at Bordeaux on February 12th, not only refused to proclaim the republic, but, unwilling to commit itself to the term "president," also elected as "chief of the executive power," Thiers, whose sympathies had always been monarchical. In his turn, Thiers ignored the revolutionary republicans when selecting his ministers, and made known his determination to work for harmony and the reorganisation of France. The Assembly, accepting his program, decreed the peace, and voted to transfer the seat of government to Versailles ; but before the deputies could gather at the new capital, the commune had been erected in Paris and civil war had begun.

The first, and probably the most important, cause for this uprising against the government is traceable to the hostility that the social democrats cherished for the monarchists and

moderates, who were threatening to overthrow the republic. The socialists of Paris, fearing that the Assembly would attempt to restore the monarchy by a *coup d'état*, or else would establish a *bourgeois* republic committed to peace and material prosperity, determined to force upon France a socialistic *régime* that would involve a definite change in the structure of government and the relation of classes. But behind this opposition of parties lay the hostility of the great municipal centres for the provinces. The deputies in the Assembly had been elected, in the main, by the rural classes, and in the presence of this dead weight of conservatism, as the radicals called it, the thirty revolutionary republicans who represented Paris found themselves a helpless minority. The Parisians feared that this conservative majority of the Assembly would decapitalise France, take from Paris the leadership she had possessed for so many years, and silence the voice of her people who had spoken in 1830 and 1848, and were ready in 1871 to support once more the cause of the true republic. Thus two causes may be assigned for the insurrection: the hatred of the revolutionary radicals for the monarchists and the moderate republicans; and the determination of a small group of socialists in Paris to emancipate the city from the control of the country, to win communal independence and autonomy, not only for themselves, but also for all the great cities of France, and to give the management of affairs into the hands of a federal body composed of representatives from the municipalities. But honest devotion to the cause of the republic and the commune was soon overshadowed by the violence and brutality of the mob, which, dominated by passion and cruelty, revolutionary madness and love of insurrection, and driven by want, misery, and distress, took advantage of the occasion furnished by the leaders of the movement and gave to it a character almost unexampled in the history of insurrectionary uprisings.

The national guard, which consisted of some two hundred

thousand of the able-bodied men of Paris and was kept armed during the siege, became the army of the insurrection that the federal and socialist leaders were able to turn against the state. As early as October, 1870, and again in January, 1871, the Communists had risen in insurrection ; and inasmuch as it was agreed that the national guard should retain its arms while the terms of the capitulation were under discussion, conditions favoured another and more serious outbreak. In February, a central committee of the national guard had been created to direct the elections, to defend the republic, and to assume control of the government of Paris ; and on March 18th, when the government at Versailles attempted to seize the cannon which this committee had transferred to the heights of Montmartre, it was the national guard who repulsed the government troops, and captured and shot Thomas and Lecomte, two of the government's generals. Without further resistance, the regular troops withdrew from the city, and left the radicals in full control. Paris was isolated in the struggle by the failure of the attempt to erect the commune in Toulouse, Limoges, Lyons, Marseilles, Narbonne, and St. Étienne, so that when after March 22d efforts to effect a reconciliation between the government and the revolutionists proved unsuccessful because neither side would accept a compromise, civil war broke out between Paris and the rest of France.

By the elections of March 26th, the commune of Paris was established. Though the central committee, the original membership of which had been almost entirely changed between February 15th and March 18th, remained to exercise supervisory functions, a general council was created made up of Blanquists, members of the International, and revolutionary republicans, which, through its ten committees, of which the general executive was the most important, was to take direct control of the communal government. The republican calendar and the red flag were adopted, and all available men in the city

were put under requisition for the military defence. But the communal organisation proved astonishingly inefficient. The executive committee was replaced on April 20th by another made up of delegates from each of the other nine ; this in turn was set aside on May 1st for a committee of public safety, similar to that of 1793 ; and this gave way ten days later to another similar committee, which proved as incompetent as the others to govern the city and to resist the siege.

The failure of the communal organisation to control the movement was due, in part, to incompetency, and, in part, to quarrels and dissensions among the members. Either the committees did nothing, or if they issued orders and gave directions, the latter were not heeded by those who should have obeyed. The fact that the theory of the commune was held by but a minority of the leaders and vaguely understood at best, made a settled plan of action impossible ; while the utter absence of serious purpose on the part of the rank and file of the Communists, the personal jealousies, cries of treachery, and unrestrained licence of the disorderly element to whom revolution was the sport of the hour, made order and discipline difficult to enforce. Furthermore, the rapid progress of the siege, which was begun by the Versaillese on April 2d and was continued without break to the end of May, drove the population within the city to desperation, and tended to throw the control of the movement into the hands of the more violent insurrectionists. The reprisals on both sides were frightful. Insurgents taken in arms were shot without mercy by the government ; while the Communists, passing beyond the control of their leaders, and mad with the desire of revenge, turned on the city, and between the 16th and 22d of May committed outrages of the most violent character. The earnestness and the honesty of purpose that actuated some of the promoters of the movement are to-day lost sight of, so destructive was the vandalism of that last week of the commune, which witnessed the plunder-

ing of the house of Thiers, the downfall of the column Vendôme, and the burning of the Tuileries, the Hôtel de Ville, and others of the finest public buildings of Paris. And as the crowning act against humanity, at the time when the Versaillese were entering the city, the hostages, to the number of two hundred, were shot down in cold blood at the cemetery Père la Chaise. This murderous *régime* was brought to an end by the capture of the city ; but in its turn the revenge of the government was fearful in its severity. Many of the insurgents were shot ; 7,500 were transported to New Caledonia, and some 13,000 were condemned to prison or exile. The work of the military tribunals was not completed for five years, and, until 1880, the question of amnesty and the pardoning of the condemned kept alive the bitterness engendered by one of the most bloody and costly of modern insurrectionary movements.

With the overthrow of the commune in Paris, the history of the republic begins. The Assembly, though elected for the sole purpose of concluding the peace, remained to govern the country and to draft the constitution. Convinced by the supplemental elections of July, which returned eighty-five republicans out of one hundred and fourteen deputies chosen, that should it dissolve, an assembly would be elected which would certainly proclaim the republic, it voted to confer upon itself constituent powers. But once in office, it determined to postpone as long as possible the settlement of the question of the constitution ; and that the ministry might proceed at once to the consideration of measures that would insure prosperity to France, agreed to a temporary arrangement known as the " Compact of Bordeaux," and on August 31, 1871, passed the Rivet law, conferring upon Thiers the title " President of the Republic."

The first questions considered were financial ; France owed more than eleven milliards of francs, of which nearly six milliards, including interest, were owed to Germany for the war indemnity. There is no better evidence of the prosperity that

had existed under the Second Empire, of the advantages accruing from the many commercial treaties that had been made between 1860 and 1866, than the manner in which this debt was paid. The two-milliard loan of June, 1871, and the three-milliard loan of July, 1872, were covered many times over by subscribers, not only in France, but in England, Holland, and Germany; and the indebtedness was paid, not by drawing on domestic capital, but by transferring to Germany credits accumulated abroad during ten years of commercial prosperity. In consequence of this rapid payment of the debt, Thiers was enabled to effect the withdrawal of the German army of occupation two years before the time agreed upon. While this important work was being accomplished, matters of great moment were under consideration in the Assembly. Among the measures passed at this time, one reorganised the communes, and conferred upon the councils of the municipalities the right to elect the mayors except in the chief places of the cantons; another established universal military service for a short term, divided the army into the actives, the reserves, and the *landwehr*, changed the recruiting system, improved the equipment, and introduced periodical manœuvres; while others restoring the princes of the house of Orléans, increasing the internal-revenue taxes, and improving the budget, were likewise adopted.

While Thiers, in conjunction with the Right and Left Centres, was thus freeing the territory from foreign troops, restoring credit, increasing the powers of the municipalities, and remodelling the military system, the Legitimists and the radicals were seeking to discredit the Assembly by noisy obstruction within the Chamber and by hostile agitation without. By speeches, manifestoes, pilgrimages to the shrines of their church and their leader, and by incessant denunciation of the republic, the Legitimists were trying to effect the recall of the Count of Chambord, the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope, and were showing their support of the Carlist move-

ment in Spain and the ultramontane movement in Germany and Italy. On the other hand, the radicals, hostile to the republic because of its conservatism, were demanding the dissolution of the Assembly, and the election of a new body which should really represent the sovereignty of the people. Silenced by the events following the overthrow of the commune, and by the measures taken against the republican press, they spoke through Gambetta, chief of the extreme Left, who in his tours in the provinces from April to November, 1872, appealed to the republican spirit of France, and endeavoured to arouse the men of the new social classes, who were, he declared, henceforth to control the destinies of France. Though influential and eloquent, and loyal in his devotion to his country, Gambetta was too often hasty and intemperate, and by his speeches made at this critical time, rendered more difficult the conclusion of peace and the reorganisation of France.

With the close of the year 1872 came the question which could be postponed no longer, as to what the permanent form of the government should be. Thiers, whose administration, though strictly parliamentary, had been more or less personal in character, had gradually lost his popularity with the Assembly, partly because of his dictatorial manner, partly because of his unwillingness to break with the republicans and to come out positively for a monarchical form of government. The Right Centre, though willing to support him in reorganising the country, was opposed to any compromise with the Left, and demanded a " fighting government " which should war against the republicans for the erection of the monarchy. When, therefore, Thiers made it plain that he desired the permanency of the republic, as the government " which would divide parties the least," the Right Centre abandoned him, and elected in January, 1873, Buffet, one of its own members, as president of the Assembly. Nor did Thiers have the support of the extreme republicans, who, hating his conservatism, had elected

in April, 1873, their own candidate, Barodet, in Paris, instead of de Rémusat, the candidate of Thiers. Too liberal for the monarchists and too conservative for the radicals, Thiers found himself without support in the Assembly, and on May 24, 1873, resigned. With unnecessary haste the parties of the Right, in their determination to take the control of the government into their own hands, elected Marshal MacMahon as president of the republic, and began their struggle for the restoration of the monarchy.

The character of the government now underwent an important change. A reactionary ministry, that of Broglie, came into office, whose object it was to restore to power the church and the monarchy. Instead of considering wholesome legislation for the welfare of France, it worked solely for the interests of party: on one hand as a "fighting government," it strove by every means in its power to suppress republicanism and the republic; on the other as a "government of moral order," it strove to restore royalty and to strengthen the church. During the years 1873 and 1874 it removed all republican officials, prefects, sub-prefects, commissaires, and the like, and replaced them with appointees of its own political faith; it repealed the municipal law of 1871, that it might control the appointment of mayors and so strengthen its hold upon the administration; by making use of laws that had been passed against the Communists, it undertook to repress republican demonstrations, to control the press, and to watch the plays in the theatres; and, by adopting official candidates, it interfered once more in the elections of France. At the same time it forbade the use of the word "republic," and in all official acts made no reference to the republican *régime*. This policy of repression was accompanied by another, the evident purpose of which was to strengthen the altar and the throne. Pilgrimages to Lourdes and La Salette were allowed and encouraged, and in 1873, special pilgrimages were conducted to Paray-le-Monial, where

speeches were made and songs were sung in honour of the Bourbon king and the temporal power of the Pope. The Jesuits were allowed greater freedom of action; and the government sought to give the church a share in the control of education by extending the laws of 1833 and 1850 to include the university, and by passing a law in 1875 which granted permission to found free universities and to establish mixed examining boards.

Such measures were of use in increasing the power of the church, but they did little to restore the monarchy. Knowing that the weakness of their cause lay in the fact that, as Thiers put it, there were three pretenders and only one crown, the monarchists adopted a policy of fusion. It was agreed that the Count of Chambord should reign as Henry V. in France, and at his death be succeeded by the Count of Paris; and that a reconciliation might be effected, the Count of Paris visited the Count of Chambord at Frohsdorf on July 5, 1873. But the Count of Chambord refused to accept the tri-coloured flag, substitution of which for the white banner of the Bourbons the Orléanists had made an indispensable part of their program, and on September 27, 1873, put an end to the hopes of the monarchists by refusing to take the throne at all. By one act he made clear the fact that real accord between the Legitimists and Orléanists was impossible, that there could be no harmony between the ideas and principles of the Restoration and those of the July Monarchy; by the other, he informed the French nation that the white banner was the symbol of principles to which France was no longer faithful, and that as he could not enter upon his inheritance unconditioned and uncompromised, he would remain forever in exile. His decision destroyed all hope of a restoration, but it saved France from the danger of civil war.

This policy of fusion having failed of its object, the Orléanists determined to extend the term of President MacMahon, hoping thereby to postpone the establishment of a permanent

government until they should be able, in the possible event of the death of the Count of Chambord, to replace the president by the Count of Paris as constitutional king. Aided by the Left Centre, which willingly voted for a measure which seemed to increase the power of the president of the republic, they passed on November 19, 1873, a law instituting the "Septennate," which prolonged the presidency of MacMahon for seven years. But this attempt to solve the question of the form of government in the interest of the Orléanists so enraged the Legitimists that the following year they united with the republicans and defeated a measure limiting the suffrage, which the Orléanists were desirous of carrying in order to make more certain their own success in the elections. In consequence of this defeat, the Broglie ministry was overthrown, May 16, 1874; and in the confusion that followed the Bonapartists, encouraged by the strife between the Legitimists and Orléanists, pushed to the front, and with General de Cissey as head of a new ministry, carried on a campaign for the restoration of the Napoleonic dynasty that lasted from May, 1874, to January, 1875. But their attempt failed. The events of the year 1874, which showed that union between the Legitimists and Orléanists was impossible, and disclosed the scheme for the restoration of the Empire, prepared the way for final republican success. The year 1875 was to decide the issue.

When Thiers in 1872 boldly advocated a republican form of government, he showed that he understood, better than the party with which he had hitherto identified himself, the fact that public opinion throughout the country favoured the republic. And the events of 1873 and 1874 had only served to show the soundness of his judgment. Although the famous Wallon amendment, which definitely established the republic, was passed by a majority of but one vote, nevertheless, it must be remembered that the republic was in reality assured when Thiers, committing himself to the cause that was supported by

the majority of the people of France, said to the monarchists on November 13, 1872, "The republic exists." In January, 1875, Gambetta, consenting to sacrifice some of his more radical opinions for the sake of the common cause, drew his party of the extreme Left to the aid of the Left and Left Centre, and with a small group from the Right Centre, who were frightened by the agitations of the Bonapartists, voted for a republican constitution. The Wallon amendment, which overthrew the hopes of the Orléanists by decreeing that at the expiration of seven years a new president should be elected by a joint assembly composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, was adopted on January 30, 1875; and in the months that followed were passed by increasing majorities, though the discussion was often acrimonious, the organic laws of 1875 which make up the present constitution of France. By these laws a president, a senate, a chamber of deputies, a responsible ministry, universal suffrage, and parliamentary methods were decreed for France, while liberty of speech, thought, and person, equality before the law, and right of trial by jury became the property of the individual. Thus, under an administrative organisation which was still that of the first Napoleon, were to be seen once more in the organic law and social structure of the state the principles of the Revolution.

Thus, an unwilling Assembly, after a fair test of party strength, had adopted at the end of four years the only form of government that was possible for France. That its choice met the approval of the nation, was proved by the first election held under the new constitution in 1876. To the Chamber of Deputies 360 republican deputies and but 170 conservatives were returned; and in the Senate, which remained for three years longer the stronghold of conservatism, the numbers were about equally divided. This important victory had been won by the republicans without a resort to illegal measures: neither revolution nor *coup d'état* had stained the history of this honour-

able conflict, and the early sessions of the new government were without reprisals or acts of revenge.

But at this point the Ultramontanes, who had been influential in overthrowing Thiers, and chief among those who had tried to restore the monarchy, made one last effort, now that they were able to command both the president and the Senate, to restore to religion its control over politics. Outside the Assembly they circulated petitions, organised pilgrimages, inveighed against Italy,—the lay members in speeches and the press, the clergy from their pulpits,—and acted almost in defiance of the law. In their turn the republicans, who had a large majority in the Chamber of Deputies, became more radical in their views and acts. Not only did they pass measures establishing liberty of the press, restoring to the communes the right of electing their mayors, and forbidding the government the right to interfere in elections ; but they also demanded the removal of all functionaries hostile to the government, and the adoption, by the ministry, of a strictly liberal policy. At the same time they turned against the clergy, and echoing Gambetta's famous cry, " Clericalism—that is our enemy," passed on March 4, 1877, an order of the day against the intrigues of the Ultramontanes.

In the struggle that followed, the clericals for the moment seemed to triumph. Marshal MacMahon, convinced that the Chamber was becoming too radical for the good of the country, and yielding to the persuasions of his advisers, wrote on May 16, 1877, a sharp letter to Jules Simon charging the latter with inability to control the Chamber. Simon at once resigned, and Marshal MacMahon appointed another ministry under the Duke of Broglie, composed of Legitimists, clericals, Orléanists, and Bonapartists, and demanded of the Senate the dissolution of the Chamber. The joy of the reactionaries was intense, but it was short-lived. Though the postponement of the new elections to October 14th, the latest date allowed by law, gave the

clericals ample time in which to carry out their elaborate program of interference, the result of the elections was overwhelmingly in favour of the republicans, who, in the new Chamber which met in November, 1877, were able to muster 330 votes, a majority of more than one hundred. Immediately the cabinet was overthrown ; and when the deputies refused to have any dealings with the extra-parliamentary cabinet under Rochebouet that MacMahon selected, on the ground that it did not represent the majority of the Chamber, the president, turning from his clerical advisers, accepted loyally the will of the country, and from the Left Centre, which was now composed entirely of constitutional republicans, selected his ministry. Within two months after the Assembly convened, the republican majority in the Chamber of Deputies had risen to one hundred and fifty, and the renewal of the third of the senators gave to the republicans in the Senate a majority of fifty-two. Thereupon MacMahon, finding himself out of accord with the legislative bodies, and unable to perform conscientiously all the acts that the Chamber demanded of him, resigned from office January 30, 1879. By a large majority Jules Grévy was chosen president of France in his place, and for the first time the republicans were in full control of both the legislative bodies and the executive.

With 1879 the era of peril was passed, for the political question had been answered in favour of a parliamentary and republican government, and all danger of monarchical and ecclesiastical reaction was in the main removed. But the real test of the republic was yet to be made : for it remained to be seen whether, on one side, France would content herself with an impersonal and parliamentary government, which less than thirty years before she had discarded for the personal and despotic rule of Napoleon III. ; and, on the other, whether the new government was competent to manage wisely the affairs of the nation, its foreign relations, the colonial question, the

church, education, military defence, social reforms, and the like, to perform with despatch and without serious friction its appointed task, or, in other words, whether the republicans who had united for defence would be willing to hold together when, with victory won, the task of governing began.

Power was now entirely in the hands of the Left. The old extreme Left, under the name of the Republican Union, with Gambetta as its leader, having abandoned many of its more radical opinions, drew nearer the Left; while a new extreme Left of irreconcilable republicans, who scorned the majority as opportunists, held firmly to their radical principles. Notwithstanding the instability of ministries,—those of Dufaure to January, 1880, Waddington to February, Freycinet to December, and Ferry to November, 1881,—the republican majority remained, on the whole, intact, and the party was able to concentrate its attention upon the republican program. During 1879, 1880, and 1881 it removed conservative and reactionary officials, voted to transfer the Chambers from Versailles to Paris, and entered upon its campaign against the clergy, in part as revenge for the events of the 16th of May. The attack often passed legitimate bounds, and was directed, not against a party which had sought to influence and control politics, but against the church at large, and even against religion itself. Not content with prohibiting the exercise of many special privileges that had been allowed the Roman Catholics, with taking away from the free universities those exceptional favours which had been granted them in 1873 by the "government of moral order," and refusing them the title of universities, the ministry strove to drive from France all religious orders, such as the Jesuits, whose presence was unauthorised by law. Failing in this, because the Senate rejected Ferry's famous Article 7, it accomplished the same end by enforcing the old laws against religious congregations that had never been repealed; and when the members of the communities refused to obey,

ejected them by force from their homes. Furthermore, that the schools might become nurseries of patriotism rather than of religious prejudice, primary education was entirely reconstructed during 1881 and 1882, and instruction was made gratuitous, compulsory, and lay. The "letter of obedience," that is, the religious diploma of capacity for teachers in primary schools, was suppressed, and all instruction in religion was strictly forbidden. The resistance that the Roman Catholics made to these measures was so great as to provoke retaliation on the part of the government, whose acts now became tainted with a sectarian and political hostility. Legitimate as the object of laicising education was in principle, the methods employed to carry it out were unnecessarily severe.

But the attack on the religious houses and the free universities and the laicising of the primary schools, while rousing the wrath of the reactionists, cannot be said to have disturbed public opinion to any great extent. Of greater concern to the people at large was the foreign policy of the government. In all her relations with foreign Powers since 1870, France had conducted herself with dignity and moderation; and although her position had been largely one of neutrality and isolation, yet with each year since the war she had grown steadily stronger, and by 1879 had won once more the respect of Europe. But the election of Grévy to the presidency, the scenes of violence in the Chamber, the attack on the church, and the wholesale removals in administration had disturbed the confidence of the Powers, who construed these acts as indications of political inconsistency and a desire for revenge, belying the good work of the preceding years. The events of the year 1880–1881, the adoption of a colonial policy by Ferry, its first application in the war against Tunis, and the signing of the treaty of May 12, 1881, with the Bey, not only roused hostility and opposition at home, but destroyed the *entente* with Italy, which had already been strained by the agitation of the clericals regarding the

restoration of the lands of the Pope, and prepared the way for the triple alliance, one object of which was to isolate France in Europe. Reactionists and radicals alike scored this colonial policy without mercy, calling it a ridiculous comedy, an electoral device, a concession to Bismarck, and a piece of political bribery and corruption ; while radicals, in particular, deemed it an unworthy substitute for the policy of revenge. The battle in and out of the Chamber was carried on without moderation ; charges and threats were freely exchanged ; and in the end, the treaty with Tunis was passed by a majority of but thirteen votes.

On November 1, 1881, the Ferry ministry was overturned, and its place taken by one under Gambetta, who, sitting as the wise, prudent, and influential president of the Chamber of Deputies, had for three years loyally supported the government. But this event, which all France had awaited with expectation and content, proved a grievous disappointment. The Grand Ministry, so called because it was to be composed of men from all parties of the Left, proved to be a ministry of obscure men taken only from the Republican Union, Gambetta's own party. Though its policy was, as its leader said, that of France, it was unable to resist the combined attacks of those who either feared a dictatorship or hated Gambetta for his opportunism, and in January, 1882, was overthrown. The republican unity was already breaking, and even Gambetta had been unable to prevent it. The discord thus engendered among republicans was increased by the refusal of the Chamber in July, 1882, to join England in intervening in Egypt on the occasion of the revolt of Arabi Pasha. Notwithstanding the impassioned appeal of Gambetta in behalf of the alliance with England,—it was his last great speech, for he died the December following,—the deputies, by an overwhelming majority, took a step which cost France all share in the future control of Egypt, hurt her reputation abroad, and disturbed the good feeling that had hitherto existed between herself and England.

The year 1882 brought disaster to the republic: the downfall of Gambetta destroyed the faith of many in republican institutions and in parliamentary government; while his death severed the allegiance of many of his conservative friends, who had admired the eloquence and grandeur of the great republican leader. The refusal of France to co-operate with England in defending Egypt intensified party hostility among the deputies, broke up the republican majority, and inaugurated a period of parliamentary anarchy in the Chamber. The people grew discouraged, lost confidence in their electoral privileges, and fell into a political apathy which, for the moment, gave to the reactionists an unusual opportunity for winning successes in the communal elections. Industrial associations, feeling the injury to trade from this want of a durable ministry and a fixed policy, sent in addresses and petitions to the government, demanding "a ministry which should resolutely take the initiative in the social reforms that had so long been promised, and make the republic respected in Europe and throughout the world." Then Jules Ferry, as the only man able to meet the emergency, was called back to the head of the ministry, and in February, 1883, entered upon his career of two years as prime minister of France.

Instead of attempting to reconcile parties, as Gambetta would probably have done, Ferry formed a fighting ministry, gained the support of a working majority in the Chamber, and determined, despite all opposition, to carry the measures that were necessary for the welfare of the country. Abandoning many of the principles to which expression had been given in earlier radical programs, the government, depending upon the opportunist majority, which was composed of the Left Centre and the Republican Union, began an aggressive campaign for the purpose of strengthening France at home and abroad, and disregarding the effect of its policy upon the individual parties, advocated measures based on necessity rather than on principle.

On one hand it revised the constitution by suppressing life membership in the Senate, furthered decentralisation by increasing the powers of the departmental councils and making the municipal councils practically self-controlling, and giving up all idea of retrenching public expenses, extended the railway system, built schools, and increased the colonial empire by sending expeditions to Tonkin and Annam, Congo, Soudan, and Tunis. By removing from the army all pretenders to the throne, it struck a severe blow at the reactionists and made more firm the position of the republic. It opposed at every point the radical program, and increased the budget, revised the constitution, and sent the expedition to Tonkin in the face of bitter radical opposition. In the work that it accomplished it proved itself to be the most energetic ministry that France had had under the constitution ; for not only did it revive the idea of parliamentary government and advance the cause of education and local self-government, but it gave to France a colonial empire and raised her prestige among the European Powers. Yet the very character of its work destroyed the majority on which it depended ; its attitude as a fighting government holding a majority only by concessions and shrewd manœuvring, did nothing to harmonise the parties in the Chamber ; and finally, in March, 1885, attacked by reactionists and radicals, after the news of the defeat of Lang Son had created a panic among the deputies and had arraigned against it those who had begun to feel restless under Ferry's vigorous and dominating leadership, it was overthrown. With the downfall of Ferry, vanished the last compact majority that France was to see for many years.

With 1885 the republic entered upon a period of peril when the very question of its own existence was to be decided. It was a period during which parliamentary institutions were disgraced, when the bitterness of personal hates, the violence of parties in the Chamber, the intrigues of enemies in the country

were alienating the people at home and arousing distrust abroad : it was a period barren either of glory or good works. Deputies laboured in the interest of politics, or spent their energies in seeking personal ends and in venting personal spites. The ministers, succeeding each other rapidly, were unable to gain a homogeneous and stable majority, and instead of offering the country a consistent policy of social and economic reform, spent their time in manipulating parties in order to avoid defeat. The tendency in the Chamber was distinctly in the direction of the Left, and the early ministries, those of Brisson, Freycinet, and Goblet, in 1885 and 1886, found it necessary to gain the support that they desired at the price of important concessions to the radicals. In 1886, fearing a monarchical revival, the Freycinet cabinet expelled all the pretenders from France, and giving up a positive policy of reform legislation, did little else than attempt to reduce expenses and to establish the equilibrium of the budget. While the Chamber was profiting from these concessions to the radicals, the country was becoming conservative, a new generation of conservatives having grown up in France meanwhile. The ministry of Rouvier, May, 1887, broke from the radicals, and turned toward the conservatives with a policy of reconciliation, but the attempt did not survive the year.

Already had a new factor entered into the political life of France. For some time there had existed a League of Patriots, organised under the leadership of Déroulède, to keep alive the desire for revenge against Germany, and through its influence General Boulanger had entered the Freycinet cabinet in January, 1886, as minister of war. Around the nucleus thus formed gathered the discontented : radicals, who desired the abandonment of the colonial policy ; Bonapartists, who saw in Boulanger the coming Cæsar ; and monarchists, who deeming him a possible Monk to their Charles II., aided him with funds and political support. The movement grew rapidly, and during

1886 and 1887 became a menace to the republic. The laicising of education, the growth of crime, the absence of great leaders and the inability of those in control, the enormous public debt, and the neglect of social reform, together with the confusion of parties and the loss of governmental authority, made possible the rise of Boulanger. The government was further compromised by the scandal arising from the sale of decorations, and the resignation of President Grévy in December, 1887. During 1888 the Boulangists appealed to the people, promising to dissolve the Chamber and to revise the constitution, with the result that, in January, 1889, they returned their leader to the Chamber by enormous majorities, and gave even sane republicans cause to fear a *coup d'état* and the return of a despotism. But Boulanger was not destined to be a second Louis Napoleon; wanting in courage and ability and the qualities that make for leadership, he became a warning rather than an actual danger to the republic. Steadied by the election of Carnot, whose name and character were pillars of strength at this critical juncture, and by the union of the factions of the republican party, which stood together in the presence of danger, the republic weathered the storm. Boulanger, prosecuted for corruption by Constans, who showed exceptional determination in this emergency, was convicted and disgraced; and with his death in 1891 the Boulangist party disappeared as an important political factor. The Exposition of 1889, in disclosing the resources of the country and in attracting the attention and favourable criticism of the civilised world, increased the confidence of the French people and aroused their loyalty to the republic. The elections of that year, in returning a majority of one hundred and forty-eight republicans, showed that the danger to the republic had been appreciated by the nation, and that the crisis was over.

After 1890 the condition of France and the republic improved steadily. Agitation in the Chamber was considerably checked

by the substitution for political questions of others of an economic and social character which aroused less the animosities of the parties. In January, 1892, a tariff law was passed by the Chamber which brought to an end the system of treaty tariffs, which had been inaugurated by Napoleon III. in 1860, and ushered in a full protective *régime* at the very time, interestingly enough, when Germany was rejecting the high-tariff arrangement of 1879 and substituting for it commercial treaties. Other measures touching foreign relations, railways, and the condition of labour, were also considered and passed. In the same year the ecclesiastical opposition to the republic was broken down by the recognition accorded to it by Pope Leo XIII., and in consequence many of the monarchists—the *ralliés*—joined the moderate republicans and accepted the republic. Notwithstanding financial scandals, which injured the credit of the government, the elections of 1893 resulted in victory for the moderates, and gave France, almost for the first time, a homogeneous majority in the Chamber.

But these same elections, in returning to the Chamber sixty socialist deputies, the representatives of the first organised socialistic party in the history of the republic, made unexpectedly powerful the radical opposition during the three years that followed. In 1894, after the assassination of President Carnot, and again in 1895, after the resignation of Casimir Périer, the radicals attempted to elect as president of the republic Brisson, a member of their own party. In this they failed, and Faure, a moderate republican, was chosen president by a majority of seventy votes ; but they succeeded in 1895 in elevating Brisson to the presidency of the Chamber, and after the fall of Ribot in October of the same year, in obtaining the selection of a radical, Bourgois, as head of a new cabinet. At the same time that this tendency toward radicalism was showing itself, another of even greater moment, looking to a simplification of the political situation, became evident. This was

due in part to the entire failure of the Boulangists and the Bonapartists in the elections of 1893, and in part to the decision of the non-constitutional parties, the Right and the socialists, to withdraw from their attitude of hostility to the republic, the former agreeing to accept provisionally at least the existing government, the latter hoping to win over many of the radicals to their cause by adopting as a tactical manœuvre legislative instead of revolutionary methods. Despite the Panama scandal, which brought the republic into disgrace, though it was beneficial in that it replaced many of the older republicans by those of the younger generation, the tendency toward the Left was checked in 1897, the cause of the moderate republicans in the main triumphed, and the Méline ministry entered upon the second year of office with good prospects for a long term of service. At that time the chief differences between the two constitutional parties related to policies, one desiring the maintenance of a conservative social order, the other a revision of the constitution in the interest of social reform. This political stability at home was accompanied with the raising of the prestige of France abroad, and under the guidance of Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs in the Méline cabinet and a pupil of Ferry, a definite policy was decided on, the object of which was to restore France to her place among the Powers, "not by persistence in isolation," as Hanotaux said, "but by keeping a vigilant eye on those favourable circumstances which by giving France her place in the concert of European Powers, would permit her to prove to all, not only her reconquered authority, but also the necessity of her existence and of her power in the equilibrium of Europe and the world."

But a momentary calm in the political situation, due to the elimination of non-constitutional parties, the adoption of a policy of reconciliation, and the long tenure of a determined and tactful minister, offered no guarantee that a political equilibrium had been obtained or that parliamentary institutions had rooted

themselves in France. The people at large cared little for politics and had up to this time remained entirely indifferent to the vicissitudes of parliamentary government, to the war of parties, or the events taking place in the legislative chambers. The favourable conditions evident in 1897 rested on other foundations than those of a political or parliamentary character: they were due to the fact that since 1889 France had grown both in wealth and prestige, that the prosperity of the state had been increased by the encouragement of industry and the adoption of a protective policy, and that the confidence of the people in themselves and their government had grown steadily stronger as one event after another had helped to restore the national good-humour. The Exposition of 1889, the recognition of the republic by the Pope, the *entente* with Russia, and the foreign policy of Hanotaux, had done more to increase the French pride and self-esteem than had the harmony which seemed to have been attained in the legislative body in Paris. Peace and prosperity, coupled with a dignified and honourable position among the Powers of Europe, were the best guarantees that the year 1897 could offer for the permanence of the republic.

CHAPTER X.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

THE events of the period from 1866 to 1870 had entirely changed the political face of Germany. Instead of a league of loosely united states as in the system of 1815 or an incomplete unity such as had existed after 1866, when Bavaria, Würtemberg, Hesse, and Baden were still independent states refusing to enter the North German Confederation, there had been formed in consequence of the war of 1870 a single Empire, not weak and broken by internal dissension as had been the old Confederation, but strong and influential and raised by virtue of its victories and the genius of its statesmen to the position of leader among the European Powers.

But the new Germany bore indelible marks of the conditions from which it had sprung and the circumstances that had attended its establishment. The system of universal military service and the attainment of unity by force of arms gave to the state a military character and increased its interest in military affairs; while the supremacy of Prussia both politically and territorially, and the fact that her armies had led the way to victory, her king been invested with the imperial office, and her representatives were in the majority in the new government, made it inevitable that she should force her methods upon Germany, and that Bismarck, who had controlled her destinies since 1862, and become both president of the Prussian ministry and chancellor of the Empire, should be the master of the new policy. The history of the twenty years following 1870 was

to be characterised first by the personal supremacy of Bismarck and after 1890 by that of the Emperor William II.; the form of government, though constitutional and in the main liberal, was not to be parliamentary, for the people though sharing in the government were to have but an indirect and negative influence on its policy; political tendencies were to be on the whole in the direction of monarchical and paternal government liberally conducted and away from the line of development marked out by the national movement of 1848 and the national association of 1859. As far as political events were to show, there was to be but little progress in Germany toward the attainment of the political ideals of the French Revolution; for the forces of conservatism and reaction were too great, the spirit and opinions of the people of the north, south, east, and west too diverse, the class divisions too deep-seated, and the victory of Prussia too complete to make possible the establishment of a strictly popular government.

The Empire as founded in 1871 was a federal state based in the main on a national foundation, although there were included within its limits Poles, Danes, and Alsatians. It was composed of nearly thirty autonomous principalities, each with its Landtag, or legislature, which was more than a provincial diet, and each subordinate to a higher authority, which was not, however, independent of all the states of the federal union, as is the case in the federal system of the United States, but was under the control of one of them, Prussia. The imperial government consisted of an Emperor, who was always to be the king of Prussia exercising imperial functions; a Bundesrath, or Federal Council, composed of delegates from the states as such, and so standing as the successor of the old Federal Diet; and a Reichstag, or Imperial Diet, composed of the representatives of the people, who were chosen at first for three years, but after 1888 for five, by universal suffrage and secret ballot, and served without pay. There was also a chancellor, but no

cabinet or ministry ; for Bismarck was determined, not only that a party ministry and a parliamentary government should not interfere with his management of Prussia ; but also that nobody of colleagues should share with him the control of the Empire. Within the limits of the constitution this government, which was superior to the government of the states, was supreme; but inasmuch as the whole imperial machinery was so constructed as to throw power into the hands of the Emperor, without whose consent no measure could become law and upon whom the chancellor depended absolutely, it is evident that sovereignty was not to be found in the people or in the Reichstag. In the United States, sovereignty rests with the people ; in England and France, with the popular chambers ; in Germany, with the Emperor.

When the first meeting of the Reichstag was held at Berlin in 1871, the arrangement of parties was found to differ but little from that which had existed in the Diet of the North German Confederation. Instead of two great divisions, one supporting, the other opposing, the government, as in England, or clearly defined groups of reactionists, moderates, and radicals, such as were to be found in France, there were many parties, the existence of which was possible because Germany had not a parliamentary form of government. Four of these could trace their descent from the old conservative party and the old liberal party or party of progress, which had sprung into being in Prussia during the struggle over the military bills from 1861 to 1866. After the victory at Königgrätz, each of these old parties had divided : the conservatives had broken into conservatives, or reactionists, and free conservatives, who supported Bismarck and the Empire ; the progressists had divided into national liberals, who accepted Bismarck's policy, and progressists proper, who demanded parliamentary institutions for both Prussia and Germany. All these parties appeared in the Reichstag, as well as in the Prussian Landtag, and upon the

middle groups, free conservatives and national liberals, Bismarck at first depended for support. But there were other parties: a remnant of the old democratic party of 1848 appeared under the name of *Volkspartei*, which was hostile to Prussia, and desired the laicising of education, and the entire separation of the state from the church; also a formidable set of clerical deputies, which appeared for the first time after the seizure of Rome by the Italian government, and demanded the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope and the complete autonomy of the church; three groups, Alsatians, Danes, and Poles, who were uncompromisingly hostile to the government, because of the treatment to which their countries had been subjected; one group of Hanoverians, who opposed the government as a protest against the annexation of Hanover in 1866; and, lastly, a group of social democrats, who consistently voted against the government, and were important, not so much for their numbers, as for the fact that they represented a growing discontent in the country at large.

From this statement it is evident that Bismarck was to find his support in the free conservatives and the national liberals, and his chief enemies in the social democrats, and the representatives of Alsace, Schleswig, Prussian Poland, and Hanover. But of these opponents the latter were too weak to cause him much concern; and the socialists, against whom he had declared as early as 1871 that the state and society were bound to defend themselves, were, as yet, not sufficiently powerful to be deserving of serious attention. But the appearance of the clerical party, the Centre, thoroughly irritated him; for he believed that in the presence of sixty-three clerical members he saw evidence that the Roman Catholics were organising a political party for the purpose of disturbing the religious peace of Germany, and were "mobilising their forces" that they might make the church an independent power in the state. To resist such a movement, Bismarck in 1871 entered into a con-

flict with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which, fought out partly in the Prussian Landtag, partly in the Reichstag, lasted for six years.

The Culturkampf, or war in behalf of civilisation, as Virchow called it, began with a little preliminary fencing, in which the Catholic party made the first advance by demanding from the Prussian Landtag governmental aid in restoring the lands of the Pope, and from the Reichstag, the insertion in the imperial constitution of those articles of the Prussian constitution that guaranteed religious liberty. Both demands were refused; and in September, 1871, when the Roman Catholic bishops forbade Old Catholics to teach in the universities and gymnasia, because they had rejected the decrees of the Vatican Council, and the Prussian government supported the latter, on the ground that the decrees had never been accepted in Prussia, the Prussian bishops appealed to the Emperor. But William I. upheld his ministers and rejected the addresses of the bishops, declaring that he was determined that Prussia should enjoy entire freedom of faith. The quarrel soon spread beyond the Prussian border: Bavarian bishops and priests who supported the church, attacked the Old Catholics from their pulpits; and the Reichstag, thus brought into the fray, passed in November a law making such utterances a penal offence. Meanwhile, in Prussia, the conflict became more than ever bitter; and in January, 1872, the minister of public worship, Mühler, suspected of sympathy with the clergy, was dismissed, and in his stead was appointed Dr. Falk, a loyal supporter of the state policy. The latter began his famous career by introducing into the Landtag a measure which provided that laymen be made inspectors of schools; and in May, 1872, he removed all disobedient bishops from their posts. An attempt to negotiate with the Pope having failed, Bismarck turned to the Reichstag; and as the Roman curia continued hostile, effected the passage of a law in July, 1872, expelling the Jesuits from Ger-

many. In December of the same year, when the Pope protested against this act, in terms that were construed as insulting to the Emperor, the chancellor, forbidding the allocution to be published in Germany, recalled his ambassador from Rome, thus diplomatically declaring war. The "battle for culture" was no longer local; it was now between the Empire and the Holy See.

Bismarck had entered the struggle unprepared, with no definite plan of action, and up to this time his attack had been scattered and lacking in unity. But he now began a systematic warfare upon the church in Germany. Taking the offensive, and striking with all the power at his command, he attempted to subject the church, both Evangelical and Roman Catholic, to the authority of the state, and to make the latter supreme, not only in political things, but in spiritual things as well. Through his minister Falk he resolved to regulate the position of the clergy in Prussia, to curtail their privileges and functions, and by the imposition of certain important conditions to transform them into state officials. In May, 1873, the Prussian Landtag passed four laws, which together with others passed during the two years following make up what are generally known as the Falk or May Laws. Of these four the first compelled converts to obtain the consent of a magistrate before changing from one church to another; the second subjected all churches to the laws and to the legal inspection of the state; the third granted to the state the control over the training, appointment, and dismissal of a clergyman, exacted of candidates a three years' residence in a university, and compelled them to pass an examination in philosophy, history, philology, and the German language; and the fourth fixed the limits of the ecclesiastical disciplinary authority. These laws were supplemented by others passed by the same body in May, 1874, and 1875, which suspended all priests who had not submitted to the previous laws, placed in the hands of the state

the administration of vacant bishoprics, made civil marriage compulsory, and withdrew state salaries from the refractory members of the clergy. In 1874 the Reichstag passed a law to prevent the illegal use of the ecclesiastical offices, and the next year another making civil marriage obligatory throughout the entire Empire.

And the church returned war for war. In an encyclical to the Prussian bishops, the Pope declared all these laws null and void ; bishops and clergy refused to obey the state authority ; the laity co-operated with the clergy in circulating protests and appeals ; and the Centre party systematically opposed the government both in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Landtag. This resistance, together with the fact that an ultramontane, Kullmann, had attempted to assassinate Bismarck on July 13, 1874, maddened the government, and prompted it to pursue relentlessly its course of coercion. Bishops were fined, imprisoned, deprived of their salaries, or exiled ; the Jesuits were driven out ; monasteries were suppressed and their members dispersed ; and at the close of the period in 1877, eight Prussian bishoprics and more than fourteen hundred curacies were vacant. The situation was becoming unbearable : the clergy were in full opposition ; the religious wants of the people were without means of satisfaction ; and the laity, repelled by the methods employed by the government, remained loyal to their bishops and their faith, and showed their disapproval of Bismarck's policy by returning ninety-two clericals to the Reichstag in 1877. Bismarck had gone a step too far, and in endeavouring to drive the clergy from the domain of politics, had encroached upon the territory within which the church had a legitimate right to rule. The Culturkampf, in taking the form of a great conflict of principles between the ecclesiastical and secular powers, resulted, as it was bound to result, in the discomfiture of the state.

In this attack on the clericals Bismarck had been supported

in the main by the national liberals; but the union had not been an entirely happy one. The liberals had a definite party program,—an imperial ministry, payment of deputies, free trade, reform of local administration, and the laicising of schools in Prussia,—and in return for their support, had demanded concessions which Bismarck had persistently refused to make. Ruled by the one idea of strengthening the Empire, he presented, during these years, only those measures that promised to centralise administration and increase the authority of the imperial government: he had advocated an increase in the army, the adoption of a military penal code, uniformity in the currency and the founding of an imperial bank, the establishment of a common system of tribunals, and the adoption of common methods of procedure, and common civil and criminal codes. But the liberals, partly on principle, and partly because they wished to take revenge on the chancellor for having refused to consider their wishes, notably in the matter of an imperial ministry and the payment of deputies, forced him into frequent compromises; but with the exception of certain administrative and judicial reforms, Bismarck conceded nothing. In fact he had used the national liberals without identifying himself with them, and had received from them support, without giving them anything in return; he had treated them as allies as long as he needed their aid, but was ready to discard them if at any time he should desire to adopt a policy that was hostile to their program.

In 1878 that time had come. The Culturkampf had proved a hopeless failure and war against the clericals was no longer the part either of expediency or of wisdom. Other plans of a social and economic nature were already shaping themselves in the minds of the Emperor and the chancellor, and the two attempts made in 1878 to assassinate William I. impelled Bismarck to action. His scheme was far-reaching although simple in its main idea. He was determined to repress the socialistic

movement, which seemed to have become a menace to the peace of Germany. This was to be accomplished in two ways: first, by the passing of certain laws which should break up the existing organisation and drive socialistic agitators from the country; secondly, by adopting other measures, which in favouring the working classes should show that the state was the workingman's best friend and the one most interested in improving his condition. Ever since the beginning of his reign, the Emperor had frequently referred in speeches and printed statements to the obligations that rested on the state to recognise the rights of labour and to provide for those who served in its armies, and he was in entire accord with the methods that the chancellor desired to employ in order to break up the existing socialistic organisation and to prevent its re-establishment by reducing the number of its adherents and increasing the loyalty of the working classes for the Emperor and the state. To attain the latter object, Bismarck planned first to deprive Germany of her system of tariff for revenue only, which had prevailed since the treaty of 1861, and to adopt one of high tariffs, in order to protect the native workmen from foreign competition and to increase their wages; and this done, to benefit the workingman by a system of relief and insurance. With these objects in view, Bismarck became in 1878, first a protectionist, and afterward a state socialist.

But Bismarck had another reason for wishing to adopt a protective policy: he hoped to improve the financial condition of the country, and to free the government from the control of the Reichstag in financial matters. Hitherto, when there had been a deficit in the revenues,—and there had been one nearly every year,—it had been customary for the Reichstag to vote special contributions (*Matrikularbeiträge*) which were paid by the several states according to a fixed proportion. To Bismarck this method seemed to involve two disadvantages: it threw a heavy burden upon the poorer classes, because the special con-

tributions were levied in the states by direct taxation ; and it limited the financial independence of the government, in making the imperial treasury dependent upon the vote of the deputies for its revenues. In thus advocating that the customs revenue be substituted for the special contributions, Bismarck was showing favour to the agricultural and working classes as against the *bourgeoisie*, and was incidentally encouraging the anti-Semitic movement, which traced its origin in part to the hatred of the landowners and the agriculturists for the moneyed elements in the state.

With this general plan of reform in mind, Bismarck in 1878 withdrew from his conflict with the church, and entered upon his new task by declaring war against the socialists. The latter had been organised by Lassalle in 1863, but the new organisation, suffering from internal dissensions, and thrust into the background by the results of the war of 1870, had been able to elect but two deputies to the Reichstag of 1871. However, the hard times of 1873 and 1874 had driven distressed labourers and artisans in great numbers into the ranks of the socialists, and so rapidly did the movement grow, and so well organised were the labour unions, that in the elections of 1874 the socialists had cast more than 350,000 votes and elected nine social democrats to the Reichstag. The union of the Lassalleans and Marxists in 1875 transformed socialism into a permanent political force ; by 1877 the party had an almost perfect organisation with a central journal, twelve thousand subscribers, and a corps of paid agitators ; and in the third general election of that year had cast more than 490,000 votes and sent twelve deputies to the Reichstag. Deeming such an organisation a menace to the welfare of the state, Bismarck demanded in May, 1878, that the Reichstag pass a bill insuring "protection against the excesses of the social democracy." But the liberal majority refused to obey ; and the chancellor, having dissolved the Reichstag, appealed to the country against them. The

result was favourable: in October the new body passed an anti-socialistic bill granting to the government extraordinary powers: all socialistic and communistic associations were to be forbidden; all processions, reunions, and feasts to be stopped; all agitators to be driven from the country; and all socialistic publications to be suppressed. Under Article 28, any section of the country could be placed in a "minor state of siege," during which the police were to be invested with unusual authority. This measure, which was to be operative for four years only, was twice renewed; but in 1890, when the Reichstag refused to make it permanent, it was allowed to lapse. During the period of twelve years when it had been in force, 1,400 publications were suppressed, 900 persons expelled from the country, and 1,500 committed to prison. The official organisation of the social democrats was thereby destroyed; and henceforth socialism worked in secret to prove, as a socialistic member said in opposing the measure, that as an intellectual movement socialism was not to be killed by law.

The dissolution of the Reichstag in 1878 was equivalent to the announcement that the government had broken with the national liberals and would henceforth find its support in the conservatives and the Centre, to whom it was prepared to concede the repeal of the May Laws. Consequently, in the elections of 1878, the liberals lost heavily, the number of national liberal deputies falling from 127 to 98, and that of the progressists from 36 to 25; and with their majority gone, the liberals went into the opposition. Having effected this political change of face, Bismarck began the prosecution of his plan for economic reform, which he believed was to benefit the labourer and strengthen the government. The protective *régime* was inaugurated by a measure which the Reichstag passed in 1879 imposing moderate duties upon all imports. In return for this support given him by the Centre, Bismarck replaced Falk by a conservative minister, and after considerable

manœuvring, succeeded in getting authority to withdraw, during the years that followed, nearly all the May Laws. Although the Bundesrath refused to follow the Reichstag in repealing the law against the Jesuits, yet in point of fact by 1893, when the Reichstag first passed the measure, the Culturkampf, in which the victory had all the time been with the church, was over.

But an important part of the chancellor's program was yet to be carried out. It was Bismarck's desire to lighten the lot of the working classes by a system of compulsory insurance, whereby provision should be made by the state for those prevented from earning their livelihood by sickness, accident, or old age. The first measure, which was passed in June, 1883, after two years of discussion, provided for insurance in case of sickness; and the next year another measure was passed, providing for those who were disabled by accident. In the following years each of these was extended to new classes of the population: in 1885 insurance in case of sickness was granted to workmen in the postal and telegraph service, in the departments of the army, navy, navigation, transportation, and the like, and in 1886 to agricultural labourers; insurance in case of accident was given in 1886 to labourers engaged in agriculture, and in 1887 to those employed in building roads, railroads, and canals, and to sailors and to others engaged in shipping. Insurance in case of old age and invalidity was established by act of May 24, 1889. Thus was made complete a system of state insurance, which the German economists believed would effect a social revolution, by relieving millions of labourers of want and drawing them to the support of the state, and which the social democrats characterised as a measure far from adequate to solve the social question, though acceptable as a step in the direction of its solution. In consequence of the experiment, more than 13,000,000 workmen were insured between 1883 and 1897 at an enormous cost to the government; but the old age and invalidity law was not entirely successful,

and in spite of the fact that the accident and sickness insurance worked well on the whole, the question was still an open one in 1897 whether the great cost of imperial socialism had been justified by the meagre results, in the way of benefiting the labouring classes, which had been attained up to that time.

Thus between 1878 and 1882 Bismarck had entirely reversed his political, religious, and economic policies. He had turned from the moderate liberals to the conservatives; had withdrawn from the war with the church, and entered upon a course of reconciliation with the Pope; and had substituted a protective for a free-trade policy in Germany. But so complete a change in the position of the government was unfortunate, in that it broke up the large party of moderate liberals which had been its main support from 1867 to 1878, and drove those who refused to adopt the protective policy to unite in 1884 with the progressists under the name of the Freisinnige party, which persistently voted in the opposition. The loss of the middle group in the Reichstag left the government face to face with a strong radical opposition, and forced it to become year by year more conservative and repressive.

The period immediately following the overthrow of the liberal majority was a time of discord and discouragement. The parties of the Right and Left, unchecked by any group of moderates, became more and more embittered toward each other; and Bismarck, construing the conflict of parties as a criticism unfavourable to any form of parliamentary government, became more cynical than ever regarding the advantages of a parliamentary system, and not only resisted all efforts to introduce such a system into Germany, but even tried to curtail what influence the parties already had in the Reichstag. In 1881 he proposed that the popular body should sit and should vote the imperial budget only once in two years, and through the appointment of von Puttkamer to the ministry of the interior, endeavoured to influence the elections. But such

attempts at coercion only made matters worse, and the elections of 1881 showed important gains for the radicals. The new Reichstag voted down the bill providing for a tobacco monopoly, which Bismarck especially wished to establish for the purpose of meeting the expense of his insurance plan; in 1881 so modified the first compulsory insurance measure that the Bundesrath rejected it; and when the second measure was presented the next year, held it for twelve months before passing it.

For all he had been able to accomplish by means of governmental measures since 1879, Bismarck had been indebted mainly to the support given him by the conservatives and Centre. But in 1884 a new question became an issue before the country, and made still more complicated the relation of parties. This was the colonial question, which assumed importance in Germany when certain merchants, who were established in Africa and Australia, asked for government protection. When the matter came before the Reichstag in 1880, it was voted down as contrary to all German traditions; but in 1884, when in response to certain inquiries of the chancellor the chambers of commerce of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen supported a colonial policy as advantageous to trade, Bismarck decided to extend state protection to private enterprises in Africa. Once having made up his mind, he pushed the matter forward with amazing rapidity. Almost before Europe was aware what Germany was doing, she had explored territories and made treaties of cession, and by October, 1884, either possessed, or had under her protection, Damaraland, Togoland, Namaqualand, and Cameroons, a part of New Guinea, and certain islands of the Pacific. As such an aggressive policy was certain to involve Germany in foreign complications, Bismarck fortified her position by coming to an understanding with the Ferry ministry in France, whose colonial policy he had already encouraged for other purposes; supported the International Association of the

Congo, which was not favoured by England and Portugal; and entered into friendly relations with the Transvaal Republic, England's neighbour and antagonist in South Africa. Assuming at the same time the position of leader in colonial matters, he called an international conference at Berlin. From November, 1884, to February, 1885, questions relating to the occupation of Africa, the slave trade, and the commerce of the Congo were debated by the representatives of all the great Powers, and by those not only of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, but of Turkey and the United States as well. By virtue of her influence at this conference in obtaining a decision guaranteeing liberty of commerce and navigation in the basin and mouths of the Congo, Germany took her place as one of the most important colonial Powers in West Africa.

But this colonial policy destroyed the union between the conservatives and the Centre, drove the latter party away from Bismarck to an alliance with the progressists, and left the chancellor face to face with an adverse majority that persistently refused to vote any colonial credits, and rejected all projects for fiscal reform. Though the free conservatives and the national liberals generally voted with him, upon the conservatives alone could he count with any certainty. A test of the situation was made in 1886. During this year frequent expressions of Slavic hostility for Germans and Magyars, the agitation of the League of the Patriots, and the rise of Boulanger, gave currency to rumours of war with Russia and France; and Bismarck, seeing the possibility of using the fears thus aroused to regain his control over the Reichstag, made no efforts to contradict these reports. When, therefore, he demanded the renewal of the military law,—the Septennate,—which would expire in 1888, and the Centre, notwithstanding the wishes of the Pope, joined with the social democrats and the Freisinnige party in voting against it, Bismarck dissolved the Reichstag for the second time, January 24, 1887. The time selected for this appeal to the

country was most auspicious ; for the people, terrified by the idea of war, were little disposed to favour the opponents of the military bill, and at the same time there was present in Germany a strong patriotic feeling, which actuated the three parties, conservatives, free conservatives, and national liberals, to combine for the support of the imperial government. These parties entered into an agreement called the Cartell, according to which each was to support the others in the election of their candidates ; and in the new Reichstag of 1887, called the Cartell Reichstag, the government had a large majority, which not only passed the military law, but also voted a brandy and sugar tax, extended its own term of office from three to five years, and renewed the law against the socialists. Such was the situation when, in March, 1888, the Emperor William died. He had attained the ripe age of ninety-one years, had seen Prussia's abasement after Jena, had witnessed the dissolution of one great imperial institution, the Holy Roman Empire, and the overthrow of another at Leipzig and Waterloo. Yet he had lived to play his part as the king of a new Prussia, to defeat Austria and a second Napoleon, and to found a great German Empire. His successor, Frederic III., favoured a more liberal and parliamentary *régime* than his father had been willing to adopt, but he ruled too short a time to affect in any way the policy of the government. He died on June 15, 1888, after a reign of three months, and was succeeded by his son William II.

The new Emperor came to the throne when but twenty-nine years of age. He did not share his father's well-known predilections for English institutions ; and though he took his grandfather for his model, he carried to extremes the doctrines which the latter had advocated always with simplicity and without affectation, and on every occasion, in toasts, addresses, pronunciamentos, and decrees to the army, lost no opportunity of making known his adherence to the old Hohenzollern ideas. He had no tolerance for free thought, socialism, and the revo-

lution. Devout adherence to religion and the church, devotion to the army and the military *régime*, unlimited faith in the divine right of kings, were the cardinal points of his creed. He had, furthermore, a sense of his mission as one responsible to God alone, entrusted by Him with the task of ameliorating the condition of the working classes according to the principles of Christian morality, of extending and strengthening the Empire to which he had fallen heir, of preserving peace among the nations, and of establishing at home respect for the church and for the law, and absolute obedience to the Crown. Statements, some impulsive doubtless, others premeditated, seemed to indicate a strong appreciation of his divinely appointed work. In his address to the German people on June 18, 1888, he said: "I have taken the government in the presence of the King of Kings, and following the example of my father, will be to my people a prince just and mild, devout and God-fearing, upholding peace, advancing the welfare of the country, aiding the poor and oppressed, and always standing as a true guardian of the right." At Coblentz, in 1897, he said that his grandfather had erected the "kingdom by the grace of God, the kingdom with its heavy duties, with its never-ending, ever-enduring toils and labours, with its awful responsibility to the Creator alone, from which no man, no minister, no Reichstag, no people, can release the prince"; and on the occasion of the departure of his brother, Prince Henry, for China in 1897, he allowed the following striking words to be spoken: "Of one thing I can assure your Majesty," said Prince Henry, "neither fame nor laurels have charm for me—one thing is the aim that draws me on,—it is to declare in foreign lands the evangel of your Majesty's hallowed person, to preach it to everyone who will hear it, and also to those who will not hear it. This gospel I have inscribed on my banner, and I will inscribe it whithersoever I go." From these utterances, and from others of a similar character spoken during the period after 1888, it is evident

that the view of monarchy held by William II. was that antedating the French Revolution, when a benevolent despotism characterised the rule of kings.

The government of a monarch holding views of this character was bound to be personal, and to have an effect upon the grouping of parties. The conservatives, impressed with the Emperor's attitude on religious matters, drew away from the national liberals and a rupture took place between the members of the Cartell. At the special request of the Emperor the Cartell was renewed; but actuated no longer by patriotic motives it proved of little avail in the elections of 1890, for the government lost heavily, the Cartell electing only 134 deputies, as against 220 in 1887. But a greater event followed: in March, 1890, it became known to the world that Prince Bismarck had been dismissed from his post as chancellor of the Empire and head of the Prussian ministry. The reasons for this important act cannot be satisfactorily determined, though, through the aid of Bismarck's own statements, they can be conjectured. The Emperor, a young man of thirty-one years, was made restless by the cautiousness and circumspection of the older statesman; and furthermore, as personal ruler of Prussia and the Empire, he could discover no place for a minister of such importance as was Bismarck, with whom he was certain to come into conflict in his determination to adopt a policy of his own. Bismarck, wishing to continue the war against the socialists, had already disapproved of the attitude of William II. toward social questions, and opposed the international conference of labour, which the Emperor called in 1890 to consider labour legislation. On his part, the Emperor had insisted that all reports of Prussian ministers should be given to him directly, instead of passing through the hands of the head of the ministry, and that all arrangements with party leaders in the Reichstag should be reported to him. Whether there were deeper reasons than these it is impossible to say; certain it is that on March 17th, after

Bismarck had refused to disclose the terms of an alliance with the Centre, of which the Emperor disapproved, William II. demanded and received the resignation of his chancellor. "The post of officer on guard in the ship of state has fallen to me," said the Emperor in his telegram of March 22d to the Grand Duke of Weimar. "The course remains the same. Forward at full speed (*Voll Dampf voran*)."

In fact, however, the course was not to be the same. With Caprivi as chancellor of the Empire and president of the Prussian ministry, many important changes were made. The measures against the socialists were dropped, with the dual result of quieting the radical opposition in the Chamber and of giving the social democrats an opportunity to reorganise; the commercial policy, though not entirely reversed, was altered, and a system of commercial alliances was again substituted for the high protective tariff, and between the years 1892 and 1894 commercial alliances were arranged with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Servia, Spain, and Russia. The policy, of which the making of these treaties was a part, had for its object the opening of new fields for German colonisation and industry. In 1890 a treaty was arranged with England, whereby Germany exchanged Witu, Uganda, and the island of Zanzibar for Heligoland, and the boundaries between the spheres of influence of the two states in West Africa were determined. The treaty of 1884 with Russia was not renewed, and at the same time the government attempted to effect a reconciliation with the Poles by conceding to them a Polish archbishop, and abandoning Bismarck's scheme of Germanising Posen. This policy, destined to be reversed in 1897, brought to the support of the government the Polish deputies who had opposed it consistently for twenty years.

Although the change in the tariff policy had angered the conservatives, nevertheless, until 1893, the Emperor had been able, at the price of an alliance with the Centre, to get a majority vote

for his measures. The first evidence of trouble came in 1892, when the government proposed to suppress lay schools in Prussia and to provide for the religious education of children. So vigorously did popular opinion express itself against this measure that the Emperor withdrew the bill; and in consequence Caprivi resigned as head of the Prussian ministry. But this separation of the offices of imperial chancellor and Prussian prime minister proved unsatisfactory; for from 1892 to 1894 Caprivi and Eulenburg, his successor in Prussia, were at variance with each other, and the parties in the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag began once more to slip from the imperial control. In 1893 the Centre united with the radicals to defeat the army bill, which demanded an appropriation for the increase of the yearly recruits and a reduction of the three-year term of service; and in consequence of this opposition, the Emperor dissolved the Reichstag, and made an appeal to the country. On account of a division in the progressist party, the government made sufficient gains in the new election to carry the army bill; but this result, which was really due to the votes of the Polish deputies, —for the bill was passed by a majority of only eleven,—was overshadowed by the successes of the social democrats, who cast nearly two million votes, and elected forty-four members to the Reichstag. Partly on account of the situation created by these unexpected socialistic gains, and partly on account of continued disagreements between Caprivi and Eulenburg, the two statesmen were dismissed in October, 1894, and the two offices were united in the person of Prince Hohenlohe.

The years from 1893 to 1896 were noteworthy for the breaking up of party strength in the Reichstag. The conservatives were weakened by the rise of an agrarian party and by the growth of the anti-Semitic movement; the radicals were thrown into confusion by the discussion upon the army bill, and separated into two groups, one for and one against the measure; and even the Centre maintained its solidarity with difficulty.

In the south, the discontent with the Emperor's policy led to the formation of a South German people's party. In internal affairs, the agrarian unrest, due largely to the adoption of the German world-commerce policy, and the financial problems, due to the desire of the government to reduce the imperial debt, were chiefly prominent. In external affairs, the colonial and commercial expansion of the Empire, and the project to form a navy that should be commensurate with the greatness of the enlarged Empire, gained the largest share of attention. The commercial treaties made between 1892 and 1894, the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, the strained relations with England, due to the Transvaal difficulty in 1896, and above all the discovery of a new field of operations in China in 1897, the occupation of the port of Kaio-Chow, and the passage of the naval bill the next year, were all indications of the renewed interest that William II. was taking in the colonial policy of Bismarck, and in new measures for increasing the wealth and prestige of the German Empire.

But the most striking feature of the situation in 1897 was not the colonial policy, but the two divergent tendencies in Germany herself; one monarchical and feudal, the other democratic. The dominance of Prussia, where the methods were strongly bureaucratic, military, and conservative, and the policy of Bismarck, who during his term of office had exerted all his efforts to destroy the subversive elements in the state, had given to German political life an essentially conservative character. This tendency was furthered by William II., who in his devotion to the doctrine of the divinity of kings, in his assertion of the duty of unqualified obedience, in his hostility to socialism, in his legislation against the freedom of the press, of speech, and of action, as seen in his attempts to regulate public meetings, to control newspapers, and to impose a censorship upon privat-docents in the universities, had revived the ideas of the old *régime*. On the other hand there had taken place

movement of the opposite character, which by 1897 had assumed striking proportions. The evolution of social democracy was the most impressive event which German history had to chronicle since 1870. From two members elected to the Reichstag and 120,000 votes cast in 1871, the party had steadily increased in strength until in 1893 it cast 1,786,000 votes and elected forty-four deputies, and in 1897 claimed to have over two million followers. Had a revision of the voting districts been made according to the population in 1897 and a larger representation been allowed the cities, fifteen of which had trebled in size in eighteen years, its deputies in the Reichstag would have been vastly increased. These figures are significant as showing the number, not of those who accepted socialistic doctrines, but of those who were discontented with conditions as they were. This astounding growth was due to the concentration of the population of Germany in the cities, which had become centres of a splendidly equipped socialistic organisation ; to the absence of a well-to-do middle class in Germany; and to the existence of large masses of the population in a condition of relative poverty.

Thus in 1897 appeared two divergent and irreconcilable tendencies : one monarchical, ecclesiastical, and military ; the other democratic, lay, and industrial. On one side stood the Emperor and the government representing both in policy and methods the supremacy of Prussia. William II. was undoubtedly sincere in his desire to act for the good of the German people, yet was adopting a policy that was only serving to increase the discontent. He was repressive in his many prosecutions for *lèse-majesté ;* was reactionary in his doctrine of the monarchy and the state, and in his appointments to office ; and was advancing the interests of the state rather than of the people at large in his determination that Germany should play a leading part in the commercial and colonial expansion of Europe, thereby substituting commercial alliances for a pro-

tective tariff, increasing the military and financial burdens of the country, and ignoring the internal needs of a land but little favoured by nature and of a people already heavily burdened by the cost of maintaining an enormous army. On the other side were the democrats, radicals and socialists, whose numbers had increased despite the efforts which the government had made to diminish them by the adoption of state socialism; who were opposed to all ecclesiastical interference in government, determined to obtain greater influence for the representatives of the people, and were hostile to the project of increasing the army or enlarging the navy as tending to depress by its weight of taxation the masses of the people. At the same time the social democrats went further and opposed the entire system of national economy; but in agreeing as they had done in 1890 that the social question could not be solved by revolution, and in recognising that a state protection of labour would be a step in the right direction, they had become in reality a democratic party working in the legislative chambers for the advancement of social reform. In 1897, radicals and social democrats, though far from an agreement on positive measures of legislation, stood side by side in opposing the reactionary tendencies of the government.

CHAPTER XI.

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

WHEN on February 18, 1861, Victor Emmanuel opened the first Italian Parliament at Turin and received "by the grace of God and the will of the nation" the title of King of Italy, a new state took its place among the Powers of Europe, ready to justify its existence by a career that should be both influential and honourable. But the obstacles to be surmounted were legion. The fact that the Italian peoples differed from one another in race, traditions, and social organisation, and had won their independence by diplomacy, rather than by any slow process of national fusion, made it inevitable that, even with political unity won, they should still lack that without which no newly founded state of to-day can be permanent, a national unity. D'Azeglio well expressed the problem of 1861 when he said: "We have united Italy; now let us unite the Italians."

The first great obstacle to unity was to be found in the history and traditions of the people themselves. In this respect Italy differed from Germany, who, though long disunited, had been conscious for centuries of the oneness in blood of all her peoples; and likewise from Austria, who, though possessing no national unity, had found her strength in the devotion of her peoples to a common dynasty. But from the fall of Rome to the close of the French Revolution, Italy had never possessed a single important element making for unity. Composed of separate states, and ruled by rival dynasties, who had no inter-

est either in the common name or the common country, she had been little better than a mosaic of races and governments. Feudal suzerains, municipal consuls, Renaissance despots, monarchs, and Popes had controlled, at one time or another, the different parts of her territory; while German, French, Spanish, Byzantine, Norman, and Saracenic influences had left their imprint upon the history and traditions of her various peoples. Furthermore, though designed geographically to be a single state, she had but few natural bonds drawing her people together. Lombards, Piedmontese, Tuscans, and Romagnols possessed, it is true, certain traits in common, and resembled one another in the character of their industry and social organisation; but all of them differed from the people of the south in each of these particulars. The sub-Alpine region was unlike the Neapolitan in climate, fertility of the soil, and the character of the produce, and the Lombards differed from the Neapolitans in temperament, traditions, and culture; while the Ligurians and the Venetians, trained for centuries in commerce and municipal independence, were wholly unlike the slothful, yet excitable, Sicilians, who had suffered for generations from bad government and oppression. In the north, where government had been less despotic and existence less beset with perils than elsewhere in Italy, brigandage was almost unknown, the population more dense, wealth more abundant, and industry more highly developed; while in the south, notably in such districts as Apulia, Basilicata, and the Calabrias, there existed a scattered population, which lacked energy or ambition, was content with a primitive form of husbandry, and stunted, physically by disease, and morally by superstition and ignorance, was given over to feuds, secret associations, and crime. Northern and southern Italy were as two different countries, and the welding together of these divergent parts was to be the work, not of a day or a year, but of many generations.

But there were other obstacles of an administrative and

financial character that demanded the immediate attention of the Italian government. Since the congress of Vienna, political Italy had consisted of five distinct states: Sardinia, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, and Austria acting as overlord of Lombardy and Venetia, each with its own administration, its own diplomatic service, its own financial, monetary, and judicial systems. It was necessary, therefore, first of all, to bring about uniformity in all these particulars; to choose between centralisation and some form of provincial autonomy; to provide for a common administration of the enlarged state; to establish common coinage and common postal arrangements; to abolish internal tariffs and provincial customs-houses; to make uniform the tariff dues along the frontier; to unite the budgets of the various states; to suppress old and iniquitous forms of taxation, and to supply new; and to provide for the assumption of the various state debts, which, on account of the expenses of the war, had become extraordinarily heavy. Furthermore, the new government was obliged to suppress brigandage in the south, that peace and order might be restored, and in arranging for the extension of the military organisation, to deal with those allies who, as volunteers under Garibaldi and others, had served well the cause of Italy, and now were to be received—both officers and men—into the Italian army. Lastly, there remained the question of obtaining Rome and Venice, without which the kingdom of Italy would be incomplete.

Such were the difficulties that confronted the statesmen of Italy in the first months of the year 1861, and such were the burdens that broke the health of Count Cavour. Though shaken by the irretrievable loss of his minister, Victor Emmanuel took up the task that Cavour had begun, and supported by a loyal majority, consisting of the representatives from Piedmont and central Italy, called to his aid Ricasoli of the Right Centre, and with him began the organisation of the new Italy. Having rejected all proposals of autonomy for the an-

nexed provinces, and having adopted a strictly autocratic and centralising policy, the king and his new minister divided the country into artificial administrative districts, fifty-nine in number, which resembled the French departments, and appointed all prefects and mayors from Turin, in order to destroy the spirit of particularism, to attach the people to the central government, and to increase their loyalty to Italy. After much manœuvring, during which the negotiations were not always of an amicable character, they reached an agreement with Garibaldi, whereby the volunteers were to be enrolled with the soldiers of the different states in a common Italian army. They began the extension of the railway system of Piedmont, and in November, 1861, Victor Emmanuel opened the new line from Bologna to Ancona, which was extended in 1863 to Foggia and afterwards to Brindisi, thus placing the government in communication with the old pontifical states and Naples. At the same time the king journeyed southward, visiting Naples and the southern provinces, partly to show himself to his new subjects, partly to consider important measures of unification, such as related to administration, public instruction, and the economic condition of the people.

During the four years that followed, projects were set on foot for improving agricultural lands, draining fens and marshes, transforming wild land into arable, and colonising waste regions, that the productivity of Italy might be increased and the population become more evenly distributed; and in order to bring Italy into closer economic relations with the world outside, commercial treaties were negotiated with France, England, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, and, in 1865, with Prussia and the Zollverein. But of more importance than all else were the endeavours made by the government to meet the heavy financial burdens, which were due to the assumption of the old state debts and to the cost of reorganising the administrative system and creating a new army and navy. In 1859, the debts

of the separate states were estimated at two milliards of lire, while that of the kingdom had risen by 1863 to twice that amount. In 1861, a loan of 500,000,000 lire was negotiated, and every effort was made to balance expenditures and receipts; but during the early years of the history of the kingdom, the natural difficulties of the situation were increased by the necessity of war preparations, which imposed a heavy financial burden on the young state. In 1864, a large part of the receipts was used to pay the interest on the debt, while the deficit, which had risen to 350,000,000 lire in the regular, and to more than 200,000,000 lire in the extra, budget, required new loans. The king relinquished a fifth of his income from the civil list, while his subjects bore without complaint new taxes, and in some instances paid their quotas in advance.

At the same time, strenuous attempts were made to bring peace to the land by improving the police service, suppressing brigandage, and removing the last traces of opposition in the Neapolitan and Sicilian departments. In 1861, Victor Emmanuel sent General Cialdini to check an uprising of old Neapolitan soldiers, peasants, and brigands, which was encouraged from Rome by Francis II., the Pope, and the clergy generally, as a holy war against the "robber king" of Italy. The struggle lasted from June to October, 1861, and though, at the time, the victory lay entirely with the government, it was many years before complete security was restored. And meanwhile Italy was strengthening her position abroad. England, France, Russia, Prussia, and, in 1865, Spain and the South German states accorded recognition to the new kingdom, while the marriage of the daughter of Victor Emmanuel in 1861 to the king of Portugal brought great joy to the Italian people. Well might the king say in his speech to Parliament in 1865, that, despite financial embarrassments, the condition of Italy had vastly improved during these four years; that the relations with foreign Powers were most satisfactory; that at home the

efforts of the government had produced wonderful results in administration, in the laws, in codes, in public works, and in the army; and that with hope might he point to the future, when questions of legislative unification, of public instruction, of credit, and of public works were to engage the attention of the government.

But for Italy no satisfactory settlement of her difficulties was possible as long as the greater problem of complete unity remained unsolved. As long as Austria should remain in Venetia and the French in Rome, and so compel Italy to keep herself prepared for war, her financial difficulties were bound to grow worse rather than better, and her relations with the Powers, notably with Austria, France, and Prussia, remaining uncertain, would make impossible perfect content and concord at home. As early as March 27, 1861, in a famous declaration, Cavour had asserted that Rome ought to be, and would be, the capital of Italy; and recognising that, for the time being, it would be impossible to acquire Venice, had concentrated his attention upon the Roman question. Having failed to carry his point, either by negotiations with the papacy, or by intrigue in Rome through certain agents, Pantaleoni, Bozino, and Isaïa, he had turned to France, and had proposed to Thouvenel an arrangement whereby the French troops might be withdrawn from the city, if the Italian government would abstain from any attack upon the States of the Church. The negotiations, which Cavour initiated, and which he would probably have carried to a successful conclusion had he lived, were continued by Ricasoli, until his resignation in March, 1862, and afterward by Rattazzi, his successor: and although the Pope firmly rejected every proposition, Napoleon seemed inclined to grant the request of the Italian government that he withdraw his troops from Rome.

But the party of action, chafing under the dilatory policy of the government, and believing that Ratazzi, himself a liberal

would favour any aggressive action, the object of which was to secure for Italy either Rome or Venetia, began to collect volunteers on the Tyrolese boundary and in Brescia, for the purpose of concerting with the Magyars and Serbs in an attack upon Austrian territory. But the Italian government promptly checkmated this move by arresting the leaders; whereupon Garibaldi started for Sicily with the cry of "Rome or death!" gathering, as he went, followers for an attack upon the papal city. But as to sanction such a revolutionary act would involve Italy in a war with France, Victor Emmanuel issued on August 3d a manifesto warning his people that every appeal to arms, not emanating from the king, was an appeal to rebellion and to civil war, and bidding them await the hour for the accomplishment of the great work, when the voice of the king would make itself heard among them. But Garibaldi, refusing to heed, crossed into Calabria, where on August 24th, at Aspromonte, he was met by the regulars under General Cialdini, and, after a conflict that both sides sought to avoid, was wounded in the ankle and taken prisoner of war.

The effect of this incident was disastrous for Italy. The Rattazzi ministry at once resigned; France broke off negotiations, and instead of withdrawing her troops from Rome, increased their number. Furthermore, in September, when the government at Turin, hoping to quiet the excitement of the Italians due to the wounding of Garibaldi, declared that Italy would still persist in her efforts to obtain Rome, Napoleon, disturbed by the effect of this announcement upon the clericals, removed Thouvenel, recalled Lavalette from Rome and Benedetti from Turin, and appointed as minister of foreign affairs the ultramontane, Drouyn de Lhuys. Yet notwithstanding this act, the sympathies of the French Emperor were still with Italy; and when he found, during 1863, that his concessions to the clericals had not won for him their support, that the Pope, with his continual *non possumus*, was as unyielding as ever, and

that the presence of the French in Rome was a continual source of disquietude to him, owing to the quarrels between his generals and the Pope, he became more than ever ready to come to an agreement with Italy.

And in 1864 Italy was ready to negotiate with the Emperor on the basis of a compromise. Although the government under Minghetti, in carrying forward the work begun by Cavour in the interest of a free church in a free state, had suppressed many religious congregations and added their revenues to the resources of the state, yet the financial situation was but little bettered thereby, and a new loan of 700,000,000 lire was asked of Parliament in 1864 and granted. Such was the financial embarrassment of Italy, and such her despair of a speedy settlement of the Roman question, owing to the anger aroused at Rome by the recent confiscation of ecclesiastical lands, that the government determined to adopt a new policy. A compromise was reached with Napoleon, according to which the Emperor promised to withdraw gradually his troops from Rome, in case Victor Emmanuel would respect the sovereign authority of the Pope over the territory that still remained to him. This agreement, known as the convention of September, 1864, was duly ratified ; and in order the better to carry out its terms, Victor Emmanuel consented to move the capital from Turin to Florence. By this convention, the Italian government postponed the solution of the Roman question ; while Napoleon not only officially recognised the previous annexations of papal territory, but tacitly agreed that the eventual occupation of Rome by the Italians was inevitable.

This convention of September, though an excellent diplomatic move for Italy, drove into insurrection the people of Turin, who in losing the capital feared to lose the leadership, and outraged both Pope and ultramontanes, who looked upon the alliance between Napoleon and their enemies as an intolerable offence against the church. Despairing of temporal

support, Pius IX. issued in December, 1864, the encyclical *Quanta cura* and the Syllabus or catalogue of the errors of the age, in which he defined the claims of the papacy and the authority of the church over the state, society, and learning, and stated, in a negative way by anathematising those who accepted a contrary doctrine, the creed of the church. Not only did he condemn liberty of worship, liberty of conscience, and all laicising of education and the state, but without tolerance he inveighed against liberal Catholics, as well as Protestants and rationalists. But notwithstanding the fact that parts of the Syllabus were directed against the Italian government and that most of it was hostile to the Italian constitution, Victor Emmanuel allowed both encyclical and Syllabus to be circulated freely in Italy, and in so doing probably made easier the final settlement of the Roman question.

But the task of solving this difficult problem having thus been postponed indefinitely, the government in February, 1865, transferred its seat to Florence, which for five years was to remain the capital city of Italy, and turned its attention to questions relating to finances, to the promotion of internal reforms, and, above all else, to the acquiring of Venetia by peaceful means. La Marmora, having failed in his attempt to buy the much-disputed territory, proposed through Napoleon that Roumania be divided, and part be given to Austria in exchange for Venetia, a proposal that both Russia and Austria refused to consider. Failing in this, after much hesitation he consented to enter into an alliance with Prussia against Austria, hoping to win Venetia as Cavour had won Lombardy, through the aid of an outside Power. But before the outbreak of war in 1866, Napoleon, in the sincerity of his desire to complete the work that he had left unfinished in 1859, made three efforts to win Venetia for Italy without war. To the embarrassment of the Italian minister, he succeeded in persuading Austria to give up

Venetia in return for Italian neutrality, but this offer Italy rejected; he then proposed that a congress be called to settle pending questions, a suggestion that Austria would accept only on condition that no cessions of territory be considered; and lastly, he arranged a convention with Austria, June, 1866, whereby Venetia was to be given to Italy, in case Austria were successful in the struggle with Prussia. But the matter was not to be settled in this way. Though Italy was defeated at Custozza, Prussia's victory at Königgrätz assured to the Italians Venetia as the reward for their alliance. On October 3, 1866, a treaty between Austria and Italy was signed at Vienna; and on the 19th of the month Venetia was formally ceded to the Italian government. By a vote of 650,000 to 49, the people of the province accepted annexation, and in November Victor Emmanuel made his entrance into Venice.

Italian unity was almost complete, but the city and territory of Rome still remained to prove a source of intense disquietude to the king and his people, and a constant annoyance to Italy, France, the papacy, and the party of action. In 1867, Garibaldi, taking advantage of the return of Rattazzi of the Left Centre to the head of the ministry, and encouraged by the final withdrawal of the French troops from Rome, announced his determination to invade the pontifical territory. Though promptly arrested by the government and returned to Caprera, he escaped; and having raised volunteers in Tuscany, crossed the papal frontier in October. The Rattazzi ministry had thus far shown no great amount of zeal in preventing the expedition; but at this crisis Victor Emmanuel issued a proclamation against the volunteers, and prepared to set in motion the Italian army, at the same time sending La Marmora to beg the French government not to intervene. But Napoleon, fearing that Italy would not hold to the convention of September, despatched General de Failly with a body of French troops, which joined the papal forces, and meeting the insurgents at Mentana, killed

and captured many of the Garibaldians in the very presence of the Italian regulars. This slaughter of their countrymen, together with de Failly's official statement that "the chassepots had done wonders" and Rouher's even more unfortunate remark, made the next year to the *Corps législatif*, that "Italy should never possess Rome—never!" destroyed all sense of gratitude on the part of the Italians to France. As the Garibaldian expedition resulted in the downfall of the ministry of Ratazzi, so the words of Rouher led to the retirement of his successor, Menabrea, because the Parliament at Florence deemed him insufficiently hostile to France.

At this juncture, when the second invasion of the Roman territory had failed, and the French were once more in the Eternal City guarding the interests of the Pope, Pius IX. made a noteworthy effort to compensate himself for the losses that he had incurred in the temporal and political world, by the prosecution of a plan that had been in his mind since the issue of the encyclical of 1864, namely, that of summoning a great ecumenical council to meet at Rome. This council, the first since the gathering at Trent in the sixteenth century, met at the Vatican, December 8, 1869, and sat until October of the following year, when it was dispersed by the events of the Franco-Prussian war. By the doctrine of Infallibility, which declared that "when the Roman Pontiff, fulfilling his mission as first teacher of all Christians, defines that which ought to be observed in matters of faith and morals, he cannot err," the supremacy of the Pope in the church was dogmatically established. By this act, Pius IX. was raised to a height of spiritual authority grander than had been attained by any of his predecessors; and the dogma of Infallibility, in placing the Pope above the episcopate and all councils, and constituting him the sole interpreter of the faith, made inevitable a stricter definition of the doctrines of the church along the lines of the Syllabus of 1864. And the situation was the more striking, in that, before

the dispersion of the members of the council, the troops of Italy had invaded the pontifical territory, and had taken from Pius IX. the last remnants of his temporal power. He, whom the ecclesiastics assembled in the nave of St. Peter's had greeted, on July 20th, as the "Infallible Pope," became, after the 20th of September, "the Prisoner in the Vatican."

For the opportunity of thus settling the Roman question, the Italians were indebted to the Franco-Prussian war. During the years 1869 and 1870, Italy and France had had the matter of their future relations under consideration, and the latter Power had discussed the advisability of an alliance with Austria against Prussia. But Italy had made it an inflexible condition of such an alliance, that the French troops be withdrawn from Rome, and the questions placed once more on the footing of the convention of September: and inasmuch as Napoleon had refused to accept any such condition, all negotiations between the two countries had been suspended. Therefore, when the war broke out in July, 1870, there existed between Italy and France neither treaty nor understanding; and though Victor Emmanuel seems to have favoured the cause of the Emperor, neither his ministers nor his Parliament would consent to his aiding France, and the deficit of nearly 700,000,000 lire made it necessary for Italy to avoid war, if possible. But the defeat of Napoleon at Sedan put an end to all uncertainty, and the withdrawal of the French troops opened the way to Rome. On September 8th, the Italian army crossed the frontier, and before the end of the month was in possession of the city. Early in October, by a vote of more than 130,000 to 1,500, the people of the papal territory voted for annexation; and with the acceptance of this act by the Parliament at Florence, with the entrance of Victor Emmanuel into Rome in December, and with the transference of the capital to that city in July, 1871, the territorial unity of Italy was at last completed.

But one more step remained to be taken before the Roman

question could be permanently disposed of, before Italy, who was approaching the close of her period of formation, could enter upon her career as a Power, free from the disturbances to which she had been subjected by political and religious controversies in the past. By the "law of guarantees," adopted May 13, 1871, one of the most remarkable of modern documents dealing with the relations between church and state, the complete spiritual independence of the Pope was secured, and the place of the church in civil society determined. The person of the Pope was declared sacred and inviolable, and any attack upon him was to be treated as if it were an attack upon the person of the king himself. He was granted royal honours, as befitting a great spiritual sovereign, and the right of free correspondence with the Catholic bishops throughout the world; he was allowed to convoke ecumenical councils, whose gatherings were to be protected by the civil authorities, to maintain his own courts, to have his own diplomatic agents and his own postal and telegraph service; and in the way of material advantages, he was to enjoy in full the Vatican and the Lateran, and the villa of Castel Gondolfo, the spring residence of the pontiffs near Lake Nemi, while the papal office, whether occupied or vacant, was to receive annually 3,225,000 lire from the Italian civil list. In all that concerned the relations of the state with the church, the government of Italy showed itself more liberal than any other Roman Catholic country in the world. The royal *exequatur* and *placet* were abolished; bishops were not required to take oath to the king; in all matters of spiritual discipline, the ecclesiastical judgment was to be final; and papal manifestoes were not to require the government's endorsement:—in fact, as far as the control or interference of the state was concerned, the church in Italy was to be absolutely independent. Yet, notwithstanding this fact, Pius IX. not only excommunicated the invaders of his territory, but, refusing all the pecuniary advantages that the "law of guaran-

tees" offered, declared himself a prisoner in the Vatican. He declined to recognise the kingdom of Italy, or to enter into any relations with it, and instructed loyal Catholics throughout the kingdom to take no part in the elections, either as electors or elected. The fact remains, however, that at no time in the history of the papacy was the chief pontiff to be so powerful, influential, and secure as after 1871. Though reactionary and mediæval in doctrine, Pius IX. and his successor became liberal and conciliatory in tactics; and though in all official acts and statements they expressed themselves as hostile to Italy and unresigned to the loss of their temporal power, nevertheless, in fact, they accepted the protection that Italy offered them, and in time came to recognise as inevitable the permanent loss of their territory.

Though the years 1870 and 1871 are of great importance in the history of the territorial development of Italy and her relations with the papacy, they have no such significance in the history of her internal government and the relation of parties. With the exception of the two ministries of Rattazzi, the offices of state had been held since 1861 by the party of the Right Centre, which had been recruited mainly from northern Italy, where the work of unification had first begun, and had been represented by such men as Ricasoli of Tuscany, Minghetti of Piedmont, and Sella of Lombardy. This party had carried the state in safety through the diplomatic and military experiences already narrated, but its path had not been easy, for it had felt keenly the heavy burden of the deficit, which in 1867 had amounted to more than 600,000,000 lire. Consequently, in that year the ministry had been obliged to reimpose the obnoxious grist tax and to take up the question of secularising ecclesiastical domains. Having expelled the Jesuits from Italy, and confiscated the territory of the monasteries by the convent law of 1866, it seized in 1867, for the benefit of the state, all church lands that were not actually in use. But as the condition of

the finances did not improve, largely owing to the obligation that devolved upon the state of maintaining a large army to ward off any attempts that should be made to restore to the Pope his territories, further measures were adopted after 1871. The convent law of 1866 was extended in 1873 to include Rome and the Patrimonium Petri ; and though modified in important particulars, a large fund was obtained by this means for schools, parishes, and hospitals. As this was inadequate for the needs of the state, specie payments were suspended in 1874, and the government found it necessary, not only to force upon the country an inconvertible paper currency, but also to levy new taxes, which created great dissatisfaction in Parliament and among the people at large. Furthermore, the deficit was increased by the attempt of the government to bring the railroads of Italy—notably the Roman and Lombardo-Venetian systems —into the possession of the state.

At the same time the young state made strenuous exertions to strengthen its position abroad, but a stable relationship with any foreign state was difficult to establish, owing to the refusal of Pius IX. to acknowledge the loss of his territory, and to the efforts of the ultramontanes in other countries to bring their governments to the support of the papal cause. For nearly ten years Italy lived in fear lest the monarchists and clericals in France should overturn the French republic, and enter upon a crusade against Italy for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope. But in other particulars Italy's position was better secured. In 1870, Amadeus, son of Victor Emmanuel, was elected King of Spain, and in 1871, Count Frederic Sclopis, one of the ablest of Italy's jurists, was chosen to preside at the tribunal of arbitration upon the Alabama claims. In 1873, Victor Emmanuel visited Vienna and Berlin, and to the joy of the Italians received a visit from Francis Joseph at Venice in 1874, and the year following, entertained William I. at Milan.

Such were the chief characteristics of the first few years of Italy's history as a kingdom. The party of the Right Centre, or Right, as it may now be called, had piloted the ship of state past many of the dangers of the period from 1861 to 1876, and with all its mistakes of judgment and want of diplomatic sagacity, it had performed a good work for Italy. But in 1876, as the result of an unobserved, but far-reaching, political revolution, it lost its control of government, and gave place to that party which twice already, in the person of Rattazzi, had sought to direct the policy of Italy—the old party of the Left Centre or modern Left. This change was due to many causes, chief among which were discontent with the grist tax and the policy of the Right Centre regarding railroads; the transference of the capital to Rome, which carried the centre of political life southward; the refusal of the loyal Catholics to vote; and, lastly, the promises of the Left to extend the franchise and to reduce the taxation. And something more than a mere shifting of party supremacy had been effected: the Right, which had stood for northern Italy, for business activity, parliamentary experience, and loyalty to France, had given way before the Left, which represented central and southern Italy and the peoples of Naples and Sicily, where radical views were more prevalent and personal rivalries more common, where parliamentary methods were little appreciated, and where regard for the constitution, for monarchy, the church, and for France, was less widely felt. Instead of Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany, Naples and Sicily now took the direction of affairs; and Depretis, Cairoli, and Crispi took the place of Minghetti, Menabrea, and Sella. The effect of this change was to place the government in the hands of party leaders, who were loyal, it is true, to the constitutional monarchy, but who were committed to a program more radical than that which the Right were willing to adopt; who were destined to become, not the leaders of one great united party, but the heads of personal

groups, often hostile to each other, as well as to the conservatives and the church.

During the first few years after 1876, the disorder in the country steadily increased. Republicans and socialists were unexpectedly successful in spreading liberal ideas, while a new party, that of the Irredentists, came into existence with the program of an "unredeemed Italy" (*Italia irredenta*), demanding the annexation of all Italian-speaking territories which were possessed by foreigners—of Tyrol and Istria, Nice and Corsica, Malta and the canton Ticino. These demands endangered Italy's friendship with Switzerland, France, and England, and led to outspoken expressions of hostility on the part of Austria and Germany, to the effect that the radical ministry in Italy could not control the revolutionary spirit in the country. Depretis was followed by Cairoli, and Cairoli in his turn by Depretis; and while Italy was in this condition of political instability Victor Emmanuel died, leaving behind him, as the grandest monument to his memory, a grateful country and an imperishable name. A few months afterward Pius IX. died also, whose persistent *non possumus* of the later days tended to blot out the memory of his earlier career as a liberal pope, and whose official intolerance had too often shut from view his kindly nature. Thus, before the close of the year 1878, the leaders of Italy had entirely changed: the Left had taken the place of the Right; Humbert, that of Victor Emmanuel; and Leo XIII., that of Pius IX.

The effect of such important changes was to throw Italy for a time into a state of political confusion and disorder. From 1876 to 1882, Parliament was given over to personal rivalries and personal ambitions; the ministry, that of Cairoli as well as that of Depretis, was without a fixed policy, and the ministers seemed to lack both decision and breadth of view. In the country, agitation increased, republicans, Irredentists, socialists, and anarchists alike arousing disturbance and tumult in

the great cities. Passanante made an attempt in 1878 upon the life of King Humbert in Naples. Barsanti clubs, organised through the south in honour of an Italian corporal executed by the government for disobedience to orders, became agencies dealing in socialistic plots and conspiracies. The intrigues of the Irredentists, who were carrying on their work in Trieste and the Tyrol in the interest of annexation, finally culminated in the scheme of Oberdank for the assassination of the Emperor Francis Joseph at Trieste. Oberdank was executed by the Austrian government, but, like Barsanti, the hero of the republicans and socialists, was immediately exalted as a political martyr. All these events made difficult the establishment of a fixed foreign policy. It was the desire of Depretis to sever all connection with France in favour of an alliance with Germany; while Cairoli, loyal to France, and inclined to tolerate the Irredentists, was unwilling to assume the burdens that an alliance with Germany and Austria would entail. Gradually, however, the atmosphere became clearer, and a definite ministerial policy took shape. Ferry's aggressive campaign in Tunis, which, in 1880 and 1881, was undertaken, despite Italy's protests, for the purpose of establishing a colonial empire for France, roused the Italian press and people, and demonstrations were made in the large cities in behalf of an alliance with Germany. Cairoli at once withdrew from office, and Depretis, returning to power, inaugurated that policy, which Italy was to follow for fifteen years, that of resistance to all enemies of the monarchy at home and close alliance with Germany and Austria abroad. Having suppressed the Irredentist movement and all republican agitation, which had been rather encouraged by the Left than otherwise since their accession to power, he brought Italy into the triple alliance in 1882.

Since 1876 the financial condition of Italy had steadily improved. The efforts made to reduce expenses had so far succeeded that, even before the death of Victor Emmanuel, the

long-wished-for balance between receipts and expenditures had been obtained ; and, notwithstanding expensive railroad undertakings, a slight surplus was reported in 1879. So satisfactory did the situation appear to be in 1883 that specie payments were resumed, and in 1884 the hated grist tax was abolished. During the same period, other reforms were instituted : a compulsory education law was passed in 1877, and in 1884 proposals for the improvement of higher education were made ; measures were taken for improving agriculture, extending public works, and bettering the sanitary conditions of Naples. In 1882, the scheme for extending the suffrage, which had been under discussion for several years, was put into operation, and by a reduction of the age limit to twenty-one years and of the tax qualification to nineteen lire, eighty centessimi, the number of voters was increased from 627,000 to 2,049,000.

Thus far Italy had had but little desire to emulate the colonial ambitions of her more powerful neighbours by attempting to extend her colonial influence beyond the region of the Mediterranean. But the same motive that had led Depretis to form an alliance with Germany and Austria, and to keep on terms of amity with England,—that is, the increasing of Italy's importance and prestige among the Powers,—induced him to undertake a colonial enterprise on the eastern coast of Africa. Before 1881, a Genoese company had established itself on the coast of the Red Sea just north of Babel-Mandeb, and had acquired a small strip of territory about the Bay of Assab, which the Italian government had purchased in 1882. Three years later, despite the protestations of the Porte, Depretis despatched troops to Africa, seized the seaport of Massowa, and before two years had passed, Italy was at full war with Abyssinia. The Italian minister, finding himself greatly embarrassed by the unusually heavy expenditures arising from this colonial undertaking, and from increased armaments, made necessary by the fear of war in Europe in 1886 and 1887, remodelled his ministry by the ad-

mission of Crispi, and was preparing to face the troublesome situation when he died in July, 1887.

Crispi, as his natural successor, took up the burden of government, and adopted, without change, the policy which Depretis had followed. He continued the war preparations of 1886, built new fortresses, and extended the war credit of that year for the purpose of increasing the navy. He adhered rigidly to the triple alliance, supported by King Humbert, who declared that the alliance was "a pledge of that peace which not only Italy, but all states, desired as necessary to the welfare of nations, to their progress and civilisation"; and at the same time espoused the cause of the colonial empire, vigorously carried on the war against King John of Abyssinia in 1888 and 1889, seized Zula, Keren, and Asmala, and extended Italy's sphere of influence inward from the coast. In 1890, after the death of King John, he supported the claims of Menelek, and with him negotiated a treaty of friendship and commerce.

But this aggressive policy destroyed the financial equilibrium in Italy, and created deficits, which reached 191,000,000 lire in 1891, and increased so rapidly in the years that followed as to preclude all hope of a restoration of the balance. Levying of new taxes became necessary, and the additional burden thus entailed, together with local industrial troubles, made it easy for republicans and socialists to create disturbances, and to rouse such a strong feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent with the monarchy, that in 1889 riots took place in Rome, Milan, Turin, and Apulia. But Crispi was firm: having declared in the Chamber his determination to defend the monarchy and to suppress all revolutionary parties, he put down the rioters, attacked the Irredentists, abolished the committees for Trieste and Trent, dissolved the Barsanti and Oberdank societies, and in general denounced the radicals, victory for whom, he maintained, would mean "war with Europe, the

overthrow of the monarchy, and the complete ruin of the fatherland." Although supported by a large governmental majority in the elections of 1890, he was obliged to resign the next year on account of certain unfortunate remarks that he made, charging the party of the Right with servility toward foreign Powers in the years 1874 and 1875.

Rudini of the Right, who succeeded Crispi, followed his predecessor's policy, adhered to the triple alliance and the commercial treaties with Germany and Austria, but, unable to improve the financial condition of the state, resigned in 1892. Giolitti, of one of the factions of the Left, took his place, but, implicated in the Banca Romana scandal, withdrew in November, 1893, having accomplished nothing. Then Crispi, to whom all eyes instinctively turned in this emergency, was entrusted again with the formation of a cabinet. He adopted the same vigorous policy that he had followed before, but defined the ministerial position more exactly: "We belong," he said, "to no one faction of Parliament more than to another, but to a great party, whose single object is the welfare of Italy." "We only need firmness and perseverance," he added, the next year; "let us rally round the king, the symbol of unity, for only the monarchy marks the unity, and guarantees the future, of the fatherland." Thus during the three years of his second ministry, Crispi stood as the advocate of monarchy, the protector of the middle classes, the upholder of the triple alliance, the promoter of an aggressive colonial policy, and the declared enemy of all popular movements, whether led by Irredentists, republicans, socialists, anarchists, or even discontented workmen and artisans. In 1894 he carried on a campaign against the peasantry of Sicily, who had revolted because of the heavy taxes imposed by Giolitti; and while endeavouring to lighten the misery of the workmen and peasants, treated with exceptional severity all socialists or others who were engaged in furthering the revolt. When the movement in Sicily

spread to Rome, Rufo, Spezzia, Pisa, Leghorn, Carrara, where the marble-workers were largely anarchists, Lucca, and Milan, he carried through the Parliament laws against the anarchists decreeing exceedingly heavy penalties—from three to twenty-four years' imprisonment at hard labour—for all convicted of making and using bombs. As personal dictator, through the prefects of the provinces, he pursued the parties of revolution, forbade the formation of unions and the gathering of assemblies, and limited the power of the press.

Many of these measures, which were of doubtful legality, roused opposition in Parliament, and the disclosures of Giolitti in December, 1894, which implicated Crispi in the bank scandal, finally destroyed his majority. But he refused to withdraw, and after remaining five months without a majority, he dissolved the Parliament and appealed to the country. The result was favourable, and his majority was restored. But the blow fell from an unexpected quarter. Since 1893, Italy had steadily continued her advance in Africa; the army had won a victory over the Mahdi at Agordat, and in 1894 had captured Kassala, the gate of the Soudan. But her aggressiveness in lower Abyssinia and her attempt to establish a protectorate over that country led to war with King Menelek in 1895 and 1896, which, in the latter year, resulted in the overwhelming defeat of General Baratieri at Adua. Such was the excitement roused at home by this failure of the colonial policy that, in some parts of the country, riots accompanied the public expressions of disapproval of the entire African campaign, and Crispi, without waiting for the vote of Parliament, withdrew from office. Rudini, his successor, immediately announced a change of policy, declaring that the African possessions would be transformed into a civil and commercial colony, and that no further attempt would be made to extend their boundaries; and making known his determination to work for economy in expenditures, for reforms in Sicily, for an amnesty for prisoners, and

for peace with the socialists. This program was partly carried out in 1897, when a treaty was arranged with Abyssinia, and a project was presented for revising the existing method of taxing incomes and personal property; but the marked sympathy that the minister displayed for the liberal program failed to win for him the support of the socialists, and only made more intense the feeling of hostility that the clergy and the ultramontanes cherished for the government.

Thus, at the close of the year 1897, Italy's position was full of difficulties, and many of the obstacles to her progress seemed almost insuperable. She was burdened with a heavy debt, which, notwithstanding the fact that the taxation was excessive, tended to increase rather than diminish; and the people, agricultural rather than industrial, frugal but not thrifty, patient but not persistent, and taxed out of all proportion to the productive capacity of the country they inhabited, were fast becoming republicans and socialists, less from conviction than from discontent and despair. The heavy expenditure, which was the cause of the evil, had been due not to the ordinary costs of administration, but to the subsidising of railway systems, extravagance in the civil service, greater or less dishonesty in the awarding of contracts, and in greatest part to the enormous armaments and expensive colonial expeditions which the Italian government had felt bound to support. Both the government and the people had seen the wisdom of abandoning an aggressive colonial policy; but the nation, proud of its past, and unwilling to resign its place as a Power and enter upon a period of recuperation, which was the only means whereby an economic and financial equilibrium could be obtained, upheld its ministers in their policy of supporting an expensive army and navy, in spite of the fact that the country, poorly supplied by nature with the sources of wealth, could ill afford the expense of maintaining a prominent international position, and that the attempt to do so was leading to emigra-

tion on one side and to well-organised socialistic insurrection on the other.

Yet the situation was far from hopeless or discouraging. Italy had been called upon in the short space of a generation to do what other states had taken centuries to complete ; and it is scarcely surprising that in all respects she had not succeeded. To have gained territorial, administrative, and legal unity ; to have built railway lines and telegraphs ; to have raised the standard of education, improved the sanitary condition of the cities, and brought peace and protection to her people ;—such a result was encouraging for the present and promising for the future. Should she be able to find a *modus vivendi* with Europe that would admit of a reduction of armaments and the lightening of the weight of taxation, and to arrive at some understanding with the church that would bring the clergy and the loyal Catholics to her support and prevent them from allying with her enemies, the socialists and republicans, she certainly would have no difficulty, as past events had shown, in maintaining her position as a strong and independent constitutional monarchy.

CHAPTER XII.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY.

As the result of six years of struggle and experimentation, the old Austria had been entirely transformed, and a new era in the history of Hungary and the house of Habsburg had begun. By the imperial rescript of February 17, 1867, and the Austrian statute of the August following, Hungary had become an independent state ; and in the place of the former single and highly centralised organisation there existed two separate governments, entirely distinct in all that concerned the internal affairs of each, and held together by no other tie than allegiance to a common dynasty and adherence to the conditions of the *Ausgleich*, itself a temporary arrangement demanding a renewal every ten years.

But these states, though separate and sovereign, were not homogeneous national units : Cisleithania, a territorial rather than a national state, was composed of seventeen provinces, of which each had its own diet, though some, such as Bohemia, Galicia, and Dalmatia, had the historical right to be called kingdoms, while others were simply duchies, counties, or margraviates ; and Transleithania, more national than was its fellow state, contained not only Hungary, but Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania as well. The variety of the races and languages, the complexity of parties, the unique character of the constitutional arrangement established by the *Ausgleich*, and the confusion engendered by the existence of seventeen local diets in Cisleithania alone, made the working of the new machinery a matter of great uncertainty.

In studying the history of these two states, it is of importance to bear in mind that the problems which confronted Hungary were much more simple than were those which the statesmen of Austria were called upon to solve. East of the Leitha existed a compact and dominant nationality, the Magyar, and but two of the dependent states, Croatia and Transylvania, had any pretence at an organisation. Moreover, the Magyars had had years of experience in parliamentary government, and though parties existed—the Right, which supported the *Ausgleich*, the Left under Tisza, which desired only a personal union with Austria, and the extreme Left, which followed the republican traditions of Kossuth—yet the early struggles were those of party rather than of race, and in no way threatened the Magyar supremacy. With Croatia, by a somewhat questionable manipulation of the electoral law, a compromise was arranged in 1868, whereby the Croats were allowed extensive rights of self-government, a representative in the ministry at Pesth, delegates in the Diet and in the Delegations, and the right of employing a considerable proportion of their revenue for themselves. In 1873, these privileges were extended; Croatia received a larger representation at Pesth, additional financial advantages, and the president of the Croatian diet was named as *ban* by the Hungarian ministry. Toward Transylvania, however, Hungary acted harshly, incorporated that state bodily into the kingdom, abolishing the government at Clausenburg and dividing the country into mere electoral and administrative districts. Great discontent arose among Saxons and Slavs because of this treatment, but the organisation of Transleithania remained permanent, and the Hungarian state, acting without serious check, grew more and more prosperous, increased her wealth, and improved the social and economic condition of her people.

But Austria found it far more difficult to discover a *modus vivendi*; for her government was called upon to treat with the

church, and to adapt the concordat to the constitution, to deal with parties and familiarise herself with constitutional methods, and to face the demands of the peoples of Bohemia, Galicia, and other Crown lands, who were discontented with the special privileges of the *Ausgleich*, and demanded for themselves rights similar to those granted to Hungary. In 1867 the machinery of government was set in motion, with Count Charles Auersperg at the head of a liberal ministry; and the struggle with the church began. Though the concordat was not formally set aside, its provisions were rendered null and void by three laws, of which one provided for civil marriages, a second freed education from the power of the church, and a third established equality of religions and regulated the rights of children born of mixed marriages. Though these laws met with bitter opposition on the part of the Pope and the higher clergy, they were finally passed, and inaugurated a *régime* of religious freedom and secular instruction. At the same time, important measures touching finances, the judiciary, and the army were adopted. Though great was Austria's need of money, the Emperor would not consent that she should follow the example of Italy and secularise the ecclesiastical estates; and it became necessary, therefore, to unify the national debt and lower the rate of interest, and to impose a tax on coupons, an act which injured the credit of Austria abroad. In judicial matters, trial by jury was introduced; and a complete reorganisation of the army was perfected by the adoption of a three-year term of service, with five years in the reserve and two in the *landwehr*.

But more difficult was it for the Austrian government to meet the demands of the nationalities, Czechs in Bohemia, Poles in Galicia, and Slavs in Moravia, who, feeling that they had been ignored in the *Ausgleich*, were asserting their right to some form of independence or autonomy similar to that which Hungary had gained. In August, 1868, the Czechs drew up a definite statement of their claims. They declared that Bohemia

was attached to Austria by no other than a personal tie ; that no alteration could be made in this relation save by a new contract between the Emperor and themselves ; that no Reichsrath foreign to Bohemia could impose upon that kingdom any debts or other public burdens ; that Cisleithania was not an historical state ; that Bohemia was not obliged to send any deputies to the Cisleithanian assembly ; and lastly, that all constitutional questions pending between the Emperor and Bohemia ought to be regulated by common agreement, and that the representatives of the Czech nation should be chosen on the basis of a just electoral law and an honest election.

Encouraged by this act of the Czechs, the Slavs of Moravia shortly afterward denied the power of the Reichsrath over them, declared that the dual monarchy was founded on neither historical nor political rights, and affirmed that no arrangement was lawful that had not been made between the Emperor and the diet of Moravia. In September, the Galicians made their declaration : they asserted that their deputies could take no part in the deliberations of the Reichsrath, except on matters common to Galicia and the Cisleithanian countries, and that their diet alone had the power to decide all questions concerning the commerce of the country, its finances, rights of citizenship, health, justice, administration, and education ; and they demanded a supreme court of appeal, a separate government, with a diet and responsible ministry. Nor was the movement confined to the north. In the south and east, Slovenes and Serbs met in assembly to discuss the question of separation or autonomy ; and so bitter was the feeling in Dalmatia, that in 1869, when an attempt was made to introduce the new military system, a revolt broke out in the Bocche di Cattaro that lasted for two months.

This threatening attitude of the dependent peoples greatly increased the embarrassments of the government, and in September, 1868, Auersperg resigned. His successor, Count

Taaffe, unable to obtain a majority in the Reichsrath, himself resigned in 1870, and for almost a year the affairs of state were conducted by a transition ministry under Potocki. During this time great disorder prevailed, the Czechs refusing to take their seats in parliament, and the Slavs, Poles, Slovenes, Italians, and Tyrolese withdrawing from it altogether as a protest against the supremacy of the German liberals. Thereupon the Emperor, having lost confidence in the ability of the liberal German majority to conduct the government, turned to the aristocratic and national conservatives, and in February, 1871, summoned Count Hohenwart to form a new cabinet, an act that seemed to commit him to a policy of federalism and the recognition of the claims of the races. Hohenwart at once admitted two Czechs into his cabinet, and proceeded to formulate a scheme whereby the demands of the Bohemians might be satisfied. Supported by the Emperor, but bitterly opposed by the German majority in the Reichsrath, who talked of calling their victorious German neighbours to their aid, he made clear his determination to grant to Czechs and Galicians autonomous powers. In September, 1871, the Emperor called upon the Czechs to state the terms of an agreement, and declared that he was ready "to recognise the rights of the kingdom, and to repeat this recognition in the coronation oath." In response to this request, the Bohemian diet drafted the Fundamental Articles of 1871, which, had they been adopted, would have placed Bohemia in the same position as that occupied by Hungary. Moravia accepted the articles, and all the Slavs awaited with intense expectation the imperial decree which should inaugurate a federalist *régime*.

But the decree was never issued. The Emperor was disquieted by the vigorous opposition of Germans and Magyars, and still more by the warnings of his chancellor, Count Beust, and the Hungarian premier, Andrássy; and after his interviews with Bismarck and the Emperor William at Ischl and Salzburg,

became fearful of the effect of his policy upon Austria's relations abroad, and withdrew from the position that he had taken. In November, 1871, he dismissed Hohenwart as the enemy of dualism, and shortly afterward Beust as the enemy of Germany, and summoning first Andrássy as common minister of foreign affairs, then Adolph Auersperg as head of a new Cisleithanian cabinet, returned to the constitution of 1867. Federalism was indefinitely postponed.

With a German liberal once more at the head of affairs in Cisleithania, and maintenance of the friendship with Germany as the fixed policy of the state, the government at Vienna turned its attention to positive measures of reorganisation and reform. Thanks to the refusal of the Czechs, who were doubly embittered now that they had so nearly obtained their demands, to take their seats in the Reichsrath, and to the support of the Galicians, to whom certain concessions were made, the Germans controlled the parliament, and, under the guidance of the firm, but cautious, Auersperg ministry, were able to carry many important measures. On April 2, 1873, they amended the constitution by taking away from the provincial diets the right of electing the deputies to the Reichsrath and vesting it in the hands of the electoral classes. The former method was manifestly unjust and open to abuse, in that the deputies chosen were always of the same political party as the majority in the local body, and were not truly representative of the electoral classes. The next year they extended the ecclesiastical law of 1868 by annulling the concordat, regulating the autonomy to be exercised by the church, and determining the limits beyond which ecclesiastical interference would be an encroachment "upon the inviolable rights of the state." As an answer to the objections made to these laws by the Pope and the bishops, Francis Joseph declared that as constitutional sovereign he could not withhold his assent to laws which had been legally introduced and passed.

While these matters were under consideration, Vienna was experiencing a perilous financial crisis. At the time of the exposition held in that city in 1873 a panic occurred—famous as the Vienna *krach*—due to excessive speculation in the securities of banks, building societies, and railways, which caused the suspension of ninety-six banks during the ensuing three years, brought great distress to all classes of the population, and extended its disastrous consequences far beyond the Cisleithanian border. And before Austria could recover from these financial reverses and relieve the distress of the labouring classes by legislative measures, and before she could make her peace with the church, she was called upon to renew the *Ausgleich* with Hungary.

In the latter state, meanwhile, had taken place a political transformation almost unique in the history of parties. The ministry of Szlávy, which represented the constitutional liberals or old party of Deák, had made every effort to develop the resources of Hungary, which had been frightfully neglected in previous years, and had secured the passage in the Diet of measures that promised to build up the internal strength of the state. After the compromise with Croatia had been effected and Transylvania had been incorporated, the chief concern of the Magyars had been to improve the condition of the finances, to extend the railway systems, and to subsidise other great undertakings that would contribute to the well-being of the country. At the same time they had begun the task, so zealously continued later, of spreading the Magyar influence and language as widely as possible throughout the whole of Transleithania, and during the prosecution of these plans, a noteworthy political change took place. So deplorable had become the financial situation and so demoralised the old party of Deák that Tisza, in 1875, renouncing his opposition to the *Ausgleich* and his desire for separation from Austria, led his party of the Left to the support of the Deákists and formed

with them a new constitutional liberal party, which was to control Hungarian affairs for the ensuing twenty years. It is interesting to note that Deák lived to see this submission of the old non-constitutional Left, and to become an enrolled member of the new party organisation. He died in 1876.

Such was the situation when for the first time the question of the renewing of the *Ausgleich* came up for discussion. During the ten years of its operation no alteration had been made in its conditions, except that in 1872 the quota paid by Hungary had been raised from 30 to 31.4 per cent., owing to the incorporation into that state of the "military frontiers." After a discussion which lasted for two years and a half, the compromise was renewed on the old basis; Hungary was to pay 31.4 per cent. and Austria 68.6 of the common expenditure. Other questions, such as the renewal of the charter of the Austrian national bank, the amount of drawbacks allowed on the exportation of brandy, sugar, and beer, excited such grave difference of opinion that not until 1878 was a final settlement reached.

In the meantime were taking place events which were destined to exert an important influence upon the relation of races and parties within the Empire at large. During the Russo-Turkish war and at the congress of Berlin, Austria had in the main supported England against Russia, and in so doing had provoked the wrath of the Slavs. This feeling of hostility, both within and without the Empire, was greatly increased when Andrássy endeavoured to carry out the terms of the treaty of Berlin, according to which Austria-Hungary was to occupy and administer Bosnia and the Herzegovina under the suzerainty of the Porte, and to keep garrisons and possess military roads in the Sandjak of Novibazar. In acquiring this territory, which he deemed of advantage to the dual monarchy in extending the imperial influence and authority in the south-east and a compensation for the loss of Venetia, Andrássy was

forced to adopt a policy which angered the Germans, because of the financial burdens it imposed upon the state, and embittered anew the Slavic nationalities. The Mussulmans of Bosnia, unwilling to be separated from their co-religionists in Turkey, so strenuously resisted the Austro-Hungarian occupation that 200,000 men were needed to overcome them; while the occupation itself, in destroying all hope of a united Slavic kingdom in the south, which had been for years the dream of Bosniaks, Servians, and Montenegrins, became a new cause of discontent for the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, and led them to unite more closely than before in their struggle against the supporters of dualism and the *Ausgleich*.

Upon the German liberals, however, the effects of this policy were seen almost immediately. For ten years they had controlled the majority in the Reichsrath and the Austrian delegation, and in their desire to be both independent and supreme, had got into the habit of criticising the ministry on every important occasion, and of seeming to place party interests higher than those of the Empire. In the face of the Emperor's wishes and of Austria's needs, they had prolonged for two years the debate upon the *Ausgleich;* they had opposed the treaty of Berlin; and now, dissatisfied that Andrássy, the common minister of foreign affairs, in causing Bosnia to be occupied, should have acted first and consulted them afterwards, they refused in the Delegation to grant the additional appropriation asked for by the government. This blocking of the plans of the imperial ministry led Andrássy to resign, November, 1878. He was succeeded first by Baron Haymerle, and after the death of the latter in 1881, by Count Kálnoky, who remained in office until 1895. But notwithstanding these changes in the office of minister of foreign affairs for the Empire, the government, in no way altering its foreign policy, adhered to the treaty of Berlin, and confirmed the friendship with Germany by the alliance of 1879.

In internal politics, however, an important change was effected. When the Germans finally succeeded in carrying through the Reichsrath a vote expressing a want of confidence in the foreign policy of the government, the Auersperg cabinet resigned, and in the May following the Emperor dissolved the legislative body. In the new elections the German liberals lost heavily, while the federalists, Slavs, and aristocratic landowners made important gains. Then the Emperor, turning from the liberals, entrusted the government to Count Taaffe, who, at first recognising no party, strove to organise a reconciliation cabinet, and invited Czechs, Poles, and Germans to aid him. But the Germans refused to comply, and on the first question that arose, that of placing the army for ten years in the hands of the government, voted in the opposition. As if to compensate for the loss of their support, Taaffe persuaded the Czechs, who during the Auersperg rule had refused to sit in the Reichsrath, to lay aside their hostility, accept the *Ausgleich* under protest, and come to the aid of the government. In consequence of this shifting, and of other changes that occurred between 1879 and 1881, the Taaffe ministry became entirely federalist, and the control of the government passed out of the hands of the liberals.

The ministry thus formed depended, in the main, upon a majority made up of Poles, Czechs, the feudal party, and the clericals, held together not by any common purpose or policy, but by a common dislike of the German minority, and a common determination not to allow the management of affairs to pass again into the hands of the opposition. Thus supported, the ministry pursued its policy of increasing the power and authority of the central government at the expense of the Reichsrath ; and inasmuch as it was obliged to make such concessions to its federalist allies as would assure the unity of the majority, its measures were often of a distinctly federalist character. But Taaffe, as a shrewd opportunist, avoided the ex-

cesses of Hohenwart, and succeeded so well in subordinating the demands of the dependent races in Cisleithania to the one great object of strengthening the power of the head of the state, that before the end of the decade the Reichsrath had declined greatly in influence, the federalists and clericals had gained but a small part of their programs, and the Emperor had become absolute in everything but name.

Nevertheless, concessions to the dependent races was a definite part of Taaffe's policy ; for it was only by yielding to the parties which followed him that he was able to hold the majority upon which he was obliged to depend for aid. Deserted by the Germans, who were in the opposition demanding more stringent economy and the maintenance of the full authority of the Reichsrath, he prepared to treat the nationalities with scrupulous impartiality. Already had he conciliated the Czechs by various measures touching their finances and schools in 1881 ; but he bound them to him more closely by obtaining the Emperor's consent in 1883 to a division of the university of Prague into two parts—a German and a Czech—and by winning for them in 1886, after a four-years' struggle, a limited use of the Czech language in official circles. So rapidly did the influence of the Czechs increase that when the government, in 1882, reduced the tax-qualification in the cities and rural communes to five florins, altered the voting districts, and remodelled the electoral class of the great landowners in Bohemia, the Czechs were able to gain control of the Bohemian diet, and to exercise such a dominant influence therein that in 1886 the seventy German deputies withdrew as a protest against the supremacy of their opponents. In Galicia, the Poles with the aid of the government managed the diet, and by a process of systematic oppression, reduced the Ruthenians to silence. In the south the Slavs gained at the expense of the Italians, because of the plottings of the Irredentists against the life of the Emperor ; while in Carniola, Carinthia, and Steier-

mark, the Slovenes, aided by the ministry, made notable advances, winning the control of schools, increasing their deputation from the cities, and in 1883 demanding a special language law. In the same year the clericals gained concessions from the government touching the establishment of confessional schools.

While thus in Cisleithania the Emperor and the nationalities were growing strong at the expense of the Reichsrath, the Hungarian Diet was steadily increasing its power at the expense of the king and the races. Taaffe's policy in Austria had encouraged the Slavic peoples of Transleithania to renew the movement which the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians had begun in 1875 for the independence of the Slavic peoples and the erection of a great Serb state ; and in Croatia, the radical party, deeming the compromise of 1868 a disgrace to their country, had embodied in their program entire separation from Hungary. Against these movements the Hungarian Diet deliberately set its face, and in its determination to complete the Magyarisation of the whole of Transleithania, acted with vigour and thoroughness. It decreed that Magyar should be the official language in commerce and trade ; forbade that the study of German be made obligatory in primary and middle schools ; refused to license German theatres in Cronstadt, Hermannstadt, and Buda-Pesth ; and in 1887 closed the Saxon school of law at Hermannstadt. In the meantime, it endeavoured to extend its work into Croatia, refused to give up the port of Fiume, and in 1883, when the Croatian radicals tore down the escutcheons upon the bureaus of finance in Agram, upon which the Hungarian Diet had shortly before placed bilingual inscriptions, Magyar and Croat, it sent troops into the country and put down the movement by force. Although the Magyar government was finally compelled to yield on the question of the theatre in Buda-Pesth and the bilingual inscriptions at Agram, yet it did not in the least abate its efforts, and so thorough was

the process of Magyarisation, especially in Transylvania, that it was estimated in 1886 that half the German schools were conducted in the Magyar language.

This was the general situation in the Empire in 1886 when the question of renewing the *Ausgleich* for the second time came before the governments of the two states. Some difficulty was experienced in coming to an agreement regarding the taxes on spirits, petroleum, and sugar, but the rumours of war, which were current during the years 1886 and 1887, made easier an understanding, and without serious trouble both Austria and Hungary renewed the compromise for another ten years.

While thus the Taaffe ministry, outwardly, at least, seemed stronger than ever, a new influence was already making itself felt in Austria that was to lead to its overthrow. The rise of anarchists, socialists, anti-Semites, and national radicals chiefly in Croatia and Bohemia, was to be the most characteristic feature of Austro-Hungarian history during the ensuing decade. Severe laws had been passed against the anarchists in 1884, 1885, and 1886, and though this party gradually lost ground, in consequence of frequent attacks made upon it by the government, the social democrats, who during the earlier years had identified themselves with the anarchists, came to the front as a separate party, and by 1888 were well organised after the German model. Owing to the different industrial conditions in Austria, however, and to the race wars, which hindered the establishment of a united and compact party, they never reached a position equal in importance to that held by the social democrats in Germany, yet their agitations in 1890 in Vienna and other towns brought upon them the state troops, and stirred up the anti-Semitic elements of the people, who attributed the social troubles to the usurious practices of Jewish capitalists. The anti-Semitic movement thus begun grew steadily stronger until the anti-Semites became sufficiently numerous to gain control of the lower Austrian diet in 1893

and the municipal council of Vienna in 1895, and to elect, in the years 1895 and 1896, the anti-Semitic leader Dr. Lüger as mayor of Vienna.

But of more immediate importance was the growth of the radical parties in Croatia and Bohemia. The radicals of Croatia, having increased in numbers after 1880, appealed to the patriotic instincts of their countrymen, urging them to demand the erection of a south Slavic kingdom, similar to that which the Illyrists of 1848 had desired. In Bohemia there had existed since 1867 a party of Young Czechs, which had been organised when the adoption of the *Ausgleich* had shut out for the moment all hope of autonomy for Bohemia. The platform of this party demanded freedom of the press and of association, the laicising of schools, and universal suffrage, as well as the recognition of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia as a separate kingdom. But from 1867 to 1887 the Young Czechs had accomplished little, having been outnumbered by the more conservative Old Czechs, who, meeting the advances of Count Taaffe and abandoning their national program, had recognised the *Ausgleich* and taken their seats in the Reichsrath. Profiting from the concessions made by Taaffe from 1880 to 1886, the Old Czechs had won from the Germans in Bohemia the control of the local diet in 1883, and were in a large majority in the delegation elected from Bohemia to the Reichsrath in Vienna. But in 1887 the Young Czechs under Dr. Gregr, adding to their party program hostility to the triple alliance and friendship for France and Russia, had entered upon a violent campaign for supremacy; and so menacing had they become by 1890 that Taaffe, fearful lest the Bohemian diet should come under the control of the socialists, persuaded the Old Czechs and feudal landowners to come to an agreement with the Germans whereby the diet should be divided into two parts—a German curia and a Czech curia—each of which should possess the full powers of a separate house, though the members of the two curiæ were to

sit and debate together. This plan for effecting a reconciliation between Czechs and Germans, which involved also a duplication of governing boards and courts of appeal, and the alteration of electoral and judicial districts, destroying, as it did, all hope of a separate Bohemian kingdom, was bitterly opposed by the Young Czechs, who by demonstrations, addresses, and vehement speeches in the diet at Prague made every effort to nullify the agreement.

So complicated had become the political situation in Austria and so embarrassed the Taaffe ministry by the growth of radical sentiment, that in January, 1891, the Emperor suddenly dissolved the Reichsrath that a new election might return a body more representative of the electoral classes. The results were significant: the Young Czechs gained thirty-six seats and the Old Czechs but ten, a fact which meant that the governmental majority was bound to be seriously impaired, for Poles and Young Czechs, one hostile, the other friendly, to Russia, could hardly be expected to work together. Taaffe, therefore, abandoned his federalist policy and, supported by German liberals and Poles, adopted a simple program of social, financial, and economic reform. Commercial treaties were made with Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, important tax-reforms were inaugurated, and a far-reaching change was made in the Austrian currency system. At the same time the government became repressive: in 1892 it put down anti-Semitic tumults, forbade social democrats to hold meetings, and suppressed student demonstrations in Vienna and Innsbruck. Towards the unruly Young Czechs it was even more hostile: it prohibited the Commenius celebration in 1892, and the next year, when the demonstrations became unusually violent, placed Prague in a minor state of siege, suspended freedom of the press, of speech, the right of reunion and association, and in certain specified cases, the right of trial by jury.

As a further measure of precaution, in order to check this

growing radical spirit Taaffe proposed in October, 1893, to reform the suffrage by admitting to a share in the political life of the state the labouring classes, which with every year were growing stronger and better organised and more discontented. This project, the aim of which was to extend the franchise to nearly the entire population of the state, roused intense excitement in the country, and drove the German Left, the Poles, and the conservatives into the ranks of the opposition; and Count Taaffe, who for a quarter of a century had been the leading personage in Austrian politics, was obliged to resign. His successor, Prince Windischgrätz, was supported by the coalition that had overthrown Taaffe; and the new ministry, though generally recognised as only temporary, on account of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, remained in power for nearly two years. During its first year of office, political life was peaceful, for chiefly questions of finance and commerce were dealt with; and it was not until March, 1894, when the proposal to extend the suffrage was presented to the Reichsrath, that trouble again began. Prince Windischgrätz was undoubtedly forced to take this step by the continued agitation and unrest among the working classes, which had been recently stirred to new activity by the efforts of the German social democrat Bebel to organise them on an international basis and to bring them into touch with the social democrats throughout Europe. The new electoral scheme provided for a fifth class of voters which was to choose, by a system that was equivalent to one of universal suffrage, forty-three delegates for the Reichsrath. But this project was vigorously opposed during the year 1894, and in all probability would have caused the downfall of the Windischgrätz ministry, as it had that of Count Taaffe, had not there appeared a new question which accomplished the same result. In June, 1895, when the ministry proposed to establish a Slovenian high-school at Cilli in Steiermark, the German Left withdrew from the coalition, and Prince

Windischgrätz, left unsupported, handed in his resignation. A new ministry formed by Count Kielmannsegg was overthrown in October, and in the same month the Emperor summoned to the head of the cabinet Count Badeni, a Pole, who served as minister-president and minister of the interior for nearly two years.

The failure of Taaffe to bring about that reconciliation of the races in Cisleithania, which for fourteen years he had earnestly and skilfully sought to accomplish, to control the radical and anti-Semitic movements, and to carry through the electoral reform that Windischgrätz also had not succeeded in effecting, determined the character of the problems that confronted Badeni on his accession to power. In October the latter made known his program : he declared that he would uphold a government that should be in accordance with the spirit of the age, oppose anything prejudicial to peace among the races, honour all just claims, as far as they were legally, financially, and economically admissible, and were in accord with the historical and religious traditions of the state, and, at the same time, resist with all his power reactionary movements. In consequence of this broad-minded declaration, the German Left, Poles, and conservatives, both lay and clerical, came to the support of the new minister.

Almost the first matter of importance to occupy the attention of the Reichsrath at its first session was the old question of extending the suffrage, which had already aroused so much opposition when proposed by Taaffe and Windischgrätz. But interestingly enough, after about three months of discussion, the measure was passed without difficulty in May, 1896. It provided for the establishment of a fifth electoral class, which was to consist of all males twenty-four years of age who were not provided for in the other four classes, and the members of which, after residing for six months in an electoral district, were to have the privilege of voting, directly in the six largest

cities, indirectly elsewhere, for the purpose of electing seventy-two additional members to the Reichsrath. With the adoption of this reform measure, universal suffrage, conditioned only by indirect voting and the system of classes, was introduced into Cisleithania. The following winter, when the Reichsrath was dissolved and new elections were ordered, the new law gave evidence of its workings: the German liberal party, made up of the German Union, the German Left or progressists, the German people's party, and the Schönerer group, lost heavily; while the anti-Semites, or Christian socialists, and the clericals made important gains, and there appeared in the Reichsrath a small group of fifteen social democrats, who had been elected, in the main, by the newly created fifth class. This was the body, broken as never before into discordant factions—seven supporting the government, three neutral, and seven in the opposition—which found itself in 1897 face to face with the question of renewing the *Ausgleich*.

Just as the political history of Austria since 1887 had been influenced to no inconsiderable degree by such radicals as Young Czechs and socialists, so that of Hungary for a decade had been characterised by the growth in strength and importance of the party of the Left. In March, 1890, after a service of fifteen years, Tisza had been forced to retire, not because of any adverse vote, but because of disagreements with his colleagues, and of stormy scenes in the Diet arising from his treatment of the Kossuth cult, which the Left was endeavouring to establish. Count Szapary, who succeeded him, resigned in 1892, for as an aristocrat and Catholic he was unwilling to meet the demands of the radicals; and Dr. Wekerle was instructed by the king to form a new cabinet. Adopting the program of the party of the Left, the new minister carried through the Diet, even in the face of violent opposition on the part of the conservatives, especially in the Table of Magnates, a number of radical measures touching civil mar-

riage, civil registration, freedom of worship, and the legal equality of the Jews; but so intense was the dissatisfaction aroused by these laws that he was forced to retire in December, 1894. The new minister, Baron Banffy, modified somewhat the Wekerle ecclesiastical program, but in reality continued Wekerle's policy by proposing in 1895 additional measures regarding freedom of worship, with especial reference to the religion of the Jews. At the same time, in the matter of the renewal of the *Ausgleich*, he expressed himself as dissatisfied with the existing customs and commercial treaty, hoping to obtain more favourable terms for Hungary.

But notwithstanding Banffy's attitude, the two governments were able to report to their respective legislatures, at various times during the years 1896 and 1897, that an agreement had been reached regarding such matters as excise duties, veterinary rules and regulations, the railway tariff, and the bank, the Magyars showing themselves less inclined than formerly to demand entire separation of economic interests. But regarding the percentage of the quota that each should pay, the differences of opinion seemed irreconcilable, and the commissions that had been nominated by the two parliaments in 1896 to consider the matter were unable to agree. Austria, asserting that Hungary had made great advances in wealth during the preceding ten years, proposed that the population of the two states be made the basis of computation, and that Hungary pay 43.16 per cent. instead of 31.4; but Hungary rejected the proposal on the ground that population was not a fair basis, and demanded that the calculation be made upon the amount of taxation—in other words, that the proportion remain as it had been before, 31.4 to 68.6. Here at the close of the year 1897 the matter rested. The Emperor consented to let the quota stand during the year 1898 as it had been arranged in previous renewals, and thus simply prolonged for one year the compromise, which otherwise would have expired on December 31, 1897.

The situation, already a troublesome one, was complicated by a series of events of a highly sensational character, which occurred in the Austrian Reichsrath and rendered impossible, for the time being, a ratification of the provisional draft of the *Ausgleich* presented by the government. Count Badeni, hoping to find his majority among the Poles, feudal landowners, and Catholic people's party, and thinking to bring over the Czechs to his support, proposed on April 5, 1897, a measure for Bohemia, and on the 22d another for Moravia, enforcing the use of the Czech language in the Bohemian civil service, with the exception of certain government offices. Immediately the Germans, notably the progressists and the Schönerer nationalists, opposed the project, and not only endeavoured to impeach the Badeni ministry, but also entered upon a course of obstruction which culminated on May 25th and October 19th in disgraceful exhibitions of violence in the Reichsrath. Czechs, Slavs, and anti-Semites were drawn up on one side against Germans and socialists on the other; and so determined was each faction to yield nothing to the other, that the bill providing for the prolongation of the *Ausgleich* for a year could not be passed. In consequence of these disorderly scenes in the Reichsrath and of rioting in the streets of Vienna, Count Badeni resigned on November 27th, leaving to his successor, Baron von Gautsch, the task of finding some way out of the difficulty. The new minister, who had served in the cabinets of both Taaffe and Badeni, at once sought to conciliate the united German opposition by offering to suspend the language law in the pure German districts of Bohemia, and to limit its working to those districts containing twenty per cent. and those cities containing twenty-five per cent. of the Czech nationality. But this modification was not deemed sufficient by the Germans, and at the end of the year 1897 no agreement had been reached.

The situation in Austria at that time was, therefore, one of

suspense ; the *Ausgleich* had not been renewed ; the question of the compromise between Czech and German was as far from settlement as ever ; the growth of anti-Semitism and socialism was introducing an incalculable factor into the political life of the state ; while the confusion of parties, the racial and personal hostilities in the Reichsrath, were fast bringing Austrian parliamentary methods into disrepute. Nevertheless, the fact that the Reichsrath, as far as the actual business of government was concerned, exerted but little influence in matters of administration made it impossible to draw from its career any conclusions regarding the success or failure of the dual monarchy. Riotous scenes over questions which were older than the state itself and which had been hotly debated before in the course of Austrian history, were no indication that a dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was at hand. The provinces of Cisleithania, with all their complexity of races, were held firmly together by a common system of administration, an imperial court, and the devotion of their peoples to the house of Habsburg ; those of Transleithania were united under the control of a compact nationality and a powerful diet ; while the two states were joined, without likelihood of separation, by the forces of centuries, by the peculiar international position that each occupied, and by those more recent historical influences that had made the *Ausgleich*, not a theoretical experiment, but a political necessity.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

DURING that period of history from 1825 to 1850, when the people of central and western Europe were striving for greater political privileges and more liberal forms of government, Russia, mediæval in institutions as well as ideas, lay bound hand and foot by the autocratic and reactionary government of Nicolas I. During his reign of thirty years, the Czar had endeavoured to isolate Russia from the west, and to restore the old *régime* of orthodoxy and absolutism, which his predecessor had sought to liberalise. Under the rule of Nicolas I. Russia stood as a mediæval despotism, protecting her territory from the invasion of foreigners or foreign ideas, restricting the movements of her people by rigid emigration laws, and repressing at home all aspirations, all expressions of interest on the part of press or people in matters of state or administration. Nicolas, himself isolated from his people as Russia was isolated from the world outside, had no intelligent idea of how his empire was governed, knew little of the life and sufferings of his people, and leaving the business of state to a venal bureaucracy, confined his own attention to his soldiers, their dress, and their manœuvres. Russia, during these years, was a land in which political independence was treason, punishable by imprisonment or death ; in which sectarianism was heresy, and proselyting an act of political hostility to be suppressed by the civil authority ; in which autonomy, either political or religious, was a disintegrating element to be removed by force.

But such a system, carried out as it was with relentless energy, worked only evil for Russia. The Czar, in upholding the principles of the Holy Alliance, in destroying the independence of Cracow and Hungary, and threatening to despoil the Turk, aroused the passionate hostility of the peoples of the west, and brought upon him the Crimean war, which was undertaken by England less to defend the Ottoman Empire, than to humiliate the Czar. The war, in its turn, disclosed the demoralised condition of the Russian administration : the corruption of officials, who had misappropriated the supplies provided for the army and the fortresses ; the inefficiency of the military organisation, which rendered ineffectual all the heroism of the soldiers in the Crimea ; the inadequacy of the commissariat and transport systems, which left the peasantry at the mercy of the soldiers ; and, finally, the want of commanding administrators and strategists competent to direct the policy of the government and to lead the army in time of war.

When the war was over, and the truth dawned upon the nation that the policy of Nicolas had cost Russia her prestige and her dominant position in Europe, and had deprived her of all the advantages she had gained over Turkey since the days of Catharine II., public opinion arose against a system that had brought only woe to the country. Confronted with defeat, humiliation, and bankruptcy, disillusioned and disenchanted by the terrible judgments that had come upon them, the people awoke from their lethargy, and during the period from 1854 to 1861, raised their voices in press, salon, and court against the inert and selfish autocracy that had brought Russia to her low estate. " Arise, O Russia," said an anonymous pamphleteer, " and stand erect and calm before the throne of the despot, and demand of him a reckoning of the national misfortunes. Russia, O Czar, had confided to thee supreme power, and thou wert to her as a god on earth. And what hast thou done ? Blinded by passion and ignorance, thou hast sought nothing but power,

thou hast forgotten Russia. Thou hast consumed thy life in reviewing troops, in altering uniforms, in signing the legislative projects of ignorant charlatans. Thou hast created a despicable race of censors of the press, that thou mightst sleep in peace, and never know the wants, never hear the murmurs of thy people. Advance, O Czar, appear at the bar of God and history. By thy pride and obstinacy thou hast exhausted Russia and raised the world in arms against her."

To these demands of his people, Alexander II., who succeeded his father in 1855, declared himself ready to respond. Convinced that the system of isolation and repression that Nicolas had adopted was weakening Russia, and that reforms in the administration and the social structure of the state were indispensable, he formulated a new policy, and turned to the intelligent men of the nobility for support in the new undertaking. Unwilling to impair his absolute authority, and fully aware of the impracticability of the constitutional changes that Alexander I. had urged in the earlier years of his reign, he sought to remedy at first only the most flagrant abuses. He restricted the censorship, freed the universities, modified the rules touching residence abroad, and this done, prepared to pass on to more radical reforms, which were destined to complete what the Crimean war had begun, the revolutionising of the internal organisation of the empire.

But regarding the nature of the proposed reform, public opinion divided, and two parties sprang into existence: the Occidentals, who advocated the introduction of the liberal ideas and institutions of the west; and the Slavophiles, who, scorning all dependence on foreign teachings, turned their thoughts to Russia's past, and desired the revival of old Russia with its noble *boyar* and free village community, the *mir*. Side by side with these were the radicals, represented by Herzen, a refugee, who at his printing office in London published documents and pamphlets, and a journal, the *Bell* (*Kolokol*), denouncing exist-

ing institutions and the corrupt functionaries (*tchinovniks*), thousands of copies of which, despite the censorship, he was able to send into Russia. But all parties, notwithstanding their differences on other points, agreed that important reforms should be inaugurated, and that first among them should be that concerning the emancipation of the serfs. A wave of romanticism swept over the land. Golgol, in *Dead Souls*, and Turgénieff, in *Memoirs of a Huntsman*, began the war upon the evils of serfdom, and the condition of the serf soon became the subject of widespread discussion in reviews, journals, and salons. The intelligent classes of Russia began to see in the *moujik* the "natural man" of Rousseau, and clamoured loudly for his freedom from bondage.

The serfs, who thus had become the objects of the national interest, were chiefly Slavs inhabiting Great Russia, Little Russia, White Russia, and Lithuania, and of these about twenty-two millions dwelt on private lands, either bound to the soil and paying dues in labour at the will of their lords, or as artisans and merchants were detached from the soil and made payment in money; while the twenty-five million Crown serfs and the four million serfs of the appanages were more independent, living in villages which held the land in collective ownership and were collectively responsible for the revenue and for military service. To emancipate this enormous mass of the community was to strike at the very foundations of Russian society, to arouse the hostility of the nobles, who drew their wealth from the products of their estates and from the dues of their peasants, and who by their bitter opposition had rendered practically ineffectual the reform measures of both Alexander I. and Nicolas I. But the reaction against the thirty years of despotism and the indignation aroused by the disclosures of fraud and corruption in administration were to accomplish that which two Czars of All the Russias had been unable to effect: for in the last analysis of causes, it will be found that it

was the Crimean war that made possible the emancipation of the serfs of Russia.

After a discussion in committees, which lasted for a year, and the drafting of a scheme by a central committee of which Nicolas Milutine, under-secretary of the interior and indefatigable friend of the peasant, was the leader of the majority, a rescript was issued in March, 1858, announcing the principles according to which the law was to be carried out; and finally, by the solemn Emancipation Act of February 19 (March 3), 1861, serfage was abolished throughout the entire Russian Empire. All serfs became personally free, those without land remaining landless, while those who had been cultivators were permitted to purchase from the lords the soil upon which their houses stood and sufficient territory to furnish support. The amount of land that each serf might redeem varied in extent in the different parts of the country, but was equal, on an average, to eleven acres per male head. To facilitate this purchase, the state advanced four-fifths of the redemption money, upon which the peasant was to pay six per cent. interest for forty-nine years. The emancipated peasants were to hold the land, not individually, but collectively; the commune (*mir*) was to be the collective landholder, to receive the redemption money from the government, to be responsible for the interest, to govern itself, and to possess important administrative and police functions; while to a group of communes, the *volost*, were to be given extensive supervisory powers.

After inaugurating this reform, one of a magnitude unsurpassed in the history of modern times, and destined to have far-reaching economic, moral, and social consequences for Russia, Alexander turned his attention to other phases of his work, to removing the abuses of *tchinovnism*, remedying the vices of excessive centralisation, and introducing a more independent and righteous justice by taking the judiciary from under the control of the administration, and introducing trial

by jury. To this end, he first reorganised the ministry in November, 1862, and after some delay issued in 1864 and 1865 special ukases altering the judicial organisation and remodelling the system of local government. The ukase of 1864 created especially for the peasantry the *volost* court, a court of last resort, within whose jurisdiction fell cases involving less than a hundred rubles, the decisions in which were controlled by customary, not written, law; and, in addition, two sets of courts: that of the justice of the peace, with right of appeal to a higher court made up of at least three of the justices of the peace of the district sitting together in the chief city, and in many cases a final appeal to the supreme court; and the ordinary court of first instance, with appeal to a superior court, and a final appeal to the same supreme court that heard appeals from the court of the assembled justices. In the working out of this scheme, justice was to be freed from all interference on the part of the government and the *tchinovniks;* magistrates were to be entirely independent; all persons were to be equal before the law; justice was to be public and procedure oral; and by the introduction of trial by jury and of the popular election of judges, the people were to be admitted to a share in the administration of justice. In the January following, the ukase touching local government was issued: two local assemblies—*zemstvos*—were established, one for the district and one for the province, the former to consist of delegates elected by the individual land-owners, the towns, and the peasant communes, the latter of delegates chosen by the district *zemstvos* themselves. These assemblies were to control roads and bridges, hospitals, public instruction, and health, to nominate justices of the peace, to have a general oversight of the harvests and to impose local taxes,—a system whereby self-government was introduced, not only into the communes of the peasantry, but into the provinces as well. In the same and following years the universities were made more independent

schools for the study of science were erected side by side with the classical schools, financial reforms were introduced, and the army was reorganised after the Prussian model.

These liberal changes established a new *régime* for Russia, and encouraged the more intelligent classes to hope for a constitution. But the opposition of the functionaries to the entire movement was so intense as early to make evident the fact, that the task of carrying through effectually even the measures already adopted would be one exceedingly difficult to perform. Alexander himself was disturbed by the indiscretions of the more excitable liberals, by the frequent demonstrations of the students, and at times by the very grandeur of the work that he had undertaken. Moreover, the committees to which he entrusted the execution of the measures, often composed of men of conflicting opinions, and left without adequate direction, performed their work slowly and with hesitation. A reaction seemed likely to take place, when an event occurred which imperilled the entire liberal cause: this was the insurrection in Poland, which was destined to exercise a momentous influence on the history, not only of Napoleon III. and Bismarck, but of Russia as well.

Beginning in 1860 as an agitation for reform and partial autonomy, the Polish movement had become by 1863 a revolution. Already had Alexander conceded to the Poles a council of state, a department of public instruction and worship, and elective councils in districts and municipalities; but the good effects of this liberality were destroyed in April, 1861, when the Czar dissolved the Agricultural Society in Warsaw, which had been organised in 1855, and had stood for six years as the representative of a new Poland. In consequence of this act, the anti-Russian party gained in strength; while the Czar, hesitating as always, tried for the ensuing two years alternating policies of repression and conciliation. Finally, in January, 1863, the party of independence and union of Poland, Lithuania,

and Podalia gained the upper hand, and began at first a secret, and, afterwards, an open, warfare with the Russian government. The bravery of the Poles and the brutal methods employed by the Russian general Muravieff roused the sympathies of the people of the west for the Poles, and though Bismarck supported Russia, in this crisis France, England, and Austria entered protests against the treatment of the insurgents. Disregarding the intervention of these Powers, Russia began in the summer and autumn of 1863 a systematic repression and Russification of Lithuania and Poland. Crushing opposition by pitiless war and war-tribunals, the Russian government took from Lithuania and Poland all remnants of autonomy, destroyed the independence of the Polish nobility, closed their schools and libraries, forbade the use of the Polish language, and having divided Poland into ten departments and eighty-five districts, incorporated the territory as a part of the administrative system of the Empire. In order the more effectually to shatter the power and influence of the Polish aristocracy, Alexander accepted Milutine's agrarian scheme for Poland, according to which the peasantry were to obtain a property right in the lands they had cultivated on much better terms than had been granted to their fellow-peasants in Russia in 1861; while the nobles not only lost their revenues and all their local seignorial authority, but received very inadequate compensation for the territory taken from them.

Thus the unfortunate insurrection cost the Poles their autonomy and national independence, and transformed their land into a military division of the Russian Empire. And it did more: it destroyed the good feeling between Russia and France; inaugurated that diplomatic revolution of 1863 which made possible Bismarck's attack upon Denmark the next year; and, lastly, by destroying the confidence of the Czar in the party of moderate reform, it gave to reactionists and *tchinovniks* the opportunity for which they had long been waiting, and

brought to an untimely end the liberal *régime* in Russia. To the Muscovites in 1865 who asked for a constitutional assembly, Alexander II. replied that the right of initiative in the work of reform belonged to himself alone, and was indissolubly bound up with the autocratic power entrusted to him by God; and in 1867 he dissolved the *zemstvo* of St. Petersburg for daring to ask for political liberties that were not embraced in the edict of 1864. As was to be expected, the reform measures fell into discredit, and were evaded wherever it was possible to do so; the self-government of the *zemstvos* was curtailed and its field of activity was invaded by the bureaucracy; justice continued to be administered secretly; the line which had been so carefully drawn between the judicial and administrative functions was not preserved; and trial by jury was used only when the strictest letter of the law demanded it. In 1865, Tolstoi, minister of public instruction, began his famous attack upon modern science, restored the classical schools to full power, suppressed the "real" schools on the ground that they were nurseries of anarchy and materialism, and forbade students of the universities to meet in clubs or assemblies. Not yet satisfied, the government began to denationalise the Baltic provinces by making Russian the official language, introducing Russian administration and official methods, and favouring the peasant population at the expense of the Germans and the Poles; and at the same time drove Roman Catholicism out of Poland, and aided the organisation of private societies by the Slavophiles, in the hope of drawing the peasantry of the west from the Latin to the Greek church. To this process of Russification Finland alone was not subjected; protected by the Czar himself, the Finns retained their old constitution, their orders, language, press, and national literature.

And meanwhile, during this period of reaction, from 1864 to 1879, Russia made many noteworthy territorial gains. No longer taking part in the affairs of the west, she waited, "col-

lecting her forces," as Gortchakoff said, and making conquests in the south-east and east. By the overthrow of Shamyl in 1864, and the final subjection of the tribes in 1875, the government brought to an end a revolt that had begun in the Caucasus in 1859; and by the two battles of Irdjar in 1866 and Zara-Buleh in 1868 terminated the war with the Turcomans, which had been conducted intermittently for many years. In consequence of the latter successes, the Khanate of Samarkand was annexed, that of Kokand, which at first was left as a vassal state, was finally added in 1873, and Russian Turkestan was organised as a province. In the meantime, from Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, an advance was made toward the south-east, by way of the desert lands of Khiva, which culminated in the battle of Geok-Tepe in 1881: the Turcomans were defeated, and the Russian frontier extended to the oasis of Merv, which was gained by voluntary submission in 1884. In the far east, by the treaty of Pekin in 1868, Russia acquired the left bank of the Amour, and founded the great arsenal of Vladivostock, and in central Asia, in 1871, made small additions of territory at the expense of China at Kouldga and in the valley of Ili. In 1875, in exchange for some of the Kouriles, she obtained from Japan the island of Sakhalin, while in the west she recovered her control of the Black Sea in 1871, and received back the land of Bessarabia in 1878. Thus, before the close of the reign of Alexander II., the Black, Caspian, and Aral seas were under Russia's dominion, and she had gained a very useful terminus on the Pacific Ocean for her trans-Siberian railway.

While Russia was making these acquisitions in the east and west, the opposition to the absolute and reactionary government of the Czar was assuming a new character at home. From 1860 to 1870 hostility to the government had taken the form of a kind of non-political nihilism, due to discouragement and despair, excellently pictured in Turgénieff's *Fathers*

and Sons, and Pissemski's *In the Whirlpool;* but during the era from 1870 to 1878, an aggressive socialistic movement took place. Socialistic agitators endeavoured to make proselytes of the masses by spreading among them the doctrines of the social democracy, and roused by the writings of Karl Marx, the influence of the International, and the example of the Paris Commune, the socialists strove to bring about a political change in the government of Russia by exciting in the people a desire for revolution. But toward the end of the year 1878 this movement, checked by the arrests of its leaders and their transportation to Siberia, lost ground before another of a different character: plots, terror, and assassination took the place of appeals to the peasants and workingmen, and bombs and dynamite supplanted pamphlets, hand bills, and clandestine newspapers. The new Nihilists, differing entirely in character and purpose from those of the earlier period, and numbering, it is thought, not a hundred in all, were organised in a wonderfully efficient manner with secret press, laboratories, and weapons for assault. Beginning in 1878 with the murder of General Mezenzeff, chief of the famous "third section," they continued unremittingly their work of terrorising the government. In 1879 they assassinated Krapotkine, governor of Kharkoff; only a month later made an assault upon Drenteln, the new chief of the "third section"; and in the same year made their first attempt to take the life of the Czar. The government redoubled its energies: terrorists were seized, imprisoned, executed, or sent to Siberia, and the country was divided into five or six great military districts, the governor-generals of which were invested with dictatorial powers. At the same time the Czar, suspicious of his own councillors and fearful of new conspiracies, appealed to the country for its co-operation, but he found little encouragement in the replies of the *zemstvos*, some of which even dared to demand an extension of their political privileges.

But these measures quieted the Nihilists for the moment only, and the peace was not for long. In December, 1879, Hartmann and his fellows blew up the train in which the Czar was travelling from St. Petersburg to Moscow; and in February, 1880, an unknown Nihilist gained access to the Winter Palace and exploded a mine under the dining hall. The Czar, broken in spirit, invested Loris-Melikoff as "chief of the executive commission" with absolute authority to guard the peace of the Empire; and the latter, with Alexander's consent, softened the rigours of the autocratic government, in order to try the effects of a policy of conciliation. He revised the press law, released prisoners, dismissed the obnoxious Tolstoi, suppressed the "third section," made important changes in the personale of the government, and what was of greater importance, secured from the Czar a promise to call a consultative assembly that should be composed of delegates from the provincial *zemstvos* and municipal *dumas*. But the order that was to establish a representative *régime* for Russia was never issued; for on March 13, 1881, even while the decree was in type awaiting publication, the Czar, when returning to his palace from a military review, was brutally murdered.

With this act vanished the promised liberal *régime*. Alexander III., who by the death of his elder brother in 1865 had become heir to the throne, was at first inclined to respect his father's wishes; but unnerved by the frightful crime of the revolutionists, and persuaded by the arguments of his old tutor, Pobedonostzeff, Procurator-General of the Most Holy Synod, he set aside the imperial decree, and in his manifesto of May 21, 1881, announced his determination to maintain his autocratic power and to preserve it from all injury. Having dismissed Loris-Melikoff, and accepted as his chief advisers Pobedonostzeff, Katkoff, an enemy of western ideas and the ablest absolutist in Russia, and Ignatieff, an intolerant pan-Slavist and advocate of an aggressive military policy, he re-

turned to a *régime* of centralisation and orthodoxy. Instead of the representative assembly that his father had consented to summon, he called in September a commission of thirty "experts," whose members, it is true, were men of high character and ability, but to whose consideration were submitted two questions only—drunkenness and emigration of the peasantry; and during the following year appointed similar commissions to consider merely such specific subjects as the reform of the administration and the regulation of local government. In their turn, these commissions, too often sacrificing the interests of the burghers and the people at large to those of the bureaucracy and the great landowners, accomplished a work far from liberal in character; and Alexander III. himself, while not abrogating the reforms of his father, placed such restrictions upon their operation as to render them, to a considerable degree, ineffectual. In 1889 he abolished the elected justices of the peace, except those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa, and appointed rural canton chiefs to take their places; he curtailed the powers of the jury, taking out of its hands many important cases and transferring them to other courts; in 1892 he diminished the number of electors of the *dumas*, or municipal assemblies, and limited in extent the municipal franchises; and with such untiring zeal had both he and his ministers pursued the nihilistic organisation, that before the close of the year 1884 the great majority of its members were either dead, or in exile in Siberia or other countries. Yet notwithstanding the success of his autocratic measures, and the vigilance of the police which had driven the conspirators to concoct their plots in Zürich and Paris, the Czar continued to live in armed isolation, his every movement guarded by soldiery, and his imperial residences surrounded by sentries.

But whatever may have been the political character of his *régime*, there can be no doubt that the Czar earnestly desired

to improve the condition of the emancipated peasantry, to reform the bureaucracy, and to check the corrupt practices of the officials, which was an evil almost organic in the life of the Russian state. He curtailed somewhat the powers of the police, and modified the rigour of secret arrest, though in all that related to this branch of the administration the changes were merely nominal. But in lightening the burdens and relieving the sufferings of his faithful peasantry, he showed himself a father to his people. Not only did his government distribute seed grain after bad harvests, furnish food in time of famine, and rebuild villages destroyed by flood and fire ; but by remitting arrears, advancing money, reducing the redemption dues, making redemption obligatory upon landlords who sought to avoid it, and helping the peasants to obtain larger allotments, by establishing a special real-estate bank, it furthered the reforms of Alexander II., and aided the peasants in redeeming their lands. The Czar revised the system of direct taxation in 1886 by abolishing the poll tax, substituting therefor taxes on land, incomes, and inheritances.

Yet kindly as was Alexander's treatment of his peasantry, his attitude toward the press, education, religion, and the nationalities was uncompromisingly hostile and autocratic. Under the guidance of Pobedonostzeff, he laboured for thirteen years to eradicate all disintegrating forces, both intellectual and political, and to create a Russia that should be Russian in language and faith. To that end, in 1883 and 1884 all liberal journals were suppressed, or placed under the most rigid censure ; the laws regarding printing and the printing-press were despotically enforced ; and all transactions in printing materials without permit were strictly forbidden. Against foreign literature, Alexander established a rigid blockade : certain books and newspapers were absolutely excluded from Russia, and others were admitted only after part of their contents had been blotted out with printer's ink or removed altogether. That

education might not become a danger to the state, attempts were made to restore the study of the classics and to check the growing interest in physical and natural sciences ; and in 1887 Delianoff, minister of public instruction, issued a series of ordinances, limiting the numbers of scholars in gymnasia and universities, and excluding from the advantages of higher education, sons of poor parents and domestics. He dismissed from the universities professors suspected of holding liberal views, suppressed certain courses in medicine that had been delivered to women, and closed the Woman's Higher Educational Institution at St. Petersburg.

But still more harsh were the methods employed by Pobedonostzeff and the Czar in their attempts to Russify the Baltic provinces and to drive out the Jews. Similar methods had been applied to Poland in 1864, and to the Baltic provinces during the years that followed ; but it was not until 1885 that a systematic process of Russification in Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia was begun. Then it was that a decree was issued making obligatory the use of Russian in the elementary schools, a measure that was extended to include the preparatory schools in 1886 and the private schools in 1890 and 1891. At the same time orders were sent forth commanding that governors and other officials conduct their business entirely in Russian ; that both parish and district courts do the same, and employ seals bearing Russian inscriptions ; that in the university of Dorpat lectures and examinations be in Russian, and that no dissertation be accepted that was not written in the same language ; that Russian be introduced as the language of the village governments and the theatres ; and that even the names of many of the towns be changed. While issuing these decrees, the government continued its attacks upon German and Polish landed proprietors, forbidding the Germans to acquire land in the Baltic provinces outside the ports and cities, and reviving against the Poles the old laws of 1864, which prohibited them

from purchasing land in Poland. It persecuted Roman Catholics in Poland and Lutherans in the Baltic provinces and Finland, and until 1893 carried on a relentless war against the Stundists of southern Russia, a sect which rejected the sacraments, the clergy, and the ritual of the Orthodox church. Alexander III. and Pobedonostzeff used all available means to make the Russian language, the Slavic blood, and the Orthodox faith supreme in every part of the great Russian Empire.

In conducting its campaign against the Jews, the government, guided by Pobedonostzeff and the successive ministers of the interior, Ignatieff, Dournovo, and Goremkine, seems to have been prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, and the desire to rescue the rural population from the grasp of the shrewd and persevering Hebrew. As early as 1881 General Ignatieff had issued a circular letter to the provincial governors, in which he had stated that since the emancipation of the serfs the Jews had monopolised trade and commerce, and had acquired a considerable percentage of the lands of the *moujiks*. Such seem to have been, in reality, the facts, and so bitter had the popular feeling become during that and the following year, that in many localities—notably at Balta in Podalia—the peasants had risen against the Jews, destroying their property and forcing thousands of them to emigrate. In 1882 the government issued the "May Laws," as they were called, rigid decrees limiting the area of residence for Jews and forbidding them to acquire landed property; and in 1887 began to exclude them from the higher-grade schools and universities, finally deciding, in 1891, that the proportion of Jewish students in the universities should be reduced to three per cent. From 1890 to 1893, owing to complaints from the provinces, and to the share taken by Jews in the nihilistic agitation, Pobedonostzeff strictly enforced these May Laws, banished the Jews from central Russia, compelled them to crowd within the Pale—the fifteen provinces of the western border—, and excluded

them from scores of useful employments. The conditions of the Jews became pitiable: herded within narrow limits, cut off from the great bulk of the Russian people, decimated by famine, and exposed to the hostile attacks of peasants and subordinate officials, they found that nothing remained to them save death, conversion, or emigration. Out of the six million Jews in Russia, it is estimated that more than three hundred thousand fled from the country during these years.

In 1894 Alexander III. died, and was succeeded by his son Nicolas II., a young man of twenty-six, who was known not to share his father's views regarding the isolation of Russia, and from whom a more liberal policy was expected. In his circular of November 9th, the young Czar announced his determination to maintain peace abroad and to work for internal progress at home; but he refused to consider any change in the existing form of government. In his speech of January 29, 1895, to a deputation from the nobility, the cities, and the *zemstvos*, he said that he intended to protect the principle of autocracy as firmly as had his father, and that he considered any plan for the admission of the *zemstvos* to a share in the government of the Empire but an idle dream. In other particulars, however, he was far more considerate and prudent than his father had been. He promised to protect the Finns in their rights, privileges, and religion, and in so doing drew from the Finnish diet in January, 1897, an address of greater friendship and loyalty that had been voted by that body for many years. Toward the Poles the change of policy was even more marked: in 1895, to the joy of the people of Poland, General Gourko was removed from his place as governor-general of that province; and two years later certain liberal concessions were made that radically altered the position of the Poles. The Czar consented that they should purchase property in Lithuania and the Ukraine, that a statue should be erected to the Polish poet Mickiewicz in Warsaw; that many

persons long imprisoned for political offences should be pardoned; that a Pole should be appointed to take the place of the Russian president of the theatre in Warsaw; that the press law should be lightened; and that the government officials should respect the wishes of the villagers in Polish districts. It is not surprising, therefore, that on his visit to Warsaw in August, 1897, Nicolas should have received a welcome, the like of which had not been known in Poland since 1861.

Toward the Powers abroad the Czar adopted his father's policy of friendship and peace. Acting with Muravieff, the successor of de Giers and Lobanof-Rostowski, as his minister of foreign affairs, he came to an understanding with Austria, Germany, and France, and during the crisis of the Armenian massacres and the Turco-Greek war, made known his purpose by expressing openly his good will toward the Powers, and his determination to work for the preservation of the general peace. During the years 1896 and 1897, visits were exchanged between Nicolas II. and Francis Joseph, and largely through the influence of Goluchowski, a Slav, common minister of foreign affairs for Austria-Hungary, a friendship was established between Austria and Russia that had, it was thought, an important political bearing upon the future of the Eastern Question. In August, 1897, the Czar welcomed William II. of Germany to St. Petersburg; while the visit of President Faure of France in the same month, and the references of Nicolas to the powerful bond of friendship and the deep sympathy that united France and Russia, roused in the world outside the suspicion that an alliance had actually been formed between these two countries. And in the east, as well as the west, the Czar made his influence felt: turning for the moment from the line of advance toward Herat and Pamir, which his father had followed in 1885 and 1892, Nicolas sought to extend Russia's territory and influence in eastern Siberia. By a treaty with Corea, October 8, 1897, Russia obtained a sort of protectorate over

that country, and in December occupied Port Arthur, by agreement with China, thereby gaining a new terminus for a branch line of her great Siberian railroad, and a hold upon the fertile land of Manchuria.

Thus the new Czar, though firmly believing in the necessity of an autocratic policy for Russia and unwilling to commit himself to any form of representative government, had in reality inaugurated a fairly liberal *régime*, and one essentially broader than that of his father. He had neutralised considerably the influence of Pobedonostzeff, and had checked the process of Russifying the western provinces; he had conciliated the Finns, and had lightened the burdens of the Poles; he had discontinued the persecution of the Jews and the dissenters; and had sought to reform the bureaucracy, to improve the condition of the nobility, and to aid the peasants. He had entered into amicable relations with the other continental Powers, that the preservation of peace might make possible the greater unity of the Slavic race, the intellectual enlightenment of the Russian people, and the expansion of Russian trade and commerce. Yet in all these acts, he had taken no step inconsistent with the establishment of a Russia, homogeneous and self-sufficient, which, though still in the youth of her intellectual and commercial development, was destined to become, as all loyal Slavs believed, a dominant factor in the world of the east.

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